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Introduction						 “…	the	scope	of	the	liberal	tradition	expanded	during	the	middle	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	such	that	it	came	to	be	seen	by	many	as	the	constitutive	ideology	of	the	West.	This	capacious	(and	deeply	confusing)	understanding	of	liberalism	was	a	product	of	the	ideological	wars	fought	against	“totalitarianism”	and	assorted	developments	in	the	social	sciences.	Today	we	both	inherit	and	inhabit	it.”				 Duncan	Bell,	“What	is	liberalism?”	(2014)	
	
	
	
	
			What	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 politics	 and	 the	 economy?	 Between	democracy	and	the	market?	What	is	the	economy	and	how	are	we	to	relate	to	it	as	a	body	politic?	These	are	questions	that	should	be	of	great	interest	to	us	in	a	time	of	social	unrest,	in	which	loosely	defined	entities	like	“the	market”	or	“the	economy”	appear	in	political	discourse	with	great	frequency,	but	lesser	clarity.	These	questions	were	 the	main	 interest	 also	of	 a	 group	of	 37	European	 and	American	 intellectuals	 who	 gathered	 in	 the	 Swiss	mountain	 village	 of	 Mont	Pèlerin	from	April	1st	to	April	10th	in	the	year	1947.	The	group	was	hand-picked	by	 Friedrich	 von	 Hayek,	 1	 an	 Austrian	 émigré	 economist	 who	 had	 recently	
                                            1	In	the	following	I	will	mainly	use	the	aristocratic	“von”	only	the	first	time	I	refer	to	Austrian,	German	or	French	thinkers	with	that	or	other	aristocratic	prepositions	in	
  11 
experienced	great	success	with	his	1944	book	The	Road	to	Serfdom.	They	met	to	discuss	liberalism	and	how	to	change	it.	This	thesis	tells	the	story	of	that	ten-day	meeting	in	1947,	and	engages	with	the	questions	and	ideas	that	animated	Hayek	and	his	fellow	travellers.	
	
Neoliberalism	Several	 scholars	 and	 commentators	 attempting	 to	 understand	 recent	developments,	such	as	the	2007/2008	financial	crisis	and	the	rise	of	so-called	New	Public	Management,	have	written	about	these	issues	under	the	rubric	of	
neoliberalism.	 In	 recent	 years	 the	 academic	 discourse	 surrounding	neoliberalism	has	come	under	severe	criticism,	due	to	the	many	incompatible	definitions	and	usages	of	the	word.2	Neoliberalism	is	 indeed	the	concept	that	permeates	also	this	work,	which	unlike	most	treatises	on	the	subject	primarily	falls	under	the	category	of	intellectual	history.		The	reason	for	this	choice	is	two-fold.	The	first	reason	is	simple:	At	the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	in	Paris,	1938,	the	group	of	thinkers	who	are	the	subject	of	this	thesis	themselves	decided	to	name	their	intellectual	and	political	project	
neoliberalism.3	The	word	was	suggested	by	the	German	economist	Alexander	von	Rüstow	(1885	–	1963),	and	François	Denord	has	written	retrospectively	that	“To	be	‘neoliberal’	was	supposed	to	imply	the	recognition	that	‘laissez-faire’	economics	 was	 not	 enough	 and	 that,	 in	 the	 name	 of	 liberalism,	 a	 modern	
                                            their	surnames.	Hayek	himself	used	his	name	both	with	and	without	the	“von”	interchangeably	after	leaving	Austria.	2	Rajesh	Venugopal,	‘Neoliberalism	as	Concept’,	Economy	and	Society	44,	no.	2	(2015):	165–87;	Terry	Flew,	‘Six	Theories	of	Neoliberalism’,	Thesis	Eleven	122,	no.	1	(2014):	49–71;	Loïc	Wacquant,	‘‘Three	Steps	to	a	Historical	Anthropology	of	Actually	Existing	Neoliberalism’,	Social	Anthropology	20,	no.	3	(2011):	66–79;	Simon	Springer,	‘Neoliberalism	as	Discourse:	Between	Foucauldian	Political	Economy	and	Marxian	Poststructuralism’,	Critical	Discourse	Studies	9,	no.	2	(May	2012):	133–47.	3	Daniel	Stedman	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe:	Hayek,	Friedman,	and	the	Birth	of	
Neoliberal	Politics	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2012),	31.	
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economic	policy	was	needed.”4	I	will	argue	in	this	thesis	that	neoliberalism	was	indeed	an	attack	on	the	ideals	of	laissez-faire,	but	that	it	was	also	an	attack	on	various	 forms	of	 social	 liberalism.	The	1938	meeting	 included	 several	of	 the	same	 people	 as	 the	 one	 in	 1947,	 including	 Hayek,	 who	my	 research	 shows	played	an	important	role	intellectually	and	organizationally	also	for	the	1938	meeting.	In	many	ways,	the	Lippmann	Colloquium	was	a	failed,	pre-war	attempt	at	doing	what	the	1947	meeting	did:	establish	an	international	organization	for	the	development	and	spread	of	neoliberal	 ideas.	Part	I	of	 this	thesis	uses	the	interwar	years’	socialist	calculation	debates,	the	1938	meeting	in	Paris,	the	rise	of	 fascism	and	the	Second	World	War	 to	map	out	both	 the	contacts	between	various	thinkers	who	would	meet	at	Mont	Pèlerin5		in	1947,	and	the	ideas	they	developed	in	dialogue	with	each	other	and	their	opponents.			My	second	reason	for	using	the	word	neoliberalism	is	that	I	consider	it	to	be	an	apt	term	to	describe	the	efforts	of	these	thinkers.	Several	of	them	would	self-identify	as	neoliberals	up	until	the	1950s,6	but	the	term	gradually	faded,	ceding	ground	 to	 terms	 like	 “libertarianism”	 and	 “classical	 liberalism”.	 This	development	might	be	an	argument	to	refrain	from	using	the	original	label,	but	I	will	argue	that	the	name	neoliberalism	is	highly	appropriate	to	describe	the	intellectual	and	political	project	which	was	 instigated	 first	 in	1938,	and	 then	fully	 in	 1947.	 When	 neoliberalism	 was	 chosen	 over	 other	 options	 such	 as	
                                            4	Philip	Mirowski	and	Dieter	Plehwe,	eds.,	The	Road	From	Mont	Pèlerin:	The	Making	of	
the	Neoliberal	Thought	Collective	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009),	48.	5	The	place	in	Switzerland	is	spelt	with	an	accent	over	the	first	”e”,	but	the	organization	uses	an	Americanized	version	when	referring	to	itself.	Consequently	I	will	be	writing	of	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	which	had	its	first	meeting	at	Mont	Pèlerin.	6	One	late	instance	is	Milton	Friedman,	‘Neo-Liberalism	and	Its	Prospects’,	Farmand,	no.	17	(1951):	89–93.	As	late	as	1955,	C.J.	Friedrich,	a	scholar	located	outside	of	the	group,	described	them	as	neo-liberals	in	a	review	article:	Carl	J.	Friedrich,	‘The	Political	Thought	of	Neo-Liberalism’,	American	Political	Science	Review	49,	no.	2	(1955):	509–25.	
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“individualism”	 and	 “positive	 liberalism”,7	 the	 participants	 of	 the	 Lippmann	Colloquium	also	spoke	of	this	new	creed	as	a	retour	to	liberalism.8	As	we	will	see,	many	of	the	actors	involved	in	the	neoliberal	project	were	conflicted	about	the	degree	of	newness	involved	in	their	creed.	While	they	did	come	to	advocate	a	 return	 to	 a	 past,	 liberal	wisdom,	my	 research	 shows	 that	 in	 their	 internal	discussions,	 they	 were	 very	 clear	 about	 the	 need	 to	 reform	 and	 change	liberalism	and	update	it	to	a	new	historical	context.	These	tensions	are	apparent	in	their	published	work	as	well,	although	less	obvious	than	in	the	minutes	of	the	1947	meeting.	 There	 the	 early	 neoliberals	 were	 actively	 debating	 the	many	problems	of	liberalism	and	how	to	turn	it	into	a	creed	capable	of	fighting	the	political	battles	of	a	modern	world.			As	an	 intellectual	historian,	my	aim	with	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	study	 the	historical	roots	of	an	ideology	and	a	political	project	which	was	once	called	neoliberalism.	I	will	 argue	 that	 although	 the	protagonists	 themselves	eventually	disavowed	this	label,	it	is	in	fact	a	precise	and	historically	accurate	word	to	describe	their	project,	since	their	brand	of	liberalism	amounted	to	something	new.	The	how’s	and	why’s	of	this	is	in	many	ways	the	topic	of	this	thesis,	and	much	attention	will	be	paid	to	situating	neoliberalism	in	relation	to	other	forms	of	liberalism,	both	synchronically	and	diachronically.	Neoliberalism	was	both	an	intellectual	and	a	political	project,	and	it	arose	in	a	very	specific	historical	context	 in	the	1920s,	30s	and	40s,	in	debate	and	dialogue	with	socialism,	fascism	and	the	rise	of	mass	politics.	The	question	of	the	impact	of	both	the	neoliberal	ideas	and	of	the	organization	formed	to	promote	them	in	1947	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	but	I	do	hope	that	my	work	on	the	content	and	historical	context	of	early	
                                            7	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	35.	8	Serge	Audier,	Le	Colloque	Lippmann:	Aux	Origines	Du	Néo-Libéralisme	(Paris:	Le	Bord	de	l’Eau,	2008),	350.	
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neoliberalism	will	be	useful	for	those	in	other	fields,	who	see	neoliberalism	as	a	salient	feature	of	social,	political	and	economic	life	today.			It	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 to	 argue	 against	neoliberalism,	neither	as	an	imagined	whole,	nor	against	any	of	the	theories	and	positions	 espoused	 by	 the	 thinkers	 in	 question.	 A	 great	 number	 of	 journal	articles	and	books	which	are	devoted	to	understanding	the	political	thought	of	neoliberalism	 also	 make	 their	 own	 arguments	 in	 relation	 to	 neoliberal	positions.	 This	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 form	of	 rational	 reconstruction,	 in	 the	terminology	coined	by	Richard	Rorty,	where	the	aim	is	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	with	past	thinkers	and	quite	possibly	also	make	arguments	about	the	current	validity	 of	 their	 claims.9	 These	 arguments	 can	 be	 based	 on	 perceived	contradictions	and	weaknesses	in	neoliberal	arguments;	the	ethical,	political	or	philosophical	positions	of	the	scholars	in	questions;	or	some	combination	of	the	two.	 The	 economist	 João	 Rodrigues,	 for	 instance,	 has	 written	 that	 Friedrich	Hayek’s	many	comments	on	the	importance	of	individuals’	motivation	and	the	moral	makeup	of	a	market	society	“contributes	to	undermine	his	claims	that	a	market	society	can	be	neutral	among	different	values.“10.	Writing	of	the	same	thinker,	 political	 theorist	 Andrew	 Gamble	 has	 claimed	 that	 Hayek’s	 overall	argument	is	“at	its	weakest“	when	he	uses	evolutionary	arguments	for	a	market-based	society	while	at	the	same	time	discarding	the	traditions	of	socialism	and	“constructive	rationalism”	as		mere	“intellectual	error”.11	Additionally,	there	are	of	 course	 a	 great	 number	 of	 scholars	 who	 write	 celebratory	 accounts	 of	neoliberal	 thought	and	neoliberal	 thinkers,	emphasizing	 the	 inventiveness	of	their	arguments;	the	success	of	policies	inspired	by	their	thinking;	their	moral	
                                            9	Richard	Rorty,	J.B.	Scheewind,	and	Quentin	Skinner,	Philosophy	in	History:	Essays	in	
the	Historiography	of	Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1984).	10	João	Rodrigues,	‘Between	Rules	and	Incentives:	Uncovering	Hayek’s	Moral	Economy’,	American	Journal	of	Economics	and	Sociology	72,	no.	3	(July	2013):	565.	11	Andrew	Gamble,	Hayek:	The	Iron	Cage	of	Liberty,	Key	Contemporary	Thinkers	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	1996),	182.	
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courage	in	staunchly	defending	the	principles	of	individual	liberty;	and	so	on.12	The	more	intellectually	advanced	branch	of	this	literature	also	moves	beyond	hagiography	in	criticizing	some	aspects	of	the	theories	in	question,	suggesting	revisions	and	improvements.13		Rational	reconstruction	and	the	normative	approach	to	political	thought	which	it	tends	to	entail	 is	of	course	a	wholly	legitimate	endeavour,	and	much	of	the	secondary	literature	to	which	this	thesis	refers	falls	into	this	category.	Even	for	those	 involved	 in	 what	 Rorty	 called	 historical	 reconstruction	 or	 intellectual	history,	the	temptation	to	pass	judgement	over	thinkers	and	theories	that	are	so	close	to	us	in	time	and	are	believed	by	many	to	have	greatly	influenced	our	present	conjuncture,	can	be	tempting	and	hard	to	avoid.	Daniel	Stedman	Jones	writes	 already	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 his	 history	 of	 neoliberalism,	 entitled	
Masters	 of	 the	 Universe,	 that	 “the	 initial	 appeal	 of	 neoliberal	 proposals	 led	ultimately	 to	 a	 widespread	 acceptance	 by	 the	 1980s	 of	 an	 overarching	philosophy	of	free	markets.”	He	goes	on	to	argue	that	“This	was	unnecessary.”14	These	are	not	the	types	of	claims	this	thesis	seeks	to	make.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	writing	of	the	history	of	political	thought	is	always	a	form	of	political	thought	 in	 itself,	 something	which	 could	be	 exemplified	by	one	of	 the	 fields’	leading	proponents,	Quentin	Skinner.	Skinner’s	work	in	the	history	of	political	thought	 has	 sometimes	 entered	 into	 debates	 in	 contemporary	 political	philosophy.15	The	political	project	of	neoliberalism	is	itself	also	a	case	in	point,	
                                            12	See	for	instance:	R.	M.	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	1995);	Alan	O.	Ebenstein,	Friedrich	Hayek:	A	Biography	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2003);	John	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	
Global	Economist	(Wilmington,	Delaware:	ISI	Books,	2001).	13	See	for	instance:	Bruce	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge:	Intellectual	Biography	of	F.A.	
Hayek	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2004);	Andreas	Hardhaug	Olsen,	
Keynes+Hayek	(Oslo:	Civita,	2015).	14	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	5.	15	James	Tully,	Quentin	Skinner	and	His	Critics	(Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1988);	Max	Edling	and	Ulf	Mörkenstam,	‘Quentin	Skinner:	From	
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because	as	I	will	argue,	it	rested	on	a	specific	narrative	of	history	itself	and	the	history	 of	 liberal	 thought	 in	 particular.	 These	 nuances	 and	 concerns	notwithstanding,	 it	 is	 worth	 stating	 clearly	 at	 the	 very	 outset	 of	 this	investigation	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	not	 engaged	 in	making	normative	 arguments	about	 what	 was	 wrong	 and	 what	 was	 right	 with	 early	 neoliberal	 thought.	Rather,	the	aim	is	to	further	advance	our	understanding	of	this	body	of	thought	through	historical	reconstruction	and	thorough	contextualization,	investigating	the	people,	places	and	historical	context	out	of	which	neoliberalism	grew.	
	
Methodology	Loosely	 inspired	 by	 the	 field	 of	 microhistory,	 I	 aim	 to	 make	 my	 subject	manageable	by	centring	investigations	on	one	ten-day	meeting	in	Switzerland	in	 April	 1947.	 Through	 a	 detailed	 focus	 on	 small	 events	 and	 developments,	microhistory	 attempts	 to	 not	 only	 be	 exact	 and	 precise	 about	 these	 micro-events,	but	also	to	say	something	about	their	relation	to	larger	developments,	which	can	only	be	represented	through	generalizations	that	risk	violating	the	ideals	of	precision	and	truthfulness	all	historians	aim	to	achieve.16	Francesca	Trivellato	has	introduced	a	separation	between	the	original	Italian	tradition	of	microhistory,	and	later	adaptations	of	microhistory	in	the	Anglophone	world.	Despite	not	being	a	unified	school	of	thought	and	never	presenting	a	uniform	or	coherent	theory	about	the	relationship	between	the	micro	and	macro	scales	of	analysis,	Trivellato	argues	that	Italian	microhistory	has	been	characterized	by	methodological	 reflexivity	 and	 attention	 to	 theory,	whereas	 the	 Anglophone	version	has	been	more	interested	in	narration.17	The	focus	on	micro-events	in	the	 Italian	 tradition	 has	 been	 used	 to	 question	 grand	 syntheses,	 and	 this	 is	
                                            Historian	of	Ideas	to	Political	Scientist’,	Scandinavian	Political	Studies	18,	no.	2	(1995):	119–31.	16	Giovanni	Levi,	‘On	Microhistory’,	in	New	Perspectives	on	Historical	Writing	(Peter	
Burke	Ed.)	(Oxford:	Polity	Press,	1991),	93–113.	17	Francesca	Trivellato,	‘Is	There	a	Future	for	Italian	Microhistory	in	the	Age	of	Global	History?’,	California	Italian	Studies	2,	no.	1	(2011).	
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partly	 the	motivation	behind	my	decision	to	devote	Part	 II	of	 this	 thesis	 to	a	careful	study	of	selected	sessions	from	one	ten-day	meeting	in	1947.	There	are	several	 competing	 grand	 syntheses	 about	 neoliberalism	 and	what	 it	 entails,	from	Marxist	writers	like	Gérard	Duménil	and	Dominique	Lévy,	who	claim	that	neoliberalism	 is	 an	 episode	 of	 the	 ongoing	 class	 struggle;18	 to	 neoliberal	apologists	like	Eamon	Butler,	who	refrain	from	using	the	label	but	nonetheless	praise	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 thinkers	 in	 question	 as	 emancipatory	 against	 the	threat	of	totalitarian	tyranny;19	and	Foucauldian	theorists	like	Wendy	Brown,	who	 see	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 new	 form	 of	 political	 rationality,	 governing	 the	formation	 of	 subjectivities	 in	 contemporary	 society.20	 Careful	 study	 of	 the	micro-event	that	was	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	1947,	will	lead	 to	 revision	 of	 many	 of	 these	 syntheses,	 but	 the	 Anglophone	 notion	 of	microhistory	as	a	tool	for	narration	certainly	also	plays	a	part	in	the	choice	of	scale	for	Part	II	of	this	thesis.	Through	narration	and	attention	to	detail,	we	can	arrive	at	a	more	 truthful	picture	of	 this	moment	 in	 time	and	place,	 and	 thus	understand	better	 the	 ideas	 that	 grew	out	of	 it.	 Coupled	with	a	 focus	on	 the	demographics	and	social	background	of	the	conference	attendees,	the	aim	is	to	arrive	at	a	sort	of	cultural	and	social	history	of	early	neoliberal	thought.		In	 the	 context	 of	 intellectual	 history,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 this	 quasi	 micro-historical	 approach	 can	 be	 helpful	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 elusive	 goal	 of	
contextualising	 ideas,	 a	 goal	 of	 the	 field	 ever	 since	 the	early	 interventions	of	Quentin	Skinner	and	J.G.A.	Pocock	in	the	1960s	and	the	subsequent	rise	of	the	linguistics	 inspired	 methodology	 of	 the	 so-called	 Cambridge	 school.	Disagreement	 persists	 as	 to	 what	 putting	 ideas	 in	 context	 actually	 means.	
                                            18	Gérard	Duménil	and	Dominique	Lévy,	Capital	Resurgent:	Roots	of	the	Neoliberal	
Revolution	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2004).	19	Eamonn	Butler,	Classical	Liberalism	-	A	Primer	(London:	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs,	2015).	20	Wendy	Brown,	Undoing	the	Demos	-	Neoliberalism’s	Stealth	Revolution	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Zone	Books,	2015).	
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Inspired	by	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	and	analytical	philosophy,	Skinner	and	Pocock	argued	that	political	language	had	to	be	understood	as	speech	acts,	and	that	the	job	 of	 the	 intellectual	 historian	 was	 to	 situate	 his	 or	 her	 object	 of	 study	 in	relation	 to	 the	wider	discursive	 field	of	which	 they	 formed	part,	 thus	paying	close	 attention	 to	 the	 authors	 intentions.21	 This	 method	 has	 been	 widely	accepted,	 but	 some	 have	 criticized	 the	 Cambridge	 school	 for	 focusing	exclusively	on	classic	texts.	Scholars	like	Robert	Darnton	have	argued	instead	for	a	“social	history	of	ideas”,	one	which	includes	texts	from	outside	the	canon	of	political	 thought,	and	even	material	objects	 like	books,	 thus	 in	some	ways	taking	the	contextual	approach	one	step	further.22	This	vibrant	field	is	certainly	an	inspiration	for	my	own	work,	and	focussing	on	the	first	meeting	of	what	was	to	become	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	gives	the	questions	I	am	addressing	in	this	thesis,	 and	 those	 that	 the	 participants	 themselves	 were	 addressing	 at	 the	meeting,	a	more	concrete,	almost	physical	quality.	It	places	these	issues	in	time	and	space,	allowing	for	an	understanding	of	them	that	is	less	abstract	than,	for	instance,	a	purely	theoretical	survey	on	neoliberalism	and	the	epistemology	of	markets.	 In	 unpacking	 and	 contextualizing	 their	 arguments,	 I	 will	 bring	attention	also	to	matters	like	where	in	Switzerland	the	meeting	was	held,	the	social	background	of	the	participants,	their	excursions	and	even	their	meals.	All	with	the	aim	of	furthering	our	appreciation	of	who	these	people	were	and	what	sort	 of	 project	 they	were	 engaged	 in.	 I	would	 argue	 that	 this	 in	many	ways	squares	well	with	Skinner’s	 insistence	that	the	 intellectual	historian	ought	to	understand	what	writers	of	 classic	 texts	were	actually	doing	 in	writing	what	they	did.23			
                                            21	See	for	instance	Quentin	Skinner,	Visions	of	Politics,	Volume	1,	Regarding	Method	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002).	22	Darrin	M.	McMahon,	‘Return	of	the	History	of	Ideas?’,	in	Rethinking	Modern	
European	Intellectual	History	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	16–17.	23	Skinner,	Visions	of	Politics,	Volume	1,	Regarding	Method,	82.	
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The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	A	variety	of	scholars	with	divergent	opinions	on	the	subject	matter	all	agree	that	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	has	been	central	to	neoliberalism.	As	early	as	1945,	Friedrich	Hayek	convinced	the	investor	Anthony	Fisher	to	set	up	a	think	tank	as	a	 better	way	 of	 influencing	 society	 than	 becoming	 a	 politician,	 and	 in	 1949	Hayek	described	his	goal	of	influencing	intellectuals	and	public	opinion	more	indirectly	in	the	article	“The	Intellectuals	and	Socialism”.	In	1981,	Fisher	set	up	an	 organization	 called	 the	 ATLAS	 Network,24	 and	 today	 it	 is	 an	 umbrella	organization	for	no	less	than	467	think	tanks	and	organizations	in	96	countries	all	over	the	world,	closely	connected	to	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	and	the	visions	of	Hayek.	David	Harvey	thus	locates	the	intellectuals	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	firmly	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 A	 Brief	 History	 of	 Neoliberalism	 (2005).25	 For	Harvey,	the	ideas	developed	by	the	members	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	mainly	served	as	 justifications	 for	 the	 restoration	of	 class	power,	which	 in	Harvey’s	Marxist	view	is	the	essence	of	“neoliberalization”.26	Angus	Burgin,	an	historian	of	the	American	Right,	sees	the	work	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	as	central	to	what	he	calls	“the	reinvention	of	free	markets	after	the	Depression”,	which	is	the	 subtitle	 of	 his	 meticulously	 researched	 The	 Great	 Persuasion	 (2012).	Similarly,	 the	 before-mentioned	 British	 historian	 Daniel	 Stedman	 Jones	emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 as	 a	 transatlantic	meeting	place	for	market-friendly,	liberal	economists	from	Europe	and	the	US	in	his	book	Masters	of	the	Universe	(2014).27	Both	Burgin	and	Stedman	Jones	see	neoliberalism	mainly	 in	opposition	 to	 the	paradigm	known	as	Keynesianism,	and	 understand	 it	 as	 a	 set	 of	 economic	 policies	 concerning,	 for	 instance,	
                                            24	Marie-Laure	Djelic,	‘Spreading	Ideas	to	Change	the	World	–	Inventing	and	Institutionalizing	the	Neoliberal	Think	Tank’,	in	Political	Affair:	Bridging	Markets	and	
Politics	(Edward	Elgar,	Forthcoming).	25	David	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	19–22.	26	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	20.	27	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	73–78.	
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deregulation	of	financial	markets,	monetary	policy	and	a	shrinking	of	the	public	sector	in	general.	Harvey’s	class	interests	thus	play	only	a	minor	part	in	these	narratives	of	what	Burgin	calls	“the	spirit	of	an	age”.28			We	may	call	these	two	approaches	to	the	study	of	neoliberalism	and	its	history	the	 “Marxist”	 and	 the	 “Policy”	 approach	 respectively.29	 Philip	 Mirowski	 is	amongst	those	who	offer	a	somewhat	different	analysis	of	neoliberalism,	one	that	is	in	fact	centred	even	more	on	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	Mirowski’s	work	in	intellectual	history	draws	on	ideas	from	Michel	Foucault’s	1979	lectures	on	neoliberalism,30	 and	 on	 methodology	 from	 Science	 and	 Technology	 Studies	(STS)	in	defining	neoliberalism	simultaneously	as	a	“thought	collective”	and	a	political	movement.31	In	a	postface	to	the	volume	The	Road	from	Mont	Pelerin	(2009),	 co-edited	 with	 Dieter	 Phlewe,	 Mirowski	 locates	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	Society	right	at	the	centre	of	a	complex	structure	of	think	tanks,	lobby	groups,	fake	(“astro-turfed”)	grassroots	organizations	and	loosely	affiliated	university	faculties,	who	have	wielded	considerable	influence	over	global	politics	in	recent	decades.32	 Within	 what	 Mirowski	 identifies	 as	 the	 Neoliberal	 Thought	Collective,	 (a	 notion	 derived	 from	 Ludwig	 Fleck),33	 there	 are	many	 different	strands	and	opinions	so	divergent	that	it	almost	seems	difficult	to	understand	that	they	could	actively	work	together.	As	we	will	see,	there	were	at	least	three	main	strands	of	 the	early	neoliberal	movement:	Austrian	economics,	German	‘ordoliberalism’	 and	 American	 Chicago-school	 economics.	 These	 could	 be	
                                            28	Angus	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion:	Reinventing	Free	Markets	Since	the	Depression	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2012),	214.	29	See	also	Ola	Innset,	‘Nyliberalisme	-	Filosofi	Eller	Politisk	Rasjonalitet?’,	Agora	33,	no.	2–3	(2016):	5–32.	30	Michel	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1978-79	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2008).	31	Philip	Mirowski,	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste:	How	Neoliberalism	Survived	
the	Financial	Meltdown	(London:	Verso,	2013),	26.	32	https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners/global-directory	33	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	35.	
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divided	into	different	sub-groups	again,	and	some	of	the	thinkers	in	question	can	also	be	said	to	alternate	between	the	three	different	approaches.	The	very	variety	 of	 ideas	within	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 discuss	thinkers	as	diverse	as,	for	instance,	Milton	Friedman	and	Friedrich	Hayek	under	the	same	umbrella	concept	of	neoliberalism.	That,	however,	 is	exactly	what	I	aim	 to	 do	 in	 this	 thesis,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Friedman	 and	 Hayek	 were	founding	members	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	is	part	of	the	rationale	for	such	a	cause	of	investigation.	In	his	book	about	the	2008	financial	crisis,	Never	Let	A	
Serious	Crisis	Go	To	Waste	(2013),	Mirowski	writes	 that	 “the	MPS	 [The	Mont	Pèlerin	 Society]	 will	 serve	 as	 our	 Rosetta	 Stone:	 any	 idea	 or	 person	 with	membership	 or	 strong	 ties	 to	 the	 organization	will	 qualify	 as	 ‘neoliberal’”.34	Mirowski	thus	uses	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	as	a	conceptual	tool	to	overcome	the	problem	of	how	to	define	neoliberalism.35	It	could	perhaps	be	argued	that	this	tool	is	stretched	somewhat	when	Mirowski	defines	contemporary	actors	as	“neoliberals”	 due	 to	 connections	with	 organizations	 belonging	 to	 the	 ATLAS	Network,	 but	 in	 the	 years	 that	 is	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis,	 	 1920	 –	 1947,	 the	method	certainly	makes	a	lot	of	sense.		In	his	collection	of	essays	on	the	history	of	German	economic	thought	Strategies	
of	 Economic	 Order	 (1995),	 Keith	 Tribe	 argues	 in	 an	 article	 on	 the	 German	Historical	 School	 that	 “Too	 often	 effort	 is	 devoted	 to	 gathering	 together	contemporaries	under	 some	 convenient	 label,	 seeking	 to	minimise	or	 ignore	inconvenient	 difference.	 A	 more	 useful	 attitude	 of	 mind	 is	 to	 accept	heterogeneity	 as	 a	 natural,	 rather	 than	 a	 pathological,	 condition;	 we	 should	
                                            34	Mirowski,	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste,	39.	35	This	was	first	done	by	Dieter	Plehwe	and	Bernhard	Walpen	in	2006,	and	in	the	introduction	to	The	Road	To	Mont	Pélerin,	Phlewe	describes	”the	MPS	network	of	organized	neoliberal	intellectuals	...	as	a	litmus	test	for	identifying	the	relevant	actors”	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	4.	
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accept	it	for	the	insights	that	it	can	give	us,	rather	than	seek	to	abolish	it.”36		It	should	 be	 clear	 that	 Tribe’s	 important	 insistence	 that	 heterogeneity	 within	economic	and	social	thought	is	natural	and	gives	rise	to	insights	is	not	at	odds	with	 the	 approach	 of	 this	 thesis.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 internal	 differences	 is	 an	important	aspect	of	the	notion	of	a	thought	collective.	The	key	to	understanding	neoliberalism	 lies	 not	 in	 their	many	 internal	 differences,	 but	 rather	 in	what	brought	 them	 together:	 A	 common,	 political	 cause.	 Despite	 their	 many	intellectual	 differences,	 the	 early	 neoliberals	 joined	 forces,	 something	which	points	to	the	very	political	nature	of	their	project.			
Reinventing	liberalism		While	R.M.	Hartwell,	the	official	historian	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	discusses	the	work	of	the	organization	as	a	“revival	of	liberalism”,37	John	Zmirak	writes	about	“liberalism	renewed”,38	and	Pierre	Dardot	&	Christian	Laval	have	opted	for	the	phrase	“the	reinvention	of	liberalism”.39	This	last	term,	“reinvention”,	is	employed	rather	often	in	modern	academic	discussions,	but	to	my	knowledge,	no	one	has	yet	to	explain	what	is	actually	meant	by	it.	It	often	appears	to	refer	to	a	sort	of	transformation.40	The	word	invention	suggests	that	something	brand	new	is	brought	in	to	being,	but	the	prefix	re-	implies	that	it	is	in	some	ways	also	a	 repetition.	 I	 find	 that	 some	 of	 the	 ambiguities	 involved	 in	 using	 and	deconstructing	 this	 phrase	 are	 useful	 for	 the	 study	 of	 neoliberalism.	 The	thinkers	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 themselves	 as	neoliberals,	and	I	will	show	that	they	were	consciously	engaged	in	a	project	to	
                                            36	Keith	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1995),	67.	37	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	xi.	38	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist,	78.	39	Pierre	Dardot	and	Christian	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World:	On	Neoliberal	Society	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Verso,	2013),	49–74.	40	See	for	instance	Anthony	Elliott,	Reinvention,	Shortcuts	(New	York:	Routledge,	2013).	
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change	 liberalism.	 The	 question	 then	 becomes:	 what	 was	 new	 about	 their	liberalism	compared	to	other	liberalisms	available	to	them,	and	why	did	these	thinkers,	at	 that	 time,	 feel	 the	need	for	a	renewed	creed?	In	order	to	answer	these	questions	we	must	know	something	about	the	history	of	liberalism	prior	to	the	period	in	question	(1920	–	1947):			There	are	several	competing	histories	of	liberalism,	and	although	Adam	Smith	(1723	–	1790)	used	the	adjective	liberal	to	refer	to	certain	policies,41	the	word	
liberalism	only	entered	political	discourse	in	the	early	nineteenth	century.	This	has	 led	some	scholars	to	date	the	birth	of	 liberalism	to	the	tumultuous	years	after	the	French	revolution	of	1789.	Edmund	Fawcett	is	one	of	these,	noting	how	the	first	to	adopt	the	term	“liberal”	openly	in	politics	were	the	Spanish	liberales,	members	 of	 the	 Cortes	 in	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 and	 that	 the	 term	subsequently	“acquired	a	past”.42	One	of	the	advantages	of	this	narrative	is	that	it	 brings	 forward	 liberalism’s	 ambivalent	 relationship	 to	 democracy	 and	suffrage.	The	many	episodes	of	horrendous	violence	during	the	Jacobin	terror	in	1793-1794	were	conceptualized	by	French	liberals	as	proof	of	what	horrors	democracy	can	lead	to	if	the	power	of	the	masses	is	not	curtailed	and	limited.	The	historian	Andrew	Jainchill	has	written	of	liberal	intellectuals	like	Benjamin	Constant	 (1767	 –	 1830)	 and	 Alexis	 de	 Tocqueville	 (1805	 –	 1859)	 that	 they	constituted	a	“republican	centre”	in	French,	post-terror	politics,	critical	of	both	the	Jacobins	and	monarchical	absolutism.43	As	we	will	see,	their	reflections	on	the	terror	was	to	provide	the	blueprint	for	neoliberal	critiques	of	socialism	and	theories	 of	 totalitarianism,	 where	 the	 root	 problem	 was	 seen	 to	 be	 mass	
                                            41	Daniel	B.	Klein,	‘The	Origin	of	“Liberalism”’,	The	Atlantic,	13	February	2004,	https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/the-origin-of-liberalism/283780/.	42	Edmund	Fawcett,	Liberalism:	The	Life	of	an	Idea	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2014),	8–9.	43	Andrew	Jainchill,	Reimagining	Politics	after	the	Terror	-	The	Republican	Origins	of	
French	Liberalism	(Ithaca	and	London:	Cornel	University	Press,	2008),	2.	
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democracy	 itself.	 Constant	 introduced	 a	 separation	 between	 “liberté	 des	anciens”	and	“liberté	des	modernes”	in	1816,	His	claim	was	that	the	excesses	of	the	 Jacobin	 revolutionaries	 had	 essentially	 been	 a	 result	 of	 Jean-Jaques	Rousseaus	(1712	–	1788)	inability	to	understand	that	modern	freedom	could	not	be	the	same	as	that	of	the	ancients.	The	“ancients”	found	freedom	in	active	political	 participation,	 but	 Constant	 claimed	 that	 this	 was	 impossible	 in	 a	modern	world.	According	to	Fawcett,	the	liberals	argued	that	“Far-flung,	mass	society	 was	 putting	 that	 ancient	 ideal	 [direct	 democracy]	 out	 of	 reach.”44	Constant	argued	that	for	modern	people	like	himself,	freedom	was	in	fact	almost	the	 opposite	 of	 political	 participation:	 it	was	 to	 be	 found	 in	 protection	 from	politics	and	society.45		Jainchill	writes:		 ”In	their	reflections	on	the	French	Revolution,	liberal-minded	thinkers	criticized	Jacobinism	for	believing	that	politics	could	remake	a	prior	social	reality,	for	assigning	priority	to	the	political	rather	than	the	social	(...)	Another	important	consequence	of	assigning	priority	to	modern	liberty	was	the	view	that	representative	government	was	superior	to	democracy(...)	Liberals	thus	held	representative	government	to	be	more	than	a	substitute	for	democracy.	It	was	a	replacement	of	democracy	that	freed	modern	individuals	rather	than,	as	Rousseau	had	famously	claimed,	disempowered	them.”46		As	we	will	 see,	 the	 first	 liberals’	 constitutionalist	 critique	 of	 democracy	 and	politics	would	be	transposed	by	the	neoliberals	onto	the	increasingly	important	domain	of	the	economy.			It	has,	however,	become	more	usual	to	begin	the	history	of	liberalism	at	a	much	earlier	date	than	when	the	word	was	first	 in	use.	Duncan	Bell	notes	that	this	only	became	a	dominant	view	as	late	as	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,47	and	as	we	shall	see,	the	intellectuals	studied	in	this	thesis	played	a	certain	part	in	
                                            44	Fawcett,	Liberalism,	42.	45	Benjamin	Constant,	‘The	Liberty	of	the	Ancients	Compared	with	that	of	the	Moderns’,	1819.	46	Jainchill,	Reimagining	Politics	after	the	Terror	-	The	Republican	Origins	of	French	
Liberalism,	13.	47	D.	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	Political	Theory	42,	no.	6	(1	December	2014):	692.	
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this,	 inspiring	 later	 followers	 to	 construct	 grand	 narratives	 of	 the	 rise	 of	freedom	and	what	they	would	call	“classical	liberalism”.48	These	narratives	are	usually	grounded	 in	British	history,	 and	stretch	back	at	 least	 to	 the	Glorious	Revolution	of	1688	and	the	English	Civil	War	(1642	–	1651).49	Ideas	of	a	”social	contract”	and	principles	of	religious	toleration,	individual	freedom	and	political	representation	 increasingly	 formed	 part	 of	 political	 discourse	 at	 the	 time,	inspired	 by	 the	 works	 of	 thinkers	 like	 Jean	 Bodin	 (1530	 –	 1596),	 Thomas	Hobbes	(1588	–	1679)	and	especially	John	Locke	(1632	–	1704).	Duncan	Bell	notes	 that	 “contextualist”	 intellectual	historians	 “have	 repeatedly	questioned	Locke’s	 elevated	 status	 as	 a	 (or	 the)	 foundational	 liberal”,	 and	 J.G.A.	 Pocock	insists	 that	 though	 “elements	 were	 present	 which	 would	 in	 due	 course	 be	assembled	 by	 means	 of	 this	 formula	 [liberalism]	 there	 was	 no	 system	 of	doctrines	 corresponding	 to	 its	 later	 use.”50	 Significantly,	 what	 was	retrospectively	 dubbed	 “liberalism”	 was	 not	 anything	 resembling	 a	 unified	political	program.			James	 L.	 Richardson	 has	 pointed	 to	 how	 issues	 of	 democracy,	 or	 what	contemporary	historians	of	political	thought	refer	to	as	“popular	sovereignty”,51	was	 often	 the	 centre	 of	 controversy	 even	 in	 the	pre-history	 of	 liberalism.	 In	
Contending	 Liberalisms	 in	 World	 Politics,	 Richardson	 calls	 liberalism’s	 first	phase	 “Elitism	 vs.	 democracy”	 and	 shows	 how,	 in	 the	 civil	war,	 the	 popular	
                                            48	See	for	instance	Butler,	Classical	Liberalism	-	A	Primer;	Michael	James,	Classical	
Liberalism	in	the	21st	Century	(Buckingham:	The	University	of	Buckingham	Press,	2014);	David	Conway,	Classical	Liberalism	-	The	Unvanquished	Ideal	(New	York:	Palgrave,	1998).	49	Eamonn	Butler	of	the	Adam	Smith	Institute	even	argues	that	liberalism	was	developed	when	Anglo-Saxons	colonized	Britain	in	the	year	400	and	then	developed	common	law	when	invaded	by	Scandinavian	Vikings	in	the	year	800.	Butler,	Classical	
Liberalism	-	A	Primer,	14.	50	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	688.	51	See	Richard	Bourke	and	Quentin	Skinner,	Popular	Sovereignty	in	Historical	
Perspective	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016).	
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group	 known	 as	 “The	 Levellers”	 stood	 against	 Army	 officers	 like	 Oliver	Cromwell,	who	“defended	the	traditional	principle	that	the	vote	was	for	those	with	 a	 stake	 in	 the	 country”.	 The	Whig	 party	 (which	 effectively	 became	The	Liberal	Party	in	the	1860s)	supported	a	government	of	the	people	as	opposed	to	absolutism,52	but	there	were	rival	interpretations	of	what	“a	government	of	the	people”	really	meant	and	Richardson	insists	that	The	Whigs	still	rejected	any	form	of	what	he	calls	democracy.53	
 Most	of	those	fighting	absolutism	in	England	appealed	to	a	doctrine	of	popular	sovereignty,	54	but	 the	 interventions	of	The	Levellers	 show	what	 a	 contested	concept	 it	was.	Some	years	 later,	Edmund	Burke	(1729	–	1797)	would	argue	that	 “the	 people	 is	 the	 True	 Legislator”,	 while	 also	 criticising	 the	 French	Revolution	 and	 arguing	 for	 strong	 constitutional	 restraints	 on	 the	 power	 of	democracy.55				
Social	liberalism	vs.	laissez-faire	David	 Harvey	 equates	 neoliberalism	 with	 laissez-faire	 in	 A	 Brief	 History	 of	
Neoliberalism,56	 and	 even	 recent	 historical	 scholarship	 has	 argued	 that	neoliberalism	is	a	project	to	reinvent	“free	markets”.57	In	journalism	and	public	debate	 the	 unfortunate	 conflation	 between	neoliberalism	 and	 laissez-faire	 is	still	 very	 common.	On	 the	 opposite	 side,	 some	 scholars	 have	 recently	 begun	
                                            52	Ibid.,	213.	53	James	L.	Richardson,	Contending	Liberalisms	in	World	Politics	(Boulder,	Colorado:	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	Inc.,	2001),	22.	54	Lorenzo	Sabbadini,	‘Popular	Sovereignty	and	Representation	in	the	English	Civil	War’,	in	Popular	Sovereignty	in	Historical	Perspective	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016),	165.	55	Bourke	and	Skinner,	Popular	Sovereignty	in	Historical	Perspective,	214.	56	Philip	Mirowski,	‘Review	of	David	Harvey	“A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism”’,	
Philosophy	and	Economics	24,	no.	1	(2008):	111–18,	doi:10.1017/S0266267108001715.	57	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion.	
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arguing	that	since	it	is	clear	that	early	neoliberalism	was	not	laissez-faire,	but	instead	 amounted	 to	 an	 aim	 to	 use	 modern	 states	 for	 liberal	 ends,	 early	neoliberalism	must	have	been	a	form	of	social	liberalism.58	In	my	opinion,	this	too	is	a	misunderstanding,	and	I	will	argue	that	neoliberalism	was	an	explicit	attack	on	both	laissez-faire	and	social	liberalism.	After	“Elitism	vs.	Democracy”,	Richardson	calls	the	second	phase	of	the	history	of	liberalism	“Laissez-faire	vs.	Social	 Liberalism”,	 and	 these	 were	 also	 the	 two	 main	 forms	 of	 liberalism	available	 in	 the	historical	 conjuncture	neoliberalism	grew	out	of.	Richardson	writes	 that	 “The	 cleavage	 was	 not	 articulated	 as	 one	 between	 elitism	 and	egalitarianism	but	was	readily	recognized	by	contemporaries	as	such.	(...)	The	central	issue	remained	essentially	the	same:	were	liberal	rights	and	freedoms	to	 be	 genuinely	 extended	 to	 all?”59	 The	 phrase	 laissez-faire	 translates	 to	something	 like	 “let-do”,	 and	with	 the	 rise	 of	 political	 economy,	 this	 doctrine	became	a	defining	notion	of	elitist	 liberalism.	Increasingly,	debates	regarding	production	and	 trade	were	blended	with	political	 and	philosophical	debates.	Bernhard	Mandeville	(1670	–	1733)	had	written	his	Fable	of	the	Bees,	in	which	he	 claimed	 that	 the	 self-interested	 actions	 of	 businessmen	 tended	 to	 be	transposed	into	a	common	good,	and	Adam	Smith	would	elaborate	on	this	with	his	 notion	 of	 the	 “invisible	 hand”.	 These	 ideas	 were	 the	 basis	 upon	 which	proponents	 of	 laissez-faire	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 would	 argue	 against	government	“intervention”	in	what	was	perceived	to	be	the	affairs	of	business	men.	These	were	certainly	privileged,	white	men	with	a	“stake	in	the	country”	who	were	glad	 to	be	 rid	of	monarchical	 absolutism,	but	 less	keen	 to	expand	suffrage	and	the	scope	of	democratic	power.		
                                            58	See	for	instance	Lars	Peder	Nordbakken,	Liberale	Tenkere	for	Vår	Tid	(Oslo:	Civita,	2017).	59	Richardson,	Contending	Liberalisms	in	World	Politics,	32.	
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Utilitarians	were	a	branch	of	liberals	who	wanted	the	goal	of	politics	to	be	the	maximum	possible	level	of	happiness.	Due	to	the	perceived	benefits	of	so-called	“free”	trade,	utilitarians	originally	cast	their	lot	with	laissez-faire.	This	changed	around	the	time	of	the	death	of	their	founder,	Jeremy	Bentham	(1748	–	1832),60	when	the	overall	happiness	level	achieved	by	laissez-faire	policies	started	being	called	into	question.61	Richardson	writes:		 ”The	reaction	against	laissez-faire	prompted	a	new	direction	in	liberal	thought	in	Britain	and	Germany	in	the	later	nineteenth	century	and,	to	a	much	lesser	extent,	in	France	and	the	United	States.	This	amounted	to	a	major	rethinking	of	liberalism	in	the	light	of	the	conservative	and	socialist	critiques	of	laissez-faire.	Accepting	part	of	the	critique,	the	social	liberals	(the	English	”new	liberals”)maintained	that	this	did	not	mean	an	abandonment	of	liberalism	but	rather	its	reformulation.”62		Key	thinkers	in	this	endeavour	were	John	Stuart	Mill	(1806	–	1873),	Thomas	Hill	Green	(1836	–	1882)	and	Leonard	Hobhouse	(1864	–	1929).	They	argued	against	 government	 passivity	 in	 economic	 affairs	 and	 in	 favour	 of	 extensive	social	programs	and	redistribution.	At	times,	social	liberalism	would	be	hard	to	distinguish	 from	socialism,	 and	according	 to	Richardson,	 ”the	 same	question	arose	 in	 France	 of	 the	 Third	 Republic,	 where	 the	 boundaries	 between	liberalism,	radicalism	and	socialism	were	ill	defined.”63	These	new	liberals	saw	their	more	pro-active	policies	as	 resulting	 from	a	belief	 in	what	 they	 saw	as	liberal	 values,	 but	 also	 from	 new	 insights	 gained	 as	 to	 how	 liberty	 may	 be	secured	 for	 more	 people.	 I	 will	 argue	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 neoliberalism	 was	neither	laissez-faire	nor	social	liberalism,	but	that	it	was	framed	as	an	explicit	
                                            60	Ibid.	61	One	timely	example	is	the	Irish	famine	of	1845	–	1852,	in	which	the	population	of	this	British	colony	sank	by	25%.	At	the	time,	British	politicians	and	administrators	used	the	dogma	of	laissez-faire	both	to	deny	helping	the	Irish	in	any	way,	and	even	refrained	from	banning	the	ongoing	export	of	much	needed	food	from	Ireland	to	England.	David	Ross,	Ireland:	History	of	a	Nation	(New	Lanark:	Geddes	&	Grosset,	2002),	224;	Tim	Pat	Coogan,	The	Famine	Plot	-	England’s	Role	in	Ireland’s	Greatest	
Tragedy	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012).	62	Richardson,	Contending	Liberalisms	in	World	Politics,	36.	63	Ibid.,	38.	
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attack	on	both	major	strands	of	liberal	thought	available	at	the	time.	This	is	why	the	name	neoliberalism	is	such	a	fitting	one.		
The	dual	argument	This	double	attack	is	neatly	summed	up	in	what	I	will	call	“the	dual	argument”,	which	I	will	argue	was	a	two-pronged	argument	made	by	the	most	important	actors	in	the	network	of	early	neoliberal	thinkers.	In	his	book	Liberalism	–	The	
Life	 of	 an	 Idea,	 Edmund	 Fawcett	 identifies	 liberals	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	 40s	 as	“antitotalitarians”.64	The	thinkers	he	discusses	under	this	rubric	are	Friedrich	Hayek	 and	 Walter	 Lippmann,	 who	 indeed	 represented	 two	 of	 the	 most	important	 intellectuals	 in	 the	 early	 neoliberal	 movement.	 But	 what	 did	 the	neoliberals	mean	by	“totalitarianism”,	and	how	did	they	change	and	reinvent	the	content	of	liberalism	by	employing	this	concept	as	liberalism’s	“Other”?	William	Davies	has	written	that	“neo-liberalism	is	the	product	of	two	crises,	not	one.	The	1930s	are	as	important	to	its	genesis	as	the	1970s”.65	This	thesis	is	about	the	importance	of	the	first	of	these	crises:	The	Great	Slump	of	the	1930s	and	the	rise	of	dictatorships	in	Europe.	The	concept	of	totalitarianism,	explaining	both	the	 Fascist,	 Nazi	 and	 Communist	 dictatorships	 in	 Italy,	 Germany	 and	 Russia	respectively	as	a	result	of	the	same	development,	became	crucial	for	US	foreign	policy	in	the	Cold	War,66	but	before	that	it	was	also	an	important	starting	point	for	early	neoliberalism.	A	large	part	of	the	pretext	for	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	was	indeed	the	fight	against	totalitarianism,	and	several	of	the	 leading	 intellectuals,	 including	 Friedrich	Hayek,	Wilhelm	Röpke,	Michael	Polanyi,	 Ludwig	 Mises,	 Louis	 Rougier	 and	 Lionel	 Robbins,	 had	 in	 the	 years	before	 expounded	 theories	 claiming	 that	 totalitarianism	 was	 the	 result	 of	
                                            64	Fawcett,	Liberalism,	275.	65	William	Davies,	‘The	Making	of	Neo-Liberalism’,	Renewal	-	A	Journal	of	Social	
Democracy	17,	no.	4	(2009):	88–92.	66	Abbott	Gleason,	Totalitarianism:	The	Inner	History	of	the	Cold	War	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995).	
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“collectivism”	 and	 economic	 planning.	 However,	 the	 notion	 that	 economic	planning	 led	 to	 totalitarianism	 did	 not	 lead	 the	 neoliberals	 to	 advocate	 a	position	of	laissez-faire,	or	to	claim	that	states	had	no	role	to	play	in	economic	affairs	what	so	ever.	On	the	contrary,	the	neoliberals	presented	their	program	as	 an	 attack	 also	 on	 laissez-faire	 liberalism,	which	 they	 claimed	 had	 proven	futile	in	the	face	of	the	totalitarian	danger.		My	concept	of	“the	dual	argument”	designates	the	combination	of	the	claim	that	“economic	planning”	leads	to	totalitarianism,	with	the	simultaneous	assertion	that	 “laissez-faire”	 would	 not	 be	 an	 adequate	 political	 program	 to	 defeat	“totalitarianism”.67	 Almost	 all	 the	 early	 neoliberals	 would	 at	 some	 point	between	1938	and	1944	write	a	book	or	paper	including	this	dual	argument.	I	will	argue	that	a	full	appreciation	of	the	tensions	involved	in	the	dual	argument	is	something	of	a	key	to	understanding	early	neoliberal	thought.			Part	I	of	this	thesis	will	thus	focus	on	the	years	from	1920	to	1947	in	order	to	explain	and	contextualize	the	dual	argument.	Chapter	1	focuses	on	the	context	of	 interwar	 Vienna	 and	 the	 controversies	 known	 as	 the	 socialist	 calculation	debates.	I	will	argue	that	this	attempt	to	intellectually	disprove	the	possibility	of	socialism	 is	a	 founding	moment	 for	neoliberalism,	as	 it	gave	rise	 to	a	new	conception	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity.	Chapter	2	will	focus	on	the	1938	Walter	Lippmann	colloquium,	and	how	ideas	from	the	socialist	calculation	debates	were	used	to	argue	also	against	social	liberalism.	Chapter	3	focuses	on	the	war	years,	in	which	key	neoliberal	thinkers	published	versions	of	the	dual	
                                            67	My	use	of	the	concept	of	duality	is	thus	different	from	how	it	is	used	in	mathematics,	where	it	refers	to	a	form	of	mirrored	symmetry.	Instead,	my	use	refers	to	its	meaning	within	theology	and	philosophy,	where	a	duality	indicates	two	parts	of	a	whole	which	are	almost	opposites,	yet	are	equally	important	for	the	totality.	It	has	also	been	used	in	history,	for	instance	in	reference	to	the	economic	dualism	between	the	north	and	south	of	Italy.	See	for	instance	Lucy	Riall,	Risorgimento:	The	History	of	
Italy	from	Napoleon	to	Nation-State	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009),	100–104.	
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argument	and	Hayek	began	preparations	for	putting	together	what	he	called	“an	army	of	freedom	fighters”	to	renew	liberalism	after	the	war.			In	 Part	 II,	 we	 will	 see	 the	 dual	 argument	 “in	 action”	 at	 some	 of	 the	 most	important	sessions	of	the	first	meeting	of	what	was	to	become	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	 in	 1947.	 Chapter	 4	 takes	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 demographics	 and	background	of	 the	attendees	meeting,	 and	Chapter	5	 focuses	on	Hayek’s	key	session	on	how	to	use	states	in	order	to	make	markets	more	competitive.	Here	the	neoliberals	went	into	largely	unchartered	territory	in	trying	to	square	their	idea	that	that	economic	planning	leads	to	totalitarianism,	with	their	claim	that	laissez-faire	liberalism	was	an	outdated	creed	unfit	for	the	modern	world.	The	neoliberals	agreed	 that	state	action	was	necessary	 to	protect	and	spread	 the	market	 order,	 but	 struggled	 to	 define	 its	 scope	 and	 nature	when	 they	were	simultaneously	 arguing	 that	 state	 “interference”	 with	 the	 economy	 led	 to	totalitarian	dictatorship.	Chapter	6	explores	the	context	of	postwar	Europe	and	the	ways	in	which	the	neoliberals	envisioned	a	new	Europe	where	states	were	put	in	the	service	of	the	market	mechanism.	Chapter	7	summarizes	the	chaotic	last	week	of	 the	meeting	and	pays	 special	 attention	 to	a	decisive	moment	 in	which	 one	 of	 the	 conference	 attendees	 argued	 that	 the	 liberal	 interventions	discussed	by	the	neoliberals	amounted	to	a	form	of	economic	planning	in	itself.			In	 the	 conclusion	 I	 will	 summarize	 my	 findings	 and	 argue	 that	 my	 study	indicates	that	neoliberalism	has	to	be	understood	as	something	much	broader	than	just	a	set	of	economic	policies.	Furthermore,	I	will	argue	against	the	notion,	put	 forward	 in	 recent	 historiography,	 that	 the	 period	 in	 question	was	 but	 a	mildly	interesting,	European	pre-history	of	neoliberalism,	which	only	found	its	true	form	in	a	1970s	“Americanized”	version,	deemed	by	these	historians	to	be	more	radical.68	Although	 the	content	of	neoliberalism	certainly	changed	over	
                                            68	See	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion;	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe.	
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time,	I	will	argue	that	this	interpretation	fails	to	take	into	account	the	novelty	of	the	 ideas	put	 forward	by	early	neoliberal	 thinkers	 in	the	 interwar-	and	early	post-war	years.	Their	ideas	about	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	and	their	opening	 towards	 using	 states	 in	 their	 service	 represented	 an	 important	innovation	 in	 liberal	 political	 thought,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 later	developments	 of	 neoliberalism,	 undertaken	 for	 instance	 by	 the	 second	generation	 of	 Chicago	 School	 economists	 and	 the	 Virginia	 school	 of	 Public	Choice	 theorists.	 I	will	 argue	 that	 the	 best	way	 to	 understand	 neoliberalism	today	is	to	study	these	original	ideas	carefully,	something	that	can	best	be	done	by	understanding	the	historical	context	out	of	which	they	grew.		 	
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Chapter	1	–	The	Socialist	Calculation	Debates	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 		“The	World	War	of	1914-18	brought	to	a	definite	end	the	‘long’	nineteenth	century	and	inaugurated	the	age	of	modernity.	Many	who	recognised	this	also	assumed	that	nineteenth-century	capitalism	would	be	replaced	by	a	new	form	of	twentieth	century,	planned	economy;	that	the	correlate	of	the	modern	world	was	an	organised	economy	in	which	rational	deliberation	would	replace	profit	and	the	market	as	the	mechanism	for	the	allocation	of	resources.”1		Keith	Tribe,	“The	Logical	Structure	of	the	Economic	World	–	the	rationalist	economics	of	Otto	Neurath”,	in	Strategies	of	Economic	Order,	1995			
	
	
	
	In	 1920,	 the	 Austrian	 economist	 and	 nobleman	 Ludwig	 von	 Mises	 (1881	 –	1973)	 wrote	 an	 essay	 entitled	 ”Wirtschaftsrechnung	 in	 sozialistische	Gemeinwesen”,	later	to	be	translated	as	”Economic	Calculation	in	the	Socialist	Commonwealth”.	Only	two	years	after	events	such	as	the	Russian	Revolution,	the	failed	Spartakist	revolution	in	Berlin,	and	the	short	lived	experiments	of	the	Bavarian	 and	 Hungarian	 People’s	 Republics,	 Mises	 claimed	 that	 collective	ownership	 of	 the	 means	 of	 production	 meant	 “the	 abolition	 of	 a	 rational	economy.”2	 The	 ensuing	 debates	 between	 economists	 of	 liberal	 and	 socialist	
                                            1	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	140.	2	Ludwig	Mises,	Economic	Calculation	in	The	Socialist	Commonwealth	(Auburn,	Alabama:	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	1990),	26.	
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persuasions,	known	as	“the	socialist	calculation	debates”,		took	many	turns	and	lasted	at	least	until	the	1940s.		In	this	chapter	I	will	argue	that	some	of	the	ideas	emerging	from	this	controversy	were	foundational	for	the	intellectual	current	known	as	neoliberalism.	First	and	foremost,	this	involved	a	novel	conception	of	what	markets	really	are.	I	will	argue	that	Hayek	and	Mises	essentially	came	to	see	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity:		a	mechanism	whose	very	existence	and	operation	was	what	made	a	modern	world	possible.			My	analysis	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 similar	 to	 that	of	Erwin	Dekker	 in	his	 recently	published	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	
Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered.	Like	Dekker,	I	will	argue	that	the	context	of	Vienna	in	the	interwar	years	contributed	to	a	new	view	of	markets	as	nothing	less	 than	the	bedrock	of	civilization.	 “Civilization”	was	a	concept	used	by	the	Austrian	economists	themselves,	who	would	speak	of	their	time,	and	especially	the	advance	of	socialism,	as	“a	revolt	against	civilization”;	and	of	their	fear	of	“the	destruction	of	the	Western	civilization	altogether.”3	However,	I	have	opted	instead	 to	 impose	 the	 concept	 of	 “modernity”	 on	 my	 analysis	 of	 early	neoliberalism,	 in	 order	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 how	 these	 thinkers	 felt	 that	 a	 new	historical	situation	called	for	a	new	liberalism.	Indeed,	Dekker	too	writes	that	the	 Austrian	 economists´	 analyses	 of	 civilization	 during	 the	 interwar	 years	amounted	 to	 a	 confrontation	 “with	 the	 central	 problem	 of	 modernity.”4	Throughout	 this	 chapter	 we	 will	 get	 a	 closer	 idea	 of	 what	 this	 “problem	 of	modernity”	really	was,	how	it	was	conceptualized	by	the	early	neoliberals	and	how	they	came	to	see	markets	as	its	solution.		
                                            3	Erwin	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	
Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016),	9.	4	Ibid.,	89.	
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In	 1961,	 Carl	 E.	 Schorske	 claimed	 that	 “the	 word	 ‘modern’	 has	 come	 to	distinguish	our	perception	of	our	lives	and	times	from	all	that	has	gone	before,	from	history	as	a	whole,	as	such.”	Schorske	saw	the	beginning	of	the	modernist	worldview	in	Mises’	near	past,	fin	de	siècle	Vienna,	which	“with	its	acutely	felt	tremors	 of	 social	 and	 political	 disintegration,	 proved	 one	 of	 the	most	 fertile	breeding	grounds	of	our	century’s	a-historical	culture.”5	According	to	Schorske,	“Modern	architecture,	modern	music,	modern	philosophy,	modern	science	–	all	these	define	themselves	not	out	of	the	past,	indeed	scarcely	against	the	past,	but	in	independence	of	the	past.”6	This	radical	independence	of	the	past	is	part	of	what	has	led	Marshall	Berman	to	describe	modernity	as	a	confusing	maelstrom	fed	from	many	sources,	such	as:		 “the	 industrialization	of	production,	which	 transforms	 scientific	knowledge	 into	 technology,	creates	new	human	environments	and	destroys	old	ones,	speeds	up	the	whole	tempo	of	 life,	generates	new	forms	of	corporate	power	and	class	struggle;	immense	demographic	upheavals	severing	millions	 of	 people	 from	 their	 ancestral	 habitats,	 hurtling	 them	 halfway	 across	 the	world	 into	 new	 lives;	 rapid	 and	 often	 cataclysmic	 urban	 growth;	 systems	 of	 mass	communication,	 dynamic	 in	 their	 development,	 enveloping	 and	 binding	 together	 the	 most	diverse	people	and	societies;	increasingly	powerful	nation	states,	bureaucratically	structured	and	operated,	constantly	striving	to	expand	their	powers;	mass	social	movements	of	people,	and	peoples,	challenging	their	political	and	economic	rulers,	striving	to	gain	some	control	over	their	 lives:	 finally,	 bearing	 and	 driving	 all	 these	 people	 and	 institutions	 along,	 an	 ever-expanding,	drastically	fluctuating	capitalist	world	market.”7		A	 great	 number	 of	 these	 issues	 were	 being	 addressed	 directly	 by	 early	neoliberal	thinkers.	Their	books,	lectures,	letters	and	closed	debates	centred	on	issues	 such	 as	 bureaucracy,	 capitalism,	 urbanization,	 social	 movements,	democracy,	science,	corporations,	diversity	and	class	differences.	In	a	time	of	economic	 crisis,	 revolutionary	 upheaval	 and	 total	 war,	 these	 colossal	 issues	were	at	 the	 forefront	of	contemporary	debate,	 informing	the	development	of	neoliberal	thought.		
                                            5	Carl	E.	Schorske,	Fin-de-Siècle	Vienna:	Politics	and	Culture,	1st	ed	(New	York:	Knopf :	distributed	by	Random	House,	1979),	xvii.	6	Ibid.,	xviii.	7	Marshall	Berman,	All	That	Is	Solid	Melts	Into	Thin	Air	(London:	Verso,	2010),	16.	
  37 
In	Consciousness	 and	 Society	 –	 The	Reorientation	 of	 European	 Social	 Thought	
1890	–	1930,	H.	Stuart	Hughes	wrote	of	this	period’s	“sense	of	the	demise	of	an	old	society,	coupled	with	an	agonizing	uncertainty	as	to	what	the	forms	of	the	new	 society	 might	 prove	 to	 be”.8	 The	 problem	 of	 traditional	 communities	breaking	up	and	being	replaced	by	larger,	more	impersonal	ones,	was	a	central	feature	of	modernity.	So	too	was	the	advent	of	various	forms	of	movements	for	and	ideas	about	socialism.	Here	I	am	not	differentiating	between	various	forms	of	 socialism,	 like	 marxism,	 pre-marxist	 socialism,	 market	 socialism	 or	bolshevism,	 but	 referring	 to	 the	 broad,	 contradictory	 movement	 for	 a	 non-capitalist	 society	 which	 had	 existed	 for	 some	 time,	 but	 had	 arguably	 only	become	 a	 significant	 force	 in	 European	 politics	 around	 the	 middle	 of	 the	nineteenth	century.9	Socialism	had	arguably	always	been	conceptualized	as	an	answer	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 capitalism,	 but	 especially	 after	 Marx,	 and	 his	Hegelian	idea	that	socialism	would	be	born	out	of	capitalism,	movements	for	socialism	were	almost	exclusively	modernist.	I	mean	this	in	the	sense	that	they	pictured	 the	 socialist	 Utiopia	 (or	 communist,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Marx),	 not	 as	 a	nostalgic	return	to	a	romanticized	past,	but	a	profoundly	new	type	of	society,	born	 out	 of	 the	modern	 present’s	 radical	 independence	 of	 the	 past.	 In	 their	criticisms	of	socialism,	neoliberals	ended	up	presenting	a	competing	solution	to	how	a	modern	world	could	function	and	bring	prosperity	to	all.	The	solution	they	offered	was	markets,	 and	as	we	will	 see	 it	was	a	 solution	born	out	of	a	profound	pessimism	with	regards	to	the	potential	for	democratic	deliberation.	Berman	has	remarked	that	twentieth-century	critics	of	modernity,	unlike	more	optimistic	nineteenth	century	writers	on	 the	 topic	 like	Marx	and	 John	Stuart	Mill,	“had	little	faith	in	the	people”:		
                                            8	H.	Stuart	Hughes,	Consciousness	and	Society	–	The	Reorientation	of	European	Social	
Thought	1890	–	1930	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	1958),	14.	9	As	we	will	see,	the	early	neoliberals	themselves	seldom	differentiated	between	different	forms	of	socialism,	and	even	argued	that	social	liberalism	led	to	socialism,	and	furthermore	that	socialism,	like	fascism,	was	a	form	of	collectivism.				
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	 “Many	twentieth-century	thinkers	have	seen	things	this	way:	The	swarming	masses	who	press	upon	us	in	the	street	and	in	the	state	have	no	sensitivity,	spirituality	or	dignity	like	our	own;	isn’t	it	absurd,	then,	that	these	‘mass	men’	(or	‘hollow	men’)	should	have	not	only	the	right	to	govern	themselves,	but	also,	through	their	mass	majorities,	the	power	to	govern	us?”10		The	reason	for	beginning	this	history	of	early	neoliberalism	in	1920	with	the	socialist	 calculation	 debates	 is	 to	 show	 explicitly	 how	 the	 core	 ideas	 of	neoliberalism	were	developed	as	a	response	to	socialism.	Scholars	like	Albert	Hirschmann	 and	 Corey	Robin	 have,	 in	 different	ways,	 interpreted	 neoliberal	thinkers	like	Friedrich	Hayek	as	fundamentally	reactionary.11	The	point	of	this	thesis	 is	to	go	further	and	show	that	since	socialism	in	many	ways	was	what	Schorske	called	a	“modern	philosophy”,	the	neoliberalism	developed	to	fight	it	had	to	be	the	same.	Indeed,	Jan-Werner	Müller	has	described	neoliberalism	as	an	attempt	to	create	a	“counter-faith”	to	communism.12	As	Keith	Tribe	points	out	in	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter,	many	of	those	who	recognised	the	years	after	World	War	 I	 as	 inaugurating	 the	 age	 of	 modernity,	 thought	 that	 capitalism	would	be	 replaced	by	a	new	 form	of	planned	economy.	Neoliberalism	was	a	reaction	to	this	trend,	but	it	offered	much	more	than	a	return	to	“laissez-faire”	and	past	liberal	wisdom.	In	attacking	both	planning	and	the	doctrine	of	laissez-faire,	neoliberalism	became	a	competing	theory	of	modernity,	a	theory	of	how	the	modern	world,	radically	different	from	past	worlds,	could	function.	As	we	will	 see,	 this	 required	 serious	 intellectual	 innovation,	 and	 although	 the	neoliberals	built	on	previous	creeds,	I	will	show	that	they	also	added	brand	new	
                                            10	Berman,	All	That	Is	Solid	Melts	Into	Thin	Air,	28.	11	Albert	O.	Hirschman,	The	Rhetoric	of	Reaction:	Perversity,	Futility,	Jeopardy	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1991);	Corey	Robin,	
The	Reactionary	Mind:	Conservatism	from	Edmund	Burke	to	Sarah	Palin	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).	12	Jan-Werner	Müller,	‘The	Place	of	Liberal	Thought	and	Practice	in	Post-War	European	Politics’,	in	Re-Inventing	Western	Civilization:	Transnational	
Reconstructions	of	Liberalism	in	Europe	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(Newcastle	upon	Tyne:	Cambridge	Scholars	Publishing,	2014),	xxiv.	
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ideas	which	 can	only	properly	be	understood	by	 studying	 the	 context	out	of	which	they	rose.		
	
Red	Vienna	In	1920,	Ludwig	von	Mises	(1881	–	1973)	was	39	years	old	and	had	worked	as	an	economic	policy	advisor	 for	 the	Vienna	Chamber	of	Commerce	 for	eleven	years.	Mises’	was	born	in	the	outskirts	of	the	Austro-Hungarian	empire,	more	precisely	in	what	was	then	Lemberg,	Galicia,	now	the	Ukrainian	city	of	Lviv.	His	father’s	family	was	of	Jewish	descent,	and	had	been	elevated	into	nobility	in	the	nineteenth	century,	hence	the	“von”	in	his	name.	Mises	arrived	in	Vienna	at	the	turn	 of	 the	 century,	 and	 had	 studied	 with	 the	 famous	 Austrian	 economist	Eugene	von	Böhm-Bahwerk	(1851	–	1914).	The	end	of	the	First	World	War,	in	which	Mises	served	as	an	officer	and	economic	advisor	to	the	War	ministry,	led	to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Austro-Hungarian	 empire,	 and	 brought	 revolution	 to	Vienna.	The	empire	had	been	crumbling	for	some	time	before	that,	and	since	1867	it	had	been	divided	into	two	parts,	Austria	and	Hungary.	Also	in	1867,	a	liberal	 constitution	 from	 six	 years	 earlier	 had	 been	 partly	 reversed,	 and,	according	 to	 Dekker,	 these	 experiences	 severely	 disillusioned	 the	 Austrian	economists	who	had	trained	and	influenced	Mises.	Their	liberalism	was	closely	tied	up	with	the	idea	of	empire,	but	they	eventually	came	to	think	that	liberal	ideas	were	too	complicated	for	ordinary	people	to	understand.	Friedrich	von	Wieser	(1851	–	1926),	for	instance,	was	amongst	those	“deeply	disappointed	about	politics	and	their	old	ideals.	They	had	truly	believed	that	the	masses	could	be	elevated	out	of	their	poverty	and	mental	backwardness,	that	they	could	learn	to	be	 responsible	 and	 autonomous	 individuals.	 This	 project	 failed.”13	Dekker	notes	 later	 that	 Mises	 (and	 Hayek)	 would	 not	 reject	 this	 elitist	 current	 of	
                                            13	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	61.	
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Austrian	thought,	but	rather	“build	on	it	and	develop	it	further”,	14	in	a	historical	context	in	which	the	days	of	empire	were	conclusively	over,	but	its	memory	still	lingered.		The	golden	age	of	bourgeois	culture	and	scientific	discovery	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	referred	to	as	“The	Age	of	Insight”	by	Eric	Kandel,15	and	“Wittgenstein’s	Vienna”	by	Allan	Janik	and	Stephen	Toulmin,16	was	increasingly	a	thing	of	the	past	in	the	Vienna	inhabited	by	Mises.	The	workers’	movement	was	growing,	and	 socialists	 had	 won	 elections	 for	 municipal	 government.	 The	 historian	Helmut	Gruber	writes:	 “There	are	 few	connections	between	the	hermetically	sealed	 world	 of	 bourgeois	 high	 culture	 Schorske	 has	 depicted	 and	 the	 “red	Vienna”	the	socialists	sought	to	create”.	This	signalled	a	new	engagement	with	politics	also	on	the	part	of	those	who	opposed	socialism,	and	Gruber	has	written	that	“Bildung	and	culture	as	a	substitute	for	politics	among	the	bourgeoise	came	to	an	end	in	the	republican	Vienna	emerging	after	1918.“17	The	so-called	“Red	Vienna”	of	the	Austrian	Social	Democratic	Party	(SDAP)	was	the	most	extensive	experiment	in	municipal	socialism	the	world	had	ever	seen,18	including	factory	councils	 and	wide-ranging	 cultural	 and	 educational	 programs	 for	workers.19	These	 projects	 certainly	 built	 upon	 previous	 initiatives	 carried	 out	 by	communists,	 socialists	 and	 social	 liberals,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 empowering	 the	urban	proletariat	and	improve	their	living	conditions,	but	the	sheer	scope	and	virtual	 take-over	of	what	had	up	until	 recently	been	a	city	dominated	by	 the	bourgeoisie	and	aristocracy	signaled	the	coming	of	a	new	age.	
                                            14	Ibid.,	63.	15	Eric	Kandel,	The	Age	of	Insight:	The	Quest	to	Understand	the	Unconscious	in	Art,	
Mind,	and	Brain,	from	Vienna	1900	to	the	Present	(New	York:	Random	House,	2012).	16	Allan	Janik,	Wittgenstein’s	Vienna	Revisited	(New	Brunswick,	USA:	Transaction,	2001).	17	Helmut	Gruber,	Red	Vienna:	Experiment	in	Working-Class	Culture,	1919-1934	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991),	12.	18	Franz	Borkenau,	Austria	and	After	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	1938),	160–75.	19	Gruber,	Red	Vienna,	21.	
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The	“Austro-Marxism”	advocated	by	the	SDAP	included	an	attempt	to	bridge	the	widening	chasm	between	revolutionary	communists	adhering	 to	 the	Russian	revolution	and	the	Bolshevik-controlled	Comintern,	and	the	reformist	Marxism	of	thinkers	 like	Karl	Kautsky	and	the	German	Social	Democratic	Party.	 In	the	tumultuous	days	of	1919,	soldiers’	and	workers’	councils,	influenced	by	Soviet	models	 in	Bavaria	and	Hungary,	 threatened	a	revolution	 in	Austria	 following	the	Bolshevik	example,	but	 the	SDAP	out-manoeuvred	these	elements	within	the	 councils	 themselves.20	 Austro-Marxists	 like	 Otto	 Bauer,	 Max	 Adler	 and	Rudolf	 Hilferding	 preached	 a	 third	way	 of	 socialism:	 between	 the	 orthodox,	“quietist”	parliamentarism	of	Kautsky,	and	the	activist,	revolutionary	stance	of	Lenin.	In	theoretical	terms,	this	was	related	to	a	Kantian	quest	to	find	a	moral,	
a	priori	 basis	 for	 socialism,	 transcending	even	 the	 category	of	 class.	 In	more	practical	 terms,	 their	 program	 centred	 on	 Vienna	 as	 a	 socialist	 laboratory.21	According	to	Gruber:		 “Unlike	other	versions	of	Marxism,	 it	 [Austro-marxism]	promised	a	 foretaste	of	 the	socialist	utopia	of	the	future	in	the	present	by	locating	the	beginning	of	the	great	transformation	leading	to	a	new	socialist	humanity	within	capitalist	society	itself,	before	the	ultimate	revolution.”22		This	foretaste	was	the	creation	of	a	new,	working	class	culture	taking	place	in	one	of	the	very	centres	of	European	bourgeois	life.	Karl	Polanyi	(1886	–	1964)	called	 it	 “one	of	 the	most	 spectacular	 triumphs	of	Western	history”.23	Mises’	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	the	intellectual	circles	he	frequented	were	certainly	influenced	by	what	was	going	on	around	 them.	 In	a	 footnote	 to	his	magnum	opus	The	Great	Transformation,	Polanyi	remarked	that	he	was	“first	drawn	to	the	study	of	Speenhamland	and	 its	effects	on	 the	classical	economists	by	 the	
                                            20	Ibid.,	16.	21	Leszek	Kolakowski,	Main	Currents	of	Marxism:	The	Founders,	the	Golden	Age,	the	
Breakdown	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2005),	242.	22	Gruber,	Red	Vienna,	5.	23	Karl	Polanyi,	The	Great	Transformation:	The	Political	and	Economic	Origins	of	Our	
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highly	suggestive	social	and	economic	situation	in	Austria	as	it	developed	after	the	Great	War.”	Polanyi	further	wrote:		 “Here,	in	a	purely	capitalist	surrounding,	a	socialist	municipality	established	a	regime	which	was	 bitterly	 attacked	 by	 economic	 liberals.	 No	 doubt	 some	 of	 the	 interventionist	 policies	practiced	by	the	municipality	were	incompatible	with	the	mechanism	of	a	market	economy.	But	purely	 economic	 arguments	 did	 not	 exhaust	 an	 issue	 which	 was	 primarily	 social,	 not	economic.”24				As	we	will	see,	the	issue	was	certainly	more	than	economic	also	to	the	liberals,	but	they	nonetheless	did	their	best	to	frame	the	debate	in	economic	terms.	At	one	 point	 during	 the	 time	 of	 Red	 Vienna,	 a	 Viennese	 mayor	 is	 to	 have	proclaimed,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	Mises	 that	 “The	 Viennese	 is	 born	 into	 Social	Democracy.	 He	 lives	 in	 it	 and	 dies	 as	 he	 has	 lived”.	 Mises	 is	 said	 to	 have	responded	with	the	Austrian	proverb	“Some	say	that	even	the	owners	of	four-story	houses	are	mortal”,	indicating	that	he	did	not	think	the	experiment	would	last.25	In	these	new,	post-imperial	times,	the	challenge	of	socialism	meant	that	the	debates	within	Viennese	 intellectual	circles	were	about	nothing	 less	than	the	possibility	of	a	 functioning	social	system	and	world	order.	Outside	of	 the	salons,	 but	 not	 entirely	 unconnected	 to	 the	 most	 radical	 members	 of	 the	bourgeoisie,	such	as	Polanyi,	the	labour	movement	was	in	power;	carrying	out	reforms	 and	 demanding	 political	 representation,	 justice	 and	 freedom	 from	abject	 poverty.	 It	 was	 into	 this	 context	 that	Mises,	 the	 nobleman	 advisor	 of	business	leaders,	struck	his	blow	against	the	very	idea	of	socialism.26			
                                            24	Ibid.,	298.	25	Jörg	Guidi	Hülsmann,	Mises:	The	Last	Knight	of	Liberalism	(Auburn,	Alabama:	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2007),	490.	26	Keith	Tribe	has	noted	that	Max	Weber	also	criticized	Neurath’s	ideas	strongly,	but	that	his	assessment	was	less	overtly	anti-socialist,	and	consequently	had	little	influence	over	the	ensuing	calculation	debates.	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	
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Mises’	argument	It	 should	 be	 mentioned	 that	 Mises	 was	 not	 the	 first	 Austrian	 economist	 to	criticize	socialism.	In	1866	Max	Menger	(1838	–	1911),	the	older	brother	of	the	more	 famous	 Carl	 Menger	 (1840	 –	 1921)	 and	 more	 of	 a	 politician	 than	 a	theoretical	 economist,	 had	 gone	 directly	 to	 workers	 and	 independent	 shop-owner	 to	 try	 and	 convince	 them	 that	 socialism	was	 not	 the	 answer	 to	 their	problems.		In	a	lecture	to	the	society	of	printers,	he	argued	that	socialism	was	a	denial	of	the	basic	laws	of	the	economy.27	This	is	the	line	that	Mises	developed	further,	 in	 a	 context	 where	 the	 issue	 was	 arguably	 an	 even	 more	 pressing	concern	than	it	had	been	in	the	days	of	Marx	and	Ferdinand	Lasalle.	Mises’	1920	essay	on	socialist	calculation	was	based	on	a	lecture	he	had	delivered	in	1919,	and	was	presented	as	a	response	to	the	socialist	economist	Otto	Neurath	(1882	–	1945).	Neurath	had	presented	a	proposal	for	a	centrally	planned,	socialized	economy	without	the	use	of	money,28	which	built	on	one	of	his	own	works	on	economic	 planning	 from	 1917.29	 Dekker	 notes	 that	 “the	 Viennese	 society,	especially	 during	 the	Habsburg	 period,	was	 extremely	 unequal.	 The	 cultural	(and	 political)	 elite	 was	 formed	 by	 a	 couple	 of	 hundred	 families”.	 Thus,	everyone	knew	(or	were	related	to)	everyone	else	who	mattered	in	Viennese	cultural	and	intellectual	life.30	There	was	some	room	for	left-leaning	thinkers	in	parts	of	this	milieu,	at	least	in	the	left-wing	of	the	Wiener	Kreis	(Vienna	Circle)	of	logical	positivists,	of	which	Neurath	was	a	member.	Due	to	his	working	class	background,	insistence	on	wearing	a	working	man’s	cap	and	refusal	to	adjust	
                                            27	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	52.	28	Gareth	Dale,	Karl	Polanyi:	The	Limits	of	the	Market,	Key	Contemporary	Thinkers	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2010),	20.		29	Giandomenica	Becchio,	‘The	Early	Debate	on	Economic	Calculation	in	Vienna	(1919-1925).’,	Storia	Del	Pensiero	Economico,	no.	2	(2007):	134.	30	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
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his	accent	however,	Neurath	was	denied	entry	into	the	house	of	Moritz	Schlick	(1882	–	1936),	the	Kreis’	most	prominent	member.31			Neurath	had	for	many	years	been	trying	to	understand	the	workings	of	a	war	economy	and	was	attempting	to	 transplant	 those	 ideas	 into	a	blueprint	 for	a	socialist	 economy	 in	 peacetime.32	 In	 Economic	 Calculation	 in	 the	 Socialist	
Commonwealth,	 Mises	 made	 some	 references	 to	 Neurath	 and	 prominent	Marxists	 of	 the	 time,	 such	 as	 Otto	 Bauer	 and	 Karl	 Kautsky,	 but	 he	 mainly	directed	his	arguments	 to	Marxists	and	socialists	 in	general.	He	claimed	 that	even	though	socialist	parties	had	obtained	power	in	Russia,	Hungary,	Germany	and	Austria,	 “they	 still	 cautiously	 avoid	 the	 crucial	 question,	 leaving	 it	 to	 be	tackled	by	the	despised	‘Utopians.’’	(…)	The	only	possible	conclusions	from	all	these	 writings	 is	 that	 they	 are	 not	 even	 conscious	 of	 the	 larger	 problem	 of	economic	 calculation	 in	 a	 socialist	 society.”33	 Neurath	 had	 indicated	 that	socialization	would	lead	to	a	“natural	economy”	without	the	use	of	money,	and	in	a	footnote,	Mises	let	this	stand	as	the	ultimate	folly	of	the	general	project	of	socialization:	“Neurath	merely	overlooks	the	insuperable	difficulties	that	would	have	to	develop	with	economic	calculation	in	the	socialist	commonwealth”.34			In	what	was	also	a	scathing	critique	of	the	labour	theory	of	value,	Mises	noted	that	 without	money	 there	 would	 be	 no	 commensurability	 (the	 possibility	 of	weighing	different	means	up	against	each	other),	and	hence	no	possibility	for	rational	calculation.	Using	the	hypothetical	example	of	whether	or	not	to	build	a	new	railroad	line,	he	wrote	“It	is	not	possible	to	attain	the	desired	end	merely	by	counterbalancing	the	various	physical	expenses	and	physical	savings.	Where	one	cannot	express	hours	of	labor,	iron,	coal,	all	kinds	of	building	material	and	
                                            31	Ibid.,	37.	32	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	153.	33	Mises,	Economic	Calculation	in	The	Socialist	Commonwealth,	40.	34	Ibid.,	24.	
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other	 things	 necessary	 for	 the	 construction	 and	 upkeep	 of	 the	 railroad	 in	 a	common	unit,	it	is	not	possible	to	make	calculations	at	all.”35	In	a	later	article	on	the	importance	of	capital	goods,	Mises	would	write:	“All	material	civilization	is	based	 upon	 this	 "capitalistic"	 approach	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 production.”36	Capitalism	was	thus	the	basis	of	civilization,	and	on	the	question	of	“rational	calculation”,	Mises	truly	hammered	home	his	anti-socialist	message:		 “Without	economic	calculation	there	can	be	no	economy.	Hence,	in	a	socialist	state	wherein	the	pursuit	 of	 economic	 calculation	 is	 impossible,	 there	 can	 be	 –	 in	 our	 sense	 of	 the	 term	–	 no	economy	whatsoever.	(…)	Would	there,	in	fact,	be	any	such	thing	as	rational	conduct	at	all,	or,	indeed,	such	a	thing	as	rationality	and	logic	in	thought	itself?	Historically,	human	rationality	is	a	development	of	economic	life.	Could	it	then	obtain	when	divorced	therefrom?”37		Capitalism	was	to	be	understood	as	human	rationality	itself,38	and	socialism	as	an	 attack	 on	 this.	 Indeed,	 Dekker	 finds	 that	 “the	 defence	 of	 markets	 is	 the	defence	of	 civilization	 itself”	 for	both	Mises	and	 later	Hayek.39	The	degree	 to	which	 this	 very	 political	 undertaking	 is	 based	 on	 economic	 reasoning	 and	arguments	 about	 supply	 and	 demand	 and	 the	 appropriate	 methods	 of	production	is	worthy	of	note.	Mises	was	keen	to	base	his	critique	of	socialism	on	what	 he	 claimed	were	 rational,	 objective	 facts;	 hence	 turning	 a	 political,	civilizational	 debate	 concerning,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 power	 and	representation,	 into	 an	 intellectual,	 or	 even	 technical	 debate.	 This	 Austrian	
                                            35	Ibid.,	24–25.	36	Ludwig	Mises,	Economic	Freedom	and	Interventionism	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2007),	31.	37	Mises,	Economic	Calculation	in	The	Socialist	Commonwealth,	21.	38	It	is	still	debated	what	Mises	really	meant	by	“rational”	and	also	the	word	“impossible”,	which	appears	at	other	points	in	his	texts	Günther	Chaloupek	notes	that	“The	impossibility	of	a	socialist	economy	does	not	imply	the	impossibility	of	goods	production	as	such	under	socialism;	but	it	does	imply	the	impossibility	of	economically	rational	production…”Günther	K.	Chaloupek,	‘The	Austrian	Debate	on	Economic	Calculation	in	a	Socialist	Economy’,	History	of	Political	Economy	22,	no.	4	(1990):	661.	39	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
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position	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the	positivism	of	the	Wiener	Kreis	or	the	idea	that	 the	economy	 is	a	domain	better	 left	 to	 the	experts.	 In	a	way,	Mises	was	arguing	against	precisely	this	notion	that	the	economy	could	be	tinkered	with	by	technocrats	in	order	to	create	a	better	society.	Yet	Mises	presented	his	view	as	 that	of	an	expert,	 an	expert	who	knows	how	markets	work	and	 therefore	understands	that	they	are	the	bedrock	of	civilization	and	not	to	be	dispensed	or	tinkered	with.		In	 the	 following	 year	 of	 1921,	Mises	 published	 a	 tome	 called	Sozialismus,	 in	which	 he	 claimed,	 among	 many	 other	 things,	 that	 “it	 is	 characteristic	 of	Socialism	 to	 discover	 in	 social	 institutions	 the	 origins	 of	 unalterable	 facts	 of	nature,	and	to	endeavour,	by	reforming	these	institutions,	to	reform	nature.”40	In	Sozialismus	he	would	use	a	variety	of	arguments	against	socialism,	and	the	contempt	with	which	he	held	 the	very	 ideal	 is	 clear.	Methodologically,	Mises	was	not	known	 for	making	naturalistic	 arguments,	 and	 the	 rhetorical	 excess	cited	above	is	not	generally	seen	to	be	symptomatic	of	his	writing.41	However,	the	suggestion	that	human	rationality	would	wither	away	in	a	socialist	society	and	the	claim	that	socialism	was	an	attempt	to	reform	nature,	suggests	that	at	base	this	was	far	from	a	technical	policy	issue	as	far	as	Mises	was	concerned.	Instead	 it	 was	 a	 highly	 charged	 question	 concerning	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	modern	social	order	and	the	progress	of	humankind.			
The	emergence	of	Hayek	Friedrich	von	Hayek	was	18	years	younger	than	Mises,	born	in	in	Vienna	in	1899	to	 a	 medical	 doctor	 and	 the	 heiress	 of	 a	 wealthy,	 land-owning	 family.	 His	connections	to	the	lost	world	of	Fin-de-siècle	Vienna	were	thus	strong;	indeed	
                                            40	Ludwig	Mises,	Socialism	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	1932),	102.	41	Nicholas	Gane,	‘Sociology	and	Neoliberalism:	A	Missing	History’,	Sociology	48,	no.	6	(2014):	1092–1106.	
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Hayek	was	the	cousin	of	none	other	than	Ludwig	Wittgenstein.	Upon	returning	from	service	in	the	First	World	War,	Hayek	studied	law	and	political	science	at	the	University	of	Vienna.	There	he	had	originally	been	drawn	to	the	politics	of	his	first	mentor,	von	Wieser,42	who	according	to	a	later	biographer	of	Hayek	was	“slightly	 tainted	 by	 Fabian	 Socialist	 sympathies”.43	 These	 stains	 of	 socialism	disappeared	quickly	when	Hayek	started	working	for	Mises	at	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	 in	 1920.	 He	 later	 said	 of	 Mises’	 1921	 book	 Sozialismus	 that	 it	“fundamentally	altered	the	outlook	of	many	of	the	young	idealists	returning	to	their	university	studies	after	World	War	I”,	adding:	“I	know,	 for	 I	was	one	of	them”.44			Intellectuals	 in	 Vienna	 would	 hold	 private	 seminars	 in	 these	 days,	 centred	around	the	different	Kreise	(circles).	The	Mises	Kreis	met	every	Friday	evening	in	 Mises’	 home.	 They	 had	 several	 rituals,	 including	 specially	 written	 songs,	which	 Dekker	 calls	 “alternative	 strategies	 to	 establish	 legitimacy.45	 The	existence	of	circles	and	private	seminars	was	due	 in	part	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	University	of	Vienna	had	few	chairs,	not	to	mention	a	culture	of	anti-semitism;	therefore	they	did	not	employ	most	of	the	leading	lights	of	Viennese	intellectual	life.46	The	subject	of	socialist	accounting	became	a	hot	topic	in	the	Kreise,	and	also	 in	 the	 many	 Viennese	 journals	 and	 publications	 relating	 to	 economics,	politics	 and	 philosophy.	 Karl	 Polanyi	 was	 editor	 of	 the	 economics	 journal	
Volkswirt,	and	he	was	amongst	those	who	dedicated	his	own	Privatseminar	to	the	issue	of	socialist	accounting.47	Hayek	was	one	of	the	participants	in	Mises’	
                                            42	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	142.	43	Ebenstein,	Friedrich	Hayek,	26.	44	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	144.	45	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	30.	46	Janik,	Wittgenstein’s	Vienna	Revisited,	248.	47	Jamie	Peck,	‘Remaking	Laissez-Faire’,	Progress	in	Human	Geography	32,	no.	1	(2008):	79.	
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seminar,	 along	 with	 later	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	members	 like	 Fritz	 Machlup	(1902	 –	 1983)	 and	 Gottfried	 von	 Haberler	 (1900	 –	 1995).48	 Hayek	 also	organized	his	own	circle,	known	as	the	Geistkreis.49	Also	in	attendance	in	Mises’	seminar	at	one	point	was	the	young	British	economist	Lionel	Robbins	(1898	–	1984),	 who	 was	 much	 taken	 with	 Mises	 and	 the	 staunch	 anti-socialism	 of	Austrian	economics.	Robbins,	who	had	become	professor	at	the	early	age	of	29,	was	a	 student	of	 the	 liberal	 economist	Edwin	Cannan	 (1861	–	1935),	 and	 in	1933	he	persuaded	his	new	acquaintance	Hayek	 to	 take	up	a	position	at	 the	London	School	of	Economics.	This	was	a	conscious	effort	on	Robbins’	part	of	bringing	 Austrian	 economic	 ideas	 to	 Great	 Britain,	 and	 as	 we	 shall	 see,	 the	changed	context	contributed	to	an	important	development	of	Hayek’s	ideas			
From	socialism	to	business	cycles	Even	 though	 the	 guild	 socialism	 of	 G.D.H.	 Cole	 (1889	 –	 1959)	 had	 been	inspirational	 to	 some	Viennese	 socialists,	 in	particular	 the	before-mentioned	Karl	Polanyi,50	the	economic	debates	in	Great	Britain	were	quite	different	from	those	 on	 the	 continent.	 Although	 certainly	 not	 radical,	 there	was	 a	 different	approach	in	the	UK	to	what	Mark	Blaug	called	“interventionism”:		 “It	 was	 the	 Austrian	 School	 that	 was	 markedly	 conservative	 and	 given	 over	 to	 attacks	 on	socialism	and	the	espousal	of	laissez-faire.	The	aversion	to	radical	politics	was	a	characteristic	note	 in	 Vienna	 seminars,	 just	 as	 interventionism	 and	 a	 bored	 attitude	 to	 Marxism	 was	characteristic	of	the	Cambridge	economist.”51		
                                            48	Eamonn	Butler,	Friedrich	Hayek:	The	Ideas	and	Influence	of	the	Libertarian	
Economist,	Harriman	Economic	Essentials	(Petersfield,	Hampshire:	Harriman	House,	2012),	12.	49	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	33.	50	Kari	Polanyi	Levitt	and	Kenneth	McRobbie,	Karl	Polanyi	In	Vienna:	The	
Contemporary	Significance	of	The	Great	Transformation	(Black	Rose	Books	Limited,	2006),	317.	51	Mark	Blaug,	Economic	Theory	in	Retrospect	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1962),	283.	
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In	Great	Britian,	Robbins	was	thus	not	debating	with	socialists,	but	rather	with	the	teachings	of	Alfred	Marshall	(1842	–	1942),	the	grand	old	man	of	Victorian	economics,52	and	in	particular	the	interventionist	economics	of	Marshall’s	very	popular	new	protégé:	John	Maynard	Keynes	(1883	–	1946).	In	his	1926	lecture	“The	End	of	Laissez-Faire”,	Keynes	had	heralded	a	new	era	in	economic	policy	making,	one	in	which	increased	government	spending	was	to	be	put	to	use	to	create	 demand	 and	 thus	 ameliorate	 slumps	 in	 the	 business	 cycle.	 Robbins	hoped	that	Austrian	capital	theory,	as	expounded	by	Mises	and	Hayek,	would	be	a	powerful	antidote	to	Keynes’	claims	in	Treatise	on	Money	from	1930,	where	he	had	argued	specifically	for	higher	government	spending.	What	has	later	been	called	the	Austrian	Business	Cycle	Theory	is	a	somewhat	more	technical	issue	than	the	attack	on	socialism,	but	it	amounted	to	a	claim	that	economic	slumps	resulted	from	artificially	low	interest	rates.	The	Austrian	school	thus	prescribed	policies	of	governmental	passivity	in	order	to	let	the	downturn	run	its	course,	instead	 of	 making	 things	 even	 worse	 by	 injecting	 capital	 and	 “artificially”	inflating	 the	 economy.53	 Dekker	 has	 drawn	 lineages	 between	 this	 line	 of	reasoning	 in	Austrian	economics	with	what	was	known	as	the	“therapeutical	nihilism”	 of	 Viennese	medicine.	 In	 this	 tradition,	 the	 limited	 capacity	 of	 the	scientist	or	doctor	to	fully	understand	nature	was	highlighted,	and	so	“the	role	of	the	doctor	is	not	to	be	a	healing	artist,	but	he	should	be	a	student	of	nature.”	The	 physician	 Joseph	 Dietl	 (1804	 –	 1878)	 wrote	 “Whether	 a	 treated	 illness	finally	 cures	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 doctor,	 rather	 it	 is	dependent	on	the	relevant	forces	of	nature	that	determine	the	outcome	of	the	illness”.54	 Similarly,	 the	 Austrian	 argument	 against	 counter-cyclical	 spending	was	 that	 the	economy	had	 to	run	 its	course,	 since	government	 interventions	
                                            52	Robert	L.	Heilbroner,	The	Worldly	Philosophers:	The	Lives,	Times	and	Ideas	of	the	
Great	Economic	Thinkers	(Simon	and	Schuster,	2011),	172.	53	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	21–22.	54	Quoted	in	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	
of	Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered,	113.	
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based	on	a	lacking	appreciation	of	how	the	economy	works,	would	only	lead	to	more	 interventions,	 and	 eventually	 to	 full	 socialism.	 “Either	 capitalism	 or	socialism;	there	is	no	middle	of	the	road”,	wrote	Mises	in	1926.55	Fritz	Machlup	wrote	in	1930:	“The	drowning	man	clings	to	all	those	who	still	have	their	head	above	water	 and	pulls	 them	with	 him.	But	 if	we	want	 to	 save	 the	 other,	we	should	suppress	our	pity,	and	let	the	drowning	man	drown.”56		As	is	suggested	by	his	above	quoted	statements	regarding	the	book	Sozialismus,	Hayek	adopted	Mises’	project	of	fighting	socialism.	Furthermore,	he	took	it	in	directions	 the	 more	 traditional	 Mises	 did	 not	 agree	 with.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	British	debate	related	more	to	technical	issues	of	how	to	deal	or	not	to	deal	with	periods	of	boom	and	bust	 than	with	 the	possibility	of	 socialism	did	not	 stop	Hayek	from	bringing	the	ideas	of	the	socialist	calculation	debate	to	an	English	language	context.	At	his	1933	inaugural	lecture	at	LSE,	entitled	“The	Trend	of	Economic	Thinking”,	Hayek	said	that	in	his	new	country,	there	were	“very	few	people	left	today	who	are	not	socialists”.57	As	we	will	see,	this	was	something	he	sought	 to	 rectify	 this	 by	 doing	 more	 than	 just	 giving	 obscure	 lectures	 on	business	cycle	theory.58			
Collectivist	Economic	Planning	In	 a	 critique	 of	 Bruce	 Caldwell’s	 intellectual	 biography	 of	 Hayek,	 Philip	Mirowski	has	argued	that	“the	key	to	understanding	the	turns	and	reversals	in	his	 [Hayek’s]	 thought	 lay	 in	 his	 politics,	 and	 not	 as	 Caldwell	 has	 it,	 in	 some	
                                            55	Ludwig	Mises,	A	Critique	of	Interventionism	(New	York:	Arlington	House,	1926).	56	Quoted	in	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	
of	Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered.	57	Bruce	Caldwell,	Socialism	and	War,	The	Collected	Works	of	F.A.	Hayek	(Chicago:	Chicago	University	Press,	1997),	14.	58	Hayek’s	lecturing	style	in	these	days	was	famously	rather	difficult,	with	a	heavy	use	of	mathematical	equations	and	a	thick	Austrian	accent	that	did	little	to	further	his	communication.	See	for	instance	Nicholas	Wapshott,	Keynes	Hayek:	The	Clash	
That	Defined	Modern	Economics,	1st	ed	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Co,	2011),	65–81.	
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abstract	philosophical	doctrines”.59	I	think	this	is	a	fair	assessment,	and	would	agree	that	the	fight	against	socialism	was	the	main	motivating	force	behind	the	development	of	Hayek’s	thought.	An	important	part	of	this	project	was	his	1935,	edited	 volume	 entitled	 Collectivist	 Economic	 Planning.	 It	 included	 the	 first	English	translation	of	Mises’	original	article,	translations	of	early	contributions	by	N.G.	Pierson,	Georg	Enrico	Barone	and	Georg	Halm,	plus	a	preface	and	an	epilogue	by	Hayek	himself.60	Hayek’s	own	texts	were	entitled	“The	Nature	and	History	of	the	Problem”	and	“The	Present	State	of	the	Debate”.	The	volume	was	published	in	conjuncture	with	the	book	Economic	Planning	in	Soviet	Russia	by	Boris	Brutzkus	(1874	–	1938).	In	his	preface,	Hayek	wrote:		 ”It	is	the	purpose	of	this	volume	therefore	to	present	within	two	covers	the	main	results	of	the	critical	analysis	of	socialist	planning	attempted	by	Continental	scholars.	Together	with	the	translation	of	Professor	Mises'	major	work	and	the	companion	volume	containing	Professor	Brutzkus'	studies	on	Russia	it	should	give	a	fairly	comprehensive	survey	of	the	problems	raised	by	any	kind	of	planning.”61		Hayek	 was	 indicating	 that	 the	 arguments	 against	 socialism	 would	 cause	problems	for	any	kind	of	planning,	echoing	Mises’	remarks	that	 there	was	no	middle	 road	 between	 capitalism	 and	 socialism,	 and	 foreshadowing	 his	 own	later	arguments	in	The	Road	to	Serfdom.	In	his	concluding	essay,	Hayek	probed	deeply	 into	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 a	 theoretical	 socialist	 society,	 focusing	especially	on	problems	of	competition	and	the	function	of	the	entrepreneur.	He	suggested	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 marginal	 costs	 would	 cause	 problems	 for	socialism,	and	that	the	analysis	of	Austrian	economics	had	“enabled	us	not	only	to	examine	some	of	the	supposed	advantages	which	are	commonly	associated	with	 any	 form	 of	 planning	 but	 also	 to	 indicate	 certain	 problems	which	 will	
                                            59	Philip	Mirowski,	‘Naturalizing	the	Market	on	the	Road	to	Revisionism:	Bruce	Caldwell’s	Hayek’s	Challenge	and	the	Challenge	of	Hayek	Interpretation’,	Journal	of	
Institutional	Economics	3,	no.	3	(2015):	351.	60	Friedrich	Hayek,	Collectivist	Economic	Planning	(London:	Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul	Ltd.,	1935).	61	Ibid.,	39.	
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necessarily	 accompany	 planning	 under	 socialism.”62	 Yet	 again,	 the	 argument	against	socialism	was	thought	to	have	implications	for	“any	form	of	planning”.	Hayek	 argued	 that	 a	 socialist	 society	 might	 possibly	 be	 more	 equal	 and	“improve	the	relative	position	of	the	working	class”,	but	that	the	gains	of	that	would	depend	“entirely	on	the	extent	to	which	productivity	 is	reduced”.63	He	admitted	 to	 having	 no	 definite	 conclusion	 as	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 this	 would	happen,	 but	 of	 course	 suggested	 as	 much	 with	 his	 whole	 intervention,	 and	especially	in	this	final	paragraph:			 “…	at	least	the	decision	cannot	be	made	before	the	alternatives	are	known,	before	it	is	at	least	approximately	realized	what	the	price	is	that	has	to	be	paid.	That	there	is	still	so	little	clarity	on	this	point,	that	it	is	still	possible	to	deny	that	it	is	impossible	to	have	the	best	of	both	worlds,	is	mainly	due	to	the	fact	that	most	socialists	have	little	idea	of	what	the	system	they	advocate	is	really	to	be	like,	whether	it	is	to	be	a	planned	or	a	competitive	system.	(...)	But	nobody	has	yet	demonstrated	how	planning	and	competition	can	be	rationally	combined;	and	so	long	as	this	is	not	done	one	is	certainly	entitled	to	insist	that	these	two	alternatives	are	kept	clearly	separate,	and	that	anybody	who	advocates	socialism	must	decide	for	one	or	the	other	and	then	demonstrate	how	he	proposes	to	overcome	the	difficulties	inherent	in	the	system	he	has	chosen.”64		The	duality	between	“planning”	and	“competition”	had	thus	been	established.	As	we	will	see	however,	it	was	to	become	a	somewhat	ambiguous	duality,	when	the	 neoliberals	 themselves	 decided	 that	 states	 were	 important	 to	 achieve	competition.			
The	challenge	of	market	socialism	Thus	 far,	 I	 have	 referred	 to	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates	 in	 the	 plural,	following	for	instance	the	philosopher	John	O’Neill	who	holds	that	“There	was	not	 one	 debate,	 but	 many”.65	 It	 has	 now	 become	 common	 to	 divide	 the	
                                            62	Ibid.,	226.	63	Ibid.,	240.	64	Ibid.,	241.	65	John	O’Neill,	The	Market:	Ethics,	Knowledge	and	Politics	(London	-	New	York:	Routledge,	1998),	112.	
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controversy	into	a	German	language	debate	and	an	English	language	debate.66	The	German	language	debate	was	initiated	by	Mises	and	took	place	mainly	in	Vienna.	The	English	language	debate	was	instigated	by	Hayek’s	publication	of	
Collectivist	Economic	Planning,	some	15	years	after	Mises’	original	intervention.	It	seems	reasonable	to	see	this	publication	as	a	follow-up	to	Hayek’s	comment	two	years	earlier	that	in	Britain,	very	few	people	were	not	socialists.67	It	also	seems	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 within	 the	 context	 of	 that	 remark,	 Hayek	thought	 of	 Keynes	 as	 a	 type	 of	 socialist,	 due	 to	 the	 latter’s	 wish	 that	governments	 “interfere”	 in	markets	 to	 counter	 slumps	 in	 the	business	 cycle.	This	seemed	to	constitute	a	form	of	planning.	However,	it	was	not	Keynes	who	responded	 to	 Hayek,	 but	 socialist	 economists	 such	 as	 Oskar	 Lange	 (1904	 –	1965)	and	Abba	Lerner	(1903	–	1982),	later	to	be	known	as	market	socialists.	In	the	German	language	debate,	Mises	engaged	with	Marxists	of	various	stripes,	guild	 socialists	 and	 others.	 What	 he	 never	 encountered	 were	 socialist,	neoclassical	economists	like	Lange	and	Lerner.	Marxists	and	guild	socialists	did	not	 adhere	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 marginal	 revolution,	 that	 had	 been	 put	forward	more	or	 less	 simultaneously	by	Stanley	 Jevons	 (1835	–	1882),	Léon	Walras	(1834	–	1910)	and	Carl	Menger.68	The	marginal	revolution	amounted	to	a	move	 towards	 formalized	equilibrium-based	models	of	 the	economy,	away	from	 the	 labour	 theory	 of	 value	 of	 classical	 political	 economists	 like	 Smith,	Ricardo	 and	 Marx.	 Menger	 is	 known	 as	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 Austrian	economics,	and	we	have	seen	that	Mises’	critique	of	socialism	was	partly	based	on	a	critique	of	the	labour	theory	of	value.	The	ideas	of	market	socialist	thus	represented	a	new	challenge	to	Austrian	economists,	since	they	too	based	their	thinking	on	the	neoclassical	framework.	
                                            66	See	for	instance	Chaloupek,	‘The	Austrian	Debate	on	Economic	Calculation	in	a	Socialist	Economy’.	67	Caldwell,	Socialism	and	War,	14.	68	Philip	Mirowski,	More	Heat	Than	Light	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1989),	254.	
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The	 Polish	 economist	 Oskar	 Lange’s	 article	 “On	 the	 Economic	 Theory	 of	Socialism”	was	published	in	two	parts	in	the	Review	of	Economic	Studies	in	1936	and	 1937.	 In	 1938	 he	 co-authored	 a	 book	 with	 the	 much	 older	 American	economist	 Fred	 Taylor	 (1855	 –	 1932),	 who	 had	 written	 on	 the	 issue	 much	earlier,	 under	 the	 same	 title.69	 Since	Lange	was	 to	become	 the	most	 famous,	socialist	 participant	 in	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debate,	 some	 scholars	 have	wrongly	 referred	 to	 the	 whole	 controversy	 as	 “The	 Mises-Lange	 Debate”.70	Unlike	 those	who	 had	 argued	with	Mises	 in	 the	 German	 language	 debates,	 ,	Lange	 made	 his	 arguments	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 neoclassical	 economics.	 He	 thus	conceded	 several	 of	 Mises’	 arguments	 out	 of	 hand,	 since	 Mises	 too	 was	operating	largely	within	the	same	frame,	namely	neoclassical	economics,	which	accepted	both	the	marginal	theory	of	value	and	the	need	for	monetary	units.	In	his	intervention,	Lange	conceded	to	Mises’	argument	about	the	use	of	money,	and	more	importantly,	to	the	argument	that	the	price	mechanism	was	vital	for	a	modern,	social	order.	Still,	he	claimed	that	a	society	with	socialized	production	could	 have	 mechanisms	 similar	 to	 markets,	 and	 that	 this	 would	 enable	 a	planning	agency	to	carry	out	the	calculation	necessary	in	order	for	a	socialist	economy	to	be	“rational”	by	Mises’	standards.	Referring	to	earlier	work	done	by	Vilfredo	Pareto	(1848	–	1923)	and	Enrico	Barone	(1859	–	1924),	Lange	could	state	 that	 economic	 calculation	was	mathematically	 possible,	 and	 also	 claim	that	 these	markets	would	 be	more	 efficient	 than	 the	markets	 of	 a	 capitalist	economy.	Market	socialism	thus	became	the	name	for	a	current	of	thought,	very	different	from	Marxism,	which	argued	that	a	socialist	society	was	the	best	way	to	achieve	the	ideals	of	efficiency	posited	by	neoclassical	economics.71		
                                            69	Murray	N.	Rothbard,	‘The	End	of	Socialism	and	the	Calculation	Debate	Revisited’,	
The	Review	of	Austrian	Economics	5,	no.	2	(1991):	51–76.	70	Robert	L.	Heilbroner,	‘Analysis	and	Vision	in	the	History	of	Modern	Economic	Thought’,	Journal	of	Economic	Litterature	28,	no.	3	(September	1980):	1100.	71	See	also	Frank	Roosevelt	and	David	Belkin,	Why	Market	Socialism?	(Armonk,	NY:	M.E.	Sharpe	Inc.,	1994).	
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The	idea	of	incorporating	the	mechanisms	of	prices	and	markets	into	a	socialist	system	was	a	tremendous	challenge	to	Hayek.	These	were	the	very	mechanisms	he	 and	Mises	 had	 claimed	 that	 the	modern	 social	 order	 rested	 on,	 and	 that	would	be	lost	in	a	socialist	society.	Market	socialism	was	a	brand	new	idea,	itself	inspired	by	the	contributions	of	Mises,72	and	it	avoided	most	of	the	attacks	made	by	 Mises	 in	 the	 German	 language	 debates.	 According	 to	 Peter	 J.	 Boettke,	economist	 and	 currently	 the	 president	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society,	 “Lange’s	response	 on	 neoclassical	 grounds	 took	 the	 Austrians	 by	 surprise	 (…)	 In	response,	both	Mises	and	Hayek	started	to	articulate	more	clearly	and	precisely	what	differentiated	Austrian	economics	from	the	neoclassical	orthodoxy.”73	The	economist	 Giandomenica	 Becchio	 confirms:	 “In	 the	 debate	 on	 socialism,	 the	strongest	 arguments	 against	 the	 Austrians	 were	 raised	 by	 neoclassical	economists.”74	Because	of	this,	Murray	N.	Rothbard	claims	that	Hayek	later	had	to	 abandon	 Mises’	 “extreme	 position”.	 According	 to	 him,	 Hayek	 and	 Lionel	Robbins	“fell	back	on	a	second	line	of	defence.”75	In	this,	Hayek	would	turn	the	debate	 away	 from	 questions	 of	 commensurability,	 efficiency	 and	 rationality,	towards	the	questions	of	epistemology,	that	is	theories	of	knowledge	and	how	it	 is	 arrived	 at.	 The	 challenge	 put	 forth	 by	 market	 socialists	 was	 to	 occupy	Hayek’s	attention	for	many	years.	As	late	as	1946	or	1947,	he	would	devote	a	
                                            72	In	his	1936	article,	Lange	famously	wrote:	”Socialists	have	certainly	good	reason	to	be	grateful	to	Professor	Mises,	the	great	advocatus	diaboli	of	their	cause.	For	it	was	his	powerful	challenge	that	forced	the	socialists	to	recognize	the	importance	of	an	adequate	system	of	economic	accounting	(…)	the	merit	of	having	caused	the	socialists	to	approach	this	problem	systematically	belongs	entirely	to	Professor	Mises.	Both	as	an	expression	of	recognition	for	the	great	service	rendered	by	him	and	as	a	memento	of	the	prime	importance	of	sound	economic	accounting,	a	statue	of	Professor	Mises	ought	to	occupy	an	honourable	place	in	the	great	hall	of	the	Ministry	of	Socialization	or	of	the	Central	Planning	Board	of	the	socialist	state.”	73	Peter	J.	Boettke,	‘Where	Did	Economics	Go	Wrong?	Modern	Economics	As	A	Flight	From	Reality’,	Critical	Review	11,	no.	1	(Winter	1997):	16–17.	74	Becchio,	‘The	Early	Debate	on	Economic	Calculation	in	Vienna	(1919-1925).’,	133.	75	Rothbard,	‘The	End	of	Socialism	and	the	Calculation	Debate	Revisited’,	54.	
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whole	seminar	at	LSE	to	dissect	the	arguments	of	Abba	Lerner’s	1944	book	The	
Economics	of	Control.76			
The	Knowledge	Argument		In	 Mises’	 original	 article,	 the	 market	 was	 indispensable	 mainly	 because	 it	allowed	human	beings	to	calculate	different	ends	up	against	each	other	through	the	use	of	monetary	units.77	But	after	Lange	and	others	had	demonstrated	the	theoretical	 possibility	 of	 market-like	 calculation	 carried	 out	 by	 a	 central	planning	 unit,	 Hayek’s	 case	 gradually	 became	 transformed	 into	 a	 claim	 that	rational	calculation	itself	was	actually	impossible,	since	the	grand	total	of	the	different	 ends	 to	which	 individuals	 aspire	was	never	 known	 in	 advance,	 but	only	 found	through	participation	 in	 the	market	order.	 “Competition”	was	the	key	term	as	Hayek	began	arguing	that	the	knowledge	of	what	a	society	ought	to	produce	and	how	was	only	 truly	arrived	at	 through	the	competitive	process;	something	 which	 made	 a	 mockery	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 could	 somehow	 be	planned	in	advance:		 “…	 the	 method	 which	 under	 given	 conditions	 is	 the	 cheapest	 is	 a	 thing	 which	 has	 to	 be	discovered,	 and	 to	 be	 discovered	 anew,	 sometimes	 almost	 from	 day	 to	 day	 by	 the	entrepreneur…	 (…)	 it	 is	 the	main	merit	 of	 real	 competition	 that	 through	 it	 use	 is	made	 of	knowledge	divided	among	many	persons	which,	 if	 it	were	 to	be	used	 in	a	centrally	directed	economy,	would	all	have	to	enter	the	single	plan.	To	assume	that	all	this	knowledge	would	be	automatically	in	the	possession	of	the	planning	authority	seems	to	me	to	miss	the	main	point.”78		Hayek	 would	 develop	 what	 is	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “Knowledge	Argument”79	in	a	series	of	articles	written	through	the	1930s	and	40s,	including	the	classic	“The	Use	of	Knowledge	in	Society”,	published	in	1945.	His	argument	
                                            76	Interview	with	Mrs.	Dorothy	Hahn,	22.12.2015	77	O’Neill,	The	Market:	Ethics,	Knowledge	and	Politics,	117.	78	Caldwell,	Socialism	and	War,	133–34.	79	See	for	instance	Jack	Birner	and	Rudy	van	Zip,	Hayek,	Co-Ordination	and	Evolution:	
His	Legacy	in	Philosophy,	Politics,	Economics	and	the	History	of	Ideas	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge,	1994).	
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against	socialism	and	in	favour	of	capitalism	was	that	only	a	capitalist	society	with	private	ownership	can	have	markets	in	any	meaningful	sense	of	the	term.	The	 main	 functioning	 of	 markets	 was	 now	 thought	 to	 be	 epistemological:	Markets	gather	knowledge	about	what	to	produce	and	how	to	do	so	in	the	most	efficient	 way.	 Thus,	 markets	 effectively	 transpose	 the	 diverse	 wishes	 and	preferences	 of	 the	 millions	 of	 people	 which	 are	 bound	 together	 in	 modern	societies	 into	 a	 functioning	 social	 order,	 in	 a	way	 that	 planning	 could	 never	achieve	 nor	 mimic.	 This	 is	 what	 it	 means	 to	 see	 markets	 as	 mediators	 of	modernity.	It	could	be	argued	that	Mises	had	already	hinted	at	this	appreciation	of	 the	epistemological	workings	of	 the	market	mechanism,	but	 it	was	only	 in	Hayek’s	work	that	it	came	to	full	fruition.	
	
Differing	accounts	Accounts	and	interpretations	of	the	socialist	calculation	debates	are	many	and	differing,	and	so	it	is	worth	commenting	briefly	on	other	accounts	to	understand	what	the	contribution	of	this	chapter	has	been.	John	O’Neill	holds	that	“the	story	told	of	it	[the	socialist	calculation	debate]	are	myths”,80	whereas	Peter	J.	Boettke	has	compiled	a	nine-volume	work	entitled	Socialism	and	the	Market,	including	both	 original	 contributions	 and	 commentary.	 Work	 on	 this	 controversy	 is	abundant.	Yet	 it	 is	my	contention	that	much	of	 it	suffers	 from	combining	the	approach	of	intellectual	history	with	the	desire	to	take	sides	along	political	lines	and	therefore	continue	the	debate.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	I	find	this	type	of	rational	reconstruction	wholly	legitimate,	but	it	is	a	different	endeavour	to	 my	 own,	 which	 comes	 closer	 to	 what	 Richard	 Rorty	 called	 historical	reconstruction	 and	 intellectual	 history.81	 In	 this	 respect	 Boettke,	 who	 is	currently	 the	president	of	 the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	 sits	 rather	 firmly	on	 the	
                                            80	O’Neill,	The	Market:	Ethics,	Knowledge	and	Politics,	112.	81	Rorty,	Scheewind,	and	Skinner,	Philosophy	in	History:	Essays	in	the	Historiography	
of	Philosophy.	
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Austrian	side	and	O’Neill	occupies	a	position	trying	to	rescue	some	of	the	ideas	of	socialism,	although	he	favours	a	non-market	version.	The	sociologist	Johanna	Bockmann	 could	 be	 considered	 something	 of	 a	 modern	 market	 socialist,	whereas	 the	 before-mentioned	Murray	 N.	 Rothbard	 was	 a	 form	 of	 Austrian	libertarian,	 somewhat	 like	 Boettke,	 but	 of	 the	 so-called	 “anarcho-capitalist”	type,	and	therefore	almost	as	critical	of	Hayek	as	he	was	sympathetic	to	Mises.			This	tension	between	the	two	main	protagonists	on	the	neoliberal	side	is	worth	exploring.	 According	 to	 O’Neill,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Hayek	 built	 on	 Mises’	argument	has	been	severely	overestimated.	O’Neill	argues	that	Hayek	departed	from	both	Mises	and	 from	neoclassical	economics.	He	claims	that	knowledge	was	not	essential	to	Mises’	arguments,82	and	writes	that	in	focusing	on	epistemic	issues,	“it	is	not	Lange	that	departs	from	Mises	here,	but	Hayek.”83	Additionally,	O’Neill	 brings	 attention	 to	 Otto	 Neurath’s	 original	 positions	 on	 problems	 of	rationality	and	commensurability.	Part	of	the	reason	why	Neurath	argued	for	a	natural	 economy	 was	 because	 he	 criticized	 the	 notion	 that	 monetary	calculations	of	value	could	ever	be	rational	in	any	meaningful	sense	of	the	word.	As	 noted,	 Mises	 had	 argued	 against	 these	 positions,	 claiming	 that	 rational	decision-making	 required	money	 so	 that	 comparisons	 could	 be	 made	 when	choosing	to	prioritize	one	possible	end	over	another.	Lange	then	conceded	to	this	argument,	but	went	on	to	show	the	mathematical	possibility	of	economic	calculation	with	central	planning.	O’Neill	argues	persuasively	that	Hayek,	in	his	subsequent	criticism	of	Lange,	turned	the	debate	on	his	head,	actually	making	use	 of	Neurath’s	 original	 arguments.	Mises	 had	 argued	 that	 socialism	would	abolish	rationality;	whereas	Hayek	would	go	on	to	claim	that	rationalism	was	
                                            82	Although	perhaps	not	essential,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	focus	on	knowledge	was	at	least	present	also	in	Mises:	”The	naive	assumption	that	the	behaviour	of	the	Absolute	Good	is	quite	arbitrary.	We	have	no	standard	on	which	to	base	a	valid	decision	between	what	is	good	and	what	is	evil	in	this	context.”	Mises,	Socialism,	351.	83	O’Neill,	The	Market:	Ethics,	Knowledge	and	Politics,	120.	
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one	 of	 the	 main	 intellectual	 errors	 behind	 socialism.	 The	 rationality	 Mises	wanted	to	save	from	socialism	was	not	the	same	as	the	rational-ism	of	which	Hayek	accused	socialists	of	all	kinds,	but	the	terminology	does	say	something	about	the	varying	strategies	employed	to	argue	against	socialism	in	the	work	of	Mises	and	Hayek	respectively.			It	is	possible	to	find	commonalities	too	of	course,	and	Becchio	has	noted	that	Mises	did	have	an	emphasis	both	on	prices	and	the	role	of	knowledge,	and	that	this	“was	the	starting	point	for	Hayek	when,	in	the	mid-1930s,	he	reconstructed	the	debate	and	wrote	his	English	language	articles	on	the	role	of	knowledge	and	on	 the	meaning	of	 competition	 in	order	 to	 explain	 the	mechanisms	of	 a	 free	market.”84	The	key	role	of	Hayek	in	framing	the	debate	for	the	second,	English	language	 round	 is	 emphasized	 also	 by	 Johanna	 Bockmann.	 She	 claims	 that	Hayek,	when	arriving	in	London,	”created	the	Socialist	Calculation	Debate	from	the	scattered	writings	of	Mises,	Lange	and	earlier	authors,	and	thus	provided	a	strategy	 for	 right-wing	 and	 libertarian	 groups	 for	 decades	 to	 come.”85	 This	seems	 a	 stretch,	 since	 there	 certainly	 was	 a	 German	 language	 socialist	calculation	 debate	 before	 Hayek’s	 edited	 volume	 in	 1935,	 but	 Hayek’s	 very	active	role	in	the	transmission	of	ideas	when	framing	the	German	debate	to	an	English	speaking	audience	is	worthy	of	close	scrutiny.			In	 1940,	 Hayek	 wrote	 the	 article	 “Socialist	 Calculation	 III:	 The	 Competitive	‘Solution’”,	 in	 which	 he	 admitted	 that	 there	 were	 indeed	 two	 very	 different	arguments	against	socialism	in	play:			 “Two	chapters	in	the	discussion	of	the	economics	of	socialism	may	now	be	regarded	as	closed.	The	first	deals	with	the	belief	that	socialism	will	dispense	entirely	with	calculation	in	terms	of	value	and	will	replace	it	with	some	sort	of	calculation	in	natura	based	on	units	of	energy	or	of	some	other	physical	magnitude.	Although	this	view	is	not	yet	extinct	and	is	still	held	by	some	
                                            84	Becchio,	‘The	Early	Debate	on	Economic	Calculation	in	Vienna	(1919-1925).’,	142.	85	Johanna	Bockman,	Markets	in	the	Name	of	Socialism:	The	Left-Wing	Origins	of	
Neoliberalism	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2011),	31.	
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scientists	and	engineers,	 it	has	been	definitely	abandoned	by	economists.	The	second	closed	chapter	 deals	 with	 the	 proposal	 that	 values,	 instead	 of	 being	 left	 to	 be	 determined	 by	competition,	should	be	found	by	a	process	of	calculations	carried	out	by	the	planning	authority,	which	would	use	the	technique	of	mathematical	economics.”86		In	this	paragraph,	Bockmann’s	contention	that	Hayek,	through	his	framing	of	the	debate,	“dehistoricized	socialism	and	narrowed	its	definition	to	mean	only	state	 ownership	 and	 central	 planning”,87	 starts	 to	 seem	 more	 plausible.	 By	presenting	the	socialist	calculation	debates	in	a	certain	way,	it	appeared	as	if	Hayek	 and	 Mises	 had	 effectively	 proved	 socialism	 an	 impossibility.	 Later	neoliberals	would	certainly	take	their	cue	from	Hayek’s	interpretation,	claiming	that	Hayek	and	Mises	had	“prove(d)	with	almost	mathematical	precision…	that	socialism	was	an	unrealisable	and	unworkable	concept.”88	From	Mises	in	1919	to	Hayek	in	the	1940s,	the	claim	that	socialism	itself	would	both	be	practically	impossible	 and,	 importantly,	 lead	 to	 a	 complete	 perversion	 of	 the	 socialist’s	original	aims	for	a	better	society,	remained	the	same.89		
A	new	vision	of	markets	Regardless	of	how	much	Hayek	departed	from	Mises,	it	is	clear	that	there	was	serious	intellectual	work	taking	place	in	Hayek’s	attempts	to	fight	socialism	by	arguing	intellectually	against	its	very	plausibility.	The	argument	I	wish	to	make	is	that	the	socialist	calculation	debates	is	where	we	find	the	first	seeds	of	the	neoliberal	conception	of	what	the	market	really	is	and	does.	Philip	Mirowski	has	described	this	as	a	change	from	a	standard	neoclassical	view	of	markets	as	static	devices	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources,	 to	 something	much	 bigger	 and	more	metaphysical.	 Mirowski	 argues	 that	 neoliberals’	 unconsciously	 borrowed	 a	
                                            86	Friedrich	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1948),	181.	87	Bockman,	Markets	in	the	Name	of	Socialism,	33.	88	Alexander	Shtromas,	Totalitarianism	and	the	Prospects	for	World	Order:	Closing	the	
Door	on	the	Twentieth	Century	(Lexington	Books,	2003),	101.	89	For	a	more	thorough	analysis	of	the	“perversity-thesis”	in	reactionary	rhetoric,	see	Hirschman,	The	Rhetoric	of	Reaction.	
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metaphor	from	the	developing	field	of	computing	sciences	and	started	seeing	The	Market	as	an	“information	processor”,	“more	powerful	and	encompassing	than	 any	 human	 being	 or	 organization	 of	 humans.”90	 Especially	 Hayek’s	interventions	made	 the	 alleged	 impossibility	 of	 socialism	 into	 a	 question	 of	epistemology,	 one	 of	 how	 knowledge	 is	 arrived	 at	 in	 a	modern,	 intertwined	world,	 and	 this	 amounted	 to	a	whole	new	way	of	 seeing	markets.	No	 longer	merely	 imagined	 sites	 of	 commerce	 and	 exchange,	 markets	 were	 seen	 as	mediators	of	modernity.		In	 some	 ways	 this	 was	 a	 continuation	 of	 previous	 naturalizations	 and	metaphysical	conceptions	of	the	market	order,91	but	in	the	context	of	the	1930s’	debates	on	the	modern	social	order,	this	was	to	take	on	a	whole	new	meaning.	Dekker	has	argued	that	Austrian	economics	did	not	conceptualize	markets	as	natural,	 but	 as	 cultural,	 in	 that	 they	 were	 allowed	 to	 function	 and	 flourish	precisely	by	human	culture.92	“Cultural”	sounds	like	the	opposite	of	“natural”,	and	 the	 Austrian	 understanding	 of	 markets	 did	 consider	 them	 to	 be	 fragile	systems	 of	 human	 interaction	 embedded	 in	 morals	 and	 values.93	 In	 more	practical	 purposes,	 however,	 this	 conceptualization	 of	 markets	 as	 cultural	devices	did	place	them	similarly	out	of	reach	for	politics	and	“interventions”	as	a	 naturalization	 would,	 since	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 markets	 were	 simply	 too	complex	for	humans	to	understand.	The	opposite	concepts	of	nature	and	culture	thus	take	on	similar	properties	in	Austrian	thought,	in	that	markets	are	deemed	
                                            90	Mirowski,	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste,	98.	91	See	also:	Philipp	H.	Lepenies,	‘Of	Goats	and	Dogs:	Joseph	Townsend	and	the	Idealisation	of	Markets—A	Decisive	Episode	in	the	History	of	Economics’,	Cambridge	
Journal	of	Economics,	no.	38	(2014):	447–57,	doi:10.1093/cje/bet024.	92	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	89.	93	For	this	important	point,	see	also	Rodrigues,	‘Between	Rules	and	Incentives:	Uncovering	Hayek’s	Moral	Economy’;	João	Rodrigues,	‘The	Political	and	Moral	Economies	of	Neoliberalism:	Mises	and	Hayek’,	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	37,	no.	5	(2013):	1001–17.	
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so	complicated	that	politicians	or	economists	would	do	best	not	to	“interfere”	with	them	or	try	to	improve	economic	outcomes	in	any	way.			Both	Mises	and	Hayek	wrote	about	 the	 functioning	of	markets	and	 the	price	mechanism	as	if	they	were	merely	describing	something	that	was	already	there,	something	 actually	 existing	 in	 the	 real	 world	 that	 they,	 unlike	 their	counterparts,	were	able	to	comprehend.	This	was	an	important	part	of	Hayek’s	self-understanding,	as	noted	by	his	biographer	Bruce	Caldwell:	“The	question	he	set	out	to	answer	was:	Why	did	contemporary	public	opinion	on	economic	issues	 differ	 so	 dramatically	 from	 that	 held	 by	 professional	 economists	 like	himself?”94	 Of	 course,	 there	 were	 plenty	 of	 economists	 whose	 views	 were	different	to	those	of	Hayek,	that	was	why	he	was	summoned	to	Great	Britain	in	the	first	place.	But	as	we	will	see	repeatedly,	a	general	idea	underpinning	both	Hayek’s	 work	 and	 indeed	 the	 whole	 neoliberal	 argument	 against	 not	 only	socialism,	but	certainly	also	Keynesianism,	was	a	notion	that	whole	world	had	gone	 mad	 and	 forgotten	 some	 essential	 economic	 “truths”.	 Without	acknowledging	it,	both	Mises	and	especially	Hayek	described	markets	in	a	new	way,	and	as	we	shall	see,	this	was	to	lead	Hayek	to	brand	new	conclusions	about	the	role	of	modern	states.	In	what	I	will	call	the	dual	argument,	the	neoliberals	also	attacked	the	old	liberalist	notion	of	laissez-faire.	After	all,	when	the	market	order	was	seen	to	have	such	amazing	properties,	it	made	perfect	sense	to	use	states	to	defend	them	against	mounting	opposition.			I	have	argued	briefly	that	Hayek’s	more	technical	work	on	Austrian	Business	Cycle	 Theory	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 completely	 unrelated	 to	 his	 very	 active	participation	 in	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates.	 Both	 activities	 relate	 to	 a	desire,	similar	to	that	of	Mises,	to	use	the	academic	field	of	economics	to	argue	politically	against	various	progressive	elements	wanting	 to	change	economic	
                                            94	Caldwell,	Socialism	and	War,	13.	
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outcomes	 either	 through	 government	 spending	 or	 whole-scale	 socialization.	Keynes	 and	 those	 who	 followed	 his	 lead	 fall	 into	 the	 former	 category,	 and	Viennese	Austro-Marxists	fall	in	the	latter,	but	as	suggested	in	his	LSE	inaugural	lecture,	Hayek	considered	them	all	to	be	socialists	of	some	form.	We	will	see	in	the	next	chapter	how	Hayek	would	gather	a	group	of	thinkers	inspired	by	the	Austrian	 positions	 in	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates	 to	 start	 using	 these	arguments	 against	 Keynes	 and	 other	 social	 liberals.	 As	we	 get	 closer	 to	 the	second	half	of	the	1930s,	the	issues	of	business	cycles	and	socialist	calculation	were	 blended	 with	 a	 third	 concern	 in	 Hayek’s	 work:	 the	 relation	 between	liberty	and	scientific	economic	planning.	The	historian	Ben	Jackson	has	written	that	“Neo-liberals	had	initially	objected,	in	the	early	1930s,	to	the	impossibility	of	rational	economic	calculation…	the	later	1930s	and	1940s	saw	this	replaced	as	the	dominant	line	of	neo-liberal	argument	by	an	emphasis	on	the	destructive	consequences	of	central	planning	for	individual	liberty.”95	Jackson	thus	sees	a	replacement	of	one	type	of	enquiry	and	arguments	with	another.	In	a	similar	vein,	 although	 less	 attuned	 to	 the	 very	 political	 nature	 of	 Hayek’s	 activities,	Bruce	Caldwell’s	concept	of	“Hayek’s	transformation”	 in	these	years	suggests	that	 the	 philosophical	 issues	 to	 which	 he	 would	 increasingly	 devote	 his	attention	had	little	to	do	with	the	socialist	calculation	debates;	which	in	turn	is	believed	to	have	had	little	to	do	with	Austrian	Business	Cycle	Theory.96	I	suggest	instead	that	the	difference	between	the	three	have	been	exaggerated,	and	that	they	all	 come	 together	 in	 the	so-called	 “Knowledge	Argument”:	 targeting	 the	many	different	economic	and	political	positions	Hayek	bundled	together	under	the	rubric	of	“planning”.	
 	
                                            95	Ben	Jackson,	‘At	the	Origins	of	Neo-Liberalism:	The	Free	Economy	and	the	Strong	State,	1930–1947’,	The	Historical	Journal	53,	no.	1	(March	2010):	140.	96	Bruce	Caldwell,	‘Hayek’s	Transformation’,	History	of	Political	Economy	20	(1988):	513–41.	
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Chapter	2	–	The		Lippmann	Colloquium	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 “The	real	world	of	liberalism	is	shot	through	with	tensions.	Its	unity	has	always	been	problematic.	Natural	law,	free	trade,	private	property,	the	virtues	of	market	equilibrium	–	these	were	so	many	dogmas	in	the	liberal	thought	dominant	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century.	[...]	A	wide	variety	of	political	critiques	flowered...”1			Pierre	Dardot	&	Christian	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World,	2013						
		The	event	known	as	le	colloque	Walter	Lippmann	was	held	in	Paris	over	five	days	in	August	26	–	30,	1938,	and	a	number	of	historians	agree	on	its	importance	as	a	precursor	 for	 the	 meeting	 at	 Mont	 Pèlerin	 in	 1947.2	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	previous	chapter,	we	noted	that	Hayek’s	and	Mises’	arguments	against	socialism	could	be	used	to	criticize	just	about	any	form	of	“planning”.	Whereas	the	chapter	on	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates	 situated	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 response	 to	socialism,	 this	 chapter	 on	 the	 1938	 Lippmann	 Colloquium	 will	 show	 how	 the	neoliberal	critique	also	 targeted	other	currents	within	 liberalism,	notably	social	liberalism.	In	addition	to	understanding	neoliberalism	as	a	response	to	socialism,	it	also	has	to	be	situated	within	the	diverse	currents	of	liberal	thought	at	the	time.	
                                            1	Pierre	Dardot	&	Christian	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World.	On	Neoliberal	Society,	21.		2	Audier,	Le	Colloque	Lippmann:	Aux	Origines	Du	Néo-Libéralisme;	Burgin,	The	Great	
Persuasion,	65–67;	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	20;	Jones,	Masters	of	
the	Universe,	31;	Dardot	and	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World,	49–75;	Bernhard	Walpen,	‘Der	Plan,	Das	Planen	Zu	Beenden’	(University	of	Amsterdam,	2004).	
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As	 we	 will	 see,	 this	 is	 where	 the	 term	 neoliberalism,	 which	 in	 1938	 was	 the	preferred	label	also	of	the	actors	themselves,	becomes	especially	instructive.	Social	liberals	and	neoliberals	alike	wanted	to	reform	liberalism	and	update	the	creed	to	a	modern	world,	but	they	chose	to	do	so	in	very	different	ways.	The	neoliberals’	theory	 of	markets	 as	mediators	 of	modernity	meant	 that	 their	 philosophy	 and	policy	conclusions	developed	as	an	all-out	attack	not	only	on	socialism,	but	also	on	other	forms	of	liberalism.		
The	rise	of	fascism	By	 the	 time	 of	 the	 colloquium	 in	 1938,	 the	 threat	 of	 communist	 revolution	 in	Western	Europe	seemed	to	have	diminished	somewhat,	and	 fascism	was	on	the	rise.	The	pressure	for	international	revolution	had	been	coordinated	from	Moscow	since	the	Russian	Revolution	of	1917,	but	it	faded	in	the	second	half	of	the	1930s.	The	Soviet	Union’s	rigid	foreign	policy,	which	had	instructed	Europe’s	Communist	Parties	 not	 to	 cooperate	 with	 social	 democrats	 and	 instead	 label	 them	 “Social	Fascists”,	changed	after	1934.3	Alarmed	at	the	prospect	of	German	invasion,	Stalin	opted	 instead	 to	 form	 a	 “Popular	 Front”	 with	 the	 liberal	 democracies	 against	fascism.4	 This	was	 the	geopolitical	backdrop	of	 the	Soviet	Union’s	 controversial	involvement	in	the	Spanish	Civil	War	from	November	1936,5	where	NKVD	agents6	went	in	behind	republican	lines	and	actively	purged	the	coalition	of	revolutionary	elements.	 The	motivation	 behind	 this	 was	 to	 prove	 to	 potential	 Popular	 Front	countries	 like	 France	 and	 Great	 Britain	 that	 they	 could	 be	 a	 moderate,	 non-revolutionary	ally	in	a	future	war	against	Germany;7	Adolf	Hitler	and	the	National	Socialist	Party	had	taken	power	in	1933	after	the	German	Weimar	Republic	had	been	“one	 large	weak	spot”	since	1930.8	Fascism	first	came	to	power	 in	 Italy	 in	
                                            3	Franz	Borkenau,	End	and	Beginning	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1981),	3.	4	Eric	J.	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes:	A	History	of	the	World,	1914-1991	(Peter	Smith	Publisher,	Incorporated,	2000),	148.	5	Franz	Borkenau,	The	Spanish	Cockpit	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	1937),	281.	6	A	precursor	to	the	Cold	War	era’s	KGB	and	present-day	FSB.	7	Franz	Borkenau,	The	Communist	International	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	1938),	407.	8	Franz	L.	Neumann,	Behemoth:	The	Structure	and	Practice	of	National	Socialism,	1933-
1944	(New	York:	Harper	Torchbooks,	1966),	33.	
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1922,	 and	 by	 the	 1930s	 various	 forms	 of	 right-wing	 autocracies	 had	 been	established	 in	countries	such	as	Spain,	Portugal,	Hungary,	Romania	and	Austria.	Causes	 commonly	 cited	 for	 this	 in	 the	 historical	 literature	 are	 dysfunctional	parliamentary	democracies,	and	the	effect	of	economic	depression.9	According	to	Mark	 Mazower	 “Opinion	 in	 Europe	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1930s	 was	 by	 no	 means	opposed	to	the	idea	of	an	authoritarian	reconstruction	of	Europe	under	German	leadership.”10	 In	1938,	 the	battle	 lines	were	still	very	much	unclear,	with	 liberal	democracies,	 fascist	 dictatorships	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 all	 displaying	 both	similarities	and	differences,	animosities	and	allegiances.11	As	we	now	know,	 the	forthcoming	wartime	alliances	would	also	be	anything	but	clear-cut.			It	 is	 common	 knowledge	 that	 fascism,	 like	 neoliberalism,	 was	 a	 response	 to	socialism,	 so	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 to	 find	 certain	 affinities	 between	 the	 political	movements.	In	Vienna,	Ludwig	von	Mises	had	acted	as	a	close	advisor	to	Engelbert	Dollfus,	who	assumed	dictatorial	powers	and	supressed	the	socialist	movement	in	the	short	Austrian	civil	war	of	1934,	in	which	the	Austro-Marxists	were	defeated	and	the	experiment	of	Red	Vienna	was	definitely	abandoned.12	 In	his	1927	book	
Liberalismus,	Mises	was	highly	critical	of	the	economics	of	fascism	as	he	observed	it	 in	 Italy	 and	 Germany,	 calling	 it	 ”altogether	 antiliberal”	 and	 “completely	interventionist”.	Even	so,	Mises	referred	to	fascism	as	“the	lesser	evil”,	expressing	much	sympathy	 for	 the	 fascist	 fight	against	 communism,	and	even	excusing	 the	violence	of	fascist	groups	as	“emotional	reflex	actions	evoked	by	indignation	at	the	deeds	of	Bolsheviks	and	Communists”.	According	 to	Mises,	 “As	soon	as	 the	 first	flush	 of	 anger	 had	 passed,	 their	 policy	 took	 a	 more	 moderate	 course	 and	 will	
                                            9	See	for	instance	Mark	Mazower,	Dark	Continent:	Europe’s	Twentieth	Century	(London:	Penguin,	1999);	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes;	Ian	Kershaw,	To	Hell	and	Back	–	
Europe	1914	–	1949	(New	York:	Viking,	2016).	10	Mazower,	Dark	Continent,	143.	11	Duncan	Bell	argues	that	the	concept	of	“liberal	democracy”	also	appeared	at	precisely	this	moment	in	time.	“Barely	visible	before	1930,	in	the	ensuing	decades	it	began	to	supplant	existing	appellations	for	Euro-Atlantic	states.”	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	703.	12	Hans-Hermann	Hoppe,	‘The	Meaning	of	the	Mises	Papers’,	The	Free	Market	15,	no.	4	(1997):	11–26.	
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probably	become	even	more	so	with	the	passage	of	time”,	something	he	claimed	was	 due	 to	 “the	 fact	 that	 traditional	 liberal	 views	 still	 continue	 to	 have	 an	unconscious	influence	on	fascists.”13	In	conclusion,	Mises	wrote:		 ”It	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 Fascism	 and	 similar	 movements	 aiming	 at	 the	 establishment	 of	dictatorships	are	full	of	the	best	intentions	and	that	their	intervention	has,	for	the	moment,	saved	European	civilization.	The	merit	 that	Fascism	has	thereby	won	for	 itself	will	 live	on	eternally	 in	history.”14		
The	popularity	of	economic	planning	As	we	will	see,	in	spite	of	Mises’	praise	and	the	rather	close	ties	to	fascism	exhibited	by	other	members	of	the	movement,	neoliberal	thinkers	managed	in	the	immediate	post-war	years	to	establish	their	creed	as	more	or	less	the	opposite	of	fascism.	This	was	because	the	ideas	developed	in	the	socialist	calculation	debates	about	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	also	served	as	an	effective	critique	of	the	economics	of	fascism.	At	the	time,	the	gyrations	of	the	world	economy	led	practically	all	political	movements	 to	 follow	Keynes	 and	move	 to	 replace	 the	 old-fashioned	policies	 of	laissez-faire	 with	 a	 more	 active	 government	 policy	 to	 improve	 economic	conditions.	Economic	historians	call	this	period	“The	Great	Slump”,15	and	according	to	 Eric	 Hobsbawm	 it	 led	 to	 “the	 fall	 of	 liberalism”.16	 The	 volumes	 of	American	
Political	 Science	 Review	 (a	 main	 international	 outlet	 then	 as	 now)	 reveals	 that	“economic	planning”	was	indeed	a	hot	topic	at	the	time.	Some	of	the	articles	on	the	subject	 matter	 published	 at	 the	 time	 include:	 “Social	 Planning	 Under	 the	Constitution”	 (Feb,	 1932);	 “Does	 City	 Planning	Assist	 Economic	 Planning?”	 (Jul,	1932);	 “Some	 Political	 Aspects	 of	 Economic	 Planning”	 (Aug,	 1932);	 “Scientific	Management	 and	 Economic	 Planning”	 (Mar,	 1933);	 “Reserve	 Bank	 Policy	 and	Economic	 Planning	 (Mar,	 1933);	 “Economic	 Planning	 and	 Foreign	 Trade”	 (Jul,	1935);	 “Transportation	 and	 Economic	 Planning”	 Sep	 (1936),	 and	 “Economic	
                                            13	Ludwig	Mises,	Liberalism	-	The	Classical	Tradition	(Auburn,	Alabama:	Liberty	Fund,	2005),	28.	14	Ibid.,	30.	15	Barry	Eichengreen,	“The	Origins	and	Nature	of	the	Great	Slump	Revisited,”	The	
Economic	History	Review	45,	no.	2	(May	1992):	213–39.	16	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes,	109.	
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Regulation	 and	 Economic	 Planning”	 (Dec,	 1939).	 This	 list	 is	 indicative	 of	 how,	during	The	Great	Depression,	governments	were	forced	to	take	a	more	active	part	in	managing	economic	life.	The	problems	and	opportunities	involved	with	this	was	the	subject	of	heated	debate,	not	only	among	political	scientists	and	economists,	but	also	 in	public	 life	as	such.	Many	argued	 that	centralized	coordination	of	 the	economy	was	the	only	way	to	avoid	a	complete	civilizational	collapse.	The	German	sociologist	 Karl	 Mannheim,	 for	 instance,	 wrote	 in	 his	 1935	 book	Mennsch	 und	
Gesselschaft	in	Zeitalter	Umbaus,	translated	in	English	to	Man	and	Society	in	an	Age	
of	Reconstruction,	that	a	new	world	order	of	“planned	freedom”	had	to	be	installed,	in	order	to	safeguard	human	dignity	under	what	he	saw	as	the	inevitable	rise	of	a	totalitarian	 state.17	 Similarly,	 the	 German	 historian	 and	 ex-communist	 Franz	Borkenau	wrote	in	The	Totalitarian	Enemy	from	1940	that	the	economic	aspects	of	totalitarianism	had	to	be	incorporated	into	a	free,	democratic	society,	in	order	to	combat	what	he	called	totalitarianism’s	pseudo-religious	aspects.18		The	 desire	 to	 use	 government	 power	 to	 improve	 economic	 conditions	 was	certainly	one	of	several	affinities	between	the	supposed	arch-enemies	of	fascism	and	communism,	but	 it	was	also	a	similarity	between	fascism	and	the	economic	policies	 pursued	 in	 liberal	 democracies.	 In	 1930,	 Keynes	 was	 invited	 by	Williamstown	 University	 in	 Massachusetts	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 project	 “World	Economic	Planning”.	The	program	would	be	a	three-year	study	from	1931	–	1933	on	 “economic	 organization	under	 (a)	 the	 individualist	 capitalist	 system,	 (b)	 the	Fascist	system,	(c)	the	Communist	system”,	and	would	include	lectures	from	Anglo-Saxon,	Italian	and	Russian	representatives.	The	chairman	of	the	Institute	of	Politics	wrote	 to	 Keynes	 that	 he	 had	 secured	 “the	 hearty	 cooperation	 of	 Premier	Mussolini”,	and	also	that	of	President	Herbert	Hoover	and	Secretary	of	State	Henry	
                                            17	Oscar	Jászi,	‘Reviewed	Works:	Man	and	Society	in	an	Age	of	Reconstruction	by	Karl	Mannheim;	The	Contempt	of	Freedom;	The	Russian	Experiment	and	After	by	M.	Polanyi’,	
The	American	Political	Science	Review	35,	no.	3	(June	1941):	550–53.	18	Franz	Borkenau,	The	Totalitarian	Enemy	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	1940),	244.	
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L.	Stimson.19	Another	example	of	the	similarity	of	economic	policy	between	various	types	of	regimes	at	this	time	is	how	the	Nazi	propaganda	minister	Joseph	Göbbels	answered	when	asked	by	an	American	journalist	in	a	television	interview	how	he	viewed	the	‘New	Deal’	economic	policies	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt:	“Wir	betrachten	die	 wirtschaftliche	 Entwicklung	 in	 Amerika	 mit	 den	 aller	 größten	 positiven	Interesse.”	(We	look	upon	the	economic	development	of	America	with	the	greatest,	positive	 interest).20	 There	was	 indeed	 a	 certain	 congruence	 of	 economic	 policy	between	politicians	leaning	towards	fascism,	communism	and	liberalism.	This	fact	lends	 credence	 to	 the	 standard	 neoliberal	 claim	 that	 they	 were	 the	 only	 ones	working	against	the	tide	of	economic	planning	and	strong	state	involvement	in	the	economy.	At	the	same	time,	it	somewhat	weakens	their	claim	that	communism	and	socialism	were	essentially	the	same	as	fascism	and	Nazism,	since	what	supposedly	linked	them	was	the	penchant	for	economic	planning.21	If	economic	planning	made	socialists	into	Nazis,	then	Keynes,	Hoover	and	Roosevelt	should	also	be	considered	Nazis.	That	was	hardly	the	claim	of	neoliberals,22	and	there	are	of	course	degrees	of	economic	 planning	 and	 state	 control	 of	 industry.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 however,	 the	notion	 of	 a	 slippery	 slope	 towards	 totalitarianism	 certainly	 suggested	 the	connection	between	social	liberalism	and	totalitarian	rule.			
                                            19	Kings	College	Cambridge,	Modern	Archives,	John	Maynard	Keynes	Papers,	AV1,	Box	38	20	‘Propaganda	Minister	Joseph	Goebbels’,	29	June	2013,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8Mcc2zWvGs&feature=youtube_gdata_player.	21	There	is	a	historical	literature	on	these	similarities.	See	for	instance:	Wolfgang	Schivelbusch,	Three	New	Deals:	Reflections	on	Roosevelt’s	America,	Mussolini’s	Italy	and	
Hitler’s	Germany,	1933-1939	(New	York:	Metropolitan	Books,	2006).	22	Although	the	connection	is	certainly	made	from	time	to	time	in	the	world	of	US	libertarian	think	tanks.	See	for	instance:	David	Gordon,	‘Three	New	Deals:	Why	the	Nazis	and	Fascists	Loved	FDR’,	Mises	Daily	Articles,	22	September	2006,	https://mises.org/library/three-new-deals-why-nazis-and-fascists-loved-fdr;	David	Boaz,	‘Hitler,	Mussolini,	Roosevelt’,	Cato	Institute,	October	2007,	https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/hitler-mussolini-roosevelt;	Jacob	G.	Hornberger,	‘The	Socialism	and	Fascism	of	the	New	Deal’,	The	Future	of	Freedom	
Foundation,	14	January	2009,	https://www.fff.org/2009/01/14/socialism-fascism-deal/.	
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The	totalitarian	enemy		What	the	Italian	political	scientist	Marco	D´Eramo	has	called	“the	discourse	of	the	twin-	totalitarianisms”23	was	largely	in	place	by	1938.	It	is	relatively	unknown	that	the	first	people	to	use	the	term	as	a	comparative	tool	for	the	study	of	both	fascism	and	Bolshevik	communism	were	German	socialists	critical	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	German	communist	party	(KPD).	Their	use	of	the	term,	and	the	comparative	approach	itself,	first	began	as	a	continuation	of	their	Marxist	analyses	of	fascism.	As	 shown	 in	 the	 book	The	 Lost	 Debate	 by	William	 David	 Jones,	 the	 concept	 of	totalitarianism	 was	 developed,	 amongst	 others,	 by	 the	 German	 underground	resistance	group	Neu	Beginnen,	with	the	support	of	left-wing	thinkers	like	Franz	Borkenau,	Franz	Neumann	and	Richard	Löwenthal.24	All	of	 these	 thinkers	had	a	somewhat	unresolved	relationship	to	both	Communism	and	Marxism	at	the	time,	but	nevertheless	built	on	Vladimir	Lenin	(1870	–	1924)	and	Rosa	Luxembourg’s	(1870	–	1919)	theories	of	imperialism	as	the	last	stage	of	capitalism.	Thinkers	like	the	Austo-Marxist	Rudolf	Hilferding	(1877	–	1941),	who	incidentally	had	wanted	to	 join	 the	 discussion	 at	 the	 Walter	 Lippmann	 Colloquium	 in	 Paris	 but	 was	excluded,25	 denounced	 Stalin	 and	 interpreted	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 a	 parallel	phenomenon	to	the	German	Third	Reich.	Thus,	in	1936,	Leon	Trotsky,	could	write	in	The	Revolution	Betrayed:	“Stalinism	and	fascism,	in	spite	of	a	deep	difference	in	social	foundations,	are	symmetrical	phenomena.”26		
	It	was	this	tradition	Lippmann,	Hayek	and	the	other	neoliberals	were	building	on	when	 they	 used	 the	 concept	 of	 totalitarianism	 to	 describe	 the	 consequences	 of	economic	 planning.	 Unlike	 the	 original	 left-wing	 tradition	 of	 totalitarianism	studies	however,	they	also	built	on	the	liberal	tradition	of	criticizing	and	wanting	to	limit	popular	democracy.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	French	liberals	like	
                                            23	Marco	D’Eramo,	‘Populism	and	the	New	Oligarchy’,	New	Left	Review,	II,	no.	82	(August	2013):	21.	24	See	William	David	Jones,	The	Lost	Debate:	German	Socialist	Intellectuals	and	
Totalitarianism	(Champaign:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1999).	25	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	47.	26	Leon	Trotsky,	The	Revolution	Betrayed	(New	York:	Pathfinder	Press,	1972),	271–72.	
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Tocqueville	had	argued	in	the	nineteenth	century	that	democracy	could	lead	to	a	whole	 new	 form	 of	 tyranny.27	 Tocqueville	 conceptualized	 this	 as	 the	 possible	“tyranny	 of	 the	majority”.	 The	British	 historian	 Lord	Acton	 (1834	 –	 1902)	 also	arrived	 at	 the	 conclusion	 that	 "the	 sphere	 of	 enforced	 command	 ought	 to	 be	restricted	within	fixed	limits",28	and	these	ideas	also	owe	something	to	Benjamin	Constant’s	 before-mentioned	 conceptualization	 of	 modern	 liberal	 liberty	 as	 a	freedom	from	society.	Albert	Hirschmann	has	noted	that	“From	the	last	third	of	the	nineteenth	century	to	the	First	World	War	and	beyond,	a	vast	and	diffuse	literature	–	embracing	philosophy,	psychology,	politics	and	belles	 letters	–	amassed	every	conceivable	argument	 for	disparaging	 the	“masses,”	 the	majority,	parliamentary	rule,	and	democratic	government.”29	Hirschmann	referred	to	Vilfredo	Pareto	(1848	–	1923)	and	Gustave	Le	Bon	(1841	–	1931),	both	of	whom	were	thinkers	who,	like	Mises,	flirted	with	fascism.	The	neoliberal	theory	that	economic	planning	is	what	leads	to	totalitarianism	thus	had	less	in	common	with	the	theories	of,	for	instance,	Leon	Trotsky,	and	was	instead	a	branch	of	this	elitist	liberalism,	described	in	the	introduction.	 To	 the	 neoliberals,	 the	 concept	 of	 totalitarianism	 was	 a	 way	 of	proving	that	past	liberals	had	been	right	about	the	dangers	of	democracy.30	They	did	 this	 by	 inserting	 elitist	 liberalism	 and	 ideas	 from	 the	 socialist	 calculation	debates	into	the	concept	of	totalitarianism,	thus	claiming	that	dictatorship	was	a	result	of	economic	planning.				
                                            27	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	Democracy	in	America,	1st	ed	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2007),	319.	28	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	29.	29	Hirschman,	The	Rhetoric	of	Reaction,	5.	30	After	an	event,	metaphorical	battles	are	fought	over	how	to	interpret	it.	The	historian	William	Sewell	uses	the	example	of	the	taking	of	the	Bastille	on	July	14,	1789,	and	argues	that	it	was	given	its	symbolic	meaning	only	when	the	actions	of	crowds	in	Paris	were	connected	to	the	political	and	philosophical	claims	made	by	the	delegates	of	the	Third	Estate	to	the	National	Assembly	at	Versaille.	See	William	H.	Sewell	Jr.,	Logics	of	History:	
Social	Theory	and	Social	Transformation	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009),	236.	
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The	Good	Society	
An	Enquiry	Into	the	Principles	of	The	Good	Society	was	published	by	the	American	journalist	 Walter	 Lippmann	 (1889	 –	 1974)	 in	 1937.	 Lippmann	 was	 a	 wealthy	Harvard	graduate,	whose	German-American	 family	 is	 said	 to	have	 taken	annual	holidays	to	Europe.	His	1922	book	Public	Opinion	and	his	1925	The	Phantom	Public	had	earned	him	a	reputation	as	a	sharp	critic	of	democracy,	who	was	nonetheless	very	committed	to	its	ideals.	Lippmann	identified	the	main	problem	of	democratic	rule	as	the	ease	with	which	public	opinion	could	be	manipulated	and	voters	could	be	misinformed.	This	critique	of	democracy	would	be	popular	amongst	neoliberals,	but	Lippmann	dedicated	his	life	to	journalism	in	order	to	ameliorate	the	problem	he	had	 identified.31	His	own	politics	varied	over	 the	years	(he	was	rumoured	to	have	been	a	member	of	a	socialist	party	in	his	youth),	and	after	the	Second	World	War	 he	would	 abandon	 the	 neoliberal	 course	 and	 become	highly	 critical	 of	 the	work	of	Friedrich	Hayek.	In	between,	however,	he	wrote	one	of	the	classic	texts	of	neoliberalism	and	inspired	the	first	organized	meeting	of	neoliberal	intellectuals.		Lippmann	sought	to	criticize	the	growth	of	state	power	and	what	he	saw	as	the	hollowing-out	of	the	rule	of	law	under	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal	policies.32	In	 doing	 so	 he	 looked	 to	 Europe,	 and	 argued	 that	 attempts	 to	 subordinate	 the	market	economy	to	centralist	planning	had	been	the	defining	feature	of	Italy	and	Germany’s	descent	into	dictatorship.	He	likened	these	fascist	dictatorships	to	their	supposed	 arch	 enemy	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 and	 labelled	 them	 all	 “Totalitarian	regimes”.33	 Writing	 of	 the	 “necessary	 absolutism”	 of	 totalitarian	 regimes,	Lippmann	claimed	that:			 “They	 [collectivists]	 speak	 of	 the	 chaos	 and	 the	 confusion	 of	 free	 regimes	 and	 feel	 inspired	 to	eliminate	the	interaction	of	all	the	numerous	private	interests	of	individuals,	groups	and	classes,	of	
                                            31	Walter	Lippmann,	Public	Opinion	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1997),	10–20.	32	Jennifer	Burns,	Goddess	of	the	Market:	Ayn	Rand	and	the	American	Right	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	49.	33	Walter	Lippmann,	The	Good	Society	(New	York:	Little	Brown,	2004),	54–91.	
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local	 and	 regional	 communities.	 Collectivists	 are	profoundly	monistic	 in	 their	 conception	of	 life	because	they	regard	variety	and	competition	as	evil.”	34			According	to	Lippmann,	this	“monism”	was	due	to	the	impossibility	of	economic	planning	in	peacetime:	“Planning	is	theoretically	possible	only	if	consumption	is	rationed”,	 he	wrote.	 “For	 a	 plan	 of	 production	 is	 a	 plan	 of	 consumption.	 If	 the	authority	is	to	decide	what	shall	be	produced,	it	has	already	decided	what	shall	be	consumed.	In	military	planning	this	is	precisely	what	takes	place:	(…)	A	planned	production	to	meet	a	free	demand	is	a	contradiction	in	terms	and	as	meaningless	as	a	square	circle.”35	It	was	this	intellectual	error	and	contradiction	in	terms	which	was	bound	to	set	collectivism	and	economic	planning	onto	a	slippery	slope	towards	totalitarianism.	 Lippman	 wrote:	 “There	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 collectivist	 principle	which	marks	any	stopping	place	short	of	the	totalitarian	state.”36	His	controversial	claim	was	that	 the	USA	and	other	 liberal	democracies	were	headed	 in	 that	very	direction,	due	to	the	“collectivism”	of	social	programs	like	the	New	Deal.		However,	 Lippmann’s	 claim	 that	 government	 interference	 led	 to	 totalitarian	dictatorship	did	not	lead	him	to	advocate	policies	of	laissez-faire.	On	the	contrary,	he	also	attacked	 laissez-faire	 liberals,	 calling	 them	“latter	day	 liberals”	who	had	“lost	the	intellectual	leadership	of	the	progressive	nations”.37	In	passages	almost	similar	to	some	of	today’s	critiques	of	neoliberalism	(when	wrongly	perceived	as	a	laissez-faire	program),	Lippmann	attempted	to	break	down	the	very	idea	that	the	economy	was	a	separate	sphere	with	which	politics	could	not	tinker:		 “The	title	to	property	is	a	construction	of	the	law.	Contracts	are	legal	instruments.	Corporations	are	legal	creatures…	It	is,	therefore,	misleading	to	think	of	them	as	existing	somehow	outside	the	law	and	then	to	ask	whether	it	is	permissible	to	‘interfere’	with	them…”38		
                                            34	Ibid.,	56.	35	Ibid.,	101–2.	36	Ibid.,	52.	37	Ibid.,	192.	38	Ibid.,	269.	
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One	could	imagine	that	such	a	strong	attack	on	state	“interference”	in	the	economy	as	 presented	 by	 Lippmann	 in	 The	 Good	 Society,	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 laissez-faire	position:	 an	 argument	 that	 the	 state	would	 stay	 out	 of	 the	 economic	 sphere	 all	together.	This	was	not	 the	 case,	 because	 the	notion	 that	 economic	planning	 lay	behind	totalitarianism	did	not	lead	Lippmann	to	criticize	state	involvement	in	the	economy	as	such.	Instead	he	argued	that	laissez-faire	liberalism	had	proven	futile	in	the	face	of	the	totalitarian	danger,	and	that	modern	states	had	to	be	put	to	use	to	protect	and	foster	the	price	mechanism.	Markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	were	too	important	to	allow	liberals	to	advocate	just	“letting	go”,	in	the	vane	hope	that	they	would	 sort	 themselves	 out.	 This	was	 the	 dual	 argument,	 inspired	 both	 by	Mises	 and	Hayek’s	 ideas	 from	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates,	 but	 to	 a	 certain	extent	 also	 by	 Chicago	 economist	 Henry	 Simons’	 1934	 pamphlet	 A	 Positive	
Program	for	Laissez-Faire.	39		
The	importance	of	Hayek	Friedrich	Hayek	and	Lionel	Robbins	at	the	LSE	in	Great	Britain	had	read	Walter	Lippmann	 attentively	 for	 some	 time,	 through	 articles	 in	 the	Atlantic	Monthly	 in	1936	and	1937	which	were	in	fact	chapters	from	the	upcoming	book.40	The	two	had	entered	into	eager	correspondence	with	Lippmann	and,	among	other	things,	Hayek	had	sent	Lippmann,	on	June	11	1937,	a	list	of	“the	few	real	liberals	known	to	me”,41	to	whom	Lippmann	later	sent	copies	of	his	book.	Robbins	and	Hayek	were	no	strangers	to	the	claim	that	economic	planning	leads	to	totalitarian	dictatorship;	for	 instance,	 in	 all	 likelihood	 they	 had	 both	 been	 in	 attendance	 at	 the	 Swedish	economist	Gustav	Cassel’s	lecture	“From	Protectionism	Through	Planned	Economy	to	Totalitarian	Dictatorship”	at	the	LSE	in	1934.	Cassel	was	familiar	with	the	work	of	Mises,	and	in	his	lecture	he	claimed	that	“The	arbitrariness,	the	mistakes	and	the	
                                            39	Henry	C.	Simons,	A	Positive	Program	for	Laissez	Faire,	Public	Policy	Pamphlet	15	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1934).	40	Ben	Jackson,	‘Freedom,	the	Common	Good,	and	the	Rule	of	Law:	Lippmann	and	Hayek	on	Economic	Planning’,	Journal	of	the	History	of	Ideas	73,	no.	1	(2012):	55–56.	41	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	Papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	
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inevitable	 contradictions	 of	 such	 policy	 [economic	 planning]	 will,	 as	 daily	experience	shows,	only	strengthen	the	demand	for	a	more	rational	coordination	of	the	 different	 measures	 and,	 therefore,	 for	 unified	 leadership.	 For	 this	 reason	Planned	 Economy	 will	 always	 tend	 to	 develop	 into	 Dictatorship.”42	 Hayek	 and	Robbins	 had	 been	 moving	 towards	 this	 idea	 also	 in	 their	 own	 writings,	 and	Lippmann	had	in	fact	been	inspired	by	the	Europeans	to	make	his	own	argument.	On	March	12,	1937,	he	wrote	the	following	in	a	letter	to	Hayek:		 “I	am	profoundly	grateful	to	you	for	sending	me	your	book	and	your	papers,	but	I	should	want	you	to	know	at	once	that	I	already	possess	the	book	and	your	papers	and	have	studied	it	very	carefully,	and	have	been	very	influenced	by	it…	In	a	crude	way	I	had	discerned	the	inherent	difficulty	of	the	planned	economy,	but	without	the	help	I	have	received	from	you	and	Professor	von	Mises,	I	could	never	have	developed	the	argument.”43		The	book	Hayek	had	sent	to	Lippmann,	which	the	latter	had	already	read	and	taken	great	inspiration	from,	was	Collectivist	Economic	Planning.	Lippmann’s	reference	to	“Professor	Mises”	makes	it	abundantly	clear	that	his	arguments	about	markets	as	the	only	devices	that	could	make	a	modern	society	function	were	taken	from	the	Austrian	 interventions	 in	 the	 socialist	 calculation	debates.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	1930s	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 fascism,	 the	 argument	 against	 socialism	had	 become	 one	saying	that	fascism	too	was	a	type	of	socialism,	and	that	liberal	democracies	were	headed	in	the	same	direction	if	they	did	not	stop	tampering	with	the	markets	that	made	the	modern	social	order	possible.		In	 his	 letter	 to	 Lippmann,	 Hayek	 divided	 the	 true	 liberals	 known	 to	 him	 into	subsections,	starting	with	“The	Cannan-group”,	in	which	he	included	himself	and	other	UK	based	economists	like	Lionel	Robbins	and	William	Harold	Hutt	(1899	–	1988).	The	next	section	were	“people	who	owe	their	conversion	mainly	to	Mises”,	a	 group	 in	 which	 he	 included	 his	 close	 Austrian	 friend	 Fritz	 Machlup	 and	 the	
                                            42	Gustav	Cassel,	‘From	Protectionism	Through	Planned	Economy	To	Dictatorship’,	
International	Conciliation,	no.	303	(October	1934):	307–25.	43	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek		
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German	 economist	 Wilhelm	 Röpke	 (1899	 –	 1966).	 Finally,	 there	 was	 “the	interesting	 little	 group	 in	 Freiburg	 in	Germany”,	 led	 by	Walter	 Eucken	 (1891	 –	1950),	and	the	Italian	group	led	by	Luigi	Einaudi	(1874	–	1961).44	A	month	later,	on	 July	10th,	Hayek	wrote	 to	 Lippmann	with	 the	news	 that	 a	man	named	Louis	Rougier	was	about	to	contact	him	concerning	the	French	rights	to	The	Good	Society.	Rougier	(1899	–	1992)	had	not	been	on	the	exclusive	list	enclosed	with	the	June	letter,	 but	 Hayek	 nonetheless	 characterized	 him	 as	 “a	 distinguished	 French	philosopher	who	 is	 highly	 respected	 for	 his	work	 on	 epistemology”.	 It	 appears	from	the	letter	that	Rougier	was	at	that	point	also	planning	French	translations	of	Mises,	 Robbins,	 Hayek	 and	 the	 before-mentioned	 Russian	 economist	 Boris	Brutzkus,45	 to	be	published	by	 the	newly-founded	publishing	house	Librairie	de	Médicis.46	 By	 spring	 1938,	 Rougier	 had	 organized	 for	 The	 Good	 Society	 to	 be	translated	and	published	in	French	as	La	Cité	Libre,	and	on	the	basis	of	Hayek’s	list	of	“true	liberals”,	he	arranged	for	a	five	day	colloquium	to	take	place	in	Paris.	Here,	French	 and	European	 thinkers	would	discuss	Lippmann’s	 book	 and	 the	 greater	question	it	posed	regarding	the	future	of	economic	and	political	liberalism.		
The	colloquium	French	scholars,	like	François	Denord,	Serge	Audier	and	Dardot	and	Laval,	tend	to	see	 the	 Lippmann	 colloquium	 as	 “the	 founding	moment	 of	 neo-liberalism”;	 the	latter	two	claiming	that	“the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	emerges	as	an	extension	of	the	1938	initiative.”47	Their	2009	book	La	nouvelle	raison	du	monde:	Essai	sur	la	société	
néolibérale	was	published	 in	English	 in	2013	as	The	New	Way	of	 the	World,	and	much	of	the	factual	information	upon	which	their	reading	of	the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	 is	 based	 is	 taken	 from	Denord’s	 2007	publication	Néo-liberalisme	 –	
version	française.	Audier	has	also	written	extensively	on	the	colloquium,	and	his	
                                            44	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	45	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	46	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	46.	47	Dardot	and	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World,	49.	
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2008	publication	Le	colloque	Walter	Lippmann	–	aux	origines	du	néo-liberalisme	also	include	a	reprint	of	the	proceedings	from	the	1938	meeting.48		The	twenty-eight	men	gathered	in	Rue	Montpensier	looked	at	the	Popular	Front	government	 in	 France	 and	 the	 general	 political	 climate	 in	 favour	 of	 centralized	economic	planning	with	great	disdain.	Amongst	 them	were	 international	guests	like	Mises,	Hayek,	Röpke,	and	Karl	Polanyi’s	brother	Michael	(1891	–	1976);	but	a	good	half	of	them	were	French,	including	intellectuals	like	Raymond	Aron	(1905	–	1983),	 Jaques	Rueff	 (1896	–	1978),	 and	Etienne	Mantoux	 (1913	–	1945).	 In	his	opening	address,	Louis	Rougier	said:		 “Le	drame	moral	de	notre	époque,	cést	dès	lors,	l´aveuglement	des	hommes	de	gauche	qui	rêvent	d´une	 démocratie	 poltique	 et	 d´un	 planisme	 économique,	 sans	 compredre	 que	 le	 planisme	économique	 implique	 l´État	 totalitaire	et	qu´un	socialisme	 liberal	est	une	contradiction	dans	 les	termes.”	49		(The	moral	drama	of	our	time	concerns	the	(willing)	blindness	of	the	men	of	the	left,	who	dream	of	a	 democratic	 politics	 and	 economic	 planning,	 without	 understanding	 that	 economic	 planning	implies	a	totalitarian	state	and	that	a	liberal	socialism	is	a	contradiction	in	terms.)		Throughout	this	thesis	we	will	become	well	acquainted	with	this	tone	of	despair	and	expression	of	outsider	status	which	characterised	Rougier’s	comments.	Both	were	 in	 many	 ways	 the	 elocutio	 of	 neoliberalism.	 I	 believe	 that	 they	 did	 see	themselves	as	confronting	a	deep	crisis	of	civilizational	proportions,	but	the	idea	that	 they	 were	 complete	 outsiders	 has	 to	 be	 nuanced:	 Neoliberal	 intellectuals	would	often	complain	at	great	length	that	no	one	ever	listened	to	them,	and	that	everything	was	moving	 in	 the	wrong	direction.	There	was	 some	 truth	 in	 this	of	course,	 but	 Rougier,	 who	 held	 a	 doctorate	 from	 Sorbonne	 and	 a	 chair	 at	 the	University	 of	 Besançon,	 also	 had	 close	 ties	 with	 many	 resourceful	 French	industrialists	 interested	 in	 funding	right-wing	 intellectuals.	One	of	 these	was	M.	Bourgeois,	 who	 was	 present	 at	 the	 colloquium,	 and	 Denord	 has	 noted	 that	Rougier’s	initiative	“attracted	members	of	the	ruling	elite	seeking	an	answer	to	“the	
                                            48	Audier,	Le	Colloque	Lippmann:	Aux	Origines	Du	Néo-Libéralisme,	299–355.	49	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	21.	
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crisis	of	capitalism”.50	Another	point	which	ties	the	Lippmann	Colloquium	closer	to	the	political	and	economic	establishment	of	the	time	is	The	Institute	for	Intellectual	Cooperation,	in	whose	headquarters	the	meeting	was	held.	The	institute	had	been	established	in	Paris	in	1924	and	was	a	precursor	to	the	post-war	United	Nations	organization	 UNESCO.	 The	 historian	Hagen	 Schulz-Forberg	 has	 shown	 how	 the	Institute	for	Intellectual	Cooperation	in	Paris,	its	local	branches	in	other	European	countries,	 and	 indeed	 the	 Geneva	 based	 League	 of	 Nations	 itself,	 served	 as	 an	important	 node	 for	 early	 neoliberal	 thought.	 Through	 various	 American	philanthropic	foundations	like	the	Carnegie	Trust	and	the	Rockefeller	Foundations,	these	 international	 institutions	 commissioned	 reports	 from	 several	 of	 the	intellectuals	involved	with	neoliberalism	(like	Mises),	and	forged	contacts	across	national	 borders	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 transnational	 cooperation	 between	politics,	 diplomacy	 and	 the	 social	 sciences.51	 The	 French	 attendees	 of	 the	colloquium	included	men	 like	 Jaques	Rueff,	who	would	become	 important	post-war	policymakers,52	and	Schulz-Forberg	argues	that	this	burgeoning	transnational	elite	in	the	interwar	years	is	important	for	the	development	of	neoliberalism.			The	sessions	of	the	meetings	were	certainly	inspired	by	Lippmann’s	book,	but	they	were	organized	under	a	broader	theme:	that	of	liberalism	and	how	to	save	it.	The	five	 sessions	 of	 the	 conference	were	 entitled:	 “The	 reasons	 for	 the	 decline	 and	retreat	of	liberalism”;	“Is	the	decline	of	liberalism	due	to	endogenous	causes?”;	“Is	liberalism	capable	of	fulfilling	its	social	tasks?”;	“If	the	decline	of	liberalism	is	not	inevitable,	what	 are	 its	 real	 causes	 (exogenous	 causes)?”;	 and	 “If	 the	 decline	 of	liberalism	is	not	inevitable,	what	remedies	can	we	take	to	analyse	it’s	causes?.”53	
                                            50	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	45.	51	Hagen	Schulz-Forberg,	‘Laying	the	Groundwork:	The	Semantics	of	Neoliberalism	in	the	1930s’,	in	Re-Inventing	Western	Civilisation:	Transnational	Reconstructions	of	
Liberalism	in	Europe	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(Newcastle	upon	Tyne:	Cambridge	Scholars	Publishing,	2014),	13–41.	52	Christopher	S.	Chivvis,	The	Monetary	Conservative	–	Jacques	Rueff	and	Twentieth-
Century	Free	Market	Thought	(De	Kalb,	Illinois:	Northern	Illinois	University	Press,	2010).	53	Audier,	Le	Colloque	Lippmann:	Aux	Origines	Du	Néo-Libéralisme,	249–50.	(Session	titles	translated	from	the	French	original)	
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They	clearly	thought	that	liberalism	was	in	“retreat”	and	had	to	be	rescued,	but	also	pointed	 to	 problems	 with	 liberalism	 itself.	 One	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 colloquium	participants	sought	to	change	and	update	liberalism;	on	the	other	they	sought	to	return	to	past,	liberal	wisdom.			
The	price	mechanism	I	 noted	 in	 the	 introduction	 that	 laissez-faire	 liberalism	 developed	 in	 the	 late	eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 as	 a	 new	 form	 of	 what	 James	 L.	Richardson	 calls	 “elitist	 liberalism”.	 As	 political	 questions	 were	 increasingly	framed	as	economic	ones,	the	doctrine	of	non-interference	with	trade	and	business	built	on	previous	arguments	against	popular	democracy	and	in	favour	of	a	negative	view	 on	 liberty.54	 New	 currents	 of	 liberalism	 then	 developed	 in	 opposition	 to	laissez-faire,	 and	 social	 liberals	 like	 Thomas	Hill	 Green	 and	 Leonard	Hobhouse	argued	that	active	policies	had	to	be	pursued	in	order	to	secure	liberty	for	all.55	By	the	time	of	the	Lippmann	colloquium,	this	social	liberalism,	at	times	labelled	“new	liberalism”,	was	a	dominant	force	in	politics:	exemplified	by	the	New	Deal	policies	pursued	by	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	the	USA.56	The	intellectual	doctrine	of	laissez-faire	as	such	seemed	to	have	been	given	its	final	blow	by	Keynes	in	his	1924	essay	
The	End	of	Laissez-Faire.57	The	neoliberals	gathered	in	Paris,	however,	worried	that	what	they	perceived	as	liberal	values	were	being	thrown	out	with	the	bathwater.	Yet	as	Lippmann’s	book	showed,	they	did	not	want	an	easy	return	to	laissez-faire	either.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 their	 conference,	 they	 founded	 the	 Centre	 International	d´Études	 pur	 la	 Rénovation	 du	 Libéralisme	 (CIRL),	 an	 international	 centre	 for	studying	 the	 renewal	 of	 liberalism.	 The	 collective	 decision	 to	 call	 themselves	
neoliberals58	 indicates	that	their	approach	to	the	problem	went	beyond	a	simple	
                                            54	Richardson,	Contending	Liberalisms	in	World	Politics,	32.	55	Michael	Frieden,	Liberal	Languages	(Princeton	and	Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005),	4.	56	Daniel	T.	Rodgers,	Atlantic	Crossings:	Social	Politics	in	a	Progressive	Age	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1998).	57	John	Maynard	Keynes,	The	End	of	Laissez-Faire	&	The	Economic	Consequences	of	the	
Peace	(Amherst,	New	York:	Prometheus	Books,	2004).	58	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	35.	
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restatement	of	 laissez-faire.	In	fact,	the	neoliberals	wanted	to	move	beyond	that	and	make	active	use	of	the	state;	but	due	to	their	view	of	markets	as	the	bedrock	of	civilization	and	mediators	of	modernity,	their	preferred	use	of	the	state	would	have	to	be	very	different	than	that	of	social	liberals	like	Keynes.	In	a	sense,	they	agreed	with	the	principle	of	state	intervention,	but	they	did	not	agree	with	the	idea	that	there	was	something	wrong	with	markets	in	their	idealised	form.	In	the	Lippmann	colloquium,	the	notion	used	to	get	out	of	this	conundrum	was	the	price	mechanism.	The	participants	agreed	that	interventions	had	to	respect	the	workings	of	the	price	mechanism.	An	active	policy	had	to	be	pursued	which	did	not	suspend	or	replace	said	mechanism,	but	instead	facilitated	its	proper	functioning.59			I	believe	that	this	distinction	between	different	uses	of	the	state	better	captures	the	neoliberal	 position	 in	 these	 years	 than	 the	 more	 typically	 drawn	 divisions	concerning	whether	or	not	to	use	the	state	at	all.	Several	scholars	have	opted	for	this	latter,	standard	narrative	when	discussing	the	divisions	within	the	Lippmann	colloquium.	Mises	did	distinguish	himself	at	the	colloquium,	as	he	would	at	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	nine	years	later,	by	representing	laissez-faire	views	that	were	believed	to	be	outdated	by	many	of	the	colloquium’s	attendees.	This	caused	for	instance	Alexander	Rüstow	to	confess	in	private	to	Wilhelm	Röpke	that	he	thought	both	Mises’	and	Hayek’s	place	“was	in	the	museum,	 in	formalin.	People	like	them	were	responsible	for	the	great	crisis	of	the	twentieth	century.”60	This	comment	later	led	political	scientist	C.J.	Friedrich	to	claim,	in	a	review	article	about	neoliberalism	written	in	1955,	that	Hayek	and	Mises	“take	a	more	traditional	view,	and	are	therefore	referred	to	by	the	neo-liberals	as	paleo-liberals”.61	As	late	as	 in	 2014,	 Edmund	 Fawcett	 referred	 to	 tensions	within	 the	Walter	 Lippmann	Colloquium	by	describing	Hayek	and	Mises	as	“free-market	purists”.62	While	this	
                                            59	Centre	International	d´Études	pour	la	Renovation	du	Libéralisme,	Compte-Rendu	Des	
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may	be	a	 reasonable	 representation	of	Mises’	position,	 it	 does	not	do	 justice	 to	Hayek’s	thinking	at	the	time.	In	the	published	minutes	of	the	meeting,	Hayek	first	appears	to	have	kept	quiet	during	the	whole	colloquium,	but	in	a	footnote	to	the	introduction	Rougier	explains	that	the	interventions	in	French	and	German	were	better	captured	in	the	minutes	than	the	ones	made	in	English:	“En	particulier,	les	trés	 intéressantes	 interventions	 du	 professeur	 F.A.	 von	 Hayek	 ne	 purent	 être	reconstituées	par	lui	de	mémoire”63	(In	particular,	he	[the	secretary]	was	not	able	to	reconstruct	 from	memory	the	very	 interesting	 interventions	of	Professor	F.A.	von	Hayek).	Hayek	did	speak,	“interestingly”	even,	if	we	are	to	believe	Rougier,	but	his	interventions	were	not	captured	in	the	minutes	since	he	appears	to	have	made	them	in	English.				As	we	have	seen,	Hayek	was	more	than	a	little	involved	behind	the	scenes	of	the	colloquium	 both	 in	 the	 intellectual	 sense	 and	 in	 the	 organizational	 sense,	 by	compiling	lists	of	“real	liberals”	and	pushing	for	international	cooperation	between	them.	However,	 it	was	Rougier	who	was	given	 the	organizational	 credit	 for	 the	meeting,	and	Lippmann	the	intellectual.	If	we	read	Hayek’s	own	writings	from	this	time,	it	seems	odd	that	Rüstow	would	conflate	his	position	with	that	of	Mises,	but	perhaps	Hayek	was	afraid	to	upset	his	mentor,	Mises.	Along	with	Röpke,64	Walter	Eucken	and	Franz	Böhm	(1895	–	1977),	Rüstow	belonged	to	the	Freiburg	based	school	of	economists	and	lawyers	who	would	later	be	called	“ordoliberals”,	after	their	jointly	edited	publication	series	Ordnung	der	Wirtschaft,	later	to	become	the	journal	 ORDO.	 The	 ordoliberals	 were	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 socialist	 calculation	debates,	 and	Röpke’s	biographer	 John	Zmirak	writes:	 “Working	alongside	other	economists	 of	 the	 German	 neoliberal	 movement	 such	 as	 Walter	 Eucken	 and	
                                            63	Centre	International	d´Études	pour	la	Renovation	du	Libéralisme,	Compte-Rendu	Des	
Séances	Du	Colloque	Walter	Lippman,	8.	64	In	Hayek’s	list	of	“true	liberals”,	sent	to	Lippmann	in	1937,	Röpke	was	categorized	not	as	part	of	the	Freiburg	group,	but	among	“those	who	owed	their	conversion	mainly	to	Mises”.	Yale	University	Archives,	Walter	Lippman	Papers,	Selected	Correspondence	1931	–	1974	–	77,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	
  83 
Alexander	Rüstow,	Röpke	built	on	 the	 insights	of	 the	Austrian	school.”65	Röpke,	who	was	not	based	in	Freiburg	and	thus	something	of	an	outsider	in	these	early	days	of	ordoliberalism,	claimed	that	reading	Mises	saved	him	from	the	dangers	of	idealistic	interwar-years	socialism,	very	much	like	Hayek:			 “[I]t	was	his	book	Nation,	Staat	und	Wirtschaft	(1919)	which	set	me	on	his	track	really	and	which	was	in	many	ways	the	redeeming	answer	to	the	questions	tormenting	a	young	man	who	had	just	come	back	from	the	trenches.”66		Even	so,	the	ordoliberals	departed	significantly	from	Mises	because	they	had	come	to	think	that	the	best	way	to	create	a	society	based	on	the	market	mechanism	was	through	 constitutional	 foundations	 put	 in	 place	 by	 a	 strong	 state.67	 They	 thus	wholeheartedly	agreed	with	Lippmann’s	attack	on	laissez-faire	and	claimed	that	a	competitive,	market	 society	needed	 state	 intervention.	 Paired	with	 a	 claim	 that	state	intervention	lay	behind	the	rise	of	totalitarian	dictatorship,	this	was	the	dual	argument	in	full.			We	don’t	know	what	Hayek	said	during	the	colloqium,	but	already	at	this	point	he	was	 in	more	or	 less	 full	agreement	with	the	ordoliberals.	 In	another	 letter	 from	1937,	Hayek	wrote	to	Lippmann:		 “I	have	always	regarded	it	as	the	fatal	error	of	classical	liberalism	that	it	interpreted	the	rule	that	the	state	should	only	provide	a	semi-permanent	framework	most	conducive	to	the	efficient	working	of	 private	 initiative	 as	 meaning	 that	 the	 existing	 legal	 framework	 must	 be	 considered	unalterable.”68			This	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 neoliberals’	 reconfiguration	 of	 liberalism.	 The	proper	functioning	of	the	state	and	how	to	further	theorize	it	within	the	realm	of	
                                            65	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist,	54.	66	Ibid.,	59.	67	Viktor	J.	Vanberg,	‘The	Freiburg	School	–	Walter	Eucken	and	Ordoliberalism’,	
Freiburger	Diskussionspapiere	Zur	Ordnungsökonomik	4,	no.	11	(1998):	17.	68	Yale	University	Archives,	Walter	Lippman	Papers,	Selected	Correspondence	1931	–	1974	–	77	,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	
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liberalism	had	already	been	Hayek’s	concern	before	the	colloquium	in	1938.	Thus	Rüstow	 and	 later	 historians	 who	 have	 quoted	 him	 are	 wrong	 to	 conflate	 his	position	with	Mises.	The	wish	to	make	use	of	the	state	meant	that	the	neoliberals	had	something	in	common	with	social	liberals	like	Keynes,	who	wanted	to	reform	liberalism	 both	 by	 abandoning	 the	 policies	 of	 laissez-faire,	 and	 challenging	 the	dogma	of	the	self-regulating	market.	The	neoliberals	were	on	board	with	the	first	step	of	this	program,	but	not	so	much	the	second.	Dardot	&	Laval	observe:	”...	while	neo-liberals	accept	the	need	for	state	intervention	and	reject	pure	governmental	passivity,	 they	 are	 opposed	 to	 any	 action	 that	might	 frustrate	 the	 operation	 of	competition	between	private	interests.”69		According	to	Schulz-Forberg,	neoliberalism	can	best	be	understood	as	an	attempt	by	 liberal	 establishment	 figures	 to	 take	 into	 account	 “the	 social”,	 but	 without	jeopardizing	what	 they	 referred	 to	 as	 the	price	mechanism.70	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	attendees	 of	 the	 Lippmann	 colloquium	 did	 focus	 some	 attention	 on	 social	questions	and	how	to	ameliorate	social	ills	while	still	preserving	what	they	thought	of	 as	 a	 liberal	 society.	 	 What	 set	 the	 Lippmann	 Colloquium	 apart	 from	 social	liberalism	and	 the	 “New	Deal	 liberalism”	 that	Lippmann	sought	 to	 criticize	was	precisely	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 price	 mechanism	 as	 something	 which	 could	 not	 be	tampered	 with.	 This	 is	 what	 made	 neoliberalism	 a	 reaction	 against	 not	 only	Keynes’	project	of	saving	capitalism	from	itself,	but	also	against	social	liberalism	as	such.	 Keynes	 acknowledged	 that	 there	 were	 some	 problems	 internal	 to	 the	mechanisms	of	markets	which	had	to	be	solved	through	government	action.	The	neoliberals	 at	 the	 Lippmann	 Colloquium,	 inspired	 by	 Mises	 and	 Hayek’s	contributions	 to	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates,	 instead	 insisted	 that	 the	mechanism	itself	was	key,	and	that	government	action	had	to	spread	and	foster	this	mechanism,	not	 replace	 it.	 I	would	 therefore	 insist	 that	we	do	not	 conflate	neoliberalism	with	social	liberalism,	as	Schulz-Forberg’s	analysis	runs	the	risk	of	
                                            69	Dardot	and	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World,	47.	70	Hagen	Schulz-Forberg,	‘The	Intellectual	and	Institutional	Roots	of	Early	Neoliberalism’	(More	Roads	From	Mont	Pelerin,	WZB,	Berlin,	2016),	2.	
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doing.	 The	 Lippmann	 colloquium	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 “social”	 moment	 of	 the	history	of	neoliberalism,	yet	even	at	this	time,	the	front	against	social	 liberalism	was	quite	clear.	John	Dewey	wrote	in	the	mid-1930s	that	“liberalism	has	meant	in	practice	things	so	different	as	to	be	opposed	to	each	other”.71	According	to	Duncan	Bell,	 “there	 was	 little	 sophisticated	 or	 thorough	 discussion	 of	 liberalism	 as	 an	intellectual	tradition	until	the	early	twentieth	century”.72	The	rise	and	legitimacy	of	social	liberalism	was	the	main	bone	of	contention	at	this	time,	and	a	sympathetic	observer	like	Michael	Frieden	sees	the	work	of	Green	and	Hobhouse	as	“teasing	out	of	liberalism	implicit	and	underplayed	features	that	created	an	ideological	turn.”73	I	argue	that	neoliberalism	was	not	part	of	this	turn	within	liberalism,	but	rather	a	response	to	it.		
Ordoliberalism		Austrian	economics	arguably	laid	the	foundations	of	the	neoliberal	view	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity,	and	Chicago	School	economics	would	become	the	most	influential	 strand	 of	 neoliberal	 thought	 from	 the	 1970s,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 Anglo-American	 world.	 In	 the	 period	 from	 the	 1930s	 to	 the	 postwar	 years	 however,	ordoliberalism	was	 arguably	 the	most	 important	 of	 the	 three	main	 currents	 of	neoliberal	thought.	This	is	precisely	due	to	their	important	admission	that	states	had	 to	be	put	 to	use	 to	organize	 competitive	markets.	Despite	 the	 caricature	of	Hayek	as	a	“free	market	purist”,	his	ideas	at	this	time	regarding	the	use	of	modern	states	to	secure	a	competitive	market	society,	had	much	in	common	with	those	of	the	ordoliberals.	Hayek	was	in	contact	with	Röpke,	and	the	latter’s	wife	prepared	the	German	translation	of	his	1944	book	The	Road	to	Serfdom.74	Hayek	is	also	said	to	have	met	Eucken	as	early	as	1928,	and	remained	in	close	contact	with	him	until	Eucken’s	death	in	1950.	He	would	later	take	over	Eucken’s	chair	at	the	University	of	Freiburg	 in	1961,	stating	 that	he	wanted	 to	carry	on	his	work,	and	that	 their	
                                            71	John	Dewey,	Liberalism	and	Political	Action	(New	York:	Prometheus	Books,	1935),	3.	72	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	693.	73	Frieden,	Liberal	Languages,	4–5.	74	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	215n.	
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“friendship	of	many	years	standing”	had	been	“based	on	the	closest	agreement	on	scientific	 as	 well	 as	 on	 political	 questions.”75	 According	 to	 the	 historian	 of	economics	 Stefan	 Kolev,	 Hayek’s	 work	 is	 best	 categorized	 into	 three	 phases	 in	which:	 first	 Hayek	 is	 a	 cycle	 theorist;	 he	 then	 becomes	 an	 ordoliberal	 social	philosopher;	 only	 to	 become	 an	 evolutionary	 social	 philosopher	 in	 his	 third	phase.76	This	partition	implies	that	the	only	early	neoliberals	who	wanted	to	use	the	state	actively	were	the	ordoliberals,	and	so	the	attack	on	laissez-faire	implicit	in	 the	 dual	 argument	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 ordoliberal	 influence	 on	 early	neoliberalism.	It	is	true	that	Mises	more	or	less	remained	a	champion	of	laissez-faire	as	far	as	his	policy	advice	was	concerned.	There	were	disagreements	between	the	different	wings	of	early	neoliberalism	concerning	the	use	of	the	state,	but	as	opposed	to	the	idea	that	the	ordoliberals	were	the	odd	ones	out,	I	would	argue	that	here	Mises	was	 the	 outsider.	 As	we	will	 see	 in	 Part	 II,	 practically	 all	 the	 other	neoliberals	 apart	 from	 Mises	 preferred	 a	 strong	 state,	 and	 their	 attempts	 at	theorizing	how	the	state	may	be	put	to	use	in	the	service	of	the	market	mechanism	was	indeed	one	of	their	main	innovations.		Keith	 Tribe	 claims	 in	 a	 footnote	 to	 his	 treatment	 of	 ordoliberalism	 in	 German	economic	 thought	 that	 “It	 would	 be	 incorrect	 to	 refer	 to	 these	writers	 as	 neo-liberals,	since	the	characteristic	feature	of	the	writings	discussed	here	is	that	they	envisage	a	wide-ranging	programme	of	social	policy	reform,	whereas	the	attention	of	neo-liberals	is	focused	on	competition	policy”.77	He	then	goes	on	to	contradict	this,	 when	 writing	 that	 ordoliberals	 gave	 “extremely	 limited	 attention”	 to	 the	linkage	between	economic	and	social	policy.78	Tribe’s	dismissal	of	the	label	might	have	something	to	do	with	 the	state	of	research	on	neoliberalism	at	 the	 time	of	
                                            75	Manfred	E.	Streit	and	Wolgemuth,	‘The	Market	Economy	and	the	State	–	Hayekian	and	Ordoliberal	Conceptions’,	in	The	Theory	of	Capitalism	in	the	German	Economic	Tradition	(Hanover:	Springer	Verlag,	2000),	227.	76	Stefan	Kolev,	‘F.A.	Hayek	as	an	Ordo-Liberal’,	HWWI	Research	Paper	5,	no.	11	(2010):	2.	77	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	207n.	78	Ibid.,	238.	
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writing	 (1995).	 His	 reading	 of	 Hayek’s	 critique	 of	 planning	 as	 fundamentally	different	to	that	of	the	ordoliberals	is	interesting,	but	does	not	contradict	my	claim	that	 the	ordoliberals	were	neoliberals	 too.79	 The	mere	participation	 in	both	 the	Lippmann	Colloquium	and	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	of	virtually	all	thinkers	central	to	 ordoliberalism	 speaks	 for	 itself.	 Part	 II	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 show	 that	 the	ordoliberal	 view	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 guarantor	 and	 enforcer	 of	 a	modern	market	society	was	central	to	early	neoliberalism,	and	was	accepted	both	by	Austrians	like	Hayek,	and	Chicago	economists	like	Aaron	Director.		But	what	was	this	ordoliberal	view	of	the	state	which	was	shared	by	Hayek	and	many	other	neoliberals?	One	way	 to	contextualize	 their	 ideas	 is	 to	 look	at	 their	contemporaries.	Looking	to	their	left,	Michel	Foucault	claimed	that	the	Freiburger	
Schule	 essentially	 took	up	 the	 same	problem	as	 the	Marxists	 at	 the	Frankfurter	
Schule:	that	is,	a	displacement	of	Marx’s	problem	of	analysing	the	logic	of	capital	by	Max	Weber’s	problem	of	 the	“irrational	rationality	of	capitalist	society”.	Various	Marxist	thinkers	 like	Luxemburg,	Hilferding	and	Lenin	considered	the	economic	downturns	of	the	early	twentieth	century	and	the	rise	of	finance	capital,	and	what	they	called	“monopoly	capitalism,”	as	capitalism’s	inner	contradictions	coming	to	final	fulfilment.	It	was	clear	to	the	ordoliberals	too	that	capitalism	was	not	working	especially	well,	and,	unlike	 laissez-faire	 liberals,	 they	came	to	 think	 that	market	society	rested	on	conditions	which	could	be	said	to	lie	outside	of	the	economy	itself.	The	philosopher	Oscar	Dybedahl	has	conceptualized	the	problem	facing	liberalism	as	a	sort	of	prisoner’s	dilemma,	in	which	a	competitive	system	would	be	beneficial	for	all	economic	actors,	but	where	it	was	also	in	the	interest	of	all	participants	to	try	and	avoid	 the	 imperatives	of	 competition	whenever	possible.80	According	 to	Foucault,	Frankfurt	philosophers	like	Marx	Horckheimer	tried	to	define	new	forms	
                                            79	Ibid.,	208.	Tribe	also	claims	that	Hayek	re-introduced	“the	purity	of	an	order	governed	by	laissez-faire	principles”,	whereas	he	sees	Röpke	as	opposed	to	this	in	suggesting	“an	alternative	to	both	laissez-faire	and	planning”.	Ibid.,	214.	80	Keith	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1995),	214.	
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of	social	rationality	“so	as	to	nullify	economic	irrationality”.	The	ordoliberals,	by	contrast,	went	about	“redefining,	or	rediscovering,	 the	economic	rationality	that	will	make	it	possible	to	nullify	the	social	irrationality	of	capitalism.”81	This	is	where	these	 economists	 and	 lawyers	 turned	 to	 “Ordnung	 der	 Wirtschaft”:	 expert-constructed	rules	and	regulations	which	would	make	markets	operate	rationally,	that	is	in	the	most	competitive	way	possible.	Foucault	wrote:	“for	the	neo-liberals,	the	most	important	thing	about	the	market	is	not	exchange”,	and	described	“a	shift	from	exchange	to	competition	in	the	principles	of	the	market.”82	We	are	reminded	of	Mirowski’s	thesis	that	neoliberalism	entails	a	new	conceptualization	of	markets	as	information	processors;	very	different	from	the	standard	neoclassical	view	that	they	 are	 simple	 devices	 for	 the	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 resources.	 A	 shift	 to	competition	as	the	main	principle	of	markets	also	fits	with	my	own	contention	that	neoliberals	understood	markets	in	a	new	way,	as	mediators	of	a	modern	society	based	on	the	principles	of	competition.	In	later	writing,	especially	the	1983	book	
Knowledge,	Evolution	and	Society,	Hayek	would	emphasize	the	idea	that	altruism	was	a	relic	of	tribal	societies,	and	an	ethical	principle	upon	which	a	modern	social	system	could	not	be	built.	According	to	him,	modern,	intertwined	societies	could	only	 work	 if	 organized	 as	 markets	 in	 which	 people	 act	 self-interestedly	 in	competition	with	others.83		Looking	 to	 the	 ordoliberals’	 right,	 many	 scholars	 have	 in	 recent	 years	 focused	attention	on	the	similarities	between	ordoliberal	conceptions	of	the	state	and	those	of	another	contemporary:	Carl	Schmitt	(1888	–	1985),	crown	jurist	of	 the	Third	Reich.	 Schmitt	 made	 a	 separation	 between	 a	 qualitative	 total	 state	 and	 a	quantitative	total	state.	A	quantitatively	total	state	is	a	weak	state,	intervening	in	all	possible	areas	due	to	all	kinds	of	societal	pressures.	According	to	Schmitt,	the	liberal	state	had	been	overwhelmed	by	the	demands	of	mass	democracy	and	the	state	was	thus	unable	to	keep	a	distance	from	society	as	such,	becoming	“total	in	
                                            81	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	106.	82	Ibid.,	118.	83	Gamble,	Hayek,	26–49.	
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its	weakness	and	defencelessness”.	Schmitt’s	 solution	 lay	 in	a	qualitatively	 total	state,	elevated	above	conflicts	of	economic	interest	and	protected	from	the	masses.	Hayek	 would	 make	 several	 references	 to	 Schmitt	 in	 later	 works	 on	 the	constitutional	structure	of	market	society,	and	Dybedahl	suggests	that	Schmitt’s	view	on	the	relationship	between	state	and	society	is	the	same	as	that	of	German	neoliberalism.	 Hayek	 accepted	 Schmitt’s	 distinction	 between	 liberalism	 and	democracy,	and	according	to	Dybedahl,	the	constant	tension	between	the	two	is	addressed	by	neoliberalism	 in	 a	doctrine	 about	 a	 strong	 state	meant	 to	protect	market	society	from	mass	democracy.84	As	Röpke	wrote	in	Die	Gesällshaftskrisis	der	
Gegenwart:	“The	free	market	requires	an	active	and	extremely	vigilant	policy”.85		
	
The	myth	of	laissez-faire	The	second	aspect	of	 the	dual	argument	 thus	 involved	an	attack	on	 the	quietist	program	of	laissez-faire.	Keynes	had	ridiculed	this	doctrine	as	somewhat	absurd,	writing	that:	“The	beauty	and	the	simplicity	of	such	a	theory	are	so	great	that	it	is	easy	 to	 forget	 that	 it	 follows	 not	 from	 the	 actual	 facts,	 but	 from	 an	 incomplete	hypothesis	introduced	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.”86	Lippmann	argued	along	similar	lines,	when	he	claimed	that	 laissez-faire	and	non-intervention	made	 little	sense,	and	that	it	was	“misleading”	to	think	of	corporations	“as	existing	somehow	outside	the	 law	 and	 then	 to	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	 permissible	 to	 ‘interfere’	 with	 them…”87	Lippmann	clearly	considered	the	very	constructed	nature	of	the	complicated	legal	arrangements	making	a	capitalist	economy	possible,	for	instance	the	inventions	of	modern	firms88	and	limited	liability	regulations.89	We	remember	also	Hayek’s	letter	
                                            84	Dybedahl,	‘Nyliberalismens	Sterke	Stat’,	14.	85	Wilhelm	Röpke,	The	Social	Crisis	of	Our	Time	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1950),	228.	86	Keynes,	The	End	of	Laissez-Faire	&	The	Economic	Consequences	of	the	Peace,	31.	87	Lippmann,	The	Good	Society,	269.	88	See	for	instance	John	Micklethwait	and	Adrian	Wooldridge,	The	Company	-	A	Short	
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to	 Lippmann	 in	 1937,	 in	 which	 he	 considered	 it	 “the	 fatal	 error	 of	 classical	liberalism”	to	consider	the	existing	legal	framework	unalterable.			It	 is	worth	 turning	again	 to	Michael	Polanyi’s	brother	Karl,	who	 in	his	magnum	opus,	The	Great	Transformation	from	1944,	studied	the	transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalism	in	England,	and	claimed	that	the	idea	of	laissez-faire	had	always	been	rhetoric	and	a	utopia.	Karl	Polanyi	was	an	active	socialist,	and	in	spite	of	his	family	relations	he	appears	to	not	have	been	very	aware	of	the	development	of	neoliberal	ideas	 about	 using	 the	 state	 in	 the	 service	 of	markets.	 He	 therefore	 focused	 his	energy	on	 the	perceived	enemy	of	 laissez-faire	 liberalism.	As	we	have	seen,	 the	neoliberals	 theorized	 totalitarianism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 planning	 and	abandonment	of	 liberal	principles,	while	Karl	Polanyi	 instead	blamed	 liberalism	for	what	he	called	 “the	cataclysm”;	 claiming	 that	 it	was	a	 result	of	 ”the	Utopian	endeavour	 of	 economic	 liberalism	 to	 set	 up	 a	 self-regulating	market	 system”.90	“Utopian”	is	a	key	term	in	his	thesis,	since	Polanyi	saw	the	full	separation	of	the	economy	from	society	as	impossible.	Throughout	his	life,	Polanyi	argued	that	“the	pursuit	of	material	self-gain	as	the	institutionally	enforced	incentive	to	participate	in	economic	life	eroded	social	and	community	life…”91	He	used	England	in	the	early	stages	of	the	industrial	revolution	as	the	example	of	how	laissez-faire	capitalism	was	in	fact	a	constructed	order,	one	which	he	argued	was	fundamentally	at	odds	with	the	reality	of	human	nature.		A	 key	 insight	 of	 what	 I	 have	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 “Foucauldian”	 approach	 to	neoliberalism	is	that	the	active	use	of	a	strong	state	to	impose	market	structures	in	all	of	society	is	the	very	essence	of	neoliberal	doctrine.	This	insight	in	fact	owes	something	 to	 The	 Great	 Transformation,	 and	 the	 notions	 have	 been	 further	developed	by	the	institutionalist	tradition	of	political	economy	which	followed	in	
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his	wake.92	Karl	Polanyi	 in	many	ways	deconstructed	 the	main	 contradiction	of	neoliberalism	as	present	in	laissez-faire	liberalism	as	early	as	1944.	Foucault	noted	how	neoliberalism	was	not	so	much	an	attack	on	the	state,	as	it	was	an	attempt	to	redefine	 it.	 It	was	Polanyi,	 however,	who	 first	 showed	how	even	 the	old	 liberal	order	was	constructed	and	 far	 from	a	natural	state	of	affairs.	 “Laissez-faire	was	planned”	was	his	 controversial	 claim.93	The	economist	 João	Rodrigues	 contends	that	 the	members	of	 the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	had	”recognized	early	on	that	 the	creation	 of	 new	markets	 is	 a	 political	 process,	 requiring	 the	 intervention	 of	 an	organized	power”,94	thus	in	fact	agreeing	with	Michael	Polanyi’s	socialist	brother.95	We	may	find	that	the	true	importance	of	the	neoliberals	was	not	so	much	that	they	were	the	first	to	instigate	the	use	of	state	power	to	uphold	a	liberal	order,	but	that	they	were	to	first	liberals	to	thoroughly	embrace	and	theorize	it.			 	
                                            92	See	for	instance	Fred	Block	and	Margaret	R.	Somers,	The	Power	of	Market	
Fundamentalism	-	Karl	Polanyi’s	Critique	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2014);	Dale,	Karl	Polanyi.	93	Polanyi,	The	Great	Transformation,	2001,	151.	94	João	Rodrigues,	‘Where	to	Draw	the	Line	Between	State	and	Markets?’,	Journal	of	
Economic	Issues	46,	no.	4	(2012):	1008,	doi:10.2753/JEI0021-3624460409.	95	For	this	point,	see	also	Philip	Mirowski,	‘Polanyi	vs.	Hayek’	(Hayek	-	Polanyi:	Questioning	the	Utopian	Spring	of	the	Market	Economy,	University	of	Sydney,	2014).		
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Chapter	3	–	The	Economic	Consequences	of	the	War								 “...before	 the	Great	Depression,	 the	gamblers	ran	capitalism	and	brought	 the	economies	down.	And	what	happened?	The	war	followed	the	Great	Depression.	In	wars	you	mobilize	everything.	Governments	tore	down	the	railings	in	Britain	and	America	to	make	bullets.	They	rationed	food,	they	conscripted	people,	and	they	sent	them	to	die.	The	state	took	over.	And	after	the	war	people	said,	‘If	you	can	plan	for	war,	why	can’t	you	plan	for	peace?’	When	I	was	17,	I	had	a	letter	from	the	government	saying,	‘Dear	Mr.	Benn,	will	you	turn	up	when	you’re	17	½?	We’ll	give	you	free	food,	free	clothes,	free	training,	free	accommodation,	and	two	shillings,	ten	pence	a	day	to	just	kill	Germans.	‘	People	said,	‘well,	if	you	can	have	full	employment	to	kill	people,	why	in	God’s	name	couldn’t	you	have	full	employment	and	good	schools,	hospitals,	good	houses?”		British	Labour	politician	Tony	Benn	in	the	2000	PBS	documentary	Commanding	Heights1									The	outbreak	of	World	War	II	lead	to	the	abandonment	of	the	Centre	International	pour	 le	Rénovation	de	Libéralisme	 (CIRL).	The	neoliberal	 intellectuals	who	had	gathered	in	Paris	to	discuss	the	writings	of	Walter	Lippmann,	at	the	invitation	of	Louis	Rougier	but	thanks	to	the	initiatives	of	Friedrich	Hayek,	went	into	a	period	of	 isolation	 from	 each	 other,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 period	 of	 transnational	collaboration	they	had	been	envisioning.	The	institute	met	a	second	time	in	January	1939,	but	Germany	occupied	parts	of	Czechoslovakia	 in	violation	of	 the	Munich	Treaty	in	March	that	same	year,	and	then	went	on	to	invade	Poland	on	September	1st.	Another	meeting	of	the	organization	had	been	planned	to	take	place	in	Geneva	that	very	month,	but	as	Great	Britain	and	France	declared	war	on	Germany,	 the	
                                            1	Full	transcript	of	the	interview	available	at	http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_tonybenn.html	(last	accessed	03.03.2017)	
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plans	 had	 to	 be	 abandoned.	 By	 June	 1940,	 the	 French	 army	 had	 collapsed	 and	France	 was	 under	 German	 control.2	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 activities	 of	neoliberal	 intellectuals	 in	 the	 years	 between	 1938	 and	 1947,	 but	 also	 on	 the	significance	of	World	War	II	for	their	ideas	and	their	political	project.	Volume	10	of	Friedrich	Hayek’s	collected	works	has	been	entitled	“Socialism	and	War”	by	its	editor,	 Bruce	 Caldwell,	 and	 war	 plays	 an	 ambiguous	 role	 in	 early	 neoliberal	thought.		On	the	one	hand,	neoliberal	intellectuals	worked	hard	to	link	the	horrors	of	 war	 and	 dictatorship	 to	 economic	 ideas	 of	 the	 wrong	 kind.	 Michel	 Foucault	claims	 that	 through	 “a	 series	 of	 theoretical	 and	 analytical	 coups	 de	 force”,	 the	German	ordoliberals	were	able	to	establish	their	project	as	the	opposite	of	Nazism.	The	centrally	planned	economy	of	the	Nazi-administration	was	held	as	proof	that	“the	defects	and	destructive	effects	traditionally	attributed	to	the	market	economy	should	instead	be	attributed	to	the	state.”3	As	we	will	see,	this	was	fraught	with	contradictions,	 both	 because	 most	 ordoliberals	 had	 not	 opposed	 Nazism	 as	strongly	as	they	would	later	claim,	but	also	because	an	important	role	was	reserved	for	the	state	also	within	their	own	doctrine.	Even	so,	the	link	established	by	the	early	 neoliberals	 between	 economic	 planning	 and	 the	 dictatorships	 who	 had	thrown	the	world	into	total	war,	helped	the	neoliberals	in	branding	their	doctrine	as	the	antitotalitarian	alternative	to	both	fascism	and	socialism.		On	the	other	hand,	the	experiences	with	economic	planning	under	war	were	seen	by	many	as	positive,	signalling	a	new	era	of	more	rational	economic	management.	As	in	the	interwar	years,	this	was	not	a	position	held	only	by	socialists,	rather	it	transcended	 most	 political	 boundaries.	 In	 the	 post-war	 years,	 Keynesian	economists	would	see	to	it	that	active	government	policies	of	demand	management	and	redistribution	became	the	order	of	the	day	across	the	western	world.4	This	was	the	tide	that	the	neoliberals	set	out	to	combat,	and	as	we	will	see,	this	fight	included	
                                            2	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes,	155.	3	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	116.	4	See	for	instance	P.A.	Hall,	The	Political	Power	of	Economic	Ideas	–	Keynesianism	Across	
Nations	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1989).	
  94 
turning	away	 from	 the	principles	of	 laissez-faire,	 in	an	attempt	 to	 create	a	new	liberalism	 capable	 of	 fighting	 the	 influence	 of	 more	 social	 forms	 of	 liberalism.	Where	Chapter	1	discussed	the	socialist	calculation	debates	and	suggested	that	the	core	 idea	 of	 neoliberalism	was	 a	 notion	 of	markets	 as	mediators	 of	modernity,	Chapter	 2	 showed	 how	 the	 rise	 of	 fascism	 arguably	 became	 a	 more	 pressing	concern	than	the	possibility	of	socialist	revolution	as	the	1930s	wore	on.	In	spite	of	belonging	squarely	on	the	political	right	and	expressing	some	sympathy	for	the	goals	 of	 fascism,	 neoliberal	 intellectuals	 like	 Ludwig	 von	 Mises	 criticized	 the	economics	 of	 fascism	with	 tools	 developed	 in	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates.	Replacing	the	mechanisms	of	markets	and	using	the	power	of	the	state	to	control	the	economy	seemed	a	common	feature	of	the	socialist	Soviet	Union	and	the	fascist	regimes	of	Italy	and	Germany.	It	was,	however,	a	feature	these	regimes	also	shared	with	liberal	democracies	like	Great	Britain	and	the	USA.	Inspired	by	the	writings	of	Walter	Lippmann,	neoliberal	intellectuals	thus	developed	an	argument	saying	that	socialism	 and	 fascism	 were	 expressions	 of	 the	 same	 essential	 program	 of	subverting	 markets,	 and	 that	 liberal	 democracies	 were	 headed	 in	 the	 same	direction	due	to	the	“collectivism”	which	was	to	be	 found	in	social	 liberalism	as	well	as	in	socialism	and	fascism.	As	shown	towards	the	end	of	the	previous	chapter,	this	strong	stance	did	not	lead	the	neoliberals	to	argue	in	favour	of	the	old	policies	of	 laissez-faire.	 Instead,	 neoliberals	 brought	 forward	 a	 dual	 argument	 which	included	a	powerful	charge	against	laissez-faire	and	began	the	process	of	thinking	actively	about	how	to	use	modern	states	without	subverting	the	mechanisms	of	markets.			
Hayek	in	the	Blitz	My	research	shows	that	although	many	other	men	contributed	and	were	important	to	 the	neoliberal	 project,	Hayek	was	 the	 central	 figure,	 beginning	 from	 the	mid	1930s.	 In	1938,	 he	held	 a	 lecture	 in	 Zürich	 entitled	 “Die	politischen	Folgen	der	Planwirtschaft”	(The	Political	Consequences	of	Economic	Planning”),	in	which	he	asserted	 that	 the	most	 important	 thing	 for	 “Freiheit	 und	Demokratie”(Freedom	
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and	 democracy)	 was	 “dass	 der	 Staat	 nicht	 allzu	 weit	 in	 das	 Wirtschaftsleben	eindringt”	(that	the	state	does	not	penetrate	too	far	into	economic	life”).5	To	him,	the	role	of	the	state	in	economic	affairs	was	not	a	question	of	dull	economic	policy	and	 mathematical	 theorems	 explaining	 booms	 and	 bust,	 but	 one	 regarding	freedom	and	democracy.	The	concern	that	civilization	itself	was	falling	apart	was	typical	 for	 neoliberal	 intellectuals	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 Austrians	 in	 particular.	Dekker	 has	written	 that	 “A	wider	 circle	 of	Viennese	 scholars	 had	 the	 feeling	 of	witnessing	the	same	development	as	they	had	seen	in	Austria	and	previously	in	the	Habsburg	empire.”6	This	sense	of	impending	doom	and	of	seeing	the	same	thing	happen	twice,	led	Austrian	scholars	like	Hayek	and	Karl	Popper	to	describe	their	work	in	this	period	as	their	“war	effort”.7			Throughout	the	war,	Hayek	was	able	to	keep	in	contact	with	at	least	some	of	the	“real	liberals”	he	had	assembled	in	Paris	in	1938.	However,	other	issues	were	more	pressing	in	a	time	of	war,	and	one	of	the	very	few	correspondences	that	Hayek	kept	in	 his	 personal	 archive	 is	 a	 peculiar	 one	 between	 himself	 and	 Frederic	 Ogilvie,	general	director	of	 the	BBC.	On	September	9,	1939,	Hayek	sent	him	a	nine-page	document	entitled	“Some	notes	on	propaganda	to	Germany”,8	together	with	a	kind	of	job	application	in	which	he	wrote:	“I	am	free	and	anxious	to	put	my	capacities	to	the	 best	 use	 which,	 after	 careful	 consideration,	 I	 believe	 to	 be	 in	 propaganda-work.”	Three	days	later	he	sent	the	same	memo	and	a	similar	letter	to	the	newly	appointed	Minister	of	 Information,	Lord	Macmillan.	Ogilvie	responded	briefly	to	Hayek,	saying	he	“was	very	much	interested	to	know	that	you	had	applied	for	a	post	at	the	Ministry	of	Information”,	but	there	was	never	any	real	response.	In	the	following	month,	Hayek	sent	increasingly	more	agitated	letters	to	Ogilvie	in	which	
                                            5	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	105,	Folder	24:	“Die	politischen	folgen	der	Planwirtschaft”	6	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	132.	7	Ibid.,	133.	8	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	105,	Folder	26	
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he	criticized	various	aspects	of	the	BBC’s	propaganda	broadcasts	to	Germany.	He	appears	to	have	sent	at	least	ten	of	these,	sometimes	several	per	day.	On	October	15th,	for	instance,	he	noted	that	one	of	the	speakers	had	a	voice	which	made	him	sound	Jewish,	writing:	“he	will	inevitably	be	taken	by	most	German	listeners	to	be	a	jew	and	in	concequence	[sic]	deprive	the	broadcast,	and	even	what	preceded	it,	of	most	of	its	effect.”			Few	copies	of	original	 letters	have	been	kept	by	Hayek,	but	the	short	responses	these	provoked	give	us	some	insight	into	how	they	may	have	been	phrased,	and	the	way	 in	which	members	of	 the	British	establishment	dealt	with	an	eccentric	Austrian	émigré	professor,	whose	help	they	clearly	felt	they	could	do	without.	One	example	from	October	3:	“Thank	you	very	much	for	your	letter	of	30th.	I	was	very	glad	 to	have	 your	 valuable	 comment	but	 hope	 very	much	 that	 “verächtlich”	 for	“verachtungsvoll”	is	not	to	be	regarded	as	so	appalling	a	blunder	as	you	suggest…”	Hayek	received	several	notes	from	various	officials	at	the	Ministry	of	Information	thanking	him	for	his	feedback,	but	altogether	avoiding	the	issue	of	employment.9	Hayek	 later	 wrote	 to	 Fritz	 Machlup,	 who	 had	migrated	 to	 the	 US,	 that	 he	 was	“getting	really	annoyed	by	 the	refusal	 to	use	a	person	 like	myself	on	any	useful	work”.	10		Hence,	 Hayek	 ended	 up	 having	 time	 on	 his	 hands	 to	 organize	 the	 liberal	insurrection	 that	 he	 hoped	 would	 follow	 the	 war.	 His	 close	 colleague	 Lionel	Robbins,	who	had	brought	 him	 to	 London	 in	 the	 first	 place,	was,	 unlike	Hayek,	highly	 trusted	by	 the	British	government.	After	 the	outbreak	of	war	he	became	director	of	 the	economics	section	at	 the	Offices	of	 the	War	Cabinet.11	Therefore,	Robbins	was	busy	working	for	the	government	when	Hayek,	along	with	the	rest	of	
                                            9	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	61,	Folder	5	10	Friedrich	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition	(The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2007),	10.	Letter	of	June	21	1940,	quoted	in	Bruce	Caldwell's	preface	11	John	Pinder,	Altiero	Spinelli	and	the	British	Federalists:	Writings	by	Beveridge,	Robbins	
and	Spinelli,	1937-1943	(London:	Federal	Trust :	Marketing	and	distribution	by	Kogan	Page,	1998),	45.	
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the	 LSE	 faculty,	 moved	 to	 Peterhouse	 at	 Cambridge	 to	 escape	 the	 German	bombings.	There	Hayek	started	writing	the	book	that	would	become	The	Road	to	
Serfdom.	12		
The	Road	to	Serfdom	In	the	book,	Hayek	claimed	not	only	that	markets	were	indispensable	for	economic	calculation,	hence	 the	 impossibility	of	 centrally	planned	socialism;	but	also	 that	even	if	calculation	was	possible,	it	would	be	impossible	to	know	what	to	calculate	for	without	 the	help	of	markets.	His	 insistence	on	 the	price	mechanism	and	 the	market	process	as	the	only	possible	mediators	between	the	many	individuals	that	comprise	a	modern	society,	was	taken	more	or	less	directly	from	Mises:	“no	single	man	can	ever	master	all	the	possibilities	of	production,	innumerable	as	they	are,	as	to	be	in	a	position	to	make	straightway	evident	judgments	of	value	without	the	aid	of	some	system	of	computation.”13	This	was	in	line	with	Mises’	original	arguments	against	socialism,	as	he	had	presented	them	in	his	influential	1935	volume.	At	that	time,	 Hayek	 had	 yet	 to	 use	 the	 term	 “totalitarianism”	 as	 a	 description	 of	 the	unwelcome	 results	 of	 economic	planning,	 but	 his	 theory	of	 the	 importance	 and	functioning	 of	 the	 market	 order	 was	 already	 largely	 in	 place.	 So	 too	 was	 his	comparison	between	fascism	and	communism.	In	a	memo	to	Sir	William	Beveridge,	already	written	in	1932,	Hayek	wrote,	under	the	title	“Nazi-Socialism”	that:			 “The	persecution	of	the	Marxists,	and	of	democrats	in	general,	tend	to	obscure	the	fundamental	fact	that	National	Socialism	is	a	genuine	Socialist	movement,	whose	leading	ideas	are	the	final	fruits	of	the	anti-liberal	tendencies	which	have	been	steadily	gaining	ground	in	Germany	since	the	later	part	of	the	Bismarckian	era	(…)	What	must	be	realised	is	that	this	is	only	the	ultimate	and	necessary	outcome	of	a	process	of	development	in	which	the	other	nations	have	been	for	a	long	time	steadily	following	Germany,	albeit	at	a	 considerable	distance.	The	gradual	extension	of	 the	 field	of	 state	activity…	sympathy	with	central	economic	planning	and	the	widespread	playing	with	dictatorship	ideas,	all	tend	in	this	direction.”14			
                                            12	Wapshott,	Keynes	Hayek,	192.	13	Mises,	Economic	Calculation	in	The	Socialist	Commonwealth,	16.	14	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition,	245–48.	
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What	Abbot	Gleason	 and	many	 others	 have	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “slippery	 slope”-argument,15	 concerning	 the	 connection	 between	 economic	 planning	 and	totalitarianism,	may	have	first	been	put	forward	by	Lippmann	in	The	Good	Society	in	1937;	but	as	we	have	seen,	he	was	far	from	the	first	to	compare	fascism	with	communism,	 and	 the	 specific	 economic	 argument	 had	 clear	 antecedents	 in	Friedrich	Hayek’s	elaboration	on	Ludwig	Mises’	arguments	against	the	possibility	of	economic	rationality	in	socialism.	This	argument	was	developed	over	more	than	a	decade,	but	arguably	only	came	to	full	fruition	in	Hayek’s	own	words	in	1944.			The	overarching	claim	of	The	Road	to	Serfdom	was	thus	that	“the	rise	of	fascism	and	naziism	(sic)	was	not	a	reaction	against	the	socialist	trends	of	the	preceding	period	but	a	necessary	outcome	of	those	tendencies.”16	Furthermore,	Hayek’s	claim	was	not	only	that	fascism	was	a	version	of,	more	than	a	reaction	against	socialism;	but	also	that	democratic	countries	were	becoming	more	socialist	by	the	hour,	and	thus	also	coming	closer	to	totalitarianism.	“For	at	 least	twenty-five	years	before	the	 spectre	 of	 totalitarianism	 became	 a	 real	 threat,	 we	 had	 progressively	 been	moving	away	from	the	basic	ideas	on	which	Western	civilization	has	been	built,”	he	wrote.	The	key	point	in	this	was	an	abandonment	of	“that	freedom	in	economic	affairs	without	which	personal	and	political	freedom	has	never	existed	in	the	past”.	Writing	from	a	Britain	under	siege	by	the	German	bomber	planes,	Hayek	claimed	that	contrary	to	popular	opinion	it	was	“the	prevalence	of	socialist	views	and	not	Prussianism”17	that	had	led	to	totalitarianism	in	Germany,	and	that	it	would	do	so	also	in	Britain	if	his	warnings	were	not	heard	in	due	time.			Hayek	 then	 cited	 several	developments	 in	Germany	 in	 the	years	of	 the	Weimar	Republic	and	as	far	back	as	to	the	rule	of	Otto	von	Bismarck	as	proof	of	how	what	he	 called	 “social	 constructivism”,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 economic	 planning,	 had	 led	 to	totalitarianism.	 These	 developments	 were	 all	 political	 attempts	 by	 socialists,	
                                            15	Gleason,	Totalitarianism,	64.	16	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition,	59.	17	Ibid.,	63.	
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fascists	and	social	liberals	to	subvert	the	workings	of	the	price	mechanism	and	the	“free”	market.	Hayek	repeatedly	stated	that	“...	the	very	complexity	of	the	division	of	 labour	 under	modern	 conditions	 (...)	makes	 competition	 the	 only	method	by	which	such	coordination	can	be	adequately	brought	about.”18	This	was	an	echo	of	Mises,	 but	 Hayek	 further	 contended	 that	 economic	 planning	 presupposed	 “the	existence	of	a	complete	ethical	code	in	which	all	 the	different	human	values	are	allotted	 their	 due	 place.”19	 He	 then	went	 on	 to	 state	 that	 there	 is	 no	 “complete	ethical	code”	available	for	human	beings	to	grasp,	so	choices	in	a	planned	society	would	 be	 have	 to	 be	 made	 by	 someone,	 between	 the	 diverse	 preferences	 of	different	 groups.	 Since	 this	 someone	 can	 never	 have	 all	 the	 knowledge	automatically	embedded	in	the	market	through	the	price	mechanism,	these	choices	would	be	bad	ones.	More	importantly	for	the	question	of	how	economic	planning	leads	to	totalitarianism:	“People	who	are	not	satisfied	with	the	priorities	made	by	planners	will	 feel	unjustly	 treated.	There	will	always	exist	 inequalities…”	Hayek	wrote,	“But	when	these	things	occur	in	a	society	which	is	consciously	directed,	the	way	in	which	people	will	react	will	be	very	different	from	what	it	is	when	they	are	nobody’s	conscious	choice.”20	This	is	a	key	element	in	the	road	to	totalitarianism	described	by	Hayek:	The	impossibility	of	planning,	be	it	by	a	democratically	elected	entity	or	not,	leads	to	inefficiency	and	social	unrest,	thus	“The	cry	for	an	economic	dictator	is	a	characteristic	stage	in	the	movement	toward	planning.”21	According	to	Hayek	this	stage	will	be	followed	by	massive	propaganda	to	secure	full	support	for	the	economic	policies	that	can	never	be	either	fair	or	effective,22	as	it	also	becomes	obvious	that	the	leading	group	within	a	totalitarian	state,	“is	not	likely	to	be	formed	by	the	best	but	rather	by	the	worst	element	of	any	society”.23	And	it	all	starts	with	economic	planning.			
                                            18	Ibid.,	95.	19	Ibid.,	101.	20	Ibid.,	137.	21	Ibid.,	108.	22	Ibid.,	171.	23	Ibid.,	160.	
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The	contested	definition	of	economic	planning	The	 question	 of	 what	 Hayek	 really	 meant	 by	 “economic	 planning”	 is	 highly	contested	to	this	day,	and	I	argue	that	the	notion	of	a	dual	argument	shows	us	that	neoliberalism	 can	 best	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 attack	 on	planning	with	an	attack	on	laissez-faire.	In	the	book,	Hayek	attempted	to	separate	between	“planning	for	competition”	and	“planning	against	competition”.24	To	some	of	Hayek’s	critics	in	our	time,	the	existence	of	successful	post-war	welfare	states	in	Europe	seem	to	disprove	Hayek’s	theory	of	totalitarianism	as	a	result	of	economic	planning	and	government	intervention	in	the	economy.25	In	the	second	part	of	the	twentieth	 century,	many	 countries	 engaged	actively	 in	 a	 variety	of	policies	 that	might	fall	under	most	definitions	of	economic	planning;	including	state	ownership	of	 industries	 and	widespread	 redistribution	 through	 high	 rates	 of	 taxation	 and	extensive	welfare	 systems.	 But	 if	 these	 are	 to	 be	 labelled	 totalitarian,	 then	 the	concept	 loses	 much	 of	 its	 power	 and	 relevance,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	atrocities	committed	by	the	European	dictatorships	that	the	concept	was	intended	to	 describe.	 Bruce	 Caldwell	 claims	 that	Hayek	was	merely	 “arguing	 against	 the	dangers	of	socialist	central	planning,	not	the	welfare	state”,	and	that	”it	was	only	in	later	 books,	 after	 the	 demise	 in	 the	west	 of	 ‘hot	 socialism’,	 that	 he	 took	up	 the	question	of	the	dangers	of	the	welfare	state,	and	when	he	did	so	 it	was	 in	more	measured	and	gradualist	terms.”26		Thus,	we	arrive	at	the	very	crux	of	the	question	of	the	role	assigned	to	the	state	by	early	neoliberals.	As	I	suggested	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	entirely	plausible	that	Hayek	never	meant	to	argue	against	government	involvement	in	the	form	of	“a	legal	system	 designed	 both	 to	 preserve	 competition	 and	 to	 make	 it	 operate	 as	
                                            24	Ibid.,	90.	25	Andrew	Farrant	and	Edward	McPhail,	‘Does	F.A.	Hayek’s	“Road	to	Serfdom”	Deserve	to	Make	a	Comeback?’,	Challenge	53,	no.	4	(1	July	2010):	96–120.	26	Bruce	Caldwell,	‘Hayek	on	Socialism	and	on	the	Welfare	State:	A	Comment	on	Farrant	and	McPhail’s	“Does	F.A.	Hayek’s	Road	to	Serfdom	Deserve	to	Make	a	Comeback?”’,	
Challenge,	no.	Jan/Feb	(2011):	2.	
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beneficially	as	possible”,	or	even	“an	extensive	system	of	social	services”.27	As	we	can	see,	this	is	pointed	out	in	the	text	itself,	and	Hayek	was	reported	to	have	been	disheartened	 by	 the	 popularity	 of	 his	 book	 amongst	 American	 business	conservatives,	 who	 mainly	 sought	 new	 arguments	 for	 lower	 taxes	 and	 less	government	 involvement	 in	what	 they	 perceived	 as	 their	 affairs.	Much	 later,	 in	
Law,	Legislation	and	Liberty	(1973)	Hayek	also	wrote,	“What	I	meant	to	argue	…	was	certainly	not	that	whenever	we	depart,	however	slightly,	from	what	I	regard	as	the	principles	of	a	free	society,	we	shall	ineluctably	be	driven	to	go	the	whole	way	to	a	totalitarian	system.”28	Hayek	here	shows	a	more	moderate	side	than	the	caricature	of	a	free	market	fundamentalist	we	find	in	some	of	the	critical	literature.	Yet,	as	should	be	clear	from	the	previous	chapter	and	from	Hayek’s	critique	of	the	welfare	 states	 later	 in	 life,	 his	 disagreements	 with	 laissez-faire	 liberals	 and	business	 conservatives	 in	 the	 US	 was	 not	 mainly	 related	 to	 welfare	 programs.	American	 business	 leaders	 took	 Hayek’s	 book	 to	 be	 a	 spirited	 attack	 on	government	 involvement	 in	 economic	 affairs;	 it	was,	 but	 they	missed	 the	 other	aspect	of	the	dual	argument,	the	more	subtle	critique	of	laissez-faire	and	Hayek’s	novel	 approach	 to	 the	 role	 of	modern	 states	 in	 both	 guarding	 and	 constituting	liberal	market	order.		We	 thus	 return	 to	 the	 common	 misunderstandings	 which	 are	 apparent	 when	scholars,	 politicians	 and	 journalists	 refer	 to	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 doctrine	 of	writers	like	Hayek	as	somehow	“anti-state”.	Johanna	Bockmann	has	observed	that	the	state/market	dichotomy	is	arguably	useless	for	real	social	analysis,	and	that	it	“easily	blurs	into	other	dichotomies:	between	socialism	and	capitalism,	between	central	 planning	 and	 the	 market,	 between	 Keynesianism	 and	 monetarism…”29	According	to	João	Rodrigues,	one	of	Hayek’s	main	contributions	was	the	idea	that	“the	 development	 of	 markets	 demands	 an	 expanding	 state	 with	 the	 power	 to	
                                            27	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition,	87.	28	Friedrich	Hayek,	Law,	Legislation	and	Liberty:	A	New	Statement	of	the	Liberal	
Principles	of	Justice	and	Political	Economy	(London:	Routledge,	1998),	58.	29	Bockman,	Markets	in	the	Name	of	Socialism,	5.	
  102 
impose	the	rules	that	markets	require.”30	This	is	the	point	where	Hayek,	along	with	several	of	the	other	early	neoliberals,	departed	from	laissez-faire	liberalism;	and	Hayek	postulated	that	“the	question	whether	the	state	should	or	should	not	‘act’	or	‘interfere’	 poses	 an	 altogether	 false	 alternative,	 and	 the	 term	 laissez-faire	 is	 a	highly	ambiguous	and	misleading	description	of	the	principles	on	which	a	liberal	policy	 is	 based.”31	 This	 expresses	 the	 fundamental	 tension	 in	 Hayek’s	 work	between	 attacking	 economic	 planning	 on	 one	 side	 and	 attacking	 laissez-faire	liberalism	on	the	other.	As	Bruce	Caldwell	writes	about	Hayek:	“Within	the	covers	of	the	same	book	he	will	both	argue	that	policies	that	aim	at	income	redistribution	violate	the	rule	of	law,	and	endorse	the	provision	of	a	‘safety	net’	that	is	itself	an	instrument	 of	 redistribution.”32	 Caldwell	 indicates	 that	 Hayek	 contradicted	himself,	 but	 the	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 dual	 argument	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	creating	 a	 tension,	 which	 pushed	 both	 Hayek	 and	 other	 neoliberal	 thinkers	forward	 to	 try	 and	 reconcile	 the	 attack	 on	 planning	 with	 their	 admission	 that	laissez-faire	was	an	outdated	program.33	
	
Other	versions	of	the	dual	argument	The	dual	argument,	stating	both	that	economic	planning	led	to	totalitarianism	and	that	liberals	would	have	to	do	better	than	laissez-faire	to	stop	it,	was	expressed	by	all	 the	 European	 protagonists	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 movement	 in	 the	 war	 years	separating	The	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	in	1938	and	the	founding	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	1947.	In	Les	mystiques	économiques,	published	in	1938,	Louis	 Rougier	 claimed	 that	 liberal	 democracy	 “finds	 itself	 transformed	 into	 a	totalitarian	state”,	and	argued	that	“la	mystique	libérale”	of	laissez-faire	was	not	
                                            30	Rodrigues,	‘The	Political	and	Moral	Economies	of	Neoliberalism:	Mises	and	Hayek’,	1007.	31	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition,	84.	32	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	5.	33	Erwin	Dekker	sees	a	similar	type	of	tension	in	the	work	of	Austrian	thinkers	like	Hayek	and	Popper,	namely	“the	tension	between	on	the	one	hand,	the	strong	conviction	of	the	futility	of	science	or	art	in	the	face	of	tyranny,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	feeling	that	one	has	the	moral	duty	to	do	something”.	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	
Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered,	136.	
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enough	to	counter	the	trend	towards	economic	planning.34	As	mentioned,	Wilhelm	Röpke	never	worked	at	the	University	of	Freiburg,	but	was	instead	based	in	Jena	and	Marburg	 before	 fleeing	Germany;	 first	 for	 Turkey	 and	 then	 to	 Switzerland,	where	he	remained	for	the	rest	of	his	 life.	Die	Gesselschaftscrisis	der	Gegenwarts	(translated	in	1950	as	The	Social	Crisis	of	Our	Time),	was	thus	“written	in	the	latter	part	of	1941,	at	a	time	when	Hitler	was	at	the	very	height	of	his	triumph,	and	in	the	solitude	of	the	Swiss	alps	which	was	then	a	small	island	in	a	continent	swamped	by	tyranny.”35	But	what	was	 the	cause	of	 this	 tyranny?	 “What	uncanny	disease	has	invaded	our	world	and	what	exactly	has	been	happening	in	those	countries	which	have	already	succumbed	to	it?”36	Röpke	saw	a	“spiritual	crisis”,	and	waxed	lyrically	about	the	“process	of	social	decomposition	and	agglomeration	for	which	the	term	‘collectivization’	has	been	coined,”	lamenting	the	“healthy	society,	firmly	resting	on	its	 own	 foundations,	 [which]	 possesses	 a	 genuine	 structure	 with	 many	intermediate	stages;	it	exhibits	a	necessarily	hierarchical	composition	(…)	where	each	individual	has	the	good	fortune	of	knowing	his	position.”37			These	 lamentations	 of	 a	 lost	 world	 with	 traditional	 hierarchies	 were	 arguably	present	also	in	Hayek’s	thought,	but	Röpke	put	his	notion	of	a	spiritual	crisis	at	the	centre	both	of	The	Social	Crisis	of	Our	Time	and	Civitas	Humana	 from	1944,	 two	books	which	are	indeed	very	similar	to	each	other.	At	times	Röpke	appeared	more	balanced	than	Hayek,	at	one	point	even	decrying	“the	vague	and	thoughtless	use	of	terms	such	as	 ‘planned	economy’	and	‘socialism’”.	Röpke,	somewhat	similarly	to	Karl	Polanyi,	insisted	that	collectivism	was	a	response	to	something	else,	but	the	driving	 force	 was	 not,	 like	 in	 The	 Great	 Transformation	 a	 double	 movement	protecting	society	from	the	attempt	at	giving	market	efficiency	primacy	over	social	relations,	but	instead	the	“spiritual	crisis.”	Yet	this	crisis	remained	a	rather	unclear	entity,	simultaneously	 the	cause	and	the	effect	of	social	unrest.	Röpke	did	claim	
                                            34	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	69.	35	Röpke,	The	Social	Crisis	of	Our	Time.,	(Preface	to	the	English	language	edition)	36	Ibid.,	Introduction	37	Ibid.,	10.	
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that	 “This	 juxtaposition	 of	 totalitarianism	 and	 socialism	 is	 more	 than	 a	 mere	comparison;	the	two	tendencies	are,	on	the	contrary,	so	closely	interrelated	that	as	can	be	proved	in	detail,	they	are,	in	the	last	analysis,	one”.38	When	it	came	down	to	this	last	analysis,	Röpke	rested	on	precisely	the	same	argument	as	Hayek:	“Since	decisions	regarding	the	use	of	the	economy’s	productive	forces	are	no	longer	made	through	 the	 market	 but	 in	 the	 office	 of	 a	 government	 agency,	 they	 become	politicalized	[sic]”,39	he	wrote.	But	“an	ideal	democracy	presupposes	…	that	people	are	in	almost	complete	agreement	on	questions	of	government…	How	would	it	be	possible	to	effect	even	a	tolerable	agreement	on	all	those	questions	of	detail	which	are	 the	 essence	of	 economic	process	 and	which	affect	 individual	 interests	most	directly	and	acutely?”40	This	was	a	reprise	of	Hayek’s	intervention	in	the	socialist	calculation	 debates,	 and	 Röpke	 was	 in	 some	 respects	 probably	 closer	 to	 the	Austrian	 school	 than	 other	 ordoliberals.	 Although	 he	 quoted	Mises,	 he	was	 not	engaging	 with	 questions	 of	 commensurability,	 rather	 with	 questions	 of	epistemology	and	knowledge.	He	claimed	not	only	that	the	market	was	a	superior	calculator	 (in	 Civitas	 Humana	 called	 “the	 Market”	 “the	 unsurpassed	 Master	 of	Calculation”41	 –	another	ordoliberal,	von	Stackelberg	said	 that	 the	market	order	operated	 as	 if	 it	 was	 an	 automatic	 calculating	 machine42);	 Röpke	 also	 saw	 the	market	as	 the	only	possible	mediator	of	modern	social	 life,	 the	process	 through	which	 the	 diverging	 ends	 of	 different	 individuals	 and	 groups	 were	 aligned.	Although	he	used	a	more	“spiritual”	approach	than	Hayek,	the	actual	arguments	of	both	The	Social	Crisis	of	Our	Time	and	Civitas	Humana	were	very	similar	to	those	of	Hayek’s	in	The	Road	to	Serfdom.			It	could	be	argued	that	Röpke	was	in	fact	the	neoliberal	thinker	who	most	closely	resembled	 Hayek	 before	 1947.	 He	 also	 did	 so	 at	 such	 an	 early	 stage	 that	 it	 is	
                                            38	Ibid.,	19.	39	Ibid.,	88.	40	Ibid.,	89.	41	R.	J.	White,	‘Review’,	The	Economic	Journal	60,	no.	239	(1	September	1950):	576.	42	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	136.	
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difficult	 to	contend	 that	 the	 influence	went	only	one	way;	Röpke	 too	must	have	influenced	 Hayek.	 Already	 in	 The	 Economics	 of	 the	 Free	 Society,	 which	 Röpke	published	in	1937,	he	put	forward	that:	“The	processes	peculiar	to	economic	life	in	a	free	society	make	evident	the	fundamental	superiority	of	the	spontaneous	order	over	the	commanded	order.”	Bruce	Caldwell	has	argued	that	Hayek	went	through	a	”transformation”	from	simply	arguing	for	a	spontaneous	order,	to	actually	trying	to	explain	it	around	the	time	of	his	essay	“Economics	and	Knowledge”	from	1936,	just	 one	year	 earlier.43	 Furthermore,	when	 it	 came	 to	 embracing	 the	 concept	of	
totalitarianism	 as	 an	 apt	 description	 of	modern	 European	 dictatorships,	 Röpke	claimed	 as	 early	 as	 1935	 that	 Fascism	was	 “distinctly	 illiberal	 [and]	 decidedly	totalitarian”	 in	 an	 article	 published	 in	 LSE’s	 journal	Economica.44	 Thus	 the	dual	argument	owes	much	not	only	to	Hayek	and	Mises,	but	also	to	Röpke.		
Against	“scientism”	In	 a	 letter	 to	 Walter	 Lippmann	 on	 May	 28th,	 1940,	 before	 the	 Blitz	 and	 the	relocation	to	Cambridge,	but	after	the	declaration	of	war,	Hayek	wrote:		 “While	I	by	no	means	despair	about	the	situation	and	while	I	do	not	dream	of	running	away	while	 the	 crisis	 lasts,	 there	 is	 one	 thing	 where	 I	 want	 to	 make	 preparations	 in	 time	 for	 all	eventualities.	If	the	worst	were	to	come,	it	might	be	to	late	to	write	about	it.	I	have	for	some	time	been	engaged	in	preparatory	work	on	a	book,	which	I	believe,	if	I	ever	come	to	do	it,	might	be	of	real	importance,	but	which	in	certain	eventualities	I	should	not	be	able	to	continue	here.	I	enclose	a	synopsis	of	the	first	part	of	the	planned	book	–	the	second	part	would	be	essentially	an	elaboration	of	the	argument	of	my	pamphlet	on	Freedom	and	the	Economic	System.”		Hayek	then	went	on	to	ask	Lippmann	to	keep	the	synopsis	“in	case	I	should	at	some	later	 date	 have	 to	 ask	 you	 to	 use	 it	 on	 my	 behalf	 in	 some	 connection.”45	 The	synopsis	referred	to	has	not	been	kept	in	the	archives,	but	it	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	it	was	not	a	synopsis	for	The	Road	to	Serfdom,	but	instead	for	a	never	completed	project	entitled	The	Abuse	of	Reason.	In	a	letter	to	Fritz	Machlup	sent	
                                            43	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	205.		44	Wilhelm	Röpke,	‘Fascist	Economics’,	Economica,	February	1935,	85.	45	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	
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just	a	few	weeks	later,	on	June	21st,	Hayek	wrote	“…	I	am	already	at	work	on	my	new	book,	a	history	of	the	influence	of	scientific	and	technological	development	on	social	thought	and	policy	(to	be	called	The	Abuse	and	Decline	of	Reason).”46	The	mentioned	 text	 “Freedom	 and	 the	 Economic	 System”	was	 the	 name	 of	 a	 policy	pamphlet	Hayek	had	published	on	Chicago	University	Press	in	1939,	and	according	to	Hayek’s	 biographer,	Bruce	Caldwell,	 ”pieces	of	 the	Abuse	 of	Reason	 project	 ...	were	published	separately:	A	part	of	the	first	section	appeared	as	an	article	entitled	”Individualism:	True	and	False”	...	The	second	section	was	published	as	”Scientism	and	 the	Study	of	Society”,	 ...	 and	parts	of	 the	historical	account	appeared	as	 the	essays	”The	Counter-Revolution	of	Science”	...	and	”Comte	and	Hegel”	(...)	The	final	section	became	The	Road	to	Serfdom.”47			In	using	the	word	“scientism”,	Hayek	was	criticizing	contemporary	thinkers	 like	Karl	Mannheim,	who,	like	many	others	at	the	time,	advocated	a	planned	society.	Other	 European	 neoliberals,	 notably	 Michael	 Polanyi	 and	 Karl	 Popper,	 also	combined	 a	 theory	 of	 science	 with	 the	 trademark	 neoliberal	 theory	 of	totalitarianism	 and	 the	 dual	 argument.	 Polanyi	was	 present	 both	 at	 the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	and	the	first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	meeting	in	1947,	whereas	Popper	only	 took	part	 in	 the	 latter	event.	 In	1938	Popper	was	 teaching	 in	New	Zealand	and	would	have	been	unable	to	attend	the	meeting	in	Paris.	Popper	was	in	close	contact	with	his	Austrian	compatriot	Hayek	however,	and	the	latter	admitted	to	having	been	influenced	by	Popper’s	1934	work	Logik	der	Forschung.48	Popper	sent	Hayek	the	manuscript	for	his	later	very	famous	work	The	Open	Society	and	its	
Enemies,	 and	Hayek	acted	as	a	sort	of	agent	 for	him	 in	Great	Britain,	eventually	securing	Popper	a	publication	deal	and	a	chair	at	the	LSE.	The	Open	Society	and	its	
Enemies	 was	 published	 in	 1945,	 and	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 famous	philosophical	theories	of	totalitarianism.	In	it	Popper	offered	“an	attractive,	high-
                                            46	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Fritz	Machlup	Collection,	Box	43,	Folder	15:	”Hayek,	Friedrich	–	1933-1944”	47	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	241.	48	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	50.	
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end	analogy	between	experimental	science	and	open-minded	liberal	politics”,49	to	show	how	the	world	had	descended	into	anti-liberal	totalitarian	politics.	Popper	made	 liberalism	the	political	equivalent	of	 scientific	discovery,	and	“divided	 the	world	into	open,	liberal-minded	spirits	who	accepted	change,	uncertainty,	and	the	provisional	 character	of	 life	 and	knowledge,	 and	 closed-up,	 illiberal	 spirits	who	craved	sameness,	fixity	and	security.	Good	societies	came	from	the	first,	bad	from	the	second”,	writes	Edmund	Fawcett.50	 In	Popper’s	grand	narrative,	Plato,	Hegel	and	Marx	were	the	villains	of	history	who	had	imposed	“closed”	orders	and	ways	of	thinking,	fundamentally	opposed	to	the	openness	of	liberalism.51		Michael	Polanyi,	who	was	Karl	Polanyi’s	brother	but	shared	none	of	his	socialist	views,52	had	already	struck	a	similar	chord	in	his	1935	essay	“Soviet	Economics	–	Fact	and	Theory”.	There	he	claimed	that	there	were	only	two	imaginable	ways	of	organizing	an	economy:	 centralized	planning	or	a	market	 system.53	 Polanyi	had	had	great	success	as	a	chemist	before	migrating	to	philosophy	and	social	theory	during	 these	 years.	 Like	Hayek,	 his	 quarrel	was	with	 the	 communists’	 claim	 to	“scientific	planning”,	given	intellectual	credence	by	engineers	and	sociologists	like	Mannheim,	who	advocated	the	complete	rationalization	and	planning	of	society	in	order	 to	 avoid	 civilizational	 collapse.	 Like	Hayek,	 Polanyi	 argued	 that	 a	 central	authority	could	not	possibly	gather	and	assimilate	information	about	all	possible	aspects	 of	 the	 economic	 system:	 “the	 central	 authority,	 however	 properly	constituted	 it	 may	 be	 as	 a	 government,	 is	 in	 fact	 ignorant	 of	 the	 desires	 of	 its	constituents	as	far	as	their	day-to-day-wants	are	concerned.”54	Polanyi	argued	that	as	with	 scientific	 discovery,	 society	 as	 a	whole	with	 all	 its	 social	 and	 economic	factors	was	 too	complicated	 to	make	economic	planning	possible.	He	continued	
                                            49	Fawcett,	Liberalism,	279.	50	Ibid.,	280.	51	Karl	Popper,	The	Open	Society	and	Its	Enemies:	Volume	Two:	Hegel	and	Marx	(Routledge	Classics,	2003).	52	Lee	Congdon,	‘Between	Brothers:	Karl	and	Michael	Polanyi	on	Fascism	and	Communism’,	Tradition	and	Discovery	XXIV,	no.	2	(98	1997):	7–13.	53	Mark	T.	Mitchell,	Michael	Polanyi	(Wilmington,	Delaware:	ISI	Books,	2006),	21.	54	Ibid.,	22.	
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along	 these	 lines	 in	 articles	 called	 “Collectivist	 Planning”	 in	 1940	 and	 the	 book	
USSR	 Economics	 in	 1936.	 As	 early	 as	 1919,	 in	 the	 essay	 “New	 Scepticism”,	 he	observed	 that	 “society	 is	 so	 complicated	 that	 even	 science	 cannot	 calculate	 the	future	effect	either	of	any	institution	or	of	any	measure	and	people	involved	with	politics,	with	their	rough	minds	and	passionate	fancies,	are	a	thousand	times	less	able	to	foresee	whether	the	institutions	they	demand	will	meet	their	interests	in	the	 last	analysis.”55	Polanyi	actually	coined	the	phrase	“spontaneous	order”,	and	his	 ideas	 about	 “tacit	 knowledge”	were	 to	become	very	 important	 for	Friedrich	Hayek,56	with	whom	he	was	in	correspondence.57		In	 an	 essay	 entitled	 “Collectivist	 Economic	 Planning”,	 Polanyi	 also	 went	 on	 to	express	the	full	dual	argument,	arguing	that	liberals	should	not	be	so	opposed	to	government	 intervention.	 There	 was	 nothing	 wrong	 with	 the	 right	 kind	 of	intervention,	 he	 claimed,	 and	 this	would	be	 absolutely	necessary	 to	protect	 the	market	economy:		 “The	orthodox	Liberals	maintain	that,	if	the	market	is	limited	by	the	fixation	of	some	of	its	elements,	then	it	must	cease	to	function,	the	implication	being	that	there	exists	a	logical	system	of	complete	
laissez-faire,	 the	only	 rational	 alternative	 to	which	 is	 collectivism.	That	 is	precisely	 the	position	which	collectivists	want	us	to	take	up	when	asserting	that	none	of	the	evils	of	the	market	can	be	alleviated	except	by	destroying	the	whole	institution	root	and	branch.”58	
	Thus	 Polanyi	 too	 found	 himself	 arguing	 both	 that	 economic	 planning	 was	 an	epistemic	 impossibility,	 and	 that	 there	 was	 absolutely	 nothing	 wrong	 with	government	 intervention.	 Once	 again,	 we	 are	 starting	 to	 glimpse	 the	 crucial	importance	for	the	early	neoliberals	of	defining	which	kinds	of	interventions	were	possible	and	not	harmful	to	the	market	order.		
	
                                            55	Michael	Polanyi,	Society,	Economics,	and	Philosophy	(Transaction	Publishers,	1997),	30.	56	Mitchell,	Michael	Polanyi,	22.	57	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	142.	58	Polanyi,	Society,	Economics,	and	Philosophy,	140.	
  109 
War	and	planning	Like	 Lippmann	 had	 done	 in	The	 Good	 Society,	Hayek	 and	 Röpke	went	 to	 great	lengths	in	their	1944	publications	to	show	how	the	wartime	command	economy	was	not	an	example	to	be	followed	after	the	war	was	over.59	Their	reasoning	behind	this	should	be	clear	by	now.	In	the	article	“Austria:	Advance	Post	in	Europe”	from	1946,	Hayek	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 quickly	 abandoning	 price	 controls	 and	rationing,	 noting	 that	 “The	 needs	 of	 reconstruction	 will	 force	 the	 Austrian	government	 to	 make	 decisions	 that	 will	 be	 highly	 unpopular	 with	 their	 own	citizens”.60	 Lionel	 Robbins	was	 a	 leading	member	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 group	who,	unlike	Hayek	and	Röpke,	was	directly	 involved	 in	organizing	 the	economic	war	effort	through	his	position	as	the	director	of	the	economic	section	of	the	Offices	of	the	War	Cabinet.61	This	must	have	had	a	profound	impact	on	Robbins,	making	him	somewhat	 less	prone	 to	abstract	generalizations	about	 the	alleged	 impossibility	and	totalitarian	effects	of	planning	and	coordination	outside	of	the	market	order.	Robbins	certainly	remained	a	strong	defender	of	liberalism	and	“free”	trade,	but	as	time	went	on,	he	focused	his	energy	on	more	concrete	questions	of	international	cooperation.	 In	1937,	Robbins	was	 invited	 to	speak	at	 Institut	Universitaire	des	Hautes	 Études	 Internationales.	 This	 Institute	was	 founded	 by	William	 Rappard	(1883	 –	 1958)	 in	 1927,	 and	 his	 institute	 hosted	 several	 other	 neoliberals	throughout	the	years,	including	Mises,	Frank	D.	Graham	and	the	Chicago	economist	Jacob	 Viner	 (1892	 –	 1970).62	 	 Robbins	 delivered	 a	 lecture	 that	 would	 later	 be	published	under	 the	 title	Economic	 Planning	 and	 International	Order.	 In	 this	 he	performed	a	very	vocal	critique	of	laissez-faire	liberalism,	stating	bluntly	that:	“If	planning	 is	an	attempt	to	create	 institutions	conducive	to	 the	satisfaction	of	 the	
                                            59	In	a	lecture	to	the	infamous	Conservative	Monday	Club	in	London,	in	1980,	Hayek	would	also	claim	that	rationing	and	economic	planning	would	be	less	efficient	even	during	war	time.	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	104,	Folder	4:	“Problems	of	War	Economy”.	60	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	107,	Folder	6:	“Austria:	Advance	Post	in	Europe”	61	Pinder,	Altiero	Spinelli	and	the	British	Federalists,	45.	62	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	12.	
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citizens,	 then	 international	 liberalism	 is	 a	 plan”,63	 and	 ”The	 characteristic	institutions	 of	 a	 liberal	 society	 are	 inconceivable	without	 government”64	 As	we	have	seen,	this	attack	on	laissez-fare	was	an	integral	part	of	the	dual	argument	and	the	 emerging	neoliberal	 program.	Robbins	was	 also	 focused	on	disproving	 left-wing	theories	of	totalitarianism	and	the	causes	behind	the	Great	Depression	and	rise	 of	 dictatorships	 in	 Europe.	 In	 The	 Economic	 Causes	 of	 War	 from	 1939	 he	engaged	actively	with	theories	of	imperialism	by	thinkers	like	Lenin,	Luxembourg,	Hilferding,	 and	 also	 the	 social	 liberal	 John	 Hobson	 (1858	 –	 1940),	 trying	 to	disprove	the	contention	that	there	were	structural	problems	in	capitalism	that	lay	behind	society’s	present	ills.65	Robbins	work	in	the	years	between	1938	and	1947	thus	attacked	 socialism	and	economic	planning,	but	 also	often	 took	 the	 form	of	defending	capitalism.	Much	like	the	other	neoliberals	(and	Carl	Schmitt),	Robbins	saw	democracy	and	the	economy	torn	up	by	what	he	called	“group	interests”.	In	a	preface	to	a	collection	of	essays	published	in	1939,	he	claimed	that:			 “The	modern	world,	deluged	by	the	clichés	of	propaganda	and	second-rate	thinking,	believes	that	it	is	becoming	collectivist.	But	this	is	self-deception.	The	apologia	for	many	recent	tendencies,	from	the	 ‘co-ordination’	 of	 British	 transport	 to	 the	 corporative	 chambers	 of	 the	 fascist	 state,	 is	collectivist.	But	 the	substance	 is	essentially	something	different.	 It	 is	 the	consolidation	of	group	interest.”66		Like	 the	 other	 neoliberals,	 Robbins	 claimed	 that	 group	 interests	 were	“incompatible	with	general	interest”,	which	according	to	him	was	best	served	not	by	 “unified	collectivism…	[but]	by	 that	 system	of	decentralized	 initiative	which,	within	 a	 suitable	 framework	 of	 law,	 is	 provided	 by	 private	 property	 and	 free	markets”.67	 In	 his	 1947	 publication	 The	 Economic	 Problem	 in	 Peace	 and	 War,	however,	he	seemed	to	perform	something	of	a	U-turn	on	questions	of	Keynesian	
                                            63	Pinder,	Altiero	Spinelli	and	the	British	Federalists,	45.	64	Ibid.,	50.	65	Lionel	Robbins,	The	Economic	Causes	of	War	(New	York:	Howard	Fertig	Inc.,	1968),	19–57.	66	Lionel	Robbins,	The	Economic	Basis	of	Class	Conflict	and	Other	Essays	in	Political	
Economy	(London:	Macmillian	and	Co.,	Limited,	1939),	vii.	67	Ibid.	
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economic	 planning.	 He	 stated	 that	 within	 his	 own	 tradition	 there	 had	 been	 “a	tendency	to	ignore	certain	deep-seated	possibilities	of	disharmony,	in	a	way	which,	I	now	think,	led	sometimes	to	superficiality	and	sometimes	to	positive	error.	I	owe	much	 to	 Cambridge	 economists,	 particularly	 to	 Lord	 Keynes	 and	 Professor	Robertson,	 for	 having	 awakened	 me	 from	 dogmatic	 slumbers	 in	 this	 very	important	respect."68		
	More	than	seeing	this	shift	as	a	radical	conversion	of	beliefs,	we	should	take	it	as	an	argument	for	not	conceding	too	easily	that	“Keynes	vs.	Hayek”	was	the	ultimate	political	battle	of	the	twentieth	century.69	Keynes	famously	wrote	to	Hayek,	after	reading	The	Road	to	Serfdom	while	on	his	way	to	the	Bretton	Woods	conference	in	1944,	that	he	found	himself	“in	deeply	moved	agreement”	with	the	bulk	of	the	text.	In	some	ways,	Keynes’	attack	on	laissez-faire	from	1924	had	been	motivated	by	the	same	urge	to	“save	capitalism”	from	the	threat	of	Marxism	as	had	Hayek’s	version	20	 years	 later.	 Both	 Hayek	 and	 Keynes	 sought	 to	 establish	 a	 form	 of	 state	intervention	that	could	ameliorate	some	suffering,	while	at	the	same	time	leaving	property	 relations	 intact	 and	 nurture	 “market	 forces”,	 instead	 of	 stifling	 them.	Keynes’	appraisal	of	The	Road	to	Serfdom	has	made	some	commentators	believe	that	Hayek	was	more	moderate	than	the	 free	market	 fundamentalist	he	 is	often	portrayed	as.	I	argue	instead	that	Keynes’	letter,	rather	than	showing	us	that	Hayek	was	 somewhat	 Keynesian,	 instead	 suggests	 that	 Keynes	 was	 somewhat	sympathetic	to	neoliberalism.	Although	he	did	not	share	all	of	Hayek’s	views	on	the	origins	 of	 totalitarian	 dictatorship,	 Keynes	 certainly	 also	 wanted	 to	 salvage	capitalism	from	the	possibility	of	socialism.	The	economic	teachings	of	Keynes	and	the	philosophies	of	social	liberalism	were	indeed	targets	for	neoliberals	from	the	very	 beginning.	 However,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 has	 been	 somewhat	misunderstood	 and	 exaggerated,	 as	 both	 strands	 criticized	 laissez-faire	 and	wanted	 to	 use	 the	 state	 actively.	 The	 main	 difference	 was	 the	 type	 of	 state	
                                            68	Lionel	Robbins,	The	Economic	Problem	in	Peace	and	War	–	Some	Reflections	on	
Objectives	and	Mechanisms	(United	Kingdom:	Read	Books,	2007),	68.	69	For	this	fallacy,	see	especially	Wapshott,	Keynes	Hayek.	
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intervention	advocated	and	the	neoliberal	idealization	of	the	market	mechanism.	Neoliberal	 forms	of	state	 intervention	were	meant	 to	safeguard	and	spread	 this	mechanism	and	make	it	the	mediator	of	modernity,	not	to	stabilize	it	or	improve	upon	its	workings.	The	distinction	is	surely	slippery,	but	it	is	fundamentally	what	differentiated	neoliberalism	from	social	liberalism	and	Keynes	from	Hayek	–	not	whether	one	should	use	the	state	at	all.	Even	this	division	is	not	clear	cut,	as	Hayek,	at	 least	 at	 times,	 seemed	 to	 accept	 the	 ordoliberal	 position	 that	 market	mechanisms	 themselves	did	have	 in	 them	a	 tendency	 to	 create	monopolies	and	concentrations	 of	 power.	 Furthermore,	 Keynes	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 undergone	something	of	a	swing	to	the	right	towards	the	end	of	his	life,	stating	for	instance	”I	find	myself	more	and	more	relying	for	a	solution	of	our	problems	on	the	invisible	hand	which	I	tried	to	eject	from	economic	thinking	twenty	years	ago.”70			
Neoiberals	in	wartime	Of	the	German	economists	present	at	the	Lippmann	Colloquium	in	1938,	Alexander	Rüstow	 and	 Wilhelm	 Röpke	 had	 already	 left	 Hitler’s	 Germany	 a	 few	 years	previously.	Their	first	port	of	call	was	Istanbul,	where	Mustafa	Kemal,	president	of	the	new	Turkish	republic	since	1923,	took	advantage	of	the	situation	in	Germany	to	 recruit	 European	 émigré	 academics	 like	 Röpke,	 Rüstow	 and	 Erich	 Auerbach	(1892	–	1957)	to	a	new	university	on	the	Bosporus.	Röpke	founded	the	Institute	for	Social	Sciences	there	in	1933,	but	moved	on	to	Geneva	four	years	later	to	teach	at	Rappard’s	Institute	for	Graduate	Studies.	Rüstow	remained	in	Istanbul	until	after	the	war,	working	on	his	 three-volume	 treatise	 on	 the	demise	of	 liberal	 politics,	
Ortsbestimmung	 der	 Gegenwart,	 English	 title:	 Freedom	 and	 Domination.	 The	original	edition	of	Röpke’s	Die	Gesselschaftskrisis	der	Gegenwart	actually	included	an	appendix	essay	written	by	Rüstow,	a	sort	of	”thumbnail	sketch”	of	Rüstow’s	own	work	that	showed	the	extent	to	which	these	two	thinkers	considered	themselves	engaged	in	the	same	project.71	
                                            70	Robert	Skidelsky,	John	Maynard	Keynes:	Fighting	for	Britain	(London:	Macmillan,	2000),	470.	71	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist,	101.	
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In	celebratory	accounts	of	ordoliberals	and	early	neoliberalism,	much	is	made	of	the	fact	that	Walter	Eucken	was	twice	questioned	by	the	Gestapo,72	and	that	other	ordoliberals	were	both	questioned	and	at	times	even	imprisoned.73	Quoting	a	letter	from	 Röpke	 to	 Hayek,	 Ronald	 Hartwell	 claims	 it	 was	 “a	 miracle”	 that	 Eucken	survived	the	war.74	Less	attention	is	paid	to	the	fact	that	the	whole	Freiburg	school,	including	Franz	Böhm	and	Ludwig	Erhard	(1897	–	1977),	actively	tried	to	influence	the	Nazi	 administration	with	policy	proposals.75	 John	Zmirak	 claims	 that	unlike	Röpke	 and	Rüstow,	 Eucken	 and	 Böhm	made	 “their	 criticism	 of	 Nazi	 economics	implicit	 in	 their	 technical	 work”,76	 but	 Ralf	 Ptak	 points	 to	 how	 this	 sort	 of	“revisionist	 history	 of	 the	 wartime	 ordoliberals	 is	 not	 supported	 by	 facts.”	 By	reading	papers	published	by	the	Freiburg-circle	between	the	mid-1930s	and	early	1940s,	 Ptak	 concludes	 that	 “ordoliberal	 concepts	 were	 designed	 to	 be	implemented	under	the	auspicies	of	a	Nazi	government”.77	This	interpretation	is	supported	also	by	the	work	of	Bernhard	Walpen	in	his	Gramscian	study	of	the	Mont	Pèlerin	Society.78	The	more	celebratory	historiography	on	ordoliberalism	is	very	much	based	on	the	notion	that	these	ideas	arose	in	opposition	to	Nazism.	In	a	1979	lecture,	Foucault	said	that	“Nazism	was,	in	a	way,	the	epistemological	and	political	‘road	 to	Damascus’	 for	 the	Freiburg	School”,	which	 is	not	quite	 the	same	as	 the	rather	 banal	 hagiographic	 accounts	 that	 see	 ordoliberalism	 as	 a	 brave	 and	ingenious	response	to	the	horrors	of	Nazism.	Foucault	continues:	“That	is	to	say,	Nazism	enabled	them	to	define	what	I	would	call	the	field	of	adversity	that	they	had	to	define	and	cross	in	order	to	reach	their	objective.”79	This	is	another	way	of	
                                            72	Lüder	Gerken,	Walter	Eucken	und	sein	Werk:	Rückblick	auf	den	Vordenker	der	sozialen	
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  114 
describing	 totalitarianism	as	 neoliberalism’s	Other,	 as	 Fawcett	 has	 noted.80	 The	work	 of	 Walpen	 and	 Ptak	 represents	 a	 serious	 challenge	 to	 the	 hagiographic	accounts	of	the	history	of	ordoliberalism	and	the	Freiburg	School,	yet	their	work	has	so	far	been	largely	ignored.	The	ordoliberals	were	to	greatly	influence	post-war	economic	policy	in	West	Germany,	and	historian	of	economics	Keith	Tribe	has	insisted	that	rather	than	treating	this	period	“as	an	awakening	from	the	nightmare	of	National	Socialist	Germany”,	continuities	should	be	emphasized.81	
	Louis	Rougier,	the	man	behind	the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	in	1938,	was	to	disappear	from	the	subsequent	history	of	neoliberalism.	The	reasons	are	said	to	lie	in	his	dealings	with	 the	Vichy	regime.	 In	October	1940,	he	acted	as	an	envoy	to	Winston	 Churchill	 in	 London	 on	 behalf	 of	 Phillipe	 Pétain,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	collaborationist	 Vichy	 government.	 Rougier	 is	 to	 have	 made	 a	 “gentleman’s	agreement”	with	Churchill	that	France	would	resume	the	war	on	Britain’s	side	once	the	 British	 could	 provide	 more	 assistance.	 For	 this	 he	 was	 branded	 as	 a	collaborator	 by	many	of	 his	 peers.82	 “Perhaps	 it	 has	 been	unavoidable	 that	 you	should	have	been	entangled	in	all	the	misunderstanding	and	confusions	of	French	opinion	 in	 this	 country…”,	 Walter	 Lippman	 wrote	 to	 Rougier	 in	 a	 letter	 dated	February	3,	1941.	Rougier	had	arrived	in	New	York,	and	wanted	to	write	an	article	explaining	his	dealings	with	the	Vichy	regime.	Lippmann,	however,	advised	against	this,	writing	that	“publication	of	this	article	would	be	a	disastrous	mistake.	It	will	be	entirely	misunderstood.	It	will	make	you,	in	this	country,	the	propagandist	of	Petain.”83		Lippmann	 and	 Rougier	 had	 had	 a	 disagreement	 after	 the	 Colloquium	 in	 1938.	Rougier	 had	 organized	 a	 dinner	 in	 Lippman’s	 honour,	 which	 included	 several	
                                            80	Fawcett,	Liberalism,	275.	81	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	6.	82	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	77.	83	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Folder	1848:	Louis	Rougier	
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backers	of	 fascist	movements	and	where	the	word	“propaganda”	had	been	used	without	 negative	 connotations.	 Lippmann	 felt	 that	 the	 dinner	 had	 not	 been	 an	effort	to	discuss	ideas,	but	a	tactical	meeting	in	a	group	with	clear	political	aims.	He	wrote	 to	Rougier	on	 July	1,	 1938:	 “I	 feel	 I	must	 tell	 you,	 that	 as	 a	matter	of	principle	to	which	I	have	adhered	for	more	than	fifteen	years,	I	never	participate	in	 propaganda	 or	 political	 movements	 of	 any	 kind	 whatsoever.”84	 But	 when	Rougier	 ended	 up	 in	 trouble	 because	 of	 his	 dealings	 with	 the	 Vichy	 regime,	Lippmann	 stood	 by	 him	 and	 helped	 him	 when	 he	 arrived	 in	 the	 US.	 Other	neoliberals	like	Röpke	and	Hayek,	by	contrast,	grew	wary	of	Rougier’s	“pro-Vichy	tendencies”	 and,	 according	 to	 Angus	 Burgin,	 they	 were	 “hesitant	 to	 maintain	relations”.	 Rougier	 then	 refused	 to	 recognize	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 De	 Gaulle	 and	France	 Libre,	 and	 found	 himself	 marginalized	 at	 the	 New	 School	 for	 Social	Research	where	he	had	been	given	a	position.85	After	the	war,	the	British’	would	deny	Rougier’s	account	of	 the	events	surrounding	his	agreement	with	Churchill,	throwing	him	into	further	disrepute.86	Thus	Rougier	would	not	present	at	the	Mont	Pelerin	 Society	meeting	 in	 1947,	 and	was	 only	 admitted	 to	 the	 organization	 in	1960.			
Individualism	true	and	false	Shortly	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	war,	 on	 December	 17,	 1945,	 Hayek	 gave	 a	 lecture	entitled	“Individualism	True	and	False”	at	University	College	Dublin.	In	it	he	turned	against	liberals	of	his	own	time,	making	crystal	clear	his	attacks	on	social	liberalism	and	his	aim	to	carve	out	a	new	liberalism	not	tainted	by	this	history.	The	lecture	opened	with	 a	 quote	 from	Tocqueville	 on	 how	 there	 had	been	 two	 currents	 of	thought	 since	 the	 eighteenth	 century:	 one	 towards	 free	 institutions	 and	 one	towards	absolute	power.87	Here	we	see	Hayek	attempting	to	continue	Tocqueville’s	
                                            84	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Folder	1848:	Louis	Rougier	85	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	51.	86	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	77.	87	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	2.	
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project	of	criticizing	democracy	in	the	same	way	as	earlier	liberals	had	criticized	absolutism.	Hayek	stated:	“Terms	 like	 ‘liberalism’	or	 ‘democracy’,	 ‘capitalism’	or	‘socialism’,	today	no	longer	stand	for	coherent	systems	of	ideas.	(…)	No	political	term	has	suffered	worse	in	this	respect	than	‘individualism.’"88	He	then	took	it	upon	himself	to	clear	up	this	confusion	and	at	the	same	time	purge	liberalism	of	those	he	labelled	 ”false	 individualists”.	 This	 was	 a	 tradition	 that	 Hayek,	 with	 his	 deep	appreciation	of	British	liberalism,	found	mainly	in	“French	and	other	continental	writers”,	 blaming	 “the	Encyclopedists,	Rousseau	and	 the	Physiocrats”,	 and	 later	deriding	such	thinkers	as	Goethe,	Humboldt	and	also	John	Stuart	Mill.	In	a	typical	case	 of	 what	 Thomas	 Gieryn	 has	 called	 “boundary	 work”	 in	 order	 to	 police	demarcations	of	political	creeds,89	Hayek	argued	that	“it	was	only	liberalism	in	the	English	sense	that	was	generally	opposed	to	centralization,	to	nationalism	and	to	socialism,	 while	 the	 liberalism	 prevalent	 on	 the	 Continent	 favoured	 all	 three.”	Hayek	 also	 engaged	 in	 what	 Duncan	 Bell	 has	 called	 “canonical	 protocol”90	 by	positing	 as	 opposed	 to	 this	 “rationalist	 individualism	 [which]	 always	 tends	 to	develop	 into	 the	 opposite	 of	 individualism,	 namely	 socialism	 or	 collectivism”,	thinkers	like	John	Locke,	Bernard	Mandeville	and	Edmund	Burke	(1729	–	1797).	He	added:	 “In	 the	nineteenth	century	 I	 find	 it	 represented	most	perfectly	 in	 the	work	 of	 two	 of	 its	 greatest	 historians	 and	 political	 philosophers:	 Alexis	 de	Tocqueville	and	Lord	Acton.”91			Hayek	then	defended	what	he	called	the	“anti-rationalism”	of	these	thinkers,	with	special	reference	also	to	Adam	Smith,	because	they	had	realized	how	“many	of	the	institutions	on	which	human	achievements	rest	have	arisen	and	are	 functioning	without	a	designing	and	directing	mind.”92	According	to	Hayek,		“design	theories	necessarily	 lead	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 social	 processes	 can	 be	 made	 to	 serve	
                                            88	Ibid.,	2–3.	89	Thomas	Gieryn,	‘Boundary-Work	and	the	Demarcation	of	Science	from	Non-Science’,	
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human	ends	only	if	they	are	subjected	to	the	control	of	individual	human	reason,	and	thus	lead	directly	to	socialism,”	whereas	“true	individualism	believes	on	the	contrary	 that,	 if	 left	 free,	 men	 will	 often	 achieve	 more	 than	 individual	 human	reason	could	design	or	foresee.”93	Hence	the	case	was	clear	for	limiting	state	power,	also	if	it	happened	to	be	exercised	by	a	legitimate	democracy:	“From	the	awareness	of	the	limitations	of	individual	knowledge	and	from	the	fact	that	no	person	or	small	group	 of	 persons	 can	 know	 all	 that	 is	 known	 to	 somebody,	 individualism	 also	derives	 its	 main	 practical	 conclusion:	 its	 demand	 for	 a	 strict	 limitation	 of	 all	coercive	or	exclusive	power.”	Hayek	followed	Tocqueville	and	Acton	to	the	letter	in	arguing	that	the	most	important	thing	about	democracy	was	to	limit	its	reach:			 “While	democracy	is	founded	on	the	convention	that	the	majority	view	decides	on	common	action,	it	does	not	mean	that	what	is	today	the	majority	view	ought	to	become	the	generally	accepted	view-even	 if	 that	 were	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 majority.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 whole	justification	of	democracy	rests	on	the	fact	that	in	course	of	time	what	is	today	the	view	of	a	small	minority	may	become	the	majority	view.”			According	to	Hayek,	“the	merit	of	competition	is	precisely	that	it	gives	the	minority	a	chance	to	prevail.”94	He	also	contended	that:	“it	should	be	said	at	once	that	true	individualism	is	not	equalitarian	[sic]	in	the	modern	sense	of	the	word.	(…)	it	also	denies	government	 the	right	 to	 limit	what	 the	able	or	 fortunate	may	achieve.”95	Hayek	 then	 turned	on	 the	 “much	abused	and	misunderstood	phrase	of	 ‘laissez-fare’”	and	claimed	that	along	with	the	“still	older	formula	of	‘the	protection	of	life,	liberty	and	property’	it	is	not	much	help:	In	fact,	in	so	far	as	both	tend	to	suggest	that	we	can	just	leave	things	as	they	are,	they	may	be	worse	than	no	answer;	they	certainly	do	not	tell	us	what	are	and	what	are	not	desirable	or	necessary	fields	of	government	activity”.96	Readers	will	recognize	this	as	the	 fundamental	 theme	of	neoliberal	thought,	and	Hayek	then	went	on	to	try	and	distinguish	between	rule-based	 exercise	 of	 power	 based	 on	 abstract	 principles,	 and	 the	more	 direct	 and	
                                            93	Ibid.,	12.	94	Ibid.,	29–30.	95	Ibid.,	30.	96	Ibid.,	17.	
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arbitrary	kind,	which	he	opposed.			In	 a	 sense	 Hayek	 attacked	 the	 “false	 individualists”	 amongst	 the	 liberals	 for	wanting	to	take	individualism,	and	thus	liberalism,	too	far.	Due	to	the	advances	of	social	liberalism	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	liberalism	had	come	to	 be	 a	 rather	 progressive	 and	 democratic	 creed.97	 In	 1904,	 for	 instance,	 the	American	 political	 theorist	 William	 Dunning	 argued	 that	 as	 opposed	 to	conservatism,	“fundamentally,	nineteenth	century	liberalism	meant	democracy”.98	We	can	see	in	“Individualism	True	and	False”	how	Hayek	was	doing	his	upmost	to	see	that	the	twentieth	century	meaning	of	the	term	would	be	something	different:	He	attacked	laissez-fare,	but	also	evoked	the	epistemology	of	“spontaneous	order”,	to	 argue	 that	 human	 beings	 cannot	 change	 the	 social	 order	 consciously.	 This	realization,	he	claimed,	was	the	basis	of	the	liberal	tradition	of	limiting	democracy.	It	is	hard	not	to	see	Hayek’s	arguments	as	part	of	what	Domenic	Losurdo	has	called	liberalism’s	“de-politicazion	and	naturalization	of	economic	and	social	relations.”99	In	an	essay	much	 later	 in	 life,	Hayek	would	once	again	comment	on	his	 fight	 to	separate	 liberalism	from	democracy	and	socialism,	writing:	 ”It	 [liberalism]	 later	became	allied	with	socialism	because	agreement	as	to	some	of	the	ultimate	ends	for	 a	 time	obscured	 the	 utter	 incompatibility	 of	 the	methods	 by	which	 the	 two	movements	tried	to	reach	their	goal.”	100	
	
The	Acton-Tocqueville	Army	When	The	Road	to	Serfdom	was	published	in	1944	it	brought	Hayek	a	great	degree	of	fame	and	success.	This	was	especially	so	in	the	US,	where	the	book	was	turned	into,	 amongst	 other	 things:	 a	 condensed	 Reader’s	 Digest-version	 distributed	 to	
                                            97	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	694.	98	William	Dunning,	‘A	Century	of	Politics’,	North	American	Review	179,	no.	577	(1904):	803.	99	Domenico	Losurdo,	Liberalism:	A	Counter-History	(London:	Verso,	2011),	193.	100	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	270.	
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millions;	a	radio	program	aired	on	NBC;101		and	a	cartoon,	first	published	in	Look	
Magazine	 and	 later	distributed	 to	all	General	Motors’	employees	 in	Detroit	 (see	figure	#1).	
                                            101	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Fritz	Machlup	Collection,	Box	43,	Folder	16:	”Radio	Script”	
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Figure #1: The Illustrated Road to Serfdom 	
  
  
 
  121 
   
 
  122 
  
  
  123 
  
  
  
  
  124 
  
  
  125 
The	cartoon	clearly	shows	only	one	aspect	of	the	dual	argument:	the	theory	that	economic	planning	 leads	 to	 totalitarian	dictatorship.	Panels	4	and	5	explain	 the	theories	 from	 the	 socialist	 calculation	 debates,	 whereas	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 panels	picture	Hayek’s	theory	of	the	detailed	steps	from	war-induced	interference	with	markets	to	totalitarian	tyranny.			Hayek	also	travelled	to	the	US	and	undertook	an	extensive	 lecture	tour	there	 in	1945	and	1946.	On	this	tour,	Hayek	spread	the	dual	argument	to	a	larger	audience,	and	began	recruitment	to	a	closed	society	based	on	this	insight.	The	roots	of	the	dual	argument	in	the	history	of	liberal	thought	were	perfectly	clear	to	Hayek,	and	he	proposed	to	call	the	society	“The	Acton-Tocqueville	society”.102	At	a	speech	at	“The	Economic	Club”	in	Detroit	in	April,	1945,	Hayek	argued	that:	”My	attempt	has	been	not	merely	to	restate	an	old	argument,	but	to	reformulate	it	and	adapt	it	to	our	time	and	to	take	account	of	what	we	have	learned	since	the	philosophy	of	free	enterprise	was	first	formulated	a	long	time	ago”,	insisting	that	what	was	needed	was	 guidelines	 for	 good	 government	 intervention,	 not	 futile	 arguments	 about	whether	 to	 have	 intervention	 or	 not.103	 At	 Stanford	 University	 in	 Palo	 Alto,	California,	Hayek	stated	ominously:	“…	if	we	are	not	careful	we	may	find	ourselves	saddled	with	 an	 omnipotent	 state	whose	machinery	 so	 thoroughly	 controls	 the	people	and	their	opinions	that	even	the	retention	of	the	forms	of	democracy	would	not	alter	its	totalitarian	character.”	There	was,	however,	some	cause	for	optimism	too;	and	although	Hayek	claimed	that	it	was	the	abandonment	of	liberalism	that	lay	behind	the	threat	of	totalitarianism,	he	could	also	look	to	the	history	of	liberal	thought	for	answers	to	how	to	combat	this	trend.	In	the	Stanford	lecture	he	claimed	that	through	Edmund	Burke,	American	political	ideas	“became	the	foundation	of	English	 whiggism	 and	 later	 liberalism”,	 but	 noted	 that	 “the	 problems	 of	 these	
                                            102	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	61,	Folder	8:	“Memorandum	on	the	Proposed	Foundation	for	an	Academy	of	Political	Philosophy,	Tentatively	Called	‘The		Acton-Tocqueville	Society’	–	Typescript	1945”	103	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	106,	Folder	8:	”The	Road	to	Serfdom	Speech	–	The	Economic	Club	of	Detroit,	Michigan	–	April	24,	1945”	
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writers	 are	 not	 yet	 the	 problems	 of	 to-day;	 while	 they	 created	 much	 of	 the	traditions	and	institutions,	they	did	not	yet	know	the	particular	dangers	to	which	they	would	be	exposed	or	which	they	would	themselves	produce.”	He	then	moved	on	 to	 what	 we	 may	 recognize	 as	 the	 second	 step	 of	 liberal	 thought	 in	 which	limitation	on	liberal	institutions	became	a	refrain,	and	he	introduced	Tocqueville	and	Acton	as	the	saviours	of	the	twentieth	century.	Here	Hayek	is	worth	quoting	at	length:			 “My	search	for	a	satisfactory	statement	of	the	basic	liberal	philosophy	led	me	in	the	end	to	two	great	historians	who	seem	to	me	to	have	achieved	the	most	complete	synthesis	of	the	basic	principles	of	a	free	society	and	in	particular	to	have	developed	the	Burkean	philosophy	to	the	highest	point	it	has	yet	reached.	It	was	in	the	fragments	of	Lord	Actons	inachieved	[sic]	great	history	of	freedom	and	in	de	Tocqueville’s	study	of	American	democracy	where	I	found	the	ripest	fruits	of	the	age-long	speculation	on	the	reconciliation	of	liberty	and	government	which	is	again	troubling	us	to-day”		According	to	Hayek,	this	phase	of	liberal	thought	had	“immediate	relevance	to	the	problems	of	to-day…[and]…	show	the	amazing	foresight	of	these	men	which	still	makes	them	the	best	guides	to	our	task”.	He	then	quoted	various	passages	from	the	two	writers	with	comments	such	as:	“What	could	be	more	penetrating	[than]	the	following	discussion	by	Lord	Acton	of	what	to-day	we	call	totalitarianism”,	or	“the	amazingly	prophetic	words,	concluding	de	Tocquevilles	Democracy	 in	America”,	adding	 that	 “these	men	were	much	more	aware	of	 the	problems	we	 face	 to-day	than	even	we	are,	and	…	they	provide	a	basic	philosophy	which	might	well	provide	the	foundation	from	which	our	further	work	can	start”.				Hayek	 then	 continued	 to	 outline	 the	 organization	 that	 could	 carry	 out	 a	 new	program	of	reinventing	liberalism	to	counter	the	totalitarian	threat.	This	lecture	also	seems	to	be	one	of	the	first	instances	in	which	Hayek	waxed	lyrical	on	a	theme	that	was	to	consume	all	his	political	energy:	the	power	of	ideas.	As	in	later	books,	he	quoted	the	then	very	recently	deceased	Keynes,	who	famously	claimed	that	little	else	than	the	ideas	of	economists	and	political	philosophers	ruled	the	world.	He	then	noted	that	the	extent	to	which	socialists	had	“succeeded	in	permeating	all	our	thinking	is	not	least	due	to	their	courage	to	be	‘utopian’”,	another	theme	he	would	
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return	to	in	a	later	call	to	arms	for	liberal	intellectuals	in	his	oft	quoted	1949	article	“The	Intellectuals	and	Socialism”.	He	concluded:	“we	must	raise	and	train	an	army	of	fighters	for	freedom”.104			This	 “army”	 was	 to	 be	 the	 Mont	 Pèlerin	 Society:	 a	 new	 version	 of	 the	 Centre	International	 d´Études	 pour	 la	 Rénovation	 du	 Libéralisme	 (CIRL)	 from	 1938,	formed	nine	years	 later	and	still	active	 today.	The	 first	mention	of	 the	 idea	had	come	at	a	seminar	at	Cambridge	in	1944,	lead	by	economic	historian	John	Clapham.	Hayek	had	read	a	paper	on	the	need	for	a	post-war	society	dedicated	to	“opposition	to	all	forms	of	totalitarianism,	whether	it	be	from	the	Right	or	from	the	Left.”	This	is	also	where	Hayek	first	came	up	with	the	idea	of	naming	it	after	“some	great	figure	who	embodies	in	an	especially	high	degree	the	virtues	and	ideals	which	such	an	organization	would	have	 to	 serve	 and	whose	name	 could	 serve	 as	 a	 flag	 under	which	men	who	agree	could	unite.”105			The	 proposed	 naming	 of	 the	 society	 after	 two	 past	 liberal	 thinkers	 is	 of	 great	interest.	Was	neoliberalism	mainly	a	restatement	of	the	ideas	of	Tocqueville	and	Acton?	In	a	six-page	memorandum	written	in	August	1945,	Hayek	referred	to	the	ideas	of	Tocqueville	and	Acton	as	a	“foundation	from	which	to	start”,	and	referred	to	the	work	of	the	society	as	a	process	of	“putting	our	own	house	in	order.”	It	was	the	house	of	 liberalism	 that	needed	 to	be	put	 in	order;	but	 it	was	not	merely	a	question	of	 a	 rediscovery	of	 lost	 ideals,	 but	 also	a	question	of	how	 these	 ideals	would	 lead	 to	 new	 ideas	 for	 a	 new	 time.	 The	 discovery	 process	 itself	 was	 not	straight	 forward,	 either.	 It	 involved	 finding	 the	 right	 parts	 of	 the	work	 of	 each	thinker	in	Hayek’s	liberal	pantheon,	a	process	we	can	glimpse	in	the	memorandum	when	he	writes	of	Acton	and	Tocqueville	that	their	thought		 “is	 largely	a	development	of	 ideas	of	Edmund	Burke,	but	does	not	 include	 the	whole	of	Burke’s	philosophy	but	only	that	part	of	which	Acton	could	say	that	‘Burke	at	his	best	is	England	at	its	best’.	
                                            104	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	107,	Folder	7:	”The	Prospects	for	Freedom,	1946”	105	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	27–29.	
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It	is	Burkes’s	wisdom	purged	of	its	excrescences	and	developed	in	the	light	of	the	experience	of	the	last	century,	as	to	develop	it	further	will	be	the	task	of	our	own.)”			According	to	Hayek,	Acton	and	Tocqueville	had	picked	up	the	best	parts	of	Burke,	and	 now	 it	 was	 up	 to	 the	 neoliberals	 to	 pick	 up	 the	 best	 parts	 of	 Acton	 and	Tocqueville,	 and	develop	 that	 further.	Yet	at	 the	same	 time,	Hayek	 insisted	 that	what	the	neoliberals	were	looking	for	were	“the	timeless	truths,	rather	than	the	application	to	the	problems	of	our	time	which	we	have	yet	to	find.”106	Perhaps	this	is	 the	 true	 meaning	 of	 the	 phrase	 “classical	 liberalism”,	 so	 often	 invoked	 by	neoliberal	thinkers	to	this	day?	It	is	not	necessarily	one	philosophy	found	within	the	work	of	a	particular	set	of	thinkers,	but	perhaps	rather	a	scattered	whole	of	timeless	truth,	appearing	in	the	work	of	different	thinkers	at	different	times.			The	problem	was	how	 to	 raise	money	 for	 such	 a	 society,	 but	 a	 fortunate	 set	 of	events	would	make	Hayek’s	dream	a	reality.	Wilhelm	Röpke	harboured	plans	of	his	own	to	unite	“true	liberals”	in	the	wake	of	the	Second	World	War	and	the	collapse	of	 the	 Institute	 pour	 le	 Rénovation	 de	 Libéralisme.	 In	 August	 1945,	 Röpke	 had	circulated	 a	 letter	 with	 plans	 for	 an	 international	 periodical,	 and	 Hartwell	 has	commented	that	Röpke’s	motivations	were	“remarkably	like	that	of	Hayek”.	They	were	 indeed:	 Röpke	 was	 concerned	 about	 totalitarianism	 and	 collectivism	 and	wanted	his	 international	periodical	 to	be	used	as	a	 “clearly	visible	and	effective	platform	 for	 discussion	with	 the	 double	 purpose	 of	 clarifying	 and	working	 out	ideas	 and	 making	 known	 the	 results”.	 107	 	 In	 a	 circular	 filled	 to	 the	 brim	 with	rhetorical	despair,	Röpke	announced	to	his	fellow	liberals	that	“It	will	be	difficult	enough	 to	eradicate	 the	evils	which	Fascism	and	National	Socialism	have	 left	 in	their	wake;	already	another	danger	has	become	manifest,	namely	that	the	hatred	sown	by	them	will	be	misused	to	set	up	in	their	stead	other	forms	of	Collectivism.	
                                            106	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	61,	Folder	8,	”Memorandum	on	the	proposed	foundation	of	an	international	academy	of	political	philosophy	tentatively	called	‘The	Acton-Tocqueville	Society’”.	107	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	29.	
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(Röpkes	emphasis)”108	Röpke	was	helped	in	his	efforts	by	the	Swiss	businessman	Albert	Hunold	(who	held	a	doctorate	but	was	mainly	engaged	in	the	Swiss	watch-making	business),	who	set	about	using	his	contacts	to	raise	money	for	the	journal.	Hunold	was	 able	 to	 acquire	 a	 considerable	 amount	 from	sources	 like	 the	 Swiss	Chamber	of	Commerce	(Wirtschaftsförderung)	and	Credit	Suisse/Schweitzerische	Kreditanstalt.	(The	money	from	Credit	Suisse	is	not	mentioned	in	Hunold’s	report	to	the	society,	but	can	be	traced	through	some	of	his	correspondence).109	According	to	Hartwell,	 the	 journal	plans	were	abandoned	because	not	enough	money	was	raised;	 however	 in	 Hunold’s	 own	 report,	 he	 stated	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	abandonment	of	the	journal	plans	were	disagreements	with	the	agreed	publisher.	A.	Francke	&	Co.	in	Bern	had	also	wanted	to	publish	a	journal	on	economic	theory,	and	that	project	included	a	Professor	Sahlin,	who	had	recently	suggested	raising	wages	in	Switzerland.	Hunold	apparently	thought	this	proposal	and	consequently	Sahlin	himself	so	unacceptable	 that	he	refused	to	publish	with	A.	Francke	&	Co.	Although	they	supposedly	had	offers	also	from	Amstutz	and	Herdeg,	a	publisher	in	Zürich,	 there	were	 now	 complications	with	 some	 of	 the	 funders	 and	 also	with	Röpke,	so	that	the	plans	for	a	journal	had	to	be	completely	abandoned.110		Nevertheless,	 both	 Hayek’s	 proposal	 for	 a	 society	 and	 Röpke	 and	 Hunold’s	proposal	 for	 a	 journal	were	now	 circulating	 amongst	 the	network	of	 neoliberal	intellectuals	in	Europe,	and	regardless	of	the	reason	for	the	abandonment	of	the	journal	project,	this	lead	Hunold	to	suggest	that	the	funds	he	had	raised	for	it	could	be	used	for	Hayek’s	project	instead.111	My	research	shows	that	a	third	proposal	to	found	a	 liberal	 organization	 for	 the	post-war	world	was	 also	 circulating	 among	some	of	those	who	would	form	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	This	was	a	suggestion	to	
                                            108	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	10,	”Plan	for	an	international	periodical”	109	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	3,	”Mont	Pelerin	Correspondence”.	110	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	15,	”Mont	Pelerin	Report”	111	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	30.	
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found	 a	 “Liberal	 International”,	 and	 its	 opening	 congress	 in	 Oxford	 ended	 up	overlapping	with	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	This	was	of	 little	concern	for	the	neoliberals	however,	as	the	organization	in	question,	which	also	exists	to	this	day,	ended	up	being	an	umbrella	organization	for	political	parties,	and	not	a	closed	society	for	intellectuals.112	Hayek’s	ideas	concerning	his	society	were	laid	 out	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Hunold	 dated	 9th	 of	 October	 1946,	 where	 he	 attached	 a	memorandum,	and		added	that	he	would	be	more	than	happy	to	write	more	fully	about	his	plans	and	whom	he	wanted	to	invite,	should	Hunold	want	any	further	information.113	
	In	that	letter,	Hayek	said	he	did	not	have	sufficient	funds	yet,	and	would	suggest	a	“preparatory	 meeting	 for	 prospective	 members,	 on	 neutral	 ground,	 preferably	Switzerland”.	 This	 is	 how	 the	 strong	 neoliberal	 connection	 to	 Switzerland	was	cemented	and	how	Hunold	became	the	organizer	of	the	first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	meeting,	as	well	as	its	secretary	for	a	decade	to	come.	Hayek	was	also	very	eager	to	 have	 a	 strong	 American	 presence	 at	 the	 meeting,	 as	 he	 had	 met	 so	 many	promising	recruits	to	his	neoliberal	cause	when	lecturing	in	the	USA.	At	one	point	he	was	approached	by	Harold	Luhnow,	the	head	of	the	William	Volker	fund,	who	had	offered	Hayek	funds	to	set	up	“a	study	of	the	conditions	for	a	competitive	order	in	the	United	States”.	Luhnow	had	offered	$25.000	per	year	for	three	years,	and	Hayek	suggested	it	be	located	at	Chicago	University	(this	 is	what	would	become	known	as	 the	 “Free	Market	 Study”).114	 Luhnow	also	offered	$5.000	 in	order	 for	Hayek	to	have	an	administrative	secretary	at	the	LSE.	Hayek	was	thrilled	by	this,	stating	 in	 his	 reply	 on	May	3,	 1945	 that	 “only	with	 such	help	 shall	 I	 be	 able	 to	combine	 continued	 research	 work	 with	 the	 various	 public	 activities	 and	
                                            112	Friedrich	Naumann	Stiftung	für	die	Freiheit,	Archives	of	the	Liberal	International:	“Oslo	1946”	and	“Oxford	1947”.	113	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Friedrich	Hayek	Collection,	Box	61,	Folder	9,	”Cover	letter	to	Albert	Hunold”	114	Robert	Van	Horn,	Building	Chicago	Economics:	New	Perspectives	on	the	History	of	
America’s	Most	Powerful	Economics	Program,	Historical	Perspectives	on	Modern	Economics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	293.	
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engagements	into	which	I	have	been	drawn	by	the	book.”	With	Luhnow’s	money,	Hayek	was	on	his	way	to	becoming	a	full-time	neoliberal	activist.	In	the	same	letter,	Hayek	mentioned	to	his	benefactor	the	idea	of	an	“International	Academy	of	Social	Political	Philosophy”,	stating			 “I	 personally	 am	 so	 convinced	 that	 the	 tasks	 such	 an	 institution	would	 have	 to	 perform	 are	 so	important	that	I	mean	to	devote	a	considerable	part	of	my	time	to	it	if	there	is	any	chance	of	getting	such	an	institution	started.	I	do	not	know	whether	that	will	be	possible,	but	I	am	convinced	that	if	it	is	started	it	will	require	very	considerable	funds	and	it	is	one	of	those	purposes	where	the	funds	can	only	come	from	private	sources.”115			Hayek	enclosed	his	draft	article	on	 the	subject,	 and	by	11th	of	 January	1947,	he	wrote	to	Hunold	to	tell	him	he	had	succeeded	through	his	American	contacts	 in	getting	costs	covered	for	16	people	travelling	from	the	US	to	the	conference.116	The	funding	came	from	Luhnow’s	Volker	Foundation,	which	had	been	set	up	by	Kansas	City	furniture	magnate	William	Volker	at	the	bequest	of	Loren	Miller,	a	libertarian	activist	who	would	also	join	the	conference.117	Invitations	had	been	pouring	out	for	some	time,	and	five	days	later,	the	16th	of	January,	Hayek	had	received	forty	replies	and	twenty-eight	acceptances.	
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  132 
	
	
	
	
PART	II	
	
The	first	meeting	
(1947)				
  133 
	 	
  134 
Chapter	4	–	An	Army	of	Fighters	for	Freedom							 “…	we	live	in	the	long	shadow	of	a	debate	with	which	most	people	are	altogether	unfamiliar.	If	we	ask	who	exercised	the	greatest	influence	over	contemporary	Anglophone	economic	thought,	five	foreign-born	thinkers	spring	to	mind:	Ludwig	von	Mises,	Friedrich	Hayek,	Joseph	Schumpeter,	Karl	Popper,	and	Peter	Drucker.”		Tony	Judt	in	“What	is	Living	and	What	is	Dead	in	Social	Democracy?”	(2009)1									The	first	thing	you	would	notice	is	the	smell.	The	year	is	1947.	It	is	the	1st	of	April	in	the	Swiss	Alps.	Spring	is	in	the	fresh	mountain	air,	but	we	are	inside	a	smoke-filled	room	at	the	Hotel	Du	Parc,	a	grand	building	overlooking	Lake	Geneva	below	and	the	French	Alps	on	the	other	side.	Some	forty	people	are	gathered	here,	almost	all	 of	 whom	 are	middle-aged,	 suit-clad	men.	 The	 rich	 smell	 of	 pipe	 smoke	 lies	heavily	 in	 the	 air.	 Perhaps	 none	 of	 them	 even	 noticed	 this	 particular	 fact.	How	utterly	normal	the	scent	must	have	been	then,	the	very	odour	of	 indoors.	To	us,	however,	 observers	 from	 a	 future	 world	 of	 strict	 smoking	 laws,	 the	 fragrant	combination	of	fresh	smoke,	arising	from	the	pipes	of	the	serious-looking	men,	and	
                                            1	Tony	Judt,	‘What	Is	Living	and	What	Is	Dead	in	Social	Democracy?’	(New	York	University,	19	October	2009),	http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/12/17/what-is-living-and-what-is-dead-in-social-democrac/.	
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old	smoke,	emanating	from	the	curtains	and	tapestries,	might	have	been	the	first	thing	to	catch	our	attention.	This	is	a	sensory	reminder	that	although	similar	and	relatable,	the	world	of	1947	was	not	quite	the	same	as	our	world.	Stacks	of	paper	are	everywhere	in	the	room.	On	tables,	in	hands,	and	resting	in	laps	are	notes	and	manuscripts,	later	to	be	stored	in	economists’	archives	all	over	the	world.	To	this	day,	 those	 pieces	 of	 paper	 still	 smell	 like	 old	 pipe	 smoke.2	 Behind	 a	 typewriter	which	holds	a	fresh	sheet	of	thin	paper,	sits	one	of	the	only	two	women	in	the	room.	She	 is	 a	 19-year-old	 economics	 student	 from	 the	 London	 School	 of	 Economics	named	Dorothy	Hahn.	She	has	been	tasked	with	writing	the	minutes	of	this	very	important	 conference.	 Surrounded	 by	 distinguished	 professors	 and	 luminaries,	she	 feels	 nervous.	 To	 make	 things	 worse,	 the	 French	 typewriter	 she	 has	 been	assigned	to	has	some	of	the	keys	put	in	a	different	order	than	what	she	is	used	to	back	home	in	England.3	Rays	of	sunshine	make	their	way	in	through	the	windows,	illuminating	the	rising	smoke	in	mid-air,	and	forming	geometrical	shapes	on	the	floor	and	on	the	walls.4	A	man	gets	up	from	his	chair.	In	three	weeks	from	now	he	is	to	turn	64.	His	name	is	William	Rappard,	and	he	has	been	tasked	by	Friedrich	Hayek	with	the	important	mission	of	chairing	the	very	first	session	of	the	very	first	meeting	of	what	was	some	days	later	to	be	named	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.		This	 second	part	of	 the	 thesis	zooms	 in	on	 the	proceedings	of	 the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference,	and	 its	main	source	are	 the	minutes	 typed	up	by	Mrs.	Hahn	on	that	unfamiliar	typewriter.	The	documents	now	exist	in	various	incomplete	forms	both	at	the	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives	at	Stanford	University	in	Palo	Alto,	California,	and	at	the	Liberal	Archive	in	Ghent,	Belgium.	In	addition,	I	have	visited	the	 personal	 archives	 of	 some	 of	 the	 men	 present:	 Friedrich	 Hayek,	 Milton	Friedman,	Lionel	Robbins,	Fritz	Machlup,	Maurice	Allais	and	Trygve	Hoff.	The	first	
                                            2	I	can	confirm	that	this	is	the	case	at	least	with	the	archives	after	Friedrich	Hayek,	Fritz	Machlup,	Lionel	Robbins,	Milton	Friedman,	Trygve	Hoff	and	Maurice	Allais.	3	Interview	with	Dorothy	Hahn	18.10.2016	4	This	description	is	based	on	photos	from	the	meeting,	found	in	the	archives	of	Lionel	Robbins.	London	School	of	Economics	Library	Archives,	Lionel	Robbins	Collection,	Box	10,	Folder	2	
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part	of	this	thesis	charted	the	road	to	Mont	Pèlerin	for	some	of	the	most	important	conference	attendees,	and	developed	the	notion	of	the	dual	argument	as	a	central	tenet	 of	 early	 neoliberal	 thought.	 This	 analysis	 of	 the	 intellectual	 and	organizational	efforts	that	went	into	the	neoliberal	thought	collective	before	their	founding	meeting	will	be	crucial	 to	gain	a	wider	appreciation	of	 the	discussions	undertaken	 at	 this	 fascinating	 ten-day	 event.	 The	 conference	 itself	 eventually	counted	ten	full	sessions	with	introductions,	two	excursions,	and	several	meetings	on	the	future	of	the	organization.	If	I	was	to	report	in	detail	on	every	single	session	of	the	meeting	in	addition	to	my	own	analysis,	this	thesis	would	be	very	long	and	something	of	a	difficult	 read.5	 I	have	 therefore	chosen	 to	 focus	attention	on	 the	sessions	and	discussions	that	I	judge	to	be	the	most	important	ones.	In	doing	so,	I	am	aided	by	the	previous	section’s	analysis	of	the	dual	argument,	which	guides	my	judgement	 regarding	 which	 of	 the	 sessions	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 essential	 to	 the	political	project	of	neoliberalism,	and	which	could	be	better	understood	as	 side	issues.	 The	 difficult	 task	 of	 selection	 and	 framing	 is	 also	 helped	 by	 the	 sources	themselves,	and	the	main	organizer,	Friedrich	Hayek’s,	repeated	insistence	that	the	early	sessions	 introduced	by	him	were	“by	far	the	most	 important	ones”.	Hayek	pre-programmed	the	first	week	of	sessions,	and	so	they	will	be	the	main	focus	in	Chapters	5	and	6.	The	second	week	of	sessions	was	programmed	by	the	attendees	
in	 situ,	 and	 as	was	 perhaps	 to	 be	 expected,	 (but	much	 to	 Hayek’s	 dismay),	 the	conference	 veered	 somewhat	 off	 topic,	 as	 the	 attendees	 went	 on	 to	 organize	sessions	 discussing	 everything	 from	 trade	unions	 and	 agricultural	 policy	 to	 the	geopolitical	role	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	possibility	of	nuclear	war.	The	content	of	these	sessions	and	discussions	will	be	summarized	and	referred	to	in	chapter	7,	but	due	to	the	before-mentioned	need	for	focus,	they	will	cede	into	the	background	in	this	narrative	of	early	neoliberal	thought	as	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	markets	as	mediators	 of	modernity,	 and	 a	 new	way	 of	 thinking	 about	modern	 states	 as	active	facilitators	of	these	devices.			
                                            5	I	would	know,	because	in	one	of	the	early	drafts	I	did	precisely	that.	
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The	program	of	the	first	week	of	sessions	was	the	following:		Tuesday	April	1st:	Morning:	Report	on	aims	and	organisation	of	Conference	by	Hayek	Afternoon	&	Evening:	“Free”	Enterprise	or	Competitive	Order		Wednesday	April	2nd:	Morning:	Modern	Historiography	&	Political	Education	Afternoon	&	Evening:	The	Future	of	Germany		Thursday	April	3rd:	Morning	&	Evening:	The	Problems	&	Chances	of	European	Federation	(The	afternoon	was	occupied	by	an	excursion	to	Chateau	de	Coppet)		Friday	April	4th:	Morning:	Liberalism	&	Christianity	Afternoon:	General	Discussion	of	aims	and	purposes	of	a	permanent	organisation		Saturday	 5th	 &	 Sunday	 April	 6th	 were	 taken	 up	 by	 excursions	 to	 Schwyz	 and	Einsiedeln.		The	following	chapter	will	go	into	the	demographics	of	the	conference	attendees,	and	 the	 introduction	 held	 by	William	 Rappard.	 A	 key	 point	 will	 be	 the	 rather	homogenous	 character	 of	 this	 group	 of	 people.	 Despite	 their	 diverse	 national	backgrounds,	they	were	almost	exclusively	privileged	white	men,	and	I	argue	that	this	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 contextualizing	 their	 ideas.	 Chapter	 5,	“Using	the	state”,	will	 focus	on	Hayek’s	 introduction	and	the	key	session	he	had	entitled	“’Free	Enterprise’	or	Competitive	Order”.	It	was	in	this	session	that	Hayek	was	 hoping	 to	 advance	 the	 discussion	 embodied	 in	 the	 dual	 argument	 and	 the	simultaneous	attack	on	economic	planning	and	laissez-faire	liberalism:	what	sort	
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of	 state	 interventions	 could	 be	 considered	 to	 help	 rather	 than	 hinder	 market	mechanisms,	and	therefore	not	be	a	form	of	economic	planning?	Chapter	6	focuses	on	the	context	of	post-war	Europe	and	the	sense	of	a	new	beginning.	I	argue	that	the	sessions	on	the	possibility	of	a	European	federation	and	the	future	of	Germany	can	 be	 seen	 together	with	 the	 excursions	 to	 Chateau	 de	 Coppet	 and	 Schwyz	 as	indicative	 of	 what	 kind	 of	 new	 Europe	 these	 intellectuals	 were	 envisioning.	Chapter	7	summarizes	the	chaotic	second	week	of	sessions	and	the	efforts	to	create	a	lasting	organization.	Special	attention	is	paid	to	a	session	on	agricultural	policies,	in	 which	 a	 conference	 attendee	 claimed	 that	 the	 dual	 argument	 was	 in	 fact	contradictory,	 and	 that	 the	 other	 neoliberals	 had	 been	 arguing	 for	 a	 variety	 of	interventions	whose	sum	could	only	be	considered	to	be	economic	planning.		
Previous	scholarship	The	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	has	been	referred	to	in	a	number	of	books	and	journal	articles,	and	described	in	some	detail	in	Ronald	M.	Hartwell’s	A	
History	of	 the	Mont	Pelerin	 Society	 (1995),	Angus	Burgin’s	The	Great	Persuasion	(2012)	 and	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 Daniel	 Stedman	 Jones’	Masters	 of	 the	 Universe	(2012).	 In	German,	Bernhard	Walpen’s	Die	offenen	Feinden	und	ihre	Gesselschaft	offers	a	convincing	study	through	the	lens	of	Gramscian	theories	of	hegemony,	but	this	volume	is	now	out	of	print.6	Hartwell	was	himself	a	member	of	the	society,7	and	 even	 served	 as	 president	 between	 1992	 and	 1994.8	 His	 volume	 was	commissioned	 and	 supported	 financially	 by	 the	 society	 itself,	 and	 as	 he	writes	himself:	a	“formidable	group	of	members,	including	past	and	present	officers	of	the	Society,	subjected	a	final	draft	of	the	history	to	detailed	and	effective	criticism.”9	The	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 has	 been	 judged	 to	 be	considerable	by	a	variety	of	 scholars	and	commentators.	 It	 is	obvious	 therefore	
                                            6	Walpen,	Die	Offenen	Feinde	Und	Ihre	Gesellschaft.	There	is	also	the	work	of	Philip	Plickert:	Philip	Plickert,	Wandlungen	Des	Neoliberalismus	(Stuttgart:	Lucius	und	Lucius,	2008).	7	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	73.	8	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	4.	9	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	xviii.	
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that	we	must	do	more	than	to	simply	take	their	own	celebratory	retelling	of	their	history	at	face	value.			The	main	problem	with	previous	work	on	this	meeting	by	independent	scholars	is	the	degree	to	which	this	early	phase	of	neoliberalism	and	the	context	of	Europe	in	the	interwar	and	early	post-war	years	 is	written	off	as	 largely	 irrelevant	for	the	subsequent	 development	 of	 neoliberalism,	which	 is	 the	main	 focus	 of	 all	 these	narratives.	 It	 is	 my	 contention	 that	 by	 not	 taking	 this	 period	 and	 this	 context	seriously	 enough,	 scholars	 like	Burgin	 and	 Stedman	 Jones	miss	 out	 on	 the	 true	importance	of	 the	dual	argument	and	the	neoliberals’	new	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity.	As	far	as	the	work	of	Angus	Burgin	is	concerned,	it	should	be	clear	from	the	introduction	and	Part	I	that	I	am	in	some	disagreement	with	his	tendency	to	portray	neoliberalism	as	a	return	to	laissez-faire.	This	interpretation	of	the	neoliberal	project	forms	the	arch	of	his	narrative	about	the	reinvention	of	“free”	 markets.10	 Burgin	 does	 write	 that	 “An	 exploration	 of	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 the	society’s	members	in	its	early	years	reveals	a	movement	far	less	doctrinaire	than	the	conventional	narrative	would	indicate”,	and	even	that	“The	financial	crisis	and	subsequent	political	instability	left	them	broadly	convinced	of	the	need	for	a	social	philosophy	that	transcended	the	abstract	dictates	of	laissez-faire.”11	However,	both	Burgin	 and	 Daniel	 Stedman	 Jones	 seem	 to	 see	 this	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 passing	pragmatism,	which	ended	with	the	rise	of	Milton	Friedman	as	a	public	figure	and	president	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	from	the	1960s	onwards.12	This	seems	to	me	to	 be	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 early	 years	 of	 neoliberalism	 too	 heavily	 influenced	 by	presuppositions	from	the	2000s	about	what	neoliberalism	really	is.	Stedman	Jones	does	write:	 	 “The	specifically	European	problems	and	traditions	central	to	the	intellectual	formation	of	Hayek,	Popper	 and	 Mises	 should	 not	 be	 understated	 despite	 their	 subsequent	 “Anglicization”	 or	“Americanization”.	These	influences	–	for	example	the	fear	of	Nazi	totalitarianism	and	the	bundling	together	of	diverse	opponents,	progressive,	liberal,	socialist	and	social	democratic	politics,	under	
                                            10	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	5.	11	Ibid.,	9.	12	Ibid.,	11;	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	98–99.	
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the	label	‘collectivism’	–	had	a	bearing,	sometimes	indirectly,	on	how	neoliberalism	was	developed	later	by	American	theorists	such	as	Friedman	and	Buchanan.”13				Despite	this,	both	Burgin	and	Stedman	Jones	appear	to	see	the	years	between	1920	and	1947	as	little	more	than	an	interesting	European	background	for	what	later	developed	 into	 a	 transatlantic	 free	 market	 project.	 These	 studies	 therefore	contribute	 to	 the	ongoing	 confusion	about	what	 the	prefix	neo	 in	neoliberalism	actually	signified.	Taking	the	left	and	right	of	contemporary	American	and	British	politics	 as	 their	 starting	points,	 these	analyses	 seem	 to	miss	 the	 real	novelty	of	early	neoliberalism:	it	was	much	more	than	a	pragmatic	middle	ground	between	social	liberalism	and	laissez-faire.	It	was	a	theory	of	modernity,	combining	a	new	conceptualization	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	with	a	will	to	use	modern	states	in	their	service.		The	 three	 chapters	 of	 Part	 I	 uncovered	 the	 dual	 argument	 in	 early	 neoliberal	thought	and	traced	the	organizational	efforts	leading	up	to	the	1947	meeting.	In	Part	II	we	will	see	the	dual	argument	in	action,	and	focus	special	attention	on	key	sessions	in	which	the	attendees	tried	to	map	out	ways	of	using	states	in	the	service	of	markets.	Some	of	the	attendees,	however,	resisted,	and	claimed	that	the	whole	approach	was	fraught	with	contradictions.	These	chapters	can	be	seen	partly	as	a	work	of	micro-history,	as	they	go	into	some	detail	to	describe	not	only	the	content	of	the	discussions	held,	but	also	the	surrounding	atmosphere,	including	excursions	and	meals,	and	the	demographic	of	the	conference	attendees.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	this	is	meant	as	an	aid	to	the	task	of	contextualization,	which	has	been	high	 on	 the	 agenda	 of	 intellectual	 historians	 since	 the	 famous	 interventions	 of	Quentin	Skinner	several	decades	ago.14	Micro-history	is	not	usually	connected	to	intellectual	 history,	 so	 the	 theoretical	 apparatus	 for	 conducting	 enquiries	 in	intellectual	history	in	this	way	is	rather	underdeveloped.	In	the	history,	philosophy	and	sociology	of	science	there	is	a	large	literature	on	scientific	communities,	but	
                                            13	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	14–15.	14	See	especially	Skinner,	Visions	of	Politics,	Volume	1,	Regarding	Method.	
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this	often	focuses	more	on	the	sociology	of	knowledge	and	how	various	“thought	collectives”	arrive	at	 their	 findings;	and	 less	on	customs,	habits	and	 the	specific	modes	of	interaction	that	exist	within	academic	communities.15	There	is	a	growing	anthropological	literature	on	how	performance	of	rituals	inform	politics	and	even	international	diplomacy,	but	to	my	limited	knowledge	it	has	yet	to	take	on	the	very	specific	milieu	of	more	academically	inclined,	activist	communities	like	the	one	in	question	in	this	thesis.16	The	following	in-depth	study	of	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	is	therefore	more	empirically	based	than	it	is	grounded	in	any	hitherto	developed	theoretical	notions.		
Introducing	neoliberalism	The	point	of	this	chapter	is	to	introduce	the	context	of	the	meeting	and	the	thirty-seven	 attendees,	 and	 the	 frame	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 before-mentioned	 William	Rappard,	and	the	introductory	remarks	he	gave	that	April	morning	in	the	smoke-filled	room	overlooking	Lake	Geneva.	He	began	his	short	address,	delivered	some	three	weeks	before	his	64th	birthday,	by	extending	thanks:	“First	and	foremost	they	are	due	to	our	eminent	colleague	Hayek,	without	whose	constructive	imagination,	tenacious	 courage	and	unflagging	efforts	over	a	number	of	months	and	even	of	years,	this	international	meeting	of	academic	liberals	would	have	remained	an	idle	dream.”17	 Rappard	 was	 born	 in	 America,	 but	 had	 become	 a	 naturalized	 Swiss	citizen,	 making	 a	 name	 for	 himself	 on	 the	 burgeoning	 scene	 of	 international	
                                            15	Sergio	Sismondo,	An	Introduction	to	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(Chichester:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2010).	16	See	for	instance	Jeffrey	C.	Alexander,	The	Performance	of	Politics	-	Obama’s	Victory	and	
the	Democratic	Struggle	for	Power	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010);	Catherine	Cole,	Performing	South	Africa’s	Truth	Commission:	Stages	of	Transition	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	press,	2009).	17	The	quotations	from	Rappard’s	opening	address	are	taken	from	a	manuscript	and	not	from	notes	made	by	Dorothy	Hahn.	They	can	therefore	be	considered	to	be	rather	accurate.	The	top	of	the	first	page	of	the	archival	document	in	question	states:	”PRIVATE	Not	for	publication	(It	is	specially	requested	not	to	quote	from	this	document	except	with	the	express	permission	of	the	person	concerned)”.	I	have,	however	taken	the	liberty	of	the	historian	to	make	some	quotations,	as	I	read	the	disclaimer	to	relate	to	more	short-term	use	of	the	manuscript.	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”.	
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diplomacy.	There	were	three	Swiss	nationals	at	the	conference	in	total:	Rappard,	Hunold	and	the	economist	Hans	Barth.	Rappard	was	an	influential	figure,	not	only	because	he	 founded	 the	Graduate	 Institute	of	 International	 Studies	 and	became	professor	and	later	rector	of	the	University	of	Geneva,	but	also	because	he	was	a	former	 director	 at	 The	 League	 of	 Nations.	 He	 took	 part	 in	 the	 peace	 talks	 at	Versailles	 in	 1919	 and	 is	 said	 to	 have	made	 a	 strong	 impression	 on	 President	Woodrow	Wilson,	convincing	him	to	locate	the	League	of	Nation	Headquarters	in	Rappard’s	 adopted	 hometown	 of	 Geneva	 in	 1920.	 The	 organization	 may	 have	ended	 in	 failure,	 but	 in	 the	 new	 post-1945	world	 of	 international	 cooperation,	Rappard	would	become	the	Swiss	representative	both	to	the	UN,	the	International	Labour	 Organization	 (ILO)	 in	 Geneva,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 Embassy.18	 As	mentioned	in	Chapter	3,	Rappard’s	Graduate	Institute	in	Geneva	had	hosted	many	important	neoliberals,	and	a	certain	mythology	of	Switzerland	as	a	liberal	utopia	already	loomed	large	for	some	of	the	conference	attendees.19	Wilhelm	Röpke,	who	was	based	at	 the	 institute,	 saw	 the	 federated	Swiss	 state	 as	 a	model	 society,	 in	which	small	land-holding	families	governed	themselves	in	accordance	with	rural	traditions	of	strict	property	rights	and	minimal	central	government.20	We	noted	this	traditionalist	streak	in	early	neoliberal	thought	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	it	is	especially	strong	in	the	work	of	Röpke.	Due	to	his	idealization	of	Swiss	society,	John	 Zmirak’s	 biography	 of	 Röpke	 has	 the	 subtitle	 Swiss	 Localist,	 Global	
Economist.21	 Andrea	 Franc	 has	written	 about	 neoliberalism	 in	 Switzerland	 as	 a	form	of	what	she	calls	“cultural	nationalism”,22	and	as	we	will	see,	Switzerland	and	its	 history	was	 indeed	held	up	 as	 a	model	 several	 times	during	 the	 conference.	
                                            18	Richard	M.	Ebeling,	‘William	E.	Rappard	-	An	International	Man	In	An	Age	of	Nationalism’,	Foundation	for	Economic	Education,	2000.	19	See	Andrea	Franc,	‘The	Importance	of	Switzerland	for	the	Neoliberal	Movement	in	World	War	II	and	the	Postwar	Years,	2014.’	(More	Roads	from	Mont	Pelerin,	WZB,	Berlin,	2016).	20	Andrea	Franc,	‘Wilhem	Röpke’s	Utopia	and	Swiss	Reality:	From	Neoliberalism	to	Neoconservatism’	(More	Roads	from	Mont	Pelerin,	WZB,	Berlin,	2016).	21	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist.	22	Andrea	Franc,	‘Neoliberalism	as	Cultural	Nationalism:	The	“Swiss	Group”	in	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,’	(More	Roads	from	Mont	Pelerin,	WZB,	Berlin,	2016).	
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Chapter	2	 referred	 to	 the	 interwar	years’	 scene	of	 international	diplomacy,	 and	American	 funded	 research	 institutes	 as	 an	 important	 context	 for	 the	 early	neoliberal	 movement.	 Similarly,	 the	 concept	 of	 “summits”	 bringing	 together	leaders	 from	 around	 the	 world	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 something	 of	 a	 post-war	phenomenon.	However,	unlike	for	instance	the	1944	Bretton	Woods	conference	or	the	1955	Bandung	conference,	the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	in	1947	was	distinctly	less	publicized	and	of	a	less	diplomatic	nature.	The	people	gathered	met	as	like-minded	individuals	representing	only	themselves,	and	so	any	rituals	in	which	they	engaged	had	the	 internal	 function	of	binding	the	group	together,	more	than	any	external	display.		In	1938,	Rappard	had	also	given	a	series	of	lectures	at	the	University	of	Chicago	which	were	later	published	in	book	form	under	the	title	The	Crisis	of	Democracy.	Much	like	other	neoliberals	he	saw	modern	democracies	as	inefficient,	easy	prey	for	various	“interest	groups”,	and	carrying	in	them	the	seeds	of	totalitarian	rule.	According	to	him,	the	Swiss	version	of	democracy	was	what	offered	hope	for	the	future	of	mankind,	notably	because	Switzerland	had	a	long	history	of	various	forms	of	democratic	rule.	Echoing	Edmund	Burke	and	Hayek’s	 theories	of	 the	organic,	slow	 evolution	 of	 social	 orders,	 Rappard’s	 lecture	 in	 Chicago	 claimed	 that	totalitarianism	had	been	the	result	of	a	rapid	transition	to	democracy:		“…	it	is	not	in	the	states	in	which	democracy	was	an	inheritance	of	the	past,	but	those	in	which	it	was	merely	a	program	or	a	hope	for	the	future,	that	have	until	today	succumbed	to	 the	onslaught	of	 authoritarian	violence.”23	His	 argument	was	 that	democracy	was	dangerous	when	it	was	seen	as	a	tool	to	change	the	world;	instead	it	had	to	be	a	 continuation	 of	 the	 traditional	 social	 order.	 According	 to	 him,	 Switzerland’s	constitutions	had,	since	the	1830s,	“extended	to	all	the	fundamental	principles	of	political	liberalism”.24	This	was	a	somewhat	curious	thing	to	say	in	1938,	since	at	least	half	 the	adult	population	of	 Switzerland	did	not	get	 the	 right	 to	vote	until	
                                            23	William	E.	Rappard,	The	Crisis	of	Democracy	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1938),	69.	24	Ibid.,	67.	
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some	 thirty-three	 years	 later,	 in	 1971.	 It	would	 take	 another	 full	 twenty	 years	before	all	Swiss	cantons	had	granted	women	the	right	to	vote	also	in	local	elections.	As	was	indicated	in	Part	I,	however,	liberal	thinkers	had	for	centuries	used	words	like	“all”	to	mean	only	people	like	themselves:	privileged	white	males.25	Rappard	did	concur	in	his	1938	speech	that	it	might	seem	odd	to	not	grant	women	the	right	to	vote,	but	he	referred	to	what	seemed	to	be	a	widely	held	opinion	in	Switzerland	at	the	time,	that	the	majority	of	women	did	not	actually	want	the	vote,	so	“it	would	hardly	be	democratic	on	the	part	of	the	men	to	impose	it	upon	them.”26		
The	attendees	Indeed,	the	following	section	will	show	that	the	attendees	of	the	first	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	 were	 people	 very	 much	 like	 William	 Rappard:	 that	 is	 male,	 white,	middle-aged,	 highly	 educated	 and	materially	 comfortable.	 In	 a	 treatise	 arguing	against	one	or	more	aspects	of	neoliberal	philosophy,	this	sort	of	observation	could	be	 considered	 an	argumentum	ad	hominem.	 As	 emphasized	 in	 the	 introduction,	however,	this	thesis	is	not	meant	as	a	work	of	social	theory	in	itself,	and	I	make	no	normative	arguments	relating	to	the	content	of	neoliberal	doctrine.	This	is	a	work	of	intellectual	history,	meant	to	untangle	and	explain	the	arguments	made	by	the	actors,	and	to	use	the	benefit	of	hindsight	and	historical	analysis	to	show	patterns	hitherto	 unnoticed.	 An	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 task	 of	 contextualizing	 these	utterings	 is	 to	understand	 the	homines	who	made	 the	utterings,	 so	 as	 to	 gain	 a	further	appreciation	of	who	they	were	and	the	intentions	they	might	have	had	in	saying	what	they	did.	Before	moving	on	to	the	content	of	Rappard’s	introduction,	we	will	therefore	take	a	brief	look	at	the	biographies	of	the	thirty-seven	attendees,	and	then	break	down	some	of	the	key	demographics	of	the	group	gathered	at	Mont	Pèlerin	in	1947.	This	will	be	done	in	the	main	body	of	the	text	and	not	in	a	separate	annex,	since	this	information	is	important	in	achieving	the	goal	of	contextualizing	early	 neoliberalism.	 It	 is	 my	 contention	 that	 the	 class,	 gender	 and	 racial	
                                            25	See	especially	Losurdo,	Liberalism.	26	Rappard,	The	Crisis	of	Democracy,	67.	
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background	of	these	thinkers	have	to	be	taken	into	account	when	we	analyse	both	their	ideas	and	the	culture	out	of	which	they	grew.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	their	ideas	can	be	easily	discarded	as	merely	a	reflection	of	their	social	standing;	only	that	when	attempting	to	understand	their	ideas	and	where	they	came	from,	we	will	do	well	to	not	discard	the	social	background	of	the	thinkers	in	question	either.	It	is	perhaps	unlikely	 that	 for	 instance	 a	 group	of	 underprivileged	women	of	 colour	from	the	same	countries	would	have	gotten	together	to	discuss	economic	theory	at	this	point	in		time;	but	it	is	likely	that	people	from	different	cultural	and	economic	backgrounds	than	the	neoliberals	would	have	seen	recent	economic	developments	in	 a	 very	 different	 light.	 The	 neoliberals	 argued	 intellectually	 against	 socialism,	organized	labour	and	most	forms	of	social	programs,	but	it	would	be	sloppy	to	not	also	consider	their	social	backgrounds	when	contextualizing	their	arguments.	As	we	will	see,	their	view	of	the	world	was	from	a	position	of	great	privilege,	 from	which	they	were	mainly	able	to	see	“economic	planning”	as	inefficient,	and	the	rise	of	mass	democracy	as	a	threat	to	freedom.		List	of	attendees:		
Carlo	Antoni	(1896	–	1959)	–	was	an	Italian	philosopher	and	a	historian.	A	student	of	Benedetto	Croce	(who	had	also	been	invited	to	the	conference),	he	specialized	in	German	philosophy,	and	his	main	work,	published	in	1942,	was	called	La	lotta	
contra	la	ragione		-	the	fight	against	reason.	He	was	given	the	chair	of	philosophy	of	history	at	 the	University	of	Rome	 in	 the	same	years	as	 the	 first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	meeting.27		
Hans	Barth	(1904	–	1965)	–	was	a	Swiss	professor	of	philosophy	and	journalist.	He	was	the	son	of	Hans	Barth,	a	famous	historian.	He	wrote	for	the	Neue	Züricher	
                                            27	Michele	Biscione,	‘Antoni,	Carlo’,	Dizionario	Biografico	Degli	Italiani	(Roma:	Istituto	dell’Enciclopedia	Italiana,	1961),	http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/carlo-antoni_(Dizionario-Biografico)/.	
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Zeitung,	 and	became	Professor	of	philosophy,	political	 science	 and	ethics	 at	 the	University	of	Zürich	in	1946.28		
Karl	Brandt	(1899	–	1975)	–	was	born	in	Essen	in	1899	and	had	already	become	professor	 at	 the	 Landwirtschaftlichen	 Hochschule	 in	 Berlin	 in	 1929.	 He	 was	 an	economist	 and	 emigrated	 to	 the	US	 in	1933,	where	he	 first	worked	at	 the	New	School	of	Social	Research,	before	moving	to	Stanford	University	in	1938.	His	main	interests	as	an	economist	were	agriculture	and	food	production.29		
Orval	 Watts	 (1898	 –	 1993)	 –	 was	 an	 American	 economist	 working	 for	 the	Foundation	for	Economic	Education,	a	brand	new	think	tank.	He	had	worked	with	its	 president,	 Leonard	 Read	 earlier,	 when	 the	 former	 was	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Los	Angeles	Chamber	of	Commerce.	Along	with	his	work	for	the	think	tank	and	other	interest	groups	he	taught	economics	at	various	American	universities.30		
Cicely	Veronica	Wedgewood	 (1910	–	1997)	–	was	a	British	historian	who	had	graduated	from	Oxford.	She	had	published	a	biography	of	Thomas	Wentwort,	the	1st	earl	of	Strafford	at	the	age	of	only	25;	a	large	work	entitled	The	Thirty	Years	War	only	three	years	later;	and	a	book	on	Oliver	Cromwell	the	year	after	that	(1939).	She	held	no	university	position	at	the	time,	but	was	made	“special	lecturer”	at	the	University	College	in	London	in	1962.31		
John	Davenport	(1905	–	1987)	–	graduated	as	an	economist	from	Yale	in	1926,	but	 worked	 as	 a	 journalist.	 He	 would	 become	 editor	 of	 the	 financial	 weekly	Barron’s	in	1949	and	of	Fortune	magazine	in	1954.	He	had	published	a	book	about	
                                            28	Alfred	Cattani,	‘Hans	Barth’,	Historischen	Lexicon	Der	Schweiz	(Bern:	Historischen	Lexicon	der	Schweiz,	2002),	http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D41549.php.	29	Glenn	Campbell,	Walter	P.	Falcon,	and	William	O.	Jones,	‘Karl	Brandt’,	Stanford	
University	Historical	Sociey	(Palo	Alto,	California,	1975).	30	Mises	Daily,	https://mises.org/profile/vervon-orval-watts	31	The	Associated	Press,	‘C.V.	Wedgwood,	86,	Storyteller	of	History’,	The	New	York	Times,	11	March	1997,	http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/11/arts/c-v-wedgwood-86-storyteller-of-history.html.	
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Winston	Churchill	in	1945,	and	one	about	the	work	of	Chicago	economist	Henry	Simons	and	the	field	of	law	and	economics	in	1946.32		
Stanley	Dennison	(1912	–	1992)	–	was	a	British	economist,	at	the	time	a	fellow	at	Caius	College	in	Cambridge.33	Ralph	Harris,	who	later	became	president	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	 Society,	 described	 Dennison	 as	 having	 been	 a	 “powerful	 exponent	 of	economic	 freedom	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 Alfred	 Marshall”	 while	 at	 Cambridge	 in	1945,34	and	he	was	later	considered	amongst	the	forbearers	of	Margaret	Thatcher’s	economic	policies.35		
Aaron	Director	(1901	–	2004)	–	was	an	American	economist,	who	had	recently	obtained	a	position	as	Professor	at	the	University	of	Chicago	Law	School.	Director	came	to	be	known	as	 the	 founder	of	 the	 field	“Law	and	Economics”,	which	uses	economic	models	and	reasoning	 to	make	 legal	arguments.	Director’s	 family	had	emigrated	from	present	day	Ukraine	in	1913,	and	he	was	one	of	the	few	attendees	with	 former	 affiliations	 with	 left-wing	 politics	 from	 his	 youth	 days.	 Director	graduated	from	Yale	in	1924,	and	changed	his	politics	after	becoming	a	graduate	student	at	the	University	of	Chicago	under	Frank	Knight.36		
Walter	Eucken	(1891	–	1950)	–	was	a	German	economist	born	in	Jena.	He	was	the	son	of	Nobel	prize	winning	author	Rudolf	Eucken	and	did	his	habilitation	in	Berlin	in	 1921.	 Since	 1927	 he	 had	 been	 Professor	 at	 Albert-Ludwigs-Universität	 in	Freiburg,	and	together	with	amongst	others	the	political	scientist	Franz	Böhm	and	the	lawyer	Hans	Grossman	Doerth,	he	formed	a	strand	of	thought	known	as	the	
                                            32	‘John	Davenport’,	New	York	Times,	12	June	1987,	http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/12/obituaries/john-davenport.html.	33	Alec	Cairncross,	Economic	Ideas	and	Government	Policy	–	Contributions	to	
Contemporary	Economic	History	(London	-	New	York:	Routledge,	1996),	48.	34	R.C.O.	Matthews,	Economy	and	Democracy	(London:	Macmillan,	1984),	219.	35	Shirley	Robin	Letwin,	The	Anatomy	of	Thatcherism	(London:	Transaction	Publishers,	1992),	80.	36	Larry	Arbeiter,	‘Aaron	Director,	Founder	of	the	Field	of	Law	and	Economics’,	The	
University	of	Chicago	News	Office,	13	September	2004.	
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Freiburg-school,	 later	 to	 be	 called	ordoliberalism,	 from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 journal	
ORDO	they	would	establish	in	1948.37		
Erich	Eyck	(1878	–	1964)	–	was	a	German	lawyer	and	historian.	He	was	from	a	bourgeois,	Jewish	family	in	Berlin,	and	went	to	Freiburg	to	complete	his	studies.	Amongst	other	works	he	wrote	a	 three-volume	biography	of	Otto	von	Bismarck	before	going	into	exile	in	Great	Britain	in	1938,	where	he	completed	a	biography	of	William	Gladstone.38		
Milton	Friedman	(1912	–	2006)	–	was	the	son	of	Jewish	immigrants	to	Brooklyn	and	one	of	the	very	few	original	Mont	Pelerin	Society	members	who	came	from	a	reasonably	humble	background.	He	earned	a	BA	from	Rutgers	University	in	1922,	an	MA	from	Chicago	the	year	after,	and	then	a	PhD	in	Economics	from	Columbia	University	 in	 1946.	He	 joined	 the	 faculty	 of	 the	University	 of	 Chicago	 the	 same	year.39		
Harry	Gideonse	(1883	–	1966)	–	was	an	American	economist	who	had	served	as	president	of	Brooklyn	College	since	1939.	He	had	also	taught	and	studied	at	the	University	of	Chicago,	Columbia	University,	and	the	Institute	for	Graduate	Studies	in	Geneva.40		
Frank	D.	Graham	(1890	–	1949)	–	was	a	Canadian	born	American	economist.	He	had	been	Walker	Professor	of	Economics	and	International	Finance	at	Princeton	
                                            37	Gerken,	Walter	Eucken	und	sein	Werk.	38	Frank	Eyck,	‘Erich	Eyck’,	in	Nationalismus	in	Den	Kulturwissenschaften.	Band	2:	
Leitbegriffe	–	Deutungsmuster	–	Paradigmenkämpfe.	Erfahrungen	Und	Transformationen	
Im	Exil	(Göttingen:	Vandenhoek	&	Ruprecht,	2004),	545–48.	39	‘Milton	Friedman	(1912-2006)’,	The	Concise	Encyclopedia	of	Economics	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2008),	http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html.	40	Walter	H.	Waggoner,	‘Dr.	Harry	D.	Gideonse	Dead;	Ex-Head	of	Brooklyn	College’,	New	
York	Times,	14	March	1985,	http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/14/nyregion/dr-harry-d-gideonse-dead-ex-head-of-brooklyn-college.html.	
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University	since	1945.	He	was	best	known	for	his	work	on	international	trade	and	international	monetary	institutions.41		
Floyd	 Arthur	 Harper	 (1905	 –	 1973)	 –	 was	 an	 American	 economist	 who	 had	graduated	from	Michigan	State	University.	He	had	been	a	professor	of	marketing	at	Cornell	University,	but	 left	his	position	in	1946,	allegedly	because	he	was	not	allowed	to	put	works	by	Hayek	on	the	curriculum.	He	had	recently	been	employed	by	the	newly	founded	Foundation	for	Economic	Education.42		
Friedrich	August	von	Hayek	(1899	–	1992)	–	was	an	Austrian	economist	who	had	been	working	in	London	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	since	1930.	He	was	from	a	wealthy,	aristocratic	family	in	Vienna	–	his	father	was	a	botanist	and	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	was	his	cousin.	In	the	mid-1930s	Hayek	more	or	less	retreated	from	economics	 into	 political	 philosophy,	 and	 gained	worldwide	 fame	with	 his	 1944	book	The	Road	to	Serfdom.43		
Henry	Hazlitt	(1894	–	1993)	–	was	an	American	journalist	working	as	the	editor	of	Newsweek,	having	previously	been	at	The	New	York	Times	and	The	Wall	Street	
Journal.	He	was	born	in	Philadelphia,	and	like	Milton	Friedman	he	was	not	from	a	rich	 family.	 His	 book	Economics	 in	 One	 Lesson	 was	 published	 in	 1946	 to	 great	acclaim,	and	it	was	his	review	of	The	Road	to	Serfdom	that	lead	to	it	being	published	in	Reader’s	Digest	in	1944.44		
Trygve	J.	B.	Hoff	(1895	–	1982)	–	was	a	Norwegian	economist	and	businessman.	He	earned	his	PhD	from	the	University	of	Oslo	in	1938	with	a	thesis	repeating	some	
                                            41	‘Professor	Graham’,	Princeton	IES	(Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	IES,	n.d.),	https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/graham.htm.	42	Will	Wilkinson,	‘Harper,	Floyd	Arthur	“Baldy”	(1905-1973)’,	in	The	Encyclopedia	of	
Libertarianism	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Cato	Institute,	n.d.),	217–18.	43	Wapshott,	Keynes	Hayek,	110–23.	44	Llewellyn	H.	Rockwell	Jr.,	‘Biography	of	Henry	Hazlitt	(1894-1993)’,	Articles	of	Interest	
-	Mises	Institute,	1	August	2007,	https://mises.org/library/biography-henry-hazlitt-1894-1993.	
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of	 Mises	 and	 Hayek’s	 arguments	 about	 socialism	 from	 the	 socialist	 calculation	debates.	The	Oslo-school	of	economics	was	highly	Keynesian	and	mathematical,	so	Hoff	was	unable	to	launch	a	career	as	an	economist.	Instead	he	set	up	consulting	companies	and	the	right-wing	journal	Farmand.45	He	was	also	involved	in	setting	up	 The	 Liberal	 International	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 but	 later	 remarked	 that	 the	attendees	of	that	conference	did	not	understand	the	meaning	of	the	word	“liberal”,	something	which	indicated	his	strong	aversion	to	social	liberalism.46		
Albert	Hunold	(dates	unknown)	–	was	a	Swiss	businessman,	among	other	things	a	 dealer	 in	 fine	 Swiss	 watches,	 who	 was	 instrumental	 in	 organizing	 the	 first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	He	later	caused	a	great	stir	when	he	fell	out	with	Hayek	in	what	has	been	known	as	“The	Hunold	Affair”,	which	lead	to	Wilhelm	Röpke	having	to	take	over	the	presidency	of	the	organization	from	Hayek.	Hunold	did	not	speak	on	matters	political	during	the	conference.47		
Carl	Iversen	(1899	–	1978)	–	was	a	Danish	economist,	and	professor	of	political	science	and	national	economy	at	the	University	of	Copenhagen	since	1939.	In	the	1960s	he	would	become	head	of	the	Danish	Economic	Council.48		
John	Jewkes	(1902	–	1988)	–	was	Professor	of	Economic	Organization	at	Merton	College	at	Oxford	University.	His	main	work	Ordeal	by	Planning	was	published	the	year	after	the	conference,	and	contained	both	elements	of	the	dual	argument.	In	1962	he	would	become	the	third	president	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.49	
                                            45	Lars	Mjøset,	‘Nyliberalisme,	Økonomisk	Teori	Og	Kapitalismens	Mangfold :	Noen	Historiske	Linjer	Og	En	Norsk	Kasusstudie’,	Agora	29,	no.	1	(2015).	46	Riksarkivet,	Oslo,	Trygve	Hoff	/	Farmand,	Box	16		47	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	48	J	Toftg	and	N	Banke,	‘Carl	Iversen’,	Dansk	Biografisk	Leksikon	(Köbenhavn:	Gyldendal,	1984	1979),	http://denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon/Samfund,_jura_og_politik/Økonomi/Nationaløkonom/Carl_Iversen.	49	Gonçalo	L.	Fonseca,	‘John	Jewkes,	1902	-	1988.’,	History	of	Economic	Thought	Website	(New	York:	Institute	for	New	Economic	Thinking,	n.d.),	http://www.hetwebsite.net/het/profiles/jewkes.htm.	
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Bertrand	 de	 Jouvenel	 (1903	 –	 1987)	 –	 was	 a	 French	 philosopher,	 aristocrat,	political	 economist,	 futurist	 and	nobleman	 from	 the	Champagne	 region.	 From	a	very	young	age	he	caused	much	stir	in	high	society	with	his	love	life.	In	the	1930s	he	was	editor	of	the	journal	of	the	French	fascist	party,	and	in	1945	he	published	the	book	Du	Pouviour.	After	the	war	he	moved	to	Switzerland.50		
Frank	Knight	(1885	–	1972)	–	was	an	American	economist	and	one	of	the	founders	of	 the	 Chicago	 School.	 He	 was	 born	 in	 Illinois,	 and	 came	 to	 Chicago	 from	 the	University	of	Iowa	in	1929.	His	most	famous	work	was	Risk,	Uncertainty	and	Profit	from	 1921.	 He	 famously	 argued	 with	 A.C.	 Pigou	 over	 social	 costs,	 and	 also	contributed	 to	 the	 argument	 for	 toll	 roads	 based	 on	 analyses	 of	 “traffic	equilibrium”.51		
Fritz	Machlup	(1902	–	1983)	–	was	an	Austrian	economist,	a	student	of	Mises,	who	had	worked	in	the	USA	since	1933.	It	was	he	who	secured	Hayek	a	publication	deal	in	the	USA	for	The	Road	To	Serfdom,	and	in	the	absence	of	Hayek	or	international	telephone	 calls,	 he	 made	 several	 decisions	 on	 his	 behalf	 regarding	 condensed	versions,	 cartoons	and	radio	 shows	 in	 the	US.52	 In	1947	he	had	recently	moved	from	the	University	of	Buffalo	to	Johns	Hopkins	in	Baltimore.		
François	Trevoux	(dates	unknown)	–	was	a	French	law	professor	based	in	Lyon,53	of	whom	little	is	known.		
                                            50	Daniël	Floris	Knegt,	‘A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	and	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	between	Liberalism,	Fascism	and	Europeanism	(1930-1954)’	(European	Unviersity	Institute,	2015).	51	‘Frank	H.	Knight’,	The	University	of	Chicago	Centennial	Catalogues	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago,	1992	1991),	http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/projects/centcat/centcats/fac/facch23_01.html.	52	HLA,	”Fritz	Machlup	Collection”,	Box	43,	Folder	15,	”Friedrich	Hayek	1933	–	1944”	53	White,	The	Clash	of	Economic	Ideas,	212.	
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Henri	de	Lovinfosse	(dates	unknown)	–	was	a	Belgian	businessman	of	aristocratic	descent,	of	whom	little	is	known.54	He	published	a	book	called	Solution	sociale	with	the	 philosopher	 Gustave	 Thibon	 in	 1951,	 in	 which	 they	 claimed	 that	 a	 more	harmonious	society	could	be	reached	because	of	a	great	convergence	of	interests	between	all	people.55		
Loren	Miller	(dates	unknown)	–	considered	himself	a	civic	reformer,	and	one	of	his	main	 contributions	 to	 neoliberalism	was	 persuading	 the	 furniture	magnate	William	Volker	to	set	up	the	William	Volker	fund	in	1932.	The	Volker	fund	paid	the	expense	of	all	the	American	attendees	of	the	first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	conference.	Miller	ran	the	foundation	until	1942,	and	after	some	time	as	an	executive	at	the	Kansas	 City	 Civic	 Research	 Institute	 he	 became	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Bureau	 of	Governmental	Research	in	Detroit.56	
	
Ludwig	von	Mises	(1881	–	1973)	–	was	an	Austrian	economist	based	in	New	York	City	at	the	New	School	for	Social	Research.	He	was	born	to	Jewish	parents	who	had	been	 raised	 into	 nobility	 in	 what	 is	 now	 Ukraine.	 He	 had	 started	 the	 socialist	calculation	debates,	which	this	thesis	argues	was	foundational	for	neoliberalism,	and	had	inspired	a	whole	generation	of	anti-socialists	with	books	like	Socialism	and	
Bureaucracy.57		
Herbert	Tingsten	(1896	–	1973)	–	was	a	Swedish	publisher	and	political	scientist.	He	was	the	son	of	a	high-ranking	public	servant,	and	had	held	a	chair	as	Professor	of	political	science	at	Stockholms	högskola	since	1923.	In	1946	he	took	up	the	post	as	editor	in	chief	of	the	daily	newspaper	Dagens	Nyheter.58		
                                            54	https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Famille_Lovinfosse	55	http://fenareta.org/blog/tag/henri-de-lovinfosse/	56	Blundell,	Waging	the	War	of	Ideas,	38.	57	Jim	Powell,	The	Triumph	of	Liberty	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2000).	58	‘Herbert	Tingsten’,	Vem	Är	Det	1961,	Vem	Är	Det	-	Svensk	Biografisk	Handbok	(Stockholm:	Norstedt	förlag,	1961).	
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Felix	 Morley	 (1894	 –	 1982)	 –	 was	 an	 American,	 and	 the	 son	 of	 a	 famous	mathematician;	he	won	a	Rhodes	scholarship	to	study	at	Oxford.	He	later	obtained	a	Guggenheim	scholarship	to	work	at	the	League	of	Nations	in	Geneva,	and	got	his	PhD	from	the	Brookings	Institution.	He	was	the	editor	of	The	Washington	Post	from	1933	–	1940,	and	won	the	Pullitzer	Prize	 in	1936	 for	his	critique	of	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt’s	National	Industrial	Recovery	Act.	In	1944	he	founded	the	conservative	magazine	Human	Events.59		
Michael	Polanyi	(1891	–	1976)	–	was	Austro-Hungarian	of	 Jewish	descent,	and	had	held	a	 chair	 as	Professor	of	 chemistry	 in	Manchester	 since	1933.	He	was	a	polymath	and	also	a	trained	doctor	who	had	written	extensively	on	the	philosophy	of	science	and	economic	planning.60		
Karl	Popper	(1902	–	1994)	–	was	an	Austrian	philosopher	of	upper-middle	class	background.	He	emigrated	to	New	Zealand	in	1937,	where	he	wrote	the	manuscript	for	his	magnum	opus	The	Open	Society	and	its	Enemies.	It	was	published	in	1944	with	the	help	of		Friedrich	Hayek,	who	also	helped	him	obtain	a	chair	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.61	
	
William	Rappard	(1883	–	1958)	–	was	born	in	New	York	City	to	Swiss	parents,	and	moved	 to	Switzerland	as	a	young	man.	He	spent	most	of	his	 life	 in	Geneva,	working	for	the	League	of	Nations,	the	University	of	Geneva	and	the	Institute	of	Graduate	Studies,	which	he	helped	 found.	The	headquarters	of	 the	World	Trade	Organization	in	Geneva	are	named	after	him.62		
                                            59	Martin	Weil,	‘Felix	Morley,	Scholar,	Educator	and	Journalist,	Dies	at	88’,	The	
Washington	Post,	15	March	1982.	60	Mitchell,	Michael	Polanyi.	61	‘Karl	Popper’,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Palo	Alto,	California:	Stanford	University,	13	November	1997),	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/.	62	Ebeling,	‘William	E.	Rappard	-	An	International	Man	In	An	Age	of	Nationalism’.	
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Leonard	Read	(1898	–	1993)	–	was	a	former	businessman	who	had	made	a	career	in	various	chambers	of	commerce	in	California.	In	1946	he	had	decided	to	dedicate	himself	 to	 the	 cause	 of	 “free”	 markets,	 and	 so	 he	 set	 up	 the	 Foundation	 for	Economic	Education,	one	of	the	world’s	first	neoliberal	think	tanks.63		
Maurice	 Allais	 (1911	 –	 2010)	 –	 was	 both	 a	 physicist	 and	 an	 economist.	 Like	Friedman	and	Hazlitt,	he	was	among	the	few	Mont	Pelerin	members	from	a	modest	background,	 born	 in	 the	 Haute-Seine	 area.	 He	 was	 director	 of	 the	 Bureau	 de	
documentation	et	de	statistique	minière	until	1948,	but	would	go	on	to	win	a	Bank	of	Sweden	award	as	one	of	the	world’s	most	renowned	economists.64		
Lionel	Robbins	(1898	–	1984)	–	was	a	British	economist,	credited	with	bringing	“continental	 economics”	 to	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 shifting	 Anglo-Saxon	economics	from	its	Marshallian	direction.	He	was	based	at	the	London	School	of	Economics,	and	was	involved	with	several	government	agencies	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War.65		
Wilhelm	Röpke	(1899	–	1966)	–	was	a	German	economist	born	in	Hannover.	He	was	professor	in	Jena,	Graz	and	Marburg	before	leaving	Germany	for	Istanbul	and	Geneva.	By	1947	he	was	a	member	of	Germany’s	currency	reform	council,	and	he	enjoyed	 great	 influence	 with	 Ludwig	 Erhard,	 another	 founding	 member	 of	 the	Mont	Pèlerin	Society,	who	became	finance	minister	and	later	chancellor	of	West	Germany.66		
                                            63	Donald	Boudreaux	and	Nick	Slepko,	‘Read,	Leonard	E.	(1898-1983)’,	The	Encyclopedia	
of	Libertarianism	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Cato	Institute,	2008).	64	Henry	Aujard,	Un	Savant	Méconnu :	Portraits	D’un	Autodidacte :	Sur	L’œuvre	de	
Maurice	Allais,	Prix	Nobel	de	Sciences	Économiques	(Paris:	C.	Juglar,	2002).	65	‘Lionel	Robbins	(1898-1984)’,	The	Concise	Encyclopedia	of	Economics	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2008),	http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Robbins.html.	66	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist.	
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George	Stigler	(1911	–	1991)	–	was	an	American	economist	of	German	descent.	He	had	 studied	economics	at	Chicago	under	Knight	and	Director,	where	he	had	become	 close	 friends	 with	Milton	 Friedman.	 In	 1947	 he	 had	 just	 been	 given	 a	position	of	professor	at	Columbia	University.67			Some	of	those	who	could	not	attend		the	conference	included	Antony	Fischer,	who	would	later	start	the	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	and	of	whom	we	will	hear	more	in	 the	 conclusion;	 Arnold	 Plant;	 the	 Italian	 economist	 Costantino	 Bresciani-Turroni;	 the	 Swedish	 economist	 Eli	 Hecksher;	 and	 the	 Italian	 president	 Luigi	Einaudi.68	
	
Demographics	
	
 		As	we	can	see	from	figure	#2,	the	crowd	addressed	by	William	Rappard	that	April	morning	in	1947	included	nationals	from	all	over	Europe	and	the	USA.	As	Hagen	Shulz-Forberg	and	Niklas	Olsen	have	recently	shown,	the	League	of	Nations	and	
                                            67	‘George	J.	Stigler	(1911-1991)’,	The	Concise	Encyclopedia	of	Economics	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2008),	http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Stigler.html.	68	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	32–33.	
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various	 other	 international	 organisations	 funded	 by	 foundations	 like	 the	Rockefeller	Foundation	and	the	Carnegie	Endowment	were	an	important	backdrop	for	early	neoliberal	organisation	in	the	interwar	years.	These	connections	have	led	Quinn	 Slobodian	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 how	 neoliberalism	 was	 a	 transnational	project	from	the	very	beginning:	both	in	its	intellectual	outlook,	but	also	in	its	novel	organisational	 form	 through	 the	 transnational	 organizations	 and	 institutes	 that	provided	 the	 institutional	 framework	 for	 early	 neoliberalism.69	 The	 early	neoliberals	 were	 very	 much	 part	 of	 a	 new,	 international	 elite	 emerging	 in	 the	interwar	 years	 which	 connected	 academic	 research	 in	 the	 social	 sciences	 with	international	diplomacy	and	the	world	of	business.			Being	so	international,	they	must	have	felt	like	quite	a	diverse	group	of	people,	but	as	figures	#3	and	later	#6	will	reveal	it	was	mainly	their	passports	and	languages	which	made	 them	 so.	 Apart	 from	Mrs.	 Hahn,	 the	 secretary,	 the	 only	woman	 in	attendance	was	the	British	historian	Cecily	Wedgewood,	who	shared	lodgings	and	train	compartments	with	Mrs.	Hahn	on	the	 journey	from	London	down	to	Mont	Pèlerin.	 In	 a	 later	 recollection,	 the	Norwegian	 attendee	Trygve	 J.	 B.	Hoff	wrote:	“While	 at	 the	 first	 meeting	 there	 were	 few	 women	 –	 only	 interpreters	 and	secretaries	 –	 later	 years	 have	 seen	 an	 increase	 in	 spouses	 joining	 the	meeting	(many	of	which	have	shown	a	surprising	interest	and	faithfulness	in	listening	to	the	often	long	and	strenuous	lectures	and	discussions).”70			
                                            69	Quinn	Slobodian,	‘World	Federation	against	the	Welfare	State:	Hayek	and	Röpke	Think	Global	before	1945’	(Economic	Thought	of	Cambridge,	Oxford,	LSE	and	the	Transformation	of	the	Welfare	State,	Hitotsubashi	University,	Tokyo,	Japan,	2015).	70	Riksarkivet,	Oslo,	Trygve	Hoff	/	Farmand,	Box	16	(translated	from	the	Norwegian)	
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			Almost	without	exception,	the	attendees	of	the	first	Mont	Pelerin	Conference	were	white	 men	 with	 PhDs,71	 and	 with	 materially	 comfortable	 lives	 hailing	 from	materially	comfortable	backgrounds.	This	is	not	to	detract	from	the	value	or	logical	consistency	of	their	arguments,	but	when	contextualizing	their	intellectual	efforts,	it	is	worth	noting	at	the	very	outset	of	this	narrative	what	a	homogenous	group	the	attendees	of	the	first	Mont	Pèlerin	meeting	really	were,	especially	since	they	were	discussing	matters	pertaining	to	all	of	human	kind	and	the	way	in	which	modern	society	was	to	be	organized.	Their	view	was	one	located	in	a	very	specific	social	stratum.	Their	view	of	the	growth	of	state	power	and	government	expenditure	was	thus	 that	 of	 a	 privileged	 elite,	 something	which	 is	 highly	 visible	 for	 instance	 in	Wilhelm	Röpke’s	 1947	 text	 “International	 crusade	 against	 luxuries”,	which	was	circulated	to	all	members	of	the	society	just	after	the	meeting.	In	the	midst	of	what	we	will	later	read	was	a	starvation	crisis	of	catastrophic	proportions,	Röpke	found	
                                            71	The	only	ones	who	might	not	have	had	PhD’s	were	the	American	journalists	Felix	Morley	and	Henry	Hazlitt	and	libertarian	activists	Loren	Miller	and	Leonard	Read.	
Figure	#3	– Attendees	of	first	MPS	meeting	by	gender
Male
Female
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it	opportune	to	write	a	long	article	complaining	about	the	difficulty	of	obtaining	luxury	goods,	like	fine	leather	satchels,	and	he	blamed	this	horrid	state	of	affairs	on	taxation	and	illiberal	government	intervention.72		
		As	 visible	 in	 figure	#4,	 the	 attendees’	 age	 raged	 from	35,	Milton	 Friedman	 and	Stanley	 Dennison,	 to	 69,	 Eirch	 Eyck.	 However,	 only	 nine	 people	 out	 of	 37	 fell	outside	of	the	age	group	42	–	57,	so	also	in	this	respect	they	were	a	rather	uniform	group.	They	were	not	particularly	young,	nor	very	old,	but	men	in	their	so-called	“prime”.	Their	average	age	was	47,5.			Looking	at	their	life	spans	in	the	“Biographies”	section,	one	is	also	struck	by	how	long	almost	all	of	them	lived	for	(see	Figure	#5).	Friedrich	Hayek	made	it	to	93,	Milton	 Friedman	 to	 94	 and	 his	 brother-in-law,	 Aaron	Director,	 lived	 to	 be	 102.	Ludwig	von	Mises	lived	until	92	and	Maurice	Allais	became	109,	the	list	goes	on.	A	
                                            72	Hoover	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society	Collection,	Box	28,	Folder	5:	”R-W”	
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Figure	#4	- Age	in	1947
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few	of	them,	like	Frank	Graham,	Walter	Eucken,	Wilhelm	Röpke	died	in	their	60s	or	just	before,	but	the	vast	majority	lived	way	past	80.	11	of	them	lived	to	be	over	90,	which	constitutes	34%.	This	group	of	people	would	attempt	to	influence	society	for	a	long	time.			
		This	adds	more	weight	to	the	argument	that	these	intellectuals	saw	modern	society	and	its	history	in	a	very	particular	light.	The	average	life	expectancy	for	those	born	in	 1900	 in	 both	 Germany	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	was	 45,6	 years.73	 This	 low	number	obviously	had	a	lot	to	do	with	the	world	wars	and	economic	downturns	this	 generation	would	endure,	but	 it	 is	worth	pausing	 to	note	 that	 amongst	 the	attendees	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	 conference,	who	 all	 hailed	 from	pretty	much	 the	same	generation,	the	average	life	lasted	a	staggering	84	years.	It	is	fair	to	say	that	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	members	lived	a	good	deal	 longer	also	than	those	who	died	of	natural	causes.	Life	expectancy	is	closely	linked	to	social	class,	where	those	in	comfortable	material	circumstances,	on	average	and	for	a	multitude	of	different	
                                            73	http://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy/	
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reasons,	live	much	longer	than	those	with	less	financial	freedom.74	It	could	possibly	be	 argued	 that	 the	 early	 neoliberals	 wanted	 to	 extend	 that	 fabled	 “freedom	 in	economic	affairs”	 to	more	people	 than	 themselves,	but	 arguments	pointing	 in	a	different	direction	could	also	easily	be	posed.	It	is	certainly	beyond	discussion	that	the	early	neoliberals’	own	position	within	the	social	order	they	wanted	to	save	was	one	of	great	privilege.	
	
Liberalism	and	economics	This	brings	us	back	to	William	Rappard’s	opening	address.	After	thanking	Hayek	especially,	he	went	on	to	extend	further	thanks	also	to	“the	anonymous	benefactors	in	 the	United	 States	 and	 in	 Switzerland”,	 and	 “my	 compatriot	Dr.	Hunold,	 from	Zurich”,	who	had	made	the	Swiss	funds	available	and	organized	the	stay	at	Mont	Pèlerin.	As	mentioned	at	the	end	of	Chapter	3,	the	anonymous	benefactors	in	the	US	were	the	William	Volker	Foundation,	and	in	Switzerland	they	were	Swiss	banks	like	Credit	Suisse	and	the	Swiss	business	confederation.	Rappard	then	remarked	on	the	use	of	English	as	lingua	franca	of	the	conference,	alluding	to	the	history	of	English	liberalism	and	what	he	called	the	“preponderance	of	Anglo-Saxondom	in	what	remains	of	liberalism	in	the	world	today”.	He	then	used	this	linguistic	point	to	segue	into	the	more	specific	content	of	his	address,	a	remark	on	liberalism	and	economics:	“The	term	of	economics	I	cannot	help	finding	dangerously	ambiguous	in	that	it	refers	both	to	a	science	and	to	a	policy	or	a	possible	variety	of	policies”,	he	 said,	 setting	 the	 tone	 for	 a	 conference	 that	 was	 to	 probe	 deeply	 into	 the	philosophical	and	political	 implications	of	being	 “liberal”	 in	a	modern,	post-war	world.	 He	 noted	 how	 in	 French	 one	 differed	 between	 science	 économique	 and	
politique	économique;	whereas	German	did	the	same	with	the	distinction	between	Volkwirtschaftslehre	 and	Volkwirschaftspolitik.	Rappard	claimed	 that	 they	were	two	 “entirely	 different	 things”	 and	 that	 this	 created	 confusion	 of	 which	“economists	as	men	of	science	are	the	chief	victims”.	“Science	cannot	be	liberal	or	
                                            74	Kate	Pickett	and	Richard	Wilkinson,	The	Spirit	Level:	Why	More	Equal	Societies	Almost	
Always	Do	Better	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2009).	
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illiberal.	In	a	sense	it	cannot	be	anything	but	liberal”,	he	exclaimed,	noting	that	the	same	was	not	the	case	when	speaking	of	policies:	“Most	policies	all	over	the	world	today	are	in	fact	illiberal	and	it	is	because	we	believe	that	they	should	be	liberal	that	 we	 are	 assembled	 here	 today.”	 He	went	 on:	 “The	 distinction	 is	 absolutely	fundamental.	It	alone	explains	why	our	friend	Hayek,	in	setting	up	his	list	of	guests,	has	not	included	therein	many	economists	who	are	not	liberals,	but	has	to	our	great	joy	admitted	certain	liberals	who	are	not	economists.”	Rappard	noted	that	many	economists	had	been	 liberals	 in	both	the	scientific	and	the	political	sense	of	 the	term,	but	then	took	care	to	make	a	point	about	how	Adam	Smith,	“The	greatest	of	all”,	 had	 placed	 his	 liberal	 doctrine	 “not	 only	 on	 scientific	 findings,	 but	 on	 two	assumptions”	which	according	to	Rappard	“could	lay	no	claim	to	scientific	validity.”	Rappard	 explained	 that	 the	 first	 assumption	 was	 that	 men	 and	 nations	 were	engaged	in	labours	of	production	with	the	main	purpose	of	enriching	themselves,	and	that	“The	other	was	the	assumption	of	the	homo	economicus,	of	the	economic	man.”	The	question	then	posed	by	Rappard	was:	“Is	the	economic	man	necessarily	a	liberal?”	a	“foe	of	restrictive	policies”?		Rappard	went	on	to	tell	the	story	of	how	he	had	“happened	to	be”	in	Algiers	at	the	time	of	the	landing	of	the	allied	forces	in	November	1942,	and	had	been	“impressed	by	the	sight	of	countless	Arabs	seated	on	the	curb	of	the	sidewalks	in	all	the	streets	of	the	city.	They	seemed	quite	indifferent	to	what	was	going	on	and	they	certainly	were	absolutely	idle.”	Rappard	had	questioned	a	French	friend	about	“this	striking	fact”	and	it	was	explained	to	him	that	“Arabs	in	Algiers	never	did	any	more	work	than	 was	 absolutely	 necessary…”	 A	 General	 Weygan	 who	 had	 been	 Governor	General	of	Algeria	had	reportedly	attempted	to	double	the	wages	and	rations	of	Arabs	(so	that	they	would	have	the	same	as	Algerians	of	European	origin),	but	to	no	avail	as	their	productive	efforts	had	been	even	further	reduced.	“…	the	Arabs	apparently	got	more	enjoyment	out	of	life	by	working	less	than	they	would	have	secured	by	producing	and	consuming	more.”	I	have	noted	the	relative	homogeneity	of	the	conference	attendees	(see	also	Figure	#6),	and	as	far	as	one	is	able	to	tell	
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from	 Rappard’s	 text,	 his	 statements	 would	 have	 been	 considered	 appropriate	within	this	circle.	The	society	discussed	 liberation	of	colonies	 in	 their	St.	Moritz	meeting	ten	years	later,	and	the	historian	Kim	Priemel	has	written	that	its	“main	thrust	 was	 an	 embarrassingly	 simplistic	 and	 brazenly	 racist	 justification	 of	European	imperialism”,75	indicating	that	the	plight	of	the	world’s	people	of	colour	was	 not	 a	 very	 pressing	 issue	 for	 the	 society’s	 members.	 Rappard	 went	 on	 to	remark	that	in	conversation	with	British	colleagues	the	night	before,	he	had	heard	that	“the	absenteeism	of	some	of	the	Welsh	miners	called	for	a	similar	explanation.”	The	 question	 for	 Rappard	 was	 then:	 “Can	 these	 Arabs	 and	 these	 Welsh	philosophers	 be	 denied	 the	 right	 to	 call	 themselves	 economic	men?”	 Rappard’s	answer	was	no,	and	he	went	on	to	describe	Adam	Smith	as	“a	Scot	who	preferred	to	work	and	to	save”,	noting	that	“For	the	Scotch	brand	of	the	homo	economicus,	work	was	 a	 virtue	 first	 because	 the	 sturdy	Nordic	mountaineer	 loved	 freedom,	secondly	because	he	did	not	shirk	effort	and	thirdly	and	finally	because	he	was	not	averse	to	wealth…”76		
                                            75	Kim	Christian	Priemel,	The	Betrayal	–	The	Nuremberg	Trials	and	German	Divergence	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016),	388.	76	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	12:	“Minutes”		
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		It	 is	 hard	 to	know	exactly	what	 to	make	of	Rappard’s	musings	on	Algerian	and	Welsh	national	character	as	a	different	sort	of	homo	economicus	than	the	one	upon	which	Adam	Smith	had	based	both	liberal	philosophy	and	the	field	of	economics.	Due	to	his	connections	to	international	diplomacy,	Rappard	was	most	likely	one	of	the	few	of	those	gathered	at	Mont	Pèlerin	who	had	set	foot	in	what	was	then	known	as	“the	colonies”,	but	whose	name	would	soon	change	to	“the	developing	world”.	In	a	 later	recollection,	 the	Norwegian	attendee	Trygve	Hoff	wrote	 that	although	there	were	no	“colored”	or	“crooked-eyed”	attendees	at	the	meeting	(he	expressed	hope	 that	 there	 would	 be	 some	 at	 later	 conferences),	 he	 still	 noted	 a	 certain	division	 along	 racial	 lines.	 “Neither	 dark	 eyes,	 curly	 hair	 or	 a	 bent	 nose”	were	“certain	proof	of	Jewish	lineage”,	he	wrote,	but	he	still	suggested	that	sub-groups	within	the	society	were	being	formed	along	ethnic	lines,	presumably	between	Jews	and	non-Jews.77	These	comments	certainly	suggest	a	rather	limited	knowledge	of	other	cultures,	and	perhaps	Rappard	was	mainly	reporting	from	the	outside	world.	
                                            77	Riksarkivet,	Oslo,	Trygve	Hoff	/	Farmand,	Box	16	(Translated	from	the	Norwegian	original).	
Figure#	6:	Atendees	of	first	MPS	meeting	by	ethnicity
White
Non-White
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It	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 his	 remarks	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 emerging	 paradigms	 of	development	and	aid	in	the	early	postcolonial	world.	Recent	studies	from	1950s	Algeria	 reveal	 the	 importance	 of	 ideas	 similar	 to	Rappard’s	 about	Arabs	 as	 not	quite	homo	 economicus	 or	 entrepreneurial	 enough	 for	 a	modern	world,	 also	 in	early	development	aid	efforts.78			Rappard’s	differentiation	between	economic	science	and	economic	policies	seems	to	have	been	rather	slippery,	as	he	then	went	on	to	conclude	that:			 “Modern	economic	liberalism	…	is	the	legitimate	off-spring	of	the	union	between	two	first	cousins:	Adam	Smith’s	penetrating	and	essentially	sound	scientific	analysis	of	 the	economic	world	of	his	day,	and	Adam	Smith’s	inborn	love	of	freedom,	constructive	effort	and	wealth.”			Thus	 the	 conclusion	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 that	 liberal	 economic	 theory	 was	scientific,	 and	 that	 liberal	 economic	 policies	were	 the	 logical	 conclusion	 drawn	from	 these	 scientific	 facts	 by	 those	 who	 love	 freedom,	 constructive	 effort	 and	wealth	(a	category	excluding	both	Arabs	and	the	Welsh).	 In	his	work	on	Liberal	
Languages,	 Michael	 Frieden	 has	 written	 that	 “The	 scramble	 for	 the	 mantle	 of	scientific	authority	is	frequently	a	facile	and	flawed	route	to	legitimacy	pursued	by	the	 ideological	 producers	 themselves.”79	 Rappard	 did	 not	 seem	 to	 think	 so,	however,	 and	 it	 seemed	 clear	 to	 him	 that	 the	 political	 conclusions	 drawn	 from	scientific	facts	eluded	only	those	people	believed	by	Rappard	to	be	very	different	from	those	gathered	at	the	Mont	Pèlerin.	One	is	reminded	of	Hayek	and	other	early	neoliberals’	constant	claims	that	politicians	and	policy	makers	were	ignoring	the	truths	of	economics	and	liberalism	in	moving	towards	socialism	and	other	forms	of	collectivism.	Indeed,	Rappard	ended	his	address	by	stating:	“Unless	the	world	has	become	completely	mad,	it	must	sooner	or	later	come	to	realize	and	to	admit	the	productive	superiority	of	a	society	based	upon	the	principle	of	free	enterprise.”	Finishing	off,	Rappard	argued	that	“The	socialism	of	Europe”	was	“the	policy	of	a	
                                            78	Muriam	Haleh	Davis,	‘Algeria	as	Postcolony?	Rethinking	the	Colonial	Legacy	of	Post-Structuralism’,	Journal	of	French	and	Francophone	Philosophy	19,	no.	2	(2011):	136–52.	79	Frieden,	Liberal	Languages,	12.	
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tired	 race”,	 and	 said,	 perhaps	 privy	 to	 the	 Marshall	 Plan,	 which	 would	 be	announced	 some	 two	 months	 later,	 that	 it	 was	 largely	 being	 subsidised	 by	capitalism	from	America	(“a	still	energetically	youthful	continent”).	Before	leaving	the	word	to	Hayek,	Rappard	concluded	to	both	American	and	European	listeners:	“May	 it	 prove	 to	 be	 for	 both	 continents	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 an	 intellectual,	economic	 and	 political	 renaissance	 without	 which	 it	 would	 seem	 well	 nigh	impossible	not	to	despair	of	the	future.”80	Thus	the	very	first	conference	of	what	was	to	become	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	had	begun.		 	
                                            80	Hoover	Institution	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	12:	“Minutes”	
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Chapter	5	–	Using	the	state	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘The	state’	is	one	of	the	most	elusive	concepts	in	social	and	political	theory	and	major	writers	often	demonstrate	this	by	using	the	term	differently…”1		Peter	Mayo	in	“The	Centrality	of	the	State	in	Neoliberal	Times:	Gramsci	and	beyond”	(2011)	
	
	
	
	
	
	Although	 I	hold	 that	 the	dual	 argument	 should	be	 seen	as	a	whole,	 it	obviously	consists	of	two	rather	distinct	parts.	In	the	years	before	1947,	which	was	the	topic	of	Part	 I,	 it	could	be	argued	that	one	part	of	 the	dual	argument	was	given	more	weight	than	the	other.	 In	their	books,	articles	and	lectures,	the	early	neoliberals	focused	 primarily	 on	 their	 theory	 of	 totalitarianism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	planning.	As	we	have	seen,	the	attack	on	laissez-faire	was	present	before	1947,	yet	it	was	not	as	obvious	as	the	campaign	against	“economic	planning”	as	the	root	of	all	 society’s	 ills	 was.	 In	 the	 discussions	 at	 Mont	 Pèlerin,	 however,	 almost	 the	opposite	was	the	case.	The	supposed	totalitarian	nature	of	both	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	East	and	the	rise	of	social	democracy	in	the	West	was	remarked	upon	and	functioned	as	an	important	backdrop,	but	as	we	will	see,	the	specific	discussions	focused	more	on	 the	 futility	of	 laissez-faire	and	the	need	to	change	 liberalism.	 I	
                                            1	Peter	Mayo,	‘The	Centrality	of	the	State	in	Neoliberal	Times:	Gramsci	and	beyond’,	
International	Gramsci	Journal,	no.	3	(March	2011):	57–71.	
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argue	 that	 part	 of	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 these	 were	 internal	 discussions,	whereas	the	works	published	between	1920	and	1947	were	meant	to	persuade	an	external	audience.	When	discussing	amongst	each	other,	it	was	not	as	necessary	for	the	neoliberals	to	repeat	their	claim	that	socialism	and	social	liberalism	led	to	totalitarianism	and	dictatorship.	On	the	other	hand,	actually	coming	to	grips	with	the	contradictions	embodied	in	the	dual	argument	and	defining	what	sort	of	state	actions	 that	were	needed	was	of	 the	upmost	 importance.	This	 is	 evident	 in	 the	approach	of	Friedrich	Hayek,	the	main	organizer,	who	emphasized	this	aspect	of	the	dual	argument	both	in	his	introductory	speech	and	his	introduction	to	the	first	session	of	the	meeting,	which	he	claimed	was	the	most	important	of	them	all.	This	chapter	focuses	on	these	two	introductions	by	Hayek	and	the	following	discussion	on	the	use	of	the	state	to	ensure	a	functioning	market	society.	As	will	become	clear,	neoliberals	of	all	 stripes,	 that	 is	members	of	 the	Chicago	school,	 the	ordoliberal	school	and	other	factions	of	the	group,	supported	Hayek’s	idea	that	states	had	to	be	 used	 to	 ensure	 a	 more	 competitive	 society.	 Conflict	 arose,	 however,	 when	Hayek’s	mentor	Mises	weighed	in	with	his	criticism	of	the	neoliberal	approach	and	arguments	 favouring	 the	 old-fashioned	 notion	 of	 laissez-faire.	 The	 project	 to	discuss	 a	 liberal	 form	 of	 interventionism	 in	more	 detail	 thus	 derailed,	 and	 the	attendees	ended	up	arguing	with	Mises	about	whether	or	not	states	could	have	a	positive	function	at	all.		
Hayek’s	welcome	After	Rappard’s	 short	 introduction,	 the	 floor	was	given	 to	 the	man	of	 the	hour:	Friedrich	Hayek.2	The	beginning	of	the	Mont	Pèlerin	Society	was	in	some	ways	also	the	end	of	a	long	journey	for	him.	Ever	since	his	arrival	in	London	in	1931,	and	his	1933	memo	“Nazi-Socialism”,	written	to	Sir	William	Beveridge	(quoted	in	chapter	
                                            2	Hayek’s	address	is	another	one	whose	manuscript	has	been	saved	for	posterity.	Again	there	is	a	disclaimer	at	the	top	saying	”It	is	specially	requested	not	to	quote	from	this	document	except	with	the	express	permission	of	the	person	concerned.”	Again,	I	have	taken	the	liberty	of	the	historian	to	make	some	quotations,	as	I	read	the	disclaimer	to	relate	to	more	short-term	use	of	the	manuscript.	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	5,	Folder	12:	“Minutes”	
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3),	Hayek	had	wanted	to	fight	collectivism	in	all	its	forms.	He	had	come	to	think	that	the	way	to	do	this	was	to	reinvent	liberalism,	purge	it	of	“false	individualists”	and	use	this	new	ideological	clarity	to	advocate	for	a	different	world	order.	After	the	publication	of	The	Road	to	Serfdom	in	1944	he	became	famous,	travelled	to	the	US,	 and	 saw	 a	window	of	 opportunity	 open	 for	 him.	His	 plan	 to	 put	 together	 a	society	of	 like-minded,	 frustrated	liberals	had	been	developing	and	coming	ever	closer	to	reality	since	he	had	first	discussed	it	at	a	meeting	in	Cambridge	only	three	years	before.	Now	he	was	there,	stating	bluntly:	“(…)	the	moment	has	arrived	to	which	I	have	so	long	looked	forward”.	Hayek	expressed	feelings	of	both	gratitude	and	“real	alarm	about	the	responsibility	I	have	taken	on	me”.	He	went	on	to	declare	that	if	liberal	ideas	were	to	have	any	chance	of	revival,	“a	great	intellectual	task”	lay	ahead:			 “This	task	involves	both	purging	traditional	liberal	theory	of	certain	accidental	accretions	which	have	become	attached	to	it	in	the	course	of	time,	and	facing	up	to	certain	real	problems	which	an	over-simplified	liberalism	has	shirked	or	which	have	become	apparent	only	since	it	had	become	a	somewhat	stationary	and	rigid	creed.”			Readers	 will	 recognize	 this	 as	 a	 compressed	 version	 of	 the	 dual	 argument,	attacking	both	laissez-faire	liberalism	and	social	liberalism	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	 new	 form	 of	 liberalism.	 Hayek’s	 “purge”	 would	 have	 mainly	 referred	 to	 the	“constructivist”	 tendencies	 that	 he	 had	 argued	 perverted	 the	 social	 liberal	tradition.	Many	years	later	Hayek	would	claim	that	this	type	of	 liberalism	was	a	“pacemaker	for	socialism”.3	The	“facing	up	to	certain	real	problems	which	an	over-simplified	liberalism	has	shirked”	was	the	second	part	of	the	dual	argument:	the	attack	on	laissez-faire,	as	a	“somewhat	stationary	and	rigid	creed”	which	did	not	correspond	to	the	realities	of	the	modern	world	and	the	crucial	importance	of	state	power	in	enforcing	a	neoliberal	world	order.	I	have	argued	that	this	dual	argument	and	 the	 challenges	 bound	 up	 in	 it	 is	 the	most	 important	 background	 for	 early	neoliberal	thought,	and	we	see	here	how	Hayek	expressly	framed	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	precisely	these	terms.	
                                            3	Friedrich	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty	(Chicago:	Gateway,	1972),	398.	
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	If	 it	 indeed	was	a	desperate	situation	for	liberalism,	Hayek	told	the	attendees	of	this	historical	conference	that	he	did	not	despair.	In	his	travels	over	recent	years,	promoting	The	Road	To	Serfdom,	he	had	found	people	from	different	fields	and	in	different	parts	of	the	world	who	had	been	“rediscovering	the	basic	principles	of	liberalism	…	hard	at	work	to	reconstruct	a	liberal	philosophy	which	can	fully	meet	the	objections	which	in	the	eyes	of	most	of	our	contemporaries	have	defeated	the	promise	the	earlier	liberalism	offered.”	Hayek	emphasized	how	everywhere	he	had	found	 “isolated	men	…	working	 on	 essentially	 the	 same	 problems	 and	 on	 very	similar	 lines.”	 The	 tentatively	 called	 Acton-Tocqueville	 society	 was	 now	 finally	bringing	 these	 people	 together,	 and	Hayek	went	 on	 to	 defend	his	 choice	 of	 not	inviting	socialists	of	any	kind	to	the	discussion,	something	for	which	Karl	Popper	had	already	criticized	him:	4	 “…	common	work	on	the	more	detailed	outline	of	a	liberal	order	is	practicable	only	among	a	group	of	people	who	are	in	agreement	on	fundamentals…”,	he	 stated.	Hayek	 then	 implicitly	questioned	William	Rappard’s	claim	 that	 “tired”	European	 socialism	was	 living	off	 the	 dynamism	of	American	capitalism.	Instead	he	noted	that	the	further	one	travelled	west	“to	countries	where	liberal	 institutions	 are	 still	 comparatively	 firm,	 and	 people	 professing	 liberal	convictions	still	comparatively	numerous,	the	less	are	these	people	yet	prepared	really	to	re-examine	their	own	conviction…”	Contrary	to	Rappard’s	claims,	Hayek	found	that	“in	those	countries	which	either	had	actually	experienced	a	completely	totalitarian	 regime	 or	 closely	 approached	 it,	 a	 few	 men	 had	 through	 their	experiences	 gained	 a	 clearer	 conception	 of	 the	 conditions	 and	 value	 of	 a	 free	society.”	 Thus	 Hayek	 offered	 a	 somewhat	 different	 view	 to	 Rappard	 on	 the	question	of	which	liberals	from	which	geographical	contexts	would	have	the	most	to	offer	in	the	coming	reinvention	of	their	creed:	“…	the	wisdom	is	not	all	on	one	side	 and	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 actual	 decay	 of	 a	 civilization	 has	 taught	 some	independent	thinkers	on	the	European	Continent	lessons	which	I	believe	have	yet	to	be	learnt	in	England	and	America	if	these	countries	are	to	avoid	a	similar	fate”.	
                                            4	Mirowski,	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste,	71.	
  170 
Dekker	has	argued	that	Viennese	intellectuals	based	their	response	to	the	volatile	situation	of	the	interwar	years	on	the	experience	of	seeing	the	Habsburg	empire	dissolve,	and	their	dreams	of	a	liberal	empire	with	it.5	They	felt	they	were	witness	to	the	same	development	happening	twice,	and	here	we	see	Hayek	claiming	that	the	same	things	that	had	happened	in	Europe	could	happen	in	America,	and	that	European	liberals	were	thus	well	equipped	to	council	their	American	allies.		The	dominance	of	economists	over	other	professions	and	background	must	have	been	obvious	to	everyone	attending,	yet	Hayek	waxed	lyrical	on	the	importance	and	 fruitfulness	 of	 discussions	 between	 economists	 like	 himself	 and	 lawyers,	historians	 and	 political	 philosophers.	 Referring	 to	 the	 first	 aspect	 of	 the	 dual	argument,	 he	 contended	 that	 economists	 had	 learned	 how	 to	 “discover	 all	 the	beliefs	which	are	part	and	parcel	of	that	movement	that	leads	to	totalitarianism”,	but	he	was	quick	to	add	that	they	could	not	be	sure	that	they	did	not	“as	uncritically	as	any	one	else	accept,	under	the	influence	of	the	atmosphere	of	our	time,	ideas	in	the	 field	 of	 history	 or	 philosophy,	 morals	 or	 law	 which	 belong	 to	 the	 same	movement	which	we	oppose	in	our	field.”	The	lesson	seemed	to	be	that	scholars	of	history	and	philosophy	might	be	able	to	detect	aspects	of	collectivism,	rationalism,	false	individualism	constructivism	or	any	of	the	other	diseases	Hayek	had	analysed	as	leading	to	totalitarianism	that	economists	might	both	miss	and	even	incorporate	into	their	own	thinking	without	being	aware	of	it.			After	apologizing	for	the	“embarrassing	nature”	of	having	to	decide	who	was	to	be	invited	to	the	conference,	Hayek	stressed	how	“it	is	not	sufficient	that	our	members	should	have	what	used	to	be	called	 ‘sound’	views’”,	alluding	to	some	assumedly	well-known	 standard	 of	 right-leaning	 political	 orientation,	with	 the	 implication	that	this	was	no	longer	sufficient:	“What	we	need	are	people	who	have	faced	the	arguments	 from	 the	 other	 side,	 who	 have	 struggled	 with	 them	 and	 fought	
                                            5	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	132.	
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themselves	 through	 to	 a	 position	 from	which	 they	 can	 both	 critically	meet	 the	objection	against	it	and	justify	their	views.”	This	was	a	time	to	be	highly	analytical,	critical	and	innovative	if	the	reinvention	of	liberalism	was	to	be	successful.	Hayek	then	went	on	to	acknowledge	and	apologize	for	the	imbalance	between	economists	and	other	professions,	blaming	in	part	his	personal	contacts,	but	also	suggesting	yet	 again	 that	 “economists	are	perhaps	more	generally	aware	of	 the	 immediate	dangers	and	of	the	urgency	of	the	intellectual	problems	which	we	must	solve	if	we	are	to	have	a	chance	to	direct	the	movement	in	a	more	desirable	direction.”	Hayek	wanted	to	expand	neoliberalism,	but	to	his	mind	there	was	no	doubt	that	his	creed	grew	out	of	the	field	of	economics:	the	critique	of	socialism	developed	through	the	socialist	calculation	debates	and	the	underlying	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity.	 According	 to	 Hayek	 “not	 a	 single	 one	 of	 all	 those	 to	 whom	 I	 sent	invitations	did	not	express	his	sympathies	with	the	aim	of	the	Conference”,	and	he	then	went	on	to	list	26	people	who	had	not	been	able	to	attend.	The	list	included	Walter	Lippmann,	Alexander	Rüstow	and	Jaques	Rueff,	who	were	all	present	at	the	1938	 colloquium	 in	 Paris.	 He	 then	 expressed	 sorrow	 at	 the	 deaths	 of	 Chicago	economist	Henry	Simons,	who	it	is	now	known	committed	suicide	in	the	summer	of	1946;6	Sir	John	Clapham,	who	preceded	over	the	meeting	at	Cambridge	in	1944	in	which	Hayek	first	laid	out	his	plans	for	a	transnational	organization	to	reinvent	liberalism;	and	the	young	French	economist	Etienne	Mantoux	who	was	killed	 in	action	only	eight	days	before	the	German	capitulation	on	7	May,	1945.	Continuing	with	 housekeeping	 items,	 Hayek	 noted	 that	 although	 some	 journalists	 were	 in	attendance,	“I	think	this	should	be	regarded	as	a	private	meeting	and	all	that	is	said	here	in	the	discussion	as	“off	the	record”	as	the	American	term	is.”			Hayek	 then	 laid	 out	 the	 program	 of	 the	 first	 week,	 noting	 first	 that	 the	 same	evenings	session	entitled	“’Free	Enterprise’	or	Competitive	Order”,	“seems	to	be	much	the	biggest	and	in	some	ways	the	most	important…	It	is	the	field	where	it	is	
                                            6	Robert	Van	Horn,	‘Henry	Simons’	Death’,	History	of	Political	Economy	46,	no.	3	(2014):	525–35.	
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most	important	that	we	should	become	clear	in	our	own	minds,	and	arrive	at	an	agreement	about	the	kind	of	programme	of	economic	policy	which	we	should	wish	to	see	generally	accepted.”	This	was	the	key	session	as	far	as	Hayek	was	concerned,	and	 he	 continued:	 “Its	 ramifications	 are	 practically	 endless,	 as	 an	 adequate	treatment	involves	a	complete	programme	of	a	liberal	economic	policy.”	It	seems	clear	that	Hayek	was	perfectly	aware	that	the	dual	argument	as	an	attack	on	both	new	liberalism	and	laissez-faire	liberalism	implied	a	serious	reconceptualization	of	liberal	thought	for	the	modern,	post-war	world.	This	reinvention	was	the	most	important	topic	of	debate,	and	he	wanted	to	set	the	conference	off	on	this	path	by	discussing	 it	 in	 the	 very	 first	 session	 that	 same	 evening.	 After	 alluding	 to	 the	session	on	historiography,	Hayek	segued	into	a	comment	on	how	the	liberal	creed	had	“contained	many	elements	which	on	the	one	hand	led	many	of	its	adherents	directly	 into	 the	 folds	 of	 socialism	 or	 nationalism	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand	antagonised	many	who	shared	the	basic	values	of	individual	freedom…”	This	was	part	of	Hayek’s	attack	on	social	liberalism	and	his	purging	of	the	false	individualism	he	 thought	 led	 to	 collectivism	 and	 socialism.	 He	 referred	 to	 it	 as	 the	 “false	rationalism,	which	gained	influence	in	the	French	Revolution	and	which	during	the	past	hundred	years	has	exercised	its	influence	mainly	through	the	twin	movements	of	 Positivism	 and	 Hegelianism.”	 According	 to	 Hayek,	 this	 had	 led	 to	 a	 “breach	between	true	liberal	and	religious	convictions…”	and	he	claimed	there	would	be	“no	hope	 for	a	revival	of	 liberal	 forces”	 if	 this	breach	was	not	healed	by	a	more	epistemologically	modest	reinvention	of	liberalism.	This	alluded	to	Wednesday’s	session	on	“Liberalism	and	Christianity”,	and	Hayek	then	made	only	brief	remarks	on	 the	 importance	 of	 Thursday’s	 sessions	 on	 the	 future	 of	 Germany	 and	 the	prospects	of	European	federation:	“problems	of	such	immediate	urgency	that	no	international	 group	 of	 students	 of	 politics	 should	 meet	 without	 considering	them…”	Before	turning	to	his	final	remarks,	Hayek	regretted	not	having	been	able	to	organize	a	session	on	the	meaning	of	the	Rule	of	Law,	a	theme	dear	to	his	heart	
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in	 his	 subsequent	 work	 on	 the	 proper	 legal	 framework	 for	 a	 modern,	 market	society.7		There	followed	some	remarks	on	the	formal	organization	of	the	meeting.		Dorothy	Hahn	would	be	keeping	minutes	of	what	Hayek	referred	to	as	“the	business	part	of	our	discussions”	and	English	would	be	the	main	language.	This	indicated	its	rising	status	on	the	international	scene,	but	also	the	simple	fact	that	Hayek	himself	did	not	speak	French.	He	also	commented	on	the	societies	future	efforts	at	recruitment,	insisting	that	a	future,	permanent	organization	“must	remain	a	closed	society,	not	open	 to	 all	 and	 sundry,	 but	 only	 people	 who	 share	 with	 us	 certain	 common	convictions…	whatever	permanent	body	we	form	(it)	must	be	a	closed	society.”	If	membership	 could	 be	 acquired	 by	 election,	 it	 would	 give	 the	 organization	 the	character	of	 “Academy”,	Hayek	 thought,	 and	 to	 this	day	applications	 to	 join	 the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	must	be	supported	by	two	current	members	of	the	society.8	Hayek	 then	 commented	 on	 possible	 difficulties	 of	 getting	 financing	 for	 a	permanent	 transnational	organization	without	 “any	strings	or	conditions	of	any	sort	being	attached	to	 the	offer”,	expressing	gratitude	to	Hunold	 for	making	the	Swiss	 funds	 available	 and	 to	 Luhnow	 of	 the	William	 Volker	 Charities	 Trust	 in	Kansas	City.	Finally,	he	expressed	that	he	would	wait	until	the	group	had	become	better	acquainted	with	any	further	practical	tasks	and	“any	attempt	to	justify	the	name	which	I	have	tentatively	suggested.”	He	finished:	“For	now	we	are	just	the	Mont	Pèlerin	Conference	to	which	you	will	have	to	give	your	own	laws	and	whose	procedure	and	destiny	is	now	entirely	in	your	hands.”		
Hayek	peeling	oranges	After	Rappard’s	and	Hayek’s	welcome	speeches,	there	was	a	break	until	2.30	pm	for	 the	 afternoon	 and	 evening	 session.	 The	 catering	 at	 the	 conference	 was	
                                            7	See	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty;	Hayek,	Law,	Legislation	and	Liberty.	8	The	application	is	then	considered	by	a	Membership	Committee,	which	makes	a	recommendation	to	a	Board	of	Directors.	https://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/join.html	
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remembered	by	Dorothy	Hahn	as	being	“very	fancy”	for	a	young	woman	arriving	from	 bombed	 out	 London.	 There	 was	 still	 rationing	 in	 much	 of	 England	 and	continental	 Europe,	 and	 the	 latter	 was	 badly	 affected	 by	 famine.	 Mrs.	 Hahn	remembers	vividly	how,	 in	 the	 luxurious	Hotel	du	Parc,	 there	were	oranges	 for	lunch	one	day,	but	that	she	was	unable	to	peel	them	as	she	had	never	in	her	life	had	one	before.	Hayek	peeled	two	oranges	for	her	at	the	table,	something	which	caused	Dorothy	Hahn	great	embarrassment.9	I	believe	that	this	brief	image	of	the	famous	Austrian	economist	peeling	oranges	for	his	embarrassed	English	secretary	tells	us	quite	a	lot.	Hahn	was	a	bright	student	of	Hayek,	and	as	a	woman	she	was	therefore	singled	out	to	become	his	secretary.	Later	in	life	she	would	work	as	the	secretary	of	her	husband,	 the	 famous	economist	Frank	Hahn,	and	do	secretarial	work	 for	other	economists.10	The	“girlish”	embarrassment	she	felt,	and	her	position	at	the	conference	as	a	secretary	instead	of	as	a	bright	young	economist	speaks	volumes	about	gender	relations	at	 the	time.	The	orange11	also	speaks	of	Europe	 in	1947,	where	devastating	war	had	made	something	as	simple	as	oranges,	which	had	been	imported	to	England	for	over	a	century,12	a	rare	delicacy	that	a	nineteen-year-old	woman	had	never	tasted.	 In	the	Swiss	alps	 in	1947,	Dorothy	Hahn’s	forty-eight-year-old	Austrian	boss	of	aristocratic	descent	must	have	seemed	simultaneously	like	a	ghost	from	the	past	and	a	guide	to	the	new	world	in	which	she	found	herself.	As	we	will	see	in	Chapter	6,	1947	was	very	much	seen	as	a	new	beginning,	and	the	neoliberals	at	Mont	Pélerin	were	eager	to	create	a	new	liberalism	for	a	new	time.	Yet	 they	kept	 referring	 to	past	 thinkers,	 and	a	 certain	aristocratic	privilege	and	
                                            9	Interview	with	Dorothy	Hahn,	Cambridge,	21.12.2015	10	Ibid.	11	More	extensive	attempts	at	studying	history	through	foodstuffs	include	E.C.	Spary,	
Eating	the	Enlightenment:	Food	and	the	Sciences	in	Paris,	1670	-	1760	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2012).	And	Steven	Shapin’s	musings	on	“the	epistemology	of	the	pineapple”	in	Steven	Shapin,	‘Changing	Tastes:	How	Foods	Tasted	in	the	Early	Modern	Period	and	How	They	Taste	Now’	(The	Hans	Rausing	Lecture	2011,	Uppsala	University,	n.d.).	12	June	Young	Choi,	‘The	Introduction	of	Tropical	Flavours	into	British	Cuisine,	1850-1950’,	in	Research	Paper,	AP	European	History	Class,	2009,	https://www.zum.de/whkmla/sp/0910/chef/chef2.html.	
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nostalgia	for	things	past	always	stayed	with	them	in	their	conflicted	attempts	to	reinvent	liberalism.		
“Free”	Enterprise	or	Competitive	Order	Hayek	began	his	second	address	of	the	day	with	a	strong	attack	on	his	own	political	camp,	the	political	right.	The	movement	towards	planning,	he	claimed,	was	“due,	more	than	anything	else,	to	the	lack	of	a	real	program,	or	perhaps	I	had	better	say,	a	consistent	philosophy	of	the	opposition	groups”.13	Conservatives	were	guilty	of	double	standards	he	thought,	since	groups	that	pretended	to	oppose	socialism	also	gave	support	to	policies	of	government	intervention	when	this	was	believed	to	be	to	their	own	advantage.	“…	the	pretending	defenders	of	‘free	enterprise’	are	in	fact	defenders	of	privileges	and	advocates	of	government	activity	in	their	favour	rather	than	opponents	of	all	privilege”,	he	said.	Here	Hayek	was	rehearsing	an	argument	he	would	repeat	for	the	rest	of	his	life:	the	insistence	that	his	ideas	from	The	Road	
to	Serfdom	were	not	intended	to	defend	the	privileges	of	big	businesses,	but	instead	a	principled	attack	on	all	government	planning	and	state	involvement	in	economic	affairs.	The	great	danger	in	what	he	saw	as	business	conservatives’	misinformed	embrace	of	his	ideas	was	that	“once	the	principle	is	admitted	that	the	government	undertakes	 responsibility	 for	 the	 status	 and	 position	 of	 particular	 groups,	 it	 is	inevitable	 that	 this	 control	 will	 be	 extended	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aspirations	 and	prejudices	of	the	great	masses.”	He	was	of	course	referring	to	the	welfare	states	that	had	developed	in	the	US	and	Europe	during	the	interwar	years,	and	were	now	being	expanded	significantly.14	This	fear	of	“the	masses”	demanding	a	decent	life	from	modern	states	is	a	recurring	and	very	important	theme	in	the	arguments	of	early	 neoliberals	 from	 various	 camps.	 The	 ordoliberals	 largely	 agreed	with	 the	analysis	 of	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 and	 argued	 that	 a	 state	 which	 starts	 to	 feed	 “special	interests”	would	become	a	weak	state.	That	afternoon,	however,	Hayek’s	spirited	attack	was	also	launched	against	conservatives	and	capital	interests:	“There	is	no	
                                            13	Liberaal	Archief,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	1,	Folder	1	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”	14	See	for	instance	Rodgers,	Atlantic	Crossings.	
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hope	of	a	return	to	a	freer	system	until	the	leaders	of	the	movement	against	state	control	 are	 prepared	 first	 to	 impose	 upon	 themselves	 that	 discipline	 of	 a	competitive	market	which	they	ask	the	masses	to	accept.”	Hayek	claimed	that	“no	organized	political	group	anywhere	is	in	favour	of	a	truly	free	system”,	and	urged	his	allies	to	think	beyond	“fixed	limits	of	practicability	imposed	by	public	opinion.”			Hayek	then	went	on	to	claim	that	“Public	opinion	on	these	matters	is	the	work	of	men	like	ourselves”,	quoting	from	Keynes’	famous	words	on	the	power	of	economic	ideas.	 The	 paragraph	 from	 Keynes’	 General	 Theory	 on	 how	 men	 in	 power	 are	merely	 reproducing	 ideas	 of	 “some	 economic	 scribbler	 decades	 earlier”	 was	reproduced	by	Hayek	both	in	this	speech,	and	in	a	famous	1949	essay	entitled	“The	Intellectuals	and	Socialism”.	It	has	gone	on	to	inspire	the	narrative	structure	of	a	great	number	of	books	and	articles	on	neoliberalism.15	The	full	quote	referred	to	by	Hayek	is	as	follows:		 “Practical	men	who	 believe	 themselves	 to	 be	 quite	 exempt	 from	 any	 intellectual	 influence,	 are	usually	the	slaves	of	some	defunct	economist.	Madmen	in	authority,	who	hear	voices	in	the	air,	are	distilling	their	frenzy	from	some	academic	scribbler	of	a	few	years	back.	I	am	sure	that	the	power	of	vested	interests	is	vastly	exaggerated	compared	with	the	gradual	encroachment	of	ideas.	Not,	indeed,	 immediately,	 but	 after	 a	 certain	 interval;	 for	 in	 the	 field	 of	 economic	 and	 political	philosophy	there	are	not	many	who	are	influenced	by	new	theories	after	they	are	twenty-five	or	thirty	years	of	age,	so	that	the	ideas	which	civil	servants	and	politicians	and	even	agitators	apply	to	current	events	are	not	 likely	to	be	the	newest.	But,	soon	or	 late,	 it	 is	 ideas,	not	vested	 interests,	which	are	dangerous	for	good	or	evil.”16		Hayek	claimed	that	it	was	from	this	“long	run	point	of	view,	that	we	must	look	at	our	task”,	a	remark	which	lends	some	credibility	to	the	idea	that	the	men	gathered	at	Mont	Pèlerin	really	succeeded	in	changing	the	world.	Although	heavily	funded	by	capital	interests,	their	ideas	were	out	of	favour	in	policy	circles	at	that	time.	As	we	will	discuss	in	the	conclusion,	however,	they	were	later	embraced	in	various	ways	in	several	different	places	across	the	world.	Hayek	hinted	at	the	long	road	ahead	by	exclaiming	that	the	general	public	at	his	time	of	speaking	was	“to	some	
                                            15	See	for	instance	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe;	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion.	16	John	Maynard	Keynes,	The	General	Theory	of	Employment,	Interest	and	Money	(Hinsdale:	Dryden	Press,	1965),	383–84.	
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extent	entirely	beyond	the	scope	of	reasoning”	–	a	remarkable	comment	indicating	just	how	little	faith	Hayek	had	in	popular	democracy.	Nonetheless,	Hayek	said	that	the	hard	task	ahead	needed	“to	show	that	the	aims	which	our	generation	has	set	itself	 are	 incompatible	 or	 conflicting,	 and	 that	 the	pursuit	 of	 some	of	 them	will	endanger	even	greater	values….	I	believe	very	careful	distinctions	will	have	to	be	drawn	 between	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 security	 and	 equality	 can	 and	 cannot	 be	provided	in	a	free	society.”	Once	again,	we	see	very	clearly	that	it	was	the	rise	of	democracy,	socialism	and	the	welfare	state	which	caused	such	momentous	concern	for	Hayek	and	his	fellow	neoliberals.	By	“security”	and	“equality”	he	would	have	been	referring	to	popular	policies	of	economic	redistribution	and	social	security,	but	he	claimed	that	these	goals	were	simply	not	compatible	with	neoliberal	ideals	of	a	free	and	open	society.		Then	came	the	second,	often	overlooked	aspect	of	the	dual	argument:	the	attack	on	laissez-faire.	Hayek	called	 it	 “the	most	 fatal	 tactical	mistake	of	many	nineteenth	century	 liberals”	 to	 have	 “given	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 abandonment	 of	 all	harmful	 or	 unnecessary	 state	 activity	 was	 the	 consummation	 of	 all	 political	wisdom…”	and	“that	the	question	of	how	[Hayek's	emphasis]	the	state	ought	to	use	those	powers	nobody	denied	to	it	offered	no	serious	and	important	problems	on	which	 reasonable	 people	 could	 differ.”	 This	 was	 where	 laissez-faire	 had	 failed	miserably:	the	state	existed,	and	it	was	powerful.	Too	powerful	for	Hayek’s	liking,	yet	that	did	not	mean	that	liberalism	was	only	about	fighting	the	state.	Instead	it	had	to	become	a	theory	also	of	how	to	best	use	the	state	for	liberal	ends.	He	then	quoted	 John	Stuart	Mill’s	Political	Economy,	written	while	Mill	was	what	Hayek	referred	to	as	 “still	a	 true	 liberal”.	There,	Mill	 	had	claimed	that	 the	principle	of	private	property	had	never	had	a	fair	trial	in	any	country,	and	Hayek	went	on	to	lament	how	Mill	had	become	a	socialist,	giving	up	on	private	property	and	turning	“his	attention	to	schemes	involving	its	restriction	or	abolition	rather	than	its	more	effective	use,	thus	abandoning	the	noble	cause	of	making	pure	private	property	the	
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basis	of	a	modern	society.”17	Within	a	few	minutes	then,	Hayek	had	both	stated	that	this	new	creed	was	a	principled	creed	not	to	be	mistaken	for	a	defence	of	privileges,	but	 also	 that	 the	principle	 of	 private	property	was	what	 lay	 at	 its	 heart.	Hayek	further	claimed	that	liberalism	was	not	the	absence	of	state	activity,	rather:			 “a	policy	which	deliberately	adopts	competition,	the	market	and	prices	as	its	ordering	principle	and	uses	 the	 legal	 framework	 enforced	 by	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	make	 competition	 as	 effective	 and	beneficial	as	possible	–	and	to	supplement	it	where,	and	only	where,	it	cannot	be	made	effective.”			The	 question	 Hayek	wanted	 to	 discuss	 then,	 was	 the	 principles	 behind	 exactly	when	 competition	 needed	 to	 be	 “supplemented”,	 and	 how	–	what	 kind	 of	 legal	framework	should	be	adopted	to	make	it	as	efficient	as	possible?	“Competition	can	be	made	more	effective	and	more	beneficent	by	certain	activities	of	government”,	he	stated.	The	 laissez-faire	or	 “Manchester-liberal”	notion	of	a	night-watch-man	state	 was	 thus	 incomplete,	 he	 thought,	 claiming	 that	 “Where	 the	 traditional	discussion	 becomes	 so	 unsatisfactory	 is	 where	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 with	 the	recognition	of	the	principles	of	private	property	and	freedom	of	contract,	which	indeed	every	liberal	must	recognise,	all	the	issues	were	settled…	It	is	only	after	we	have	agreed	on	these	principles	that	the	real	problems	begin.”	Hayek	referred	to	his	 title	 for	 the	 session	 “’Free’	Enterprise	or	Competitive	Order”,	 venturing	 that	“The	two	names	do	not	necessarily	designate	the	same	system	and	it	is	the	system	described	by	the	second	which	we	want”.	Interestingly	however,	when	this	lecture	was	printed	as	part	of	the	publication	Individualism	and	Economic	Order	(1948),	Hayek	 changed	 the	 title	 from	 “Free	 Enterprise	 or	 Competitive	Order”,	 to	 a	 less	provocative	 “Free	 Enterprise	 and	 Competitive	 Order”.18	 In	 its	 original	 form	however,	Hayek’s	 lecture	clearly	stated	 that	 “free”	enterprise	and	a	competitive	
                                            17	Hayek	later	developed	what	John	Gray	has	called	“an	obsession”	with	John	Stuart	Mill	and	his	relationship	with	Harriet	Taylor.	He	collected	their	letters	to	each	other	and	concluded	in	an	article	that	it	must	had	been	Taylor	who	turned	Mill	away	from	“true	liberalism”.	John	Gray,	‘How	Friedrich	Hayek	Became	Fascinated	with	the	Romance	of	Harriet	Taylor	and	J	S	Mill’,	New	Statesman,	28	May	2015.	18	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	107–19.	
  179 
order	 were	 two	 completely	 different	 things.	 The	 attack	 on	 laissez-faire	 was	obvious.		In	a	striking	example	of	how	different	the	general	view	on	government	provided	services	was	in	1947	from	what	it	is	now,	Hayek	then	went	on	to	state	that	“in	a	modern	community	(a)	considerable	number	of	services	which	are	needed,	such	as	sanitary	and	health	services…	could	not	possibly	be	provided	by	the	market	for	the	obvious	reason	that	no	price	can	be	charged	to	the	beneficiaries.”	Part	of	his	attack	on	laissez-faire	did	include	the	admission	that	some	services	would	have	to	be	run	by	the	public,	and	he	seemed	unable	to	imagine	that	there	could	be	a	market	in	health	services.	Little	did	he	know	that	people	like	Milton	Friedman,	who	was	present,	and	later	society	members	and	presidents	would	go	on	to	promulgate	the	very	 view	 that	 markets	 were	 indeed	 also	 much	 better	 than	 governments	 at	providing	virtually	any	service,	including	sanitary	and	health	services.	There	is	a	growing	tendency	to	describe	Hayek	as	some	sort	of	soft	neoliberal,	or	to	describe	early	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 moderate	 third	 way	 between	 laissez-faire	 and	 social	democracy.19	I	will	argue	in	the	conclusion	that	this	would	be	a	mistake,	as	it	is	the	very	logic	of	state	enforced	efficient	markets	that	Hayek	and	the	early	neoliberals	pioneered	 which	 made	 the	 subsequent	 attacks	 on	 public	 financing	 and	 the	marketization	of	public	services	a	possibility.	In	1947,	it	was	impossible	for	Hayek	to	even	imagine	how	successful	this	new	way	of	thinking	about	the	role	of	markets	and	states	in	the	modern	world	would	actually	be.	Thus	his	repeated	claims	in	the	1940s	 that	 some	 services	 must	 be	 public	 and	 that	 a	 social	 safety	 net	 must	 be	provided	was	 not	 a	matter	 of	 Hayek	 being	moderate;	 rather	 it	 shows	 both	 the	degree	to	which	his	view	was	on	the	defensive	at	the	time,	so	that	some	concessions	had	to	be	made	to	the	opposing	view.	Hayek	insisted:	“At	some	stage	or	other	we	shall	certainly	have	to	consider	which	services	of	this	kind	we	must	always	expect	the	governments	to	provide	outside	the	market	[Hayek’s	emphasis]and	how	far	the	
                                            19	See	for	instance	David	Sloan	Wilson,	‘The	Road	to	Ideology.	How	Friedrich	Hayek	Became	a	Monster’,	Evonomics,	2015,	http://evonomics.com/the-road-to-ideology-how-friedrich-hayek-became-a-monster/.	
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fact	 that	 they	 must	 do	 so	 will	 also	 affect	 the	 conditions	 on	 which	 the	 market	economy	proceeds.”	 Public	 services	 paid	 for	 through	 taxation,	 but	 operated	 for	profits	by	private	 companies	 competing	 in	 specially	designed	markets	was	well	beyond	even	the	neoliberal	imagination	in	1947.		Hayek	went	on	to	urge	the	participants	again	to	“above	all	beware	of	the	error	that	the	 formulae	 ‘private	 property’	 and	 ‘freedom	 of	 contract’	 solve	 our	 problems.”	Hayek	wanted	more	nuance,	stating	that	“Our	problems	begin	when	we	ask	what	ought	 to	be	 the	contents	of	property	rights”,	and	made	specific	reference	 to	 the	issues	of	land	ownership	and	modern	cities:			 “the	simple	rules	which	are	adequate	to	ordinary	mobile	 ‘things’	or	 ‘chattel’	are	not	suitable	 for	indefinite	 extension…	 Unless	 we	 can	 provide	 some	 guidance	 in	 fields	 like	 this	 about	 what	 are	legitimate	or	necessary	government	activities	and	what	are	its	limits	we	must	not	complain	if	our	views	are	not	taken	seriously	when	we	oppose	other	kinds	of	less	justified	‘planning’”.			He	proceeded	to	talk	about	the	prevention	of	monopoly,	and	wanted	specifically	to	talk	 about	 “inventions,	 copyright,	 trademarks	 and	 the	 like”.	 To	 Hayek	 it	 was	“beyond	doubt	that	in	these	fields	a	slavish	application	of	the	concept	of	property	as	 it	has	been	developed	 for	material	 things	has	done	a	great	deal	 to	 foster	 the	growth	 of	 monopoly	 and	 that	 here	 very	 drastic	 reforms	 may	 be	 required	 if	competitions	is	to	be	made	to	work”.	Note	again	the	core	idea	that	competition	can	be	“made	to	work”	by	drastic	reforms.	As	we	have	seen,	this	was	a	line	Hayek	very	much	 shared	 with	 the	 German	 ordoliberals.20	 Hayek	 thought	 of	 patents	 as	“particularly	interesting	from	our	point	of	view	because	they	provide	so	clear	an	illustration	how	 it	 is	 necessary	 in	 all	 such	 instances	not	 to	 apply	 a	 ready	made	formula	but	to	go	back	to	the	rationale	[Hayek’s	emphasis]	of	the	market	system	and	to	decide	for	each	class	what	the	precise	rights	are	to	be	which	the	government	ought	 to	 protect.”	 This	 is	 another	 key	 formulation	 of	Hayek’s	 project:	 trying	 to	restate	liberalism	for	a	new	world	that	was	very	different	from	that	out	of	which	it	
                                            20	Robert	Van	Horn,	‘Reinventing	Monopoly	and	the	Role	of	Corporations:	The	Roots	of	Chicago	Law	and	Economics’,	in	The	Road	from	Mont	Pelerin	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009),	204–38.	
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grew.	The	way	to	do	this	for	Hayek	involved	trying	to	understand	what	he	called	the	rationale	of	the	market	system	and	thus	somehow	channel	how	these	thinkers	would	have	thought	had	they	been	alive,	and	how	they	would	have	applied	their	principles	to	radically	different	circumstances.			Hayek	 then	went	on	 to	 talk	of	 freedom	of	 contract.	Echoing	Walter	Lippmann’s	remarks	from	The	Good	Society,	he	stated	that	“’Freedom	of	contract’	is	in	fact	no	solution	because	in	a	complex	society	like	ours	no	contract	can	explicitly	provide	against	all	contingencies…	the	precise	content	of	the	permanent	legal	framework,	the	 rules	 of	 civil	 law,	 are	 of	 the	 greatest	 importance	 for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 a	competitive	market	will	operate”,	he	 said,	 lamenting	also	 that	 “little	 intellectual	effort	has	been	directed	to	the	question	in	what	way	this	legal	framework	should	be	modified,	to	make	competition	more	effective.”	Stefan	Kolev’s	contention	that	Hayek	 at	 this	 point	 was	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 second	 phase	 of	 his	 intellectual	development,	in	which	he	was	an	ordoliberal	philosopher	focused	on	the	“traffic	rules”	of	the	market	system,	seems	to	hold	true	for	his	interventions	at	the	1947	meeting.21	 He	 proclaimed	 that	 corporation	 laws	 regarding	 limited	 liability	 had	“greatly	assisted	the	growth	of	monopoly”,	to	the	point	where	“size	of	enterprise	has	become	an	advantage	beyond	the	point	where	it	is	justified	by	technological	facts”.	 Unlike	 the	 American	 Supreme	 Court,	 who	 in	 the	 landmark	 2010	 ruling	
Citizens	 United	 vs.	 FEC	 awarded	 corporations	 the	 same	 rights	 as	 individuals,22	Hayek	stated	“It	seems	to	me	that	in	general	the	freedom	of	the	individual	by	no	means	 need	 be	 extended	 to	 give	 all	 these	 freedoms	 to	 organised	 groups	 of	individuals”.		So	far,	Hayek	had	“spoken	only	of	what	is	required	to	make	competition	effective	on	the	side	of	employers…”	in	order	for	them	“to	put	their	own	house	in	order”.	However,	he	was	quite	clear	that	that	“we	must	not	delude	ourselves	that	in	many	
                                            21	Kolev,	‘F.A.	Hayek	as	an	Ordo-Liberal’.	22	Brown,	Undoing	the	Demos	-	Neoliberalism’s	Stealth	Revolution,	154–73.	
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ways	 the	most	 crucial,	 the	most	difficult	 and	 the	most	delicate	part	 of	 our	 task	consists	in	formulating	an	appropriate	programme	of	labour	or	trade	union	policy”.	Here	 liberals	 had	 failed	 and	 ended	 up	 legalizing	 “violence,	 coercion	 and	intimidation”,	 by	which	 he	 presumably	meant	 unions	 and	 organized	 labour.	 “If	there	is	to	be	any	hope	of	a	return	to	a	free	economy	the	question	how	the	powers	of	trade	unions	can	be	appropriately	limited	in	law	as	well	as	in	fact	is	one	of	the	most	important	of	all	the	questions	to	which	we	must	give	our	attention.”	Hayek	was,	however,	running	out	of	time	at	this	point	and	had	to	abandon	his	broadside	against	labour	power	and	hurriedly	moved	on	to	taxation,	stating	that	there	were	two	serious	consequences	of	what	he	called	present	societies’	“extreme	egalitarian	ends”.	One	being	that	it	was	“practically	impossible	for	the	successful	man	to	rise	by	accumulating	a	fortune”,	the	other	being	one	related	to	inheritance	tax.	Hayek	would	later	pen	philosophical	treaties	defending	inheritance,23	but	for	now	he	had	to	conclude	that	“there	are	many	other	important	problems	which	I	have	not	even	mentioned”,	acknowledging	that	it	was	indeed	“too	wide	a	field	to	treat	the	whole	of	 it	 adequately	 even	 if	 we	 could	 devote	 the	 whole	 of	 these	 ten	 days	 to	 its	discussion.”24		
Support	from	Freiburg	and	Chicago	Professor	Aaron	Director	gave	a	second	introduction,25	where	he	stated	that	there	had	been	a	steady	shift	from	individualism	to	authority	in	economic	life	for	over	
                                            23	See	the	essay	“Equality,	Value	and	Merit”,	published	in	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	
Liberty,	85–102.	24	The	version	of	Hayek’s	manuscript	kept	at	The	Liberal	Archive	in	Gent	is	different	from	the	one	kept	at	the	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives.	In	the	former,	there	are	long	sections	entitled	”ASSOCIATIONS”,	”MONETARY	STABILIZATION”	and	”EQUALITY”	before	the	speech	closes	off.	This	version	is	also	gathered	from	somewhere	at	the	Hoover	Institution,	albeit	not	in	the	box	related	to	the	archives	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	which	contains	the	shortened	version.	It	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	shortened	version	was	the	one	Hayek	presented	at	the	conference	and	thus	I	have	limited	my	treatment	to	that.	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”	25	There	is	no	manuscript	available	for	Director’s	intervention	and	it	was	not	recorded	exactly	verbatim	by	Mrs.	Hahn.	I	have	therefore	chosen	to	paraphrase	the	various	interventions,	instead	of	writing	them	as	quotations	in	quotation	marks,	even	though	
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two	generations.	At	 first	 it	had	been	gradual,	 and	state	 interference	had	mainly	been	 a	 response	 to	 the	 humanitarian	 tradition	 of	 liberalism.	 Director	was	 here	referring	 to	 the	rise	of	 social	 liberalism,	described	 in	Chapter	2,	and	 it	 could	be	argued	that	it	was	this	“humanitarian	tradition	of	liberalism”	that	the	neoliberals	sought	to	purge.	Director	said	that	he	found	that	the	shift	was	now	part	of	a	definite	design	to	adopt	an	entirely	different	type	of	economic	organization,	in	many	ways	reprising	Hayek’s	argument	about	the	collectivist	nature	of	social	liberalism,	and	pointing	to	the	overlaps	between	socialism	and	social	liberalism	in	the	preceding	century.	Director	offered	three	explanations	for	this.	One	was	a	change	in	what	he	called	“basic	beliefs”,	where	individual	freedom	no	longer	commanded	the	support	it	 once	 did,	 and	 order	 security	 and	 fixed	 status	 in	 life	 had	 become	 prevailing	objectives.	In	this	sense,	Director	argued,	the	free	competitive	market	was	being	abandoned	because	it	did	its	task	too	well,	and	thus	yielded	results	incompatible	with	 new	 moral	 values.	 The	 second	 explanation	 offered	 by	 Director	 was	 the	widespread	 opinion	 that	 competitive	 markets	 were	 no	 longer	 suited	 as	 an	organizing	 principle,	 this	 referred	 to	 the	 argument	 put	 forward	 by	 those	 who	claimed	 that	 socialism	was	 simply	 a	 more	 rational	 and	 efficient	 form	 of	 social	organization.	 The	 third	 explanation	 was	 the	 one	 Director	 took	 as	 the	 basis	 of	discussion:	that	the	destruction	of	the	competitive	order	was	a	direct	consequence	of	 the	 incomplete	 character	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 liberalism	 as	 developed	 in	 the	nineteenth	century,	which	provided	no	role	for	the	state	in	economic	life	beyond	that	 of	 enforcing	 contracts.	 Here	 Director	 was	 completely	 in	 line	 with	 Hayek,	claiming	that	liberals	had	had	no	solution	to	offer	derived	from	their	fundamental	philosophy	 since	 the	middle	of	 the	nineteenth	 century.	Director	 said	he	had	no	wish	to	minimise	the	harms	that	had	been	caused	by	current	state	intervention,	but	he	also	wanted	to	emphasise	that	the	intervention	had	its	root	in	real	problems	that	 could	 be	 eliminated	 only	 by	 offering	 better	 solutions.	 Thus	 Director,	 like	Hayek,	 advocated	 that	 the	 theory	 of	 liberalism	had	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 include	 a	
                                            parts	of	the	minutes	appear	as	full	sentences.	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”	
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prescription	of	the	role	of	the	state.	He	then	went	on	to	draw	three	lessons	that	this	reinvented	theory	of	liberalism	needed	to	be	based	on.	Firstly,	Director	said	it	was	apparent	 that	 free	 enterprise	 was	 indeed	 consistent	 with	 monopoly	 power.	Secondly	 it	 was	 apparent	 that	 a	 competitive	 system	 would	 allocate	 resources	effectively,	but	that	it	was	not	able	to	do	so	in	the	absence	of	stable	and	suitable	monetary	rules.	The	third	lesson	was	that	a	competitive	system	appeared	to	fall	short	of	meeting	what	he	called	the	democratic	standards	of	equality.	Director	thus	seemed	 to	 favour	 regulations	 to	 secure	 competition,	 monetary	 stability	 and	 a	certain	 form	 of	 social	 equality.	 After	 this,	 he	 claimed	 that	 the	 founders	 of	 19th	century	liberalism	served	the	cause	of	freedom	by	promoting	free	enterprise,	and	that	 the	 task	 ahead	 of	 modern	 day	 liberals	 would	 be	 to	 promote	 freedom	 by	promoting	 the	 dispersion	 of	 power	 necessary	 for	 a	 competitive	 order.	 The	founders	of	liberalism	endeavoured	to	minimize	the	coercive	powers	of	the	state,	he	said,	but	the	task	of	Director’s	day	would	be	to	redefine	the	role	of	the	state	in	order	to	prevent	the	assumption	of	this	power	by	organized	minority	occupational	groups,	referring	presumably	to	labour	unions.	Director	then	went	on	to	establish	three	fields	in	which	he	thought	state	action	was	required	to	make	the	competitive	order	work:	 the	 prevention	 of	monopolies,	 the	 control	 of	 combinations	 among	either	business	concerns	or	workers	and	 the	provision	of	monetary	stability.	 In	addition,	 he	mentioned	 the	problem	of	 inequality	 and	distress	 and	 the	possible	scope	 for	state	activity	 in	 the	redistribution	of	 income,	but	on	 this	 topic	he	was	more	ambiguous.			Walter	Eucken	also	held	what	was	intended	to	be	an	introduction,	but	after	Hayek’s	lengthy	 intervention	 and	 a	 slightly	 shorter	 one	 by	 Director,	 his	 brief	 remarks	appeared	 more	 as	 a	 comment.	 Eucken’s	 intervention	 centred	 on	 two	 remarks	about	monopoly.	The	content	of	his	 intervention	is	not	clear	 from	the	minutes	I	have	found,	but	in	a	section	in	the	article	“Reinventing	Monopoly	and	the	Role	of	Corporations”,	Robert	Van	Horn	reads	Director’s	introduction	at	the	1947	meeting	based	on	the	minutes	quoted	above,	and	he	also	makes	reference	to	Eucken’s	reply.		
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According	to	Van	Horn,	“Eucken	pointed	out	that	Director	erroneously	presumed	that	the	government	should	directly	address	the	monopoly	problem”.26	Van	Horn	further	writes:		 “Eucken	based	his	comment	on	a	key	premise	of	ordoliberalism:	The	autonomous	monopoly	office,	the	enforcer	of	competition	law	should	be	immune	from	political	influence	and	should	be	guided	in	assessment	with	established	legal	strictures.”27			The	definition	of	“government”	is	what	is	at	stake	in	Eucken’s	disagreement	with	Director.	The	ordoliberal	view	holds	that	the	enforcers	of	competition	law	should	be	outside	of	political	control.	Crucially,	it	would	still	be	a	structure	formed	by	the	state	 and	 meant	 to	 support	 markets,	 but	 it	 would	 be	 “immune	 from	 political	influence”.	 Eucken	 was	 thus	 chastising	 Director	 for	 assuming	 that	 liberal	 state	interventions	 to	ensure	a	competitive	market	society	would	somehow	be	at	 the	mercy	of	democracy.	That	was	not	the	point	of	the	strong,	ordoliberal	state.	Rather	its	 purpose	 was	 the	 precise	 opposite:	 to	 shield	markets	 from	 the	 pressures	 of	democracy.	The	main	point	of	Van	Horn’s	article	is	to	show	that	“despite	the	fact	that	 Director	 did	 not	 support	 an	 economic	 constitution	 and	 an	 independent	monopoly	office,	he	 shared	Eucken’s	disdain	 for	 concentrated	power	because	 it	undermined	 freedom.”28	 Despite	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 the	 “monopoly	 problem”	should	be	addressed	“directly”	by	government,	members	of	both	the	Freiburg	and	the	Chicago	school	shared	common	ground	on	the	importance	of	competition	law	and	 using	 the	 state	 to	 make	 markets	 more	 competitive.	 With	 the	 later	 rise	 of	Chicago	Law	and	Economics,	however,	the	Chicago	school	approach	to	this	would	change	 considerably.29	 The	 subsequent	 shifts	 in	 neoliberal	 doctrine	 will	 be	discussed	briefly	in	the	conclusion,	but	for	now	we	can	observe	that	in	1947,	the	
                                            26	Van	Horn,	‘Reinventing	Monopoly	and	the	Role	of	Corporations:	The	Roots	of	Chicago	Law	and	Economics’,	212.	27	Ibid.,	213.	28	Ibid.	29	Van	Horn,	‘Reinventing	Monopoly	and	the	Role	of	Corporations:	The	Roots	of	Chicago	Law	and	Economics’.	
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schools	 of	 Chicago	 and	 Freiburg	 were	 largely	 united	 in	 support	 for	 Hayek’s	revamping	of	liberalism	based	on	what	I	have	called	the	dual	argument.		
Discussion30	In	 the	 following	 discussion,	 Frank	 Graham	 said	 he	 found	 himself	 almost	 in	complete	agreement	with	Professor	Eucken,	but	wondered	whether	he	was	correct	to	have	said	that	natural	monopolies	would	be	handled	worse	when	taken	over	by	the	state.	According	to	him,	the	right	place	for	a	natural	monopoly	was	in	the	state;	the	significant	thing	being	that	the	profits	would	go	to	the	state,	something	which	he	thought	justified	the	existence	of	a	monopoly	price	as	opposed	to	a	market	price.	Hayek	 then	 took	 the	 floor	 again,	 attempting	 to	 clarify	 the	 difference	 between	 a	competitive	order	and	ordered	competition:	 the	 former	being	a	system	to	make	competition	 work,	 the	 latter	 something	 which	 on	 the	 contrary	 restricted	competition	from	working.	His	main	concern	would	be	to	make	the	market	work	where	it	can	work,	once	again	noting	that	there	were	some	services	that	could	not	be	made	subject	to	the	market	mechanism.	He	then	raised	the	issues	of	monetary	and	financial	policy,	asking	how	monetary	policy	may	be	automatic	and	outside	the	range	 of	 politics,	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 provision	 for	 the	 unemployed	 and	unemployable.	He	thought	it	taken	for	granted	that	this	had	to	exist,	but	that	the	issue	was	how	to	make	it	interfere	as	little	as	possible	with	the	market	mechanism.	The	key	questions	of	course	were	which	outcomes	and	processes	to	define	as	part	of	 the	mechanism,	but	Hayek	did	not	go	 into	 that,	and	as	we	will	discuss	 in	 the	conclusion,	neither	did	anyone	else.	He	then	repeated	some	of	his	general	outlines	of	 the	difficulties	of	market	policy	proper,	 including	property	and	contract	 law;	
                                            30	 There	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 two	 separate	 parts	 to	 the	 discussion	 -	 one	 immediately	following	Hayek’s	introduction,	and	one	evening	session.	The	collection	of	minutes	at	the	Hoover	 Archives	 holds	 the	 minutes	 of	 one	 of	 these	 and	 the	 collection	 at	 The	 Liberal	Archive	in	Gent	has	the	other.	The	latter	have	the	time	signature	4.30,	whereas	the	former	has	the	time	signature	8.30,	so	I	will	therefore	assume	that	this	is	the	order	in	which	the	discussion	took	place,	although	the	fragmentary	nature	of	the	minutes	leave	something	to	be	desired	for	those	seeking	to	establish	absolute	clarity.	
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how	to	deal	with	monopolies;	corporations	and	associations;	problems	of	taxation	and	problems	of	international	trade.		The	next	page	of	minutes	has	the	time	signature	8.30	on	it,	 indicating	that	quite	some	time,	and	most	likely	a	break	for	dinner,	had	passed	since	the	session	began	with	Hayek’s	introduction	at	4.30.	As	the	bright	April	night	grew	dark,	the	civilized	discussions	seemed	to	increase	in	temperature	as	Ludwig	von	Mises	soon	weighed	in	 with	 his	more	 dogmatic	 laissez-faire	 attitude.	 First,	 however,	 Professor	 Carl	Iversen	 suggested,	 rather	 heretically,	 that	 the	 rules	 being	 laid	 down	by	 liberals	could	be	the	rules	to	be	adopted	by	state	monopoly.	This	prompted	Walter	Eucken	to	say	that	if	it	were	the	question	of	placing	a	single	monopoly	in	the	hands	of	the	government,	it	would	be	one	thing,	but	that	to	transfer	a	number	of	monopolies	to	the	government	would	be	very	different.	The	American	conservative	activist	Loren	Miller,	 one	 of	 the	 very	 few	who	was	 only	 referred	 to	 only	 as	Mr.	 Miller	 in	 the	minutes,	 stated	 his	 disagreement,	 but	 he	 was	 rather	 alone.	 John	 Jewkes	 even	claimed	that	everyone	present	was	ready	to	accept	that	 it	 is	one	function	of	 the	state	to	provide	some	services.	He	was,	however,	immediately	turned	on	by	Ludwig	von	Mises.	The	others	accused	Mises	of	defending	orthodoxy	of	the	18th	century	with	 his	 laissez-faire	 dogmatism,	 but	 he	 would	 not	 budge.	 Mises	 claimed	 that	interventionists	 had	 always	 wanted	 different	 types	 of	 interventionism,	 and	therefore	had	thought	that	they	were	in	opposition	-	indicating	that	intervention	would	 always	 be	 intervention,	 no	matter	 how	 it	 was	 conceptualized.	 This	 was	completely	at	odds	with	Hayek	and	the	other	neoliberals	grand	idea	of	finding	ways	to	use	the	state	in	the	service	of	markets,	and	so	the	amicable	spirit	and	general	sense	of	agreement	was	challenged	by	Mises	stance.			We	noted	 in	Chapter	2	 that	whatever	Hayek’s	 interventions	 in	 the	1938	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	 really	were,	Alexander	Rüstow	perceived	him	as	 sharing	Mises’	 “paleo-liberal”	 views.	 This	 does	 not	 correspond	 to	 our	 close	 reading	 of	Hayek’s	work	at	 the	 time;	however	Bruce	Caldwell	has	 remarked	 that	 although	
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Hayek	departed	significantly	from	Mises,	he	always	treated	him	very	carefully	and	avoided	confrontation	with	his	former	mentor,31	who	had	a	reputation	for	being	a	difficult	 person.32	 After	 Mises’	 outburst,	 Hayek	 therefore	 offered	 some	 more	diplomatic	words,	affirming	that	any	proposal	to	redistribute	income	was	in	itself	an	interference.	He	asked	rhetorically	if	there	was	a	point,	once	you	start	towards	redistribution	of	income	by	taxation,	where	you	can	stop	short	of	a	totally	planned	economy,	referring	to	the	slippery	slope	argument	which	both	he	and	Mises	had	been	 making.	 According	 to	 Hayek,	 however,	 it	 was	 important	 to	 distinguish	between	 interfering	 with	 wages	 and	 with	 fixing	 minimum	 wages	 in	 a	 market	economy,	and	he	claimed	that	the	latter	was	an	interference	that	left	relative	scales	unchanged.			Lionel	Robbins	then	continued	the	diplomatic	mission	towards	Mises,	saying	that	everyone	agreed	with	him	that	most	 interventions	of	 the	state	 in	regards	 to	 the	workings	of	the	market	mechanism	had	been	bad,	and	that	he	hoped	Mises	would	agree	that	the	main	task	of	the	society’s	members	would	be	to	re-educate	the	world	to	 understand	 the	 functions	 performed	 by	 the	 market	 and	 by	 free	 enterprise.	However,	Robbins’	stated	that	it	was	an	essential	principle	of	a	competitive	society	that	 the	 “freedom	 of	 contract	 should	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 destroy	 freedom	 of	contract”.	 By	 this	 he	 was	 referring	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	powerful,	 in	this	case	large	corporations	with	monopolies,	could	easily	 interfere	with	the	freedom	of	others,	in	this	case	smaller	companies.	Robbins	then	argued	that	what	he	referred	to	as	“the	people’s	reply	to	economists’	recommendation	of	free	 market	 forces”	 was	 a	 claim	 that	 free	 enterprise	 tended	 to	 coagulate	 into	monopoly.	To	this,	Robbins	suggested	that	the	neoliberals	gathered	in	the	room	ought	to	reply	that	many	manifestations	of	monopoly	had	in	fact	been	deliberately	fostered	by	the	state	and	that	they	should	like	these	manifestations	to	disappear.		
                                            31	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	144–45.	32	Robert	Leeson,	Hayek:	A	Collaborative	Biography	-	Part	I:	Influences,	from	Mises	to	
Bartley	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013),	17.	
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Chapter	1	of	this	thesis	began	with	Mises’	interventions	in	the	socialist	calculation	debates,	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	his	 ideas	about	markets	were	of	the	upmost	importance	for	the	birth	of	the	neoliberal	movement.	In	this	session	of	the	1947	meeting,	however,	we	see	very	clearly	that	the	younger	members	of	the	group	were	desperate	to	move	beyond	Mises’	laissez-faire	stance	and	to	find	ways	to	use	the	power	of	modern	states	for	liberal	ends.	Unlike	the	other	neoliberals,	Mises	seemed	to	not	see	the	distinction	between	what	Hayek	in	The	Road	to	Serfdom	had	called	planning	 for	 competition,	 and	planning	against	 it.33	The	mythology	 surrounding	Mises	holds	that	he	once	stormed	out	of	a	room	with	other	neoliberals,	presumably	on	the	ship	from	the	US	to	Europe	in	1947,	calling	them	“a	bunch	of	socialists”.34	The	other	neoliberals	on	 the	other	hand,	were	eager	 to	make	Mises	understand	that	 theirs	was	 not	 a	 social	 liberalism,	 and	Hayek	 stated	 explicitly	 that	 income	redistribution	 was	 a	 form	 of	 interference	 that	 did	 lead	 onto	 a	 slippery	 slope	towards	totalitarianism.	Although	they	seemed	to	accept	the	need	for	some	public	services,	 the	 neoliberals’	 focus	 was	 on	 using	 states	 to	 make	 markets	 more	competitive	and	certainly	not	to	achieve	any	form	of	social	equality.	The	point	was	to	use	the	state	to	avoid	power	concentrations	and	monopolies	which	hampered	the	working	of	markets,	but	Mises	again	argued	that	all	the	trouble	with	monopoly	sprang	 from	 government	 policy.	 Criticizing	 Mises	 dogmatism,	 Frank	 Graham	argued	that	perfect	freedom	existed	only	in	the	jungle,	where	there	is	no	law,	and	that	if	Mises’	suggestions	were	carried	out,	everyone	would	find	themselves	in	said	jungle.	Graham	ventured	that	the	people	gathered	at	Mont	Pèlerin	were	there	to	find	the	middle	road	between	the	 jungle	and	the	 jail,	 something	which	 involved	very	careful	consideration	of	what	government	ought	to	do	and	how	much	it	ought	to	do	it.	He	further	claimed	that	unless	government	took	the	active	role	to	maintain	competition,	it	would	not	be	maintained.	Thus	Graham	too,	along	with	Hayek	and	Director,	seemed	to	follow	the	ordoliberals’	idea	about	the	importance	of	a	strong	state	to	ensure	a	competitive	market	society.	I	would	therefore	argue	that	this	was	
                                            33	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	-	The	Definitive	Edition,	90.	34	Llewellyn	H.	Rockwell	Jr.,	‘Mises	and	Liberty’	(Auburn,	Alabama,	1998),	https://mises.org/library/mises-and-liberty.	
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a	central	neoliberal	idea,	with	which	everyone	apart	from	Mises	and	Loren	Miller	seemed	 to	 agree.	 In	 another	 defence,	 Mises	 asked	 rhetorically	 whether	 society	should	be	based	on	public	or	private	ownership,	and	declared	himself	in	favour	of	private	enterprise.	So	too	were	the	other	neoliberals,	of	course,	but	what	they	had	been	able	to	do	was	to	turn	Mises	critique	of	socialism	into	a	critique	which	also	struck	at	laissez-faire	liberalism.	They	argued	that	the	problem	with	monopolies	and	large	corporations	were	that	they	inhibited	the	proper	workings	of	the	market	mechanism.	In	a	sense,	this	was	also	the	central	problem	with	socialism	(although	they	obviously	held	 that	 the	 two	were	very	different).	Theirs	was	a	pro-market	critique	of	laissez-faire.	Making	market	mechanisms	the	mediators	of	modernity	enabled	the	neoliberals	to	criticize	laissez-faire	not	for	being	an	anti-social	creed,	but	 for	 corrupting	 the	market	mechanism	 and	making	 society	 less	 competitive.	This	was	not	a	development	Mises	had	 foreseen,	and	he	maintained	his	 laissez-faire	views.			At	the	end	of	the	discussion	Aaron	Director	concluded	that	they	would	never	get	anywhere	in	defining	what	the	rules	of	the	game	should	be,	 if	they	did	not	even	know	whether	there	should	be	any	rules	at	all.	It	was	an	apt	summary	of	the	first	day	of	discussions,	where	the	development	of	neoliberalism	had	been	arrested	by	the	man	who	first	set	the	train	in	motion.		 	
  191 
	
Chapter	6	–	A	New	Europe	
	
	
	
	
	
	 “…the	federation	will	have	to	possess	the	negative	power	of	preventing	individual	states	from	 interfering	 with	 economic	 activity	 in	 certain	 ways,	 although	 it	 may	 not	 have	 the	positive	power	of	acting	in	their	stead.”35		Friedrich	Hayek	in	“The	Economic	Conditions	for	Interstate	Federalism”,	(1939)	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	The	next	morning’s	sessions	were	opened	by	Cecily	Wedgwood,	the	only	female	attendee	 of	 the	 conference.	 She	 opened	 by	 saying:	 “I	 understand	 that	 after	 the	animated	 argument	 of	 last	 night,	 this	 morning’s	 session	 is	 to	 be	 a	 cooling	 off	process”.	She	continued:	“I	do	not	know	whether	that	hope,	expressed	yesterday	evening,	has	anything	to	do	with	what	I	take	to	be	my	status	at	this	conference”.	Wedgwood	 appeared	 to	 make	 reference	 to	 her	 being	 the	 only	 woman	 at	 the	conference,	but	in	elegant	fashion	she	instead	went	on	to	discuss	her	status	as	the	only	historian	at	the	conference,	arguing	that	“it	would	be	a	mistake	to	get	the	idea	that	 history	 cannot	 generate	 as	much	 passion	 as	 economics.	 It	 can	 generate	 as	
                                            35	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	267.	
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much,	or	even	more.”	Although	I	certainly	agree	with	Wedgwood	in	general,	the	session	on	historiography	was	largely	a	forgettable	one.	Both	Hayek	and	Popper	had	 been	 especially	 critical	 of	 “historicism”	 in	 their	 wartime	 publications,	 and	Dekker	notes	that	for	them,	“historicism	is	not	mainly	associated	with	the	German	historical	school	and	its	aversion	to	theory,	but	rather	to	the	Hegelian	tradition	of	universal	historical	laws.”	It	was	“the	prophetic	character”	36	of	Marxism	and	other	forms	 of	 socialism	 that	 was	 feared	 by	 the	 neoliberals,	 and	 so	 the	 session	 on	historiography	had	little	to	do	with	previous	concerns	of	Austrian	economics	and	their	famous	Methodenstreit	with	the	German	historical	school.37	The	introductions	by	 Wedgwood	 and	 Carlo	 Antoni	 instead	 focused	 on	 how	 to	 fight	 what	 they	perceived	as	the	growing	trend	of	fatalism,	and	the	notion	that	economic	planning	and	socialism	were	inevitable	historical	developments.	The	following	discussion	included	 a	 debate	 regarding	 whether	 there	 was	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 a	 market	 for	historical	narratives,	and	what	liberal	historians	might	do	to	gain	more	traction	for	their	(correct,	it	was	assumed)	version	of	history.38			This	 once	 again	 points	 to	 the	 interesting	 interplay	 between	 past,	 present	 and	future	in	the	ideological	work	carried	out	by	the	early	neoliberals	in	their	historical	context.	The	reason	for	choosing	“A	New	Europe”	as	the	title	of	this	chapter	is	to	draw	attention	to	the	social,	political	and	geopolitical	concerns	of	 the	particular	moment	 in	 time	 in	 which	 neoliberalism	 was	 first	 institutionalised.	 The	 years	following	the	cataclysmic	Second	World	War	were	a	time	of	great	misery,	but	also	of	great	optimism	and	vision	for	the	future.	The	neoliberals	had	visions	too,	and	these	 visions	 rested	 on	 their	 conceptualization	 of	 markets	 as	 mediators	 of	modernity,	analysed	in	Part	I,	and	on	their	corresponding	belief	that	states	had	to	be	 put	 to	 use	 to	 create	 the	 modern	 market	 society,	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
                                            36	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	139.	37	For	more	on	this,	see	for	instance	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	64–83.	38	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”		
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chapter.	 The	 epigraph	 to	 this	 chapter	 is	 taken	 from	 Hayek’s	 1939	 essay	 “The	Economic	 Conditions	 for	 Interstate	 Federalism”,	 in	 which	 he	 argued	 that	federations	could	be	used	to	limit	economic	planning.	In	The	Road	to	Serfdom	he	had	 argued	 that	 economic	 planning	 presupposed	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 complete	ethical	 code	 that	 all	 people	 could	 ascribe	 to,	 the	 existence	 of	 which	 was	 an	impossibility	 in	 a	 diverse,	 modern	 world.	 His	 essay	 on	 federalism	 argued	 in	 a	similar	fashion	that	economic	planning	was	only	possible	under	conditions	of	“the	comparative	 homogeneity,	 the	 common	 convictions	 and	 ideals,	 and	 the	 whole	common	tradition	of	the	people	of	a	nation	state”.39	A	European	federation	could	thus	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 curb	 economic	 planning	 and	 instigate	 a	 rule-based	system	 in	 which	 democratically	 elected	 national	 governments	 could	 no	 longer	interfere	with	market	mechanisms.	Some	scholars	understand	neoliberalism	to	be	a	project	of	US	domination	of	 the	rest	of	 the	world,	beginning	 in	the	1970s,40	at	times	supplemented	with	the	introduction	of	the	United	Kingdom	as	an	additional	national	 subject	 with	 some	 agency	 in	 the	 “transatlantic	 project”	 of	neoliberalization.41	In	contrast	to	this	interpretation,	other	scholars	challenge	both	the	periodization	and	the	geographical	limitation	of	this	narrative.	Pierre	Dardot	and	Christian	Laval,	 for	 instance,	are	eager	 to	show	that	neoliberalism	does	not	only	have	European	roots,	but	that	the	political	organization	of	post-war	Europe	is	far	 from	 the	 reverse-image	 of	 neoliberalism	 that	 we	 are	 sometimes	 lead	 to	believe.42	The	degree	to	which	the	European	integration	project	is	neoliberal,	and	if	 so	 for	 how	 long	 this	 has	 been	 the	 case,	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	much	 recent	debate.43	Due	to	the	time	limitations	set	in	the	title	(1920	–	1947),	it	is	not	an	issue	this	 thesis	seeks	 to	address	directly,	but	 I	hope	 this	chapter	can	contribute	 to	a	
                                            39	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	264.	40	Mark	Blyth,	‘One	Ring	To	Bind	Them	All:	American	Power	and	Neoliberal	Capitalism’,	in	Growing	Apart?	America	and	Europe	in	the	21st	Century	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	109–35.	41	See	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe.	42	Dardot	and	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World.	43	Wolfgang	Streeck,	‘The	Crises	of	Democratic	Capitalism’,	New	Left	Review,	II,	no.	71	(October	2011):	5–29;	Thomas	Biebricher,	‘Neoliberalism	and	Democracy’,	
Constellations	22,	no.	2	(2015):	255–66.	
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broadened	 understanding	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 something	 more	 than	 an	 Anglo-American	policy	program	put	into	place	from	the	1970s	and	onwards.	The	main	focus	of	this	chapter	will	thus	be	the	context	of	post-war	Europe,	with	important	issues	such	as	the	beginning	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	process	of	denazification	in	Germany.	 I	 will	 pay	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 conference	 sessions	 entitled	 “The	Future	of	Germany”	and	“The	Problems	and	Chances	of	European	Federation”,	and	also	 the	 neoliberals’	 excursions.	 Their	 visits	 to	 the	 liberal	 haven	 of	 Chateau	 de	Coppet	and	 the	birthplace	of	Swiss	 federalism	will	 tell	us	something	about	how	their	 visions	 for	 Europe’s	 future	 were	 influenced	 by	 past	 liberal	 thinkers,	 the	history	of	Switzerland	and	a	wish	to	unite	liberalism	with	Christianity.	Although	they	wanted	a	new	liberalism,	 it	 is	clear	that	tradition	also	played	an	 important	part	 in	their	outlook.44	 I	will	argue	at	the	end	of	the	chapter	that	their	theory	of	modernity	 in	 this	 respect	 shares	 some	similarities	with	 the	desire	of	 fascism	 to	create	a	modernity	based	on	tradition	and	hierarchies.45		
	
Post-war	The	end	of	the	Second	World	War	is	merely	70	years	ago.	It	was	a	cataclysmic	event	that	profoundly	changed	the	world	as	a	whole,	and	Europe	in	particular.	Some	of	this	is	attempted	captured	in	Tony	Judt’s	history	of	Europe	since	1945,	which	is	entitled	simply	Postwar	(2005).	So	much	of	what	has	happened	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	needs	to	be	seen	in	relation	to	this	enormously	destructive	event,	which	killed	some	60	million	people,	left	50	million	homeless,46	and	changed	the	balance	of	world	power	forever.	In	Goodbye	To	All	That,	Dan	Stone	writes	that	“memory	of	the	Second	World	War	is	the	key	to	understanding	European	affairs	since	1945.”47	The	Second	World	War	is	what	lies	between	the	early	beginnings	of	
                                            44	For	this	point,	see	also	Melinda	Cooper,	Family	Values	-	Between	Neoliberalism	and	the	
New	Social	Conservatism	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Zone	Books,	2017).	45	Roger	Griffin,	Modernism	and	Fascism	-	The	Sense	of	a	Beginning	Under	Mussolini	and	
Hitler	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007).	46	Kershaw,	To	Hell	and	Back	–	Europe	1914	–	1949,	471.	47	Dan	Stone,	Goodbye	To	All	That?	-	The	Story	of	Europe	Since	1945	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	xi.	
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the	neoliberal	thought	collective,	as	described	in	Part	I,	and	the	founding	meeting	of	 their	 lasting	organization,	which	 is	described	 in	 this	part	of	 the	 thesis.	 Stone	further	claims	that	“in	order	to	understand	the	post-war	years	one	needs	to	know	not	 just	what	happened	 (‘event	history’),	but	what	people	at	each	point	 in	 time	thought	about	what	had	happened	in	the	past	(…).”48	This	is	highly	relevant	for	the	present	 investigation,	because	the	questions	we	are	grappling	with	are	not	only	how	the	war	may	have	changed	neoliberal	ideas,	but	also	how	neoliberals	would	use	the	memory	of	the	war	to	advance	ideas	they	had	held	also	before	the	war	took	place.			Nothing	was	ever	the	same	after	1945,	especially	with	regards	to	the	main	topic	of	this	thesis	and	indeed	of	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pèlerin	Society:	the	role	of	the	state	in	modern	social	life.	The	historiography	of	this	period	describes	the	rise	of	welfare	states	in	both	Europe	and	the	US.	The	Scandinavian	welfare	states	are	famous,	and	so	are	those	of	France,	Italy	and	the	Benelux	countries.	Germany	built	its	own	version	of	this,	based	less	on	Keynesian	ideas	about	macroeconomic	policy,	and	more	on	 compromises	between	powerful	ordoliberal	policymakers	and	 the	German	 unions.49	 John	 Ruggie	 has	 famously	 called	 the	 era	 one	 of	 “embedded	liberalism”,50	alluding	to	the	role	that	liberalism	and	capitalism	played	in	a	history	that	is	sometimes	construed	as	purely	social	democratic.51	According	to	Tony	Judt,	“it	was	in	Britain	that	the	most	ambitious	efforts	were	made	to	build	from	scratch	a	genuine	‘Welfare	State’”,52	but	various	piecemeal	welfare	provisions	were	turned	
                                            48	Ibid.,	x.	49	Peter	S.	Allen,	‘The	Underdevelopment	of	Keynesianism	in	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany’,	in	The	Political	Power	of	Economic	Ideas	–	Keynesianism	Across	Nations	(New	Jersey,	United	States:	Princeton	University	Press,	1989),	263–91.	50	John	Ruggie,	‘International	Regimes,	Transactions,	and	Change:	Embedded	Liberalism	in	the	Postwar	Economic	Order’,	International	Organization	36,	no.	2	(Spring	1982):	379–415.	51	This	allusion	might	not	have	been	intentional	on	Ruggie’s	part.	Being	American,	his	use	of	the	word	”liberal”	could	be	conflated	with	the	European	use	of	the	phrase	”social	democratic”.	52	Tony	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945	(London:	Vintage	Books,	2005),	74.	
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into	 full-blown	 redistributive	 welfare	 states	 all	 over	 Europe	 at	 this	 time,	 and	variations	on	the	phrase	“the	war	changed	everything”53	are	commonplace	in	the	historiography	covering	the	rise	of	these.	To	economists	like	Thomas	Piketty,	the	post-war	years	were	les	trentes	glorieuses	of	democratic	capitalism,54	but	I	follow	Timothy	 Shenk’s	 insistence	 that	 “even	 capitalism’s	 golden	 age	was	mixed	with	baser	metals”,55	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 time	 in	which	 the	welfare	 states	were	 first	implemented	also	holds	the	key	to	understanding	what	can	be	seen	in	the	present	as	their	demise	and	undoing.	“The	Second	World	War	transformed	both	the	role	of	the	modern	state	and	the	expectations	placed	upon	it”,	writes	Judt.56	But	there	were	already	forces	at	work	in	the	interwar	years,	resisting	this	newfound	“faith	in	the	state”,	and	plotting	for	this	transformation	to	be	something	quite	different	from	the	post-war	welfare	state,	and	perhaps	something	closer	to	our	current	impasse.			
The	beginning	of	the	Cold	War	1947	was	a	year	of	crisis	in	Europe.	A	few	days	after	the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	opened,	France’s	minister	of	National	Economy,	André	Phillipe,	stated	bluntly	“We	are	 threatened	with	 total	 economic	 and	 financial	 catastrophe”.57	 Some	 parts	 of	France	 had	 bread	 rationing	 and	 large	 strikes	 erupted	 at	 Renault	 factories,	prompting	 fears	 of	 a	Communist	 take-over.58	 Agricultural	 production	 in	Europe	had	been	nearly	halved	during	the	war,59	and	malnutrition	was	still	wide	spread	some	two	years	after	its	end.	On	top	of	all	this,	the	winter	of	1947	had	been	the	worst	since	1880,	and	all	countries	except	Switzerland	and	Sweden	suffered	from	food	shortages.	In	Germany	there	was	no	functioning	currency,	and	cigarettes	were	
                                            53	Ibid.,	73.	54	Thomas	Piketty,	Capital	in	the	Twenty-First	Century:	The	Dynamics	of	Inequality,	
Wealth,	and	Growth	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	2014).	55	Timothy	Shenk,	‘The	Long	Shadow	of	Mont	Pèlerin’,	Dissent	Magazine,	2013,	http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-long-shadow-of-mont-pelerin.	56	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	73.	57	Ibid.,	94.	58	Martin	Evans	and	Emmanuel	Godin,	‘The	Great	Fear	of	1947:	Could	France	Have	Gone	Communist?’,	History	Today	55,	no.	1	(January	2005).	59	Kershaw,	To	Hell	and	Back	–	Europe	1914	–	1949,	470.	
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the	accepted	medium	of	exchange.60	In	this	atmosphere	of	crisis	and	despair,	the	burgeoning	Acton-Tocqueville	Society	was	far	from	being	the	only	Euro-American	cooperation	project.	By	the	spring	of	1947,	“Washington’s	bilateral	approaches	to	Europe’s	economic	troubles	had	manifestly	 failed”,61	and	by	June	the	same	year,	secretary	of	state	George	Marshall	would	launch	his	famous	European	Recovery	Program,	later	to	be	called	the	Marshall	Plan.	Dan	Stone	calls	this	the	moment	when	the	Cold	War	began	in	earnest.62	According	to	Judt	too,	1947	was	a	major	turning	point	for	Europe,	the	beginning	of	prosperous	years	to	come.	All	this,	however,	was	far	from	obvious	at	the	time.		As	 many	 as	 thirteen	 of	 the	 thirty-seven	 attendees	 at	 the	 conference	 were	 US	nationals	(see	figure	#2),	and	sixteen	of	the	participants,	that	is	almost	half	of	them,	were	based	in	the	US	and	had	to	travel	what	was	then	an	exceptionally	long	way	to	get	to	Mont	Pèlerin.	1947	was	also	the	year	in	which	the	Norwegian	explorer	Thor	Heyerdahl	 took	 101	 days	 crossing	 the	 Pacific	 Ocean	 on	 his	 Kon-Tiki	 raft.	 The	voyage	across	the	Atlantic	Ocean	on	a	steamship	was	certainly	not	as	slow	as	that,	but	it	did	take	up	to	four	days.	Of	the	American-based	attendees,	nine	were	located	in	the	East	Coast	area,	four	in	the	Midwest	and	one	on	the	West	Coast.63	With	the	sea	journey	itself	lasting	at	least	four	days,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	if	the	US-based	 attendees	 travelled	 by	 ship,	 like	 Keynes	 did	when	 he	 participated	 in	 the	Bretton	Woods	conference	in	1944	and	read	The	Road	to	Serfdom,	they	would	have	had	to	leave	their	homes	at	least	a	week	prior	to	April	1.	Thus	they	were	sure	to	have	heard	the	news	of	President	Harry	S.	Truman’s	recent	speech	to	a	joint	session	of	Congress	in	Washington	DC	on	March	12,	in	which	he	laid	out	what	was	later	to	be	called	“The	Truman	Doctrine”.	Together	with	the	Marshall	Plan,	it	signalled	the	beginning	of	a	new	geopolitical	era.	
                                            60	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	86.	61	Ibid.,	91.	62	Stone,	Goodbye	To	All	That?	-	The	Story	of	Europe	Since	1945,	30.	63	Most	of	this	information	this	is	based	on	is	acquired	from	Hoover	Archives,	Mont	Pelerin	Society	Collection,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	”Booklets”.	
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	The	pretext	for	Truman’s	speech	had	been	the	burgeoning	civil	war	in	Greece,	and	a	Great	Britain	verging	on	bankruptcy	that	had	officially	asked	the	US	to	take	over	its	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 Aegean	 region.64	 In	 his	 speech,	 President	 Truman	asserted	that	the	USA	would	help	“democracies”	all	over	the	world	to	”maintain	their	 free	 institutions	 and	national	 integrity	 against	 aggressive	movements	 that	seek	to	impose	on	them	totalitarian	regimes”.65		This	was	obviously	a	reference	to	the	Soviet	Union,	because	relations	between	the	 former	allies	had	been	steadily	deteriorating	for	some	time.	Just	months	earlier,	the	Soviet	Union	had	announced,	much	to	the	surprise	of	the	USA,	that	it	would	not	be	joining	the	Bretton	Woods	institutions,	which	had	been	conceived	at	the	conference	in	1944	and	included	the	International	Monetary	Fund	and	the	World	Bank.66	Later	the	same	year,	a	council	of	foreign	ministers	held	in	New	York	had	failed	to	agree	a	German	peace	treaty,	and	tensions	were	mounting	between	the	two	new	super	powers.67	The	Cold	War	was	about	to	begin,	and	the	concept	of	totalitarianism	was	right	at	the	heart	of	it.	Tony	Judt	has	been	one	of	many	to	claim	that	“The	years	1941-45	had	just	been	an	interlude	 in	an	 international	 struggle	between	Western	democracies	and	Soviet	totalitarianism.”68	 But	 “Soviet	 totalitarianism”	was	not	 really	 the	 totalitarianism	that	the	attendees	of	the	first	meeting	of	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	were	worried	about.	 The	 totalitarian	 threat	 they	 feared	 the	most	was	 not	 an	 external,	 but	 an	internal	 threat	 to	 western	 democracies	 if	 they	 did	 not	 abandon	 “economic	planning”.		The	 remaining	 twenty-one	attendees	of	 the	 conference	all	 arrived	 from	various	locations	in	a	Europe	shattered	by	war.	The	UK-based	attendees	travelled	by	ship	to	the	continent,	and	then	by	train	overland.	It	is	likely	that	they	travelled	through	
                                            64	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes,	229.	65	Gleason,	Totalitarianism,	265.	66	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	108.	67	Stone,	Goodbye	To	All	That?	-	The	Story	of	Europe	Since	1945,	29.	68	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	104.	
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France,	 which	 was	 now	 one	 of	 the	 occupying	 powers	 of	 Germany.	 The	 French	occupation	 zone	 consisted	 of	 the	 historically	 and	 economically	 very	 important	Ruhr	 area,	 and	 the	French	disagreed	with	 the	other	Allied	nations	over	how	 to	handle	 the	 occupation.	 There	 were	 accusations	 that	 France	 was	 obstructing	reconstruction	efforts	in	order	to	wind	down	Germany	into	several	smaller	states.	However,	these	tensions	within	the	Allied	Control	Council	were	of	little	importance	compared	to	those	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	three	other	countries.	Just	a	few	months	before	the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	started,	on	the	1st	of	January	1947,	USA	 and	Great	Britain	 had	 joined	 their	 zones	 together	 into	 the	 bizone,	 and	 the	Allied	Control	Council	was	considered	more	or	less	defunct.			
The	post-war	right	The	contested	retrospective	distribution	of	blame	and	honour	for	the	events	that	took	 place	 during	 Second	World	War	 has	 quite	 recently	 become	 the	 subject	 of	renewed	historical	enquiry.69	Our	understanding	of	neoliberalism	has	much	to	gain	from	these	new	perspectives	on	the	political	nature	of	history-writing	in	the	post-war	years.	The	painstaking	efforts	made	by	post-war	European	nation	states	 to	draw	clear	lines	between	heroes	and	villains	during	the	preceding	upheaval	have	been	charted	by	Tony	Judt,	who	remarks	that	this	was	really	an	impossible	task	after	such	a	long	and	all-encompassing	war	that	included	so	many	other	conflicts	within	it.	This	problem	was	not	only	confined	to	Germany,	but	included	issues	of	collaboration	all	over	Europe.	“Having	assigned	the	blame	for	the	recent	past,	and	punished	those	whose	cases	were	the	most	egregious	or	psychologically	satisfying,	the	 majority	 of	 people	 in	 the	 lands	 recently	 occupied	 by	 Germany	 were	 more	interested	 in	putting	uncomfortable	memories	behind	them	and	getting	on	with	their	 fractured	 lives”,	 Judt	 writes.70	 As	 for	 everyone	 else,	 it	 was	 of	 the	 utmost	important	for	the	neoliberal	movement	to	be	able	to	portray	themselves	as	active	resistors	of	Nazism	and	fascism.	After	all,	they	had	argued	that	fascist	dictatorship	
                                            69	See	for	instance	Priemel,	The	Betrayal	–	The	Nuremberg	Trials	and	German	Divergence.	70	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	52.	
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would	be	the	dreaded	endpoint	of	societies	not	following	their	advice	on	economic	planning.	 The	 various	 European	 countries	 all	 had	 different	 experiences	 of	war,	occupation,	 neutrality	 and	 collaboration.	 Carl	 Iversen	 from	 Denmark,	 Herbert	Tingsten	from	Sweden	and	Trygve	Hoff	from	Norway	represented	a	Scandinavian	country	each.	Of	these,	Sweden	had	claimed	neutrality	and	Denmark	and	Norway	had	 been	 occupied.	 In	 the	 latter	 country,	 Hoff’s	 liberal	 journal	 Farmand	 later	claimed	 to	 have	 been	 one	 of	 the	 first	 media	 outlets	 to	 be	 banned	 by	 the	 Nazi	occupation	 regime.71	 Italy	 and	Belgium	also	 had	 one	 representative	 each	 at	 the	conference,	Carlo	Antoni	and	Henri	de	Lovinfosse	respectively.	Of	these,	Belgium	had	been	occupied,	whereas	Italy	had	originally	formed	part	of	the	Axis	forces,	only	to	switch	sides	towards	the	end	of	the	war	after	the	allied	invasion	and	the	toppling	of	Benito	Mussolini.	Germany	had	four	representatives,	including	Brandt	and	Eyck	who	travelled	from	the	US	and	the	UK,	and	of	course	Wilhelm	Röpke	and	Walter	Eucken.	Of	these,	it	was	only	Eucken	who	had	lived	in	Germany	during	the	war,	and	as	 described	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 despite	 being	 able	 to	 reinvent	 themselves	 as	 anti-totalitarians,	the	ordoliberals	of	the	Freiburg	School	had	indeed	been	working	with	the	Nazi	authorities	on	designing	economic	policies	during	the	war.72	Figures	like	Gustav	 Schmölders,73	 Alfred	 Müller-Armack	 and	 Heinrich	 von	 Stackelberg	 had	been	active	Nazis.74			The	five	exiled	Austrians	-	Machlup,	Popper,	Hayek,	Mises	and	Polanyi,	 together	made	up	the	second	largest	national	contingent.75	We	saw	in	Chapter	2	how	Ludwig	von	Mises	initially	praised	fascism,	but	was	later	forced	to	leave	Vienna	for	a	post	at	Rappard’s	Graduate	 Institute	 in	Geneva	and	 then	 to	make	way	 for	 the	US	via	Spain	and	Portugal	around	the	time	of	the	outbreak	of	war.76	In	Austria,	a	law	was	
                                            71	Nordbakken,	Liberale	Tenkere	for	Vår	Tid,	139.	72	Ralf	Ptak,	‘Neoliberalism	in	Germany:	Revisiting	the	Ordoliberal	Foundations	of	the	Social	Market	Economy’,	in	The	Road	from	Mont	Pelerin	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009),	98–139.	73	Priemel,	The	Betrayal	–	The	Nuremberg	Trials	and	German	Divergence,	387.	74	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950.	75	Stone,	Goodbye	To	All	That?	-	The	Story	of	Europe	Since	1945,	45.	76	Hülsmann,	Mises:	The	Last	Knight	of	Liberalism,	753–57.	
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passed	 in	1947	which	distinguished	between	more	and	 less	 incriminated	Nazis,	and	gave	the	latter	category,	some	500,000	people,	amnesty.	By	1956,	the	former	group,	some	42,000	people,	would	also	be	given	amnesty,	and	Judt	remarks	that	“After	 that,	 Austrians	 simply	 forgot	 about	 their	 involvement	 with	 Hitler	altogether.”77	 Stone	 has	 called	 the	 attempted	 settling	 of	 accounts	 from	 the	war	years	“a	process	that	involved	not	asking	too	many	questions	about	precisely	who	had	 done	 what	 or	 suffered	 what	 during	 the	 war	 years.”	 For	 obvious	 reasons,	Germany	was	 in	a	 special	position,	and	 in	1947,	 the	Allied	powers	were,	 rather	unsuccessfully,	attempting	 to	carry	out	so-called	“denazification	programs”.	The	Nuremberg	 trials	had	 finished	some	 five	months	before	 the	conference	at	Mont	Pèlerin,	 during	which	 Konrad	 Adenauer,	 the	 future	 chancellor,	 had	 spoken	 out	against	them,	claiming	that	Nazi	fellow-travellers	had	to	be	left	in	peace	and	that	“Denazification	was	lasting	much	too	long	and	doing	no	good.”78	Both	in	the	Allied	and	in	the	Soviet	occupation	zones,	denazification	remained	a	shallow	process,	as	it	was	simply	not	practically	possible.	Both	the	population	and	the	leaders	were	too	deeply	embedded	in	the	crimes	of	the	past	for	a	complete	purge	to	be	feasible.	At	 the	 end	 of	 it	 all,	 “the	 search	 for	 serviceable	 myths	 of	 anti-Fascism	 –	 for	 a	Germany	of	anti-Nazis,	a	France	of	Resisters	or	a	Poland	of	victims	–	was	the	most	important	 invisible	 legacy	 of	 World	 War	 Two	 in	 Europe.”	 According	 to	 Judt:	“Without	such	collective	amnesia,	Europe’s	astonishing	post-war	recovery	would	not	have	been	possible.”79	The	birth	of	neoliberalism	as	an	anti-totalitarian	creed	is	part	of	this	myth.	And	as	we	will	see,	the	men	gathered	at	Mont	Pélerin	strongly	implied	 that	 the	horrors	of	World	War	 II	were	due	 to	 the	 things	 they	had	been	fighting	all	along:	“economic	planning”	and	“collectivism”.		If	 the	German	members	of	the	neoliberal	movement,	even	those	with	ties	to	the	Nazi	 administration,	 were	 able	 to	 fall	 down	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 history	 when	judgement	 was	 passed	 in	 post-war	 Europe,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case	 with	 Louis	
                                            77	Judt,	Postwar	-	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	51–52.	78	Ibid.,	53.	79	Ibid.,	61.	
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Rougier.	Although	he	was	responsible	for	the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	and	a	key	organizer	of	 the	nascent	movement,	he	was	not	 invited	 to	 the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	at	all.	Instead	he	was	ousted	from	the	neoliberal	thought	collective	due	to	his	connections	 to	 the	Vichy	regime,	described	 in	greater	detail	 in	Chapter	3.	Curiously,	no	such	fate	befell	his	fellow	national,	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel,	a	former	fascist	sympathiser	who	had	taken	up	residency	in	Switzerland,	and	who	made	up	the	French	delegation	along	with	Maurice	Allais	and	Francois	Trevoux.	Indeed,	the	ordoliberals	were	not	the	only	neoliberals	whose	sympathies	during	the	war	had	been	 less	 impressive	 than	 certain	 hagiographic	 accounts	 of	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	Society	would	suggest.80	Jouvenel	had	been	the	editor	of	L'Émancipation	nationale,	the	 journal	 of	 Partie	 Populaire	 Français,	 France’	 fascist	 party.81	 Fascism	 has	traditionally	 been	 construed	 as	 fundamentally	 anti-liberal,	 but	 there	 were	 also	points	of	great	convergence	between	some	variants	of	fascism	and	neoliberalism,	notably	with	 regards	 to	 the	question	of	democracy.	 In	an	 intense	and	 revealing	correspondence	from	1944,	to	which	we	will	return,	Wilhelm	Röpke	and	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	found	each	other	in	mutual	distrust	of	democracy	and	a	longing	for	an	elite	of	 enlightened	aristocrats.82	 In	1944,	 an	enthusiastic	 reviewer	 in	Economic	
Journal	wrote	about	Wilhelm	Röpke’s	book	Civitas	Humana	of	the	same	year:	”He	asks	us	to	put	away	’democratic	prudery’	and	acknowledge	frankly	that	not	only	private	property,	but	also	unequal	property,	 is	a	pre-requisite	to	moral	civilised	living”.83.		As	described	in	Part	I,	early	neoliberalism	was	in	many	ways	defined	by	this	 distrust	 of	 popular	 democracy.	 In	 their	 reinvention	 of	 previous	 liberal	critiques	 of	 democracy	 and	 universal	 suffrage,	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 the	 rise	 to	prominence	 of	 mass	 politics	 was	 what	 lay	 behind	 the	 turn	 towards	 economic	planning	and	subsequent	totalitarian	dictatorships.	The	fascist	past	had	severely	
                                            80	See	for	instance	Hartwell,	A	History	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society;	Nordbakken,	Liberale	
Tenkere	for	Vår	Tid.	81	Laurent	Kestel,	‘L’engagement	de	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	Au	PPF	de	1936	À	1939,	Intellectuel	de	Parti	et	Entrepreneur	Politique’,	French	Historical	Studies,	no.	30	(2007):	105–25.	82	Knegt,	‘A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	and	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	between	Liberalism,	Fascism	and	Europeanism	(1930-1954)’,	219–26.	83	White,	‘Review’.	
  203 
discredited	Europe’s	political	right,	however,	and	this	is	an	important	backdrop	for	the	Mont	Pèlerin	Conference.	In	some	ways,	it	was	not	possible	to	be	much	further	to	the	right	than	the	neoliberals	in	1947,	and	neoliberalism	should	be	understood	as	a	thoroughly	right	wing	appropriation	of	liberalism.			I	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 2	 that	 the	 Lippmann	 Colloquium	 was	 not	 only	 the	 first	conference	of	neoliberalism,	but	also	its	most	social	liberal	moment.	Although	they	spoke	 up	 against	 social	 liberalism	 and	 claimed	 state	 interference	 led	 to	totalitarianism,	 many	 of	 the	 men	 gathered	 at	 the	 Lippmann	 Colloquium	 also	seemed	to	take	social	questions	more	seriously	than	what	was	the	case	at	Mont	Pèlerin	in	1947.	Although	it	 lost	to	“neoliberalism”,	“left-wing	liberalism”	was	in	fact	 one	of	 the	 suggested	names	discarded	at	 the	 colloquium.84	 The	 subsequent	rightward	turn	of	early	neoliberalism	might	have	been	what	led	to	the	absence	in	1947	 of	 yet	 another	 key	 figure	 of	 the	 Lippmann	 colloquium,	Walter	 Lippmann	himself.	He	was	listed	as	a	founding	member	of	the	society,	but	never	attended	any	of	 the	 conferences.	 Before	 becoming	 a	 critic	 of	 Roosevelt’s	 New	Deal	 program,	Lippmann	had	been	considered	a	progressive	liberal,	and	at	the	outbreak	of	world	war,	Lippmann’s	politics	had	changed	once	again.85	Already	on	October	28,	1938,	a	few	 weeks	 after	 Edvard	 Beneš	 resignation	 as	 president	 of	 Czechoslovakia	following	Germany’s	invasion,	Lippman	wrote	in	a	letter	to	Rougier:	“In	many	ways	I	feel	that	the	immediate	problem	in	Europe	is	no	longer	how	to	save	liberty,	but	how	to	save	the	national	independence	of	the	people	who	would	like	to	preserve	their	 liberty.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 to	 preserve	 their	 independence	 they	 may	 have	 to	sacrifice	for	the	time	being	much	of	their	liberty.”86	Lippmann	proceeded	to	break	off	 contact	with	most	of	 the	neoliberals,	 and	his	 change	of	attitude	 towards	 the	movement	whose	first	meeting	was	named	after	him	is	summed	up	in	a	short	reply	
                                            84	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	35.	85	Lippmann,	Public	Opinion,	introduction.	86	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Folder	1848:	Louis	Rougier	
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to	Hayek	many	years	later,	on	January	2,	1960.	The	latter	had	sent	Lippmann	the	manuscript	for	his	The	Constitution	of	Liberty	on	December	18,	1959,	writing:			 “It	is	the	final	outcome	of	many	years	of	thought	on	the	principles	of	a	free	society	–	indeed	of	a	trend	of	thought	which	may	be	said	to	have	started	twenty-two	years	ago	when	I	read	The	Good	Society.	 I	have	put	 into	 this	volume	everything	 I	have	on	 the	subject	and	 I	 rather	hope	 that	 the	argument	will	appeal	to	you.”87		Lippmann,	wrote	back	that	he	had	not	read	it,	but:			 “I	 have,	 however,	 been	 browsing	 in	 it	 and	 I	 am	puzzled	 to	 find	 that	 you	 have	 one	 reference	 to	corporations	and	nineteen	to	labor	unions.	Does	this	mean	that	the	index	is	at	fault	or	can	it	mean	that	you	believe	the	corporation	and	its	problems	rates	less	than	a	page	in	a	treatise	of	this	kind?	I	should	really	like	to	know	before	I	read	the	book	what	you	say	about	this.”88			As	far	as	we	know	there	was	never	any	answer	to	this,	as	Hayek	must	have	taken	the	hint	and	realised	that	Lippmann’s	mildly	progressive	politics	were	no	longer	compatible	with	neoliberalism.	
	
The	future	of	Germany	Cold	War	 issues	 like	 the	Truman	doctrine	and	 the	Marshall	Plan,	 and	 the	many	attempts	 to	 deal	with	 the	 recent	 past	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 national	 contexts	 through	denazification	and	similar	processes,	were	the	backdrop	of	the	session	dedicated	to	“The	Future	of	Germany”.	Introductions	were	held	by	Wilhelm	Röpke	and	Walter	Eucken.	Röpke	was	the	first	speaker	and	declared	that	the	problem	of	Europe	was	Germany,	and	that	he	problem	of	the	world	was	Europe.	The	man	who	in	a	recent	paper	had	rallied	against	“the	war	on	luxuries”	still	insisted	that	the	problem	had	to	be	seen	in	terms	of	the	most	elementary	needs,	and	added:	“We	may	therefore	be	 forced	 to	 define	 liberalism,	 for	 Germany,	 purely	 as	 being	 the	 state	 of	 non-
                                            87	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	88	Yale	University	Library,	Walter	Lippmann	papers,	Selected	correspondence	1931	–	1974,	Box	10,	Folder	11:	Hayek	
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totalitarianism”.89	Röpke	then	continued	with	a	reference	to	US	Secretary	of	State	James	Byrnes’	famous	“Stuttgart	speech”	held	a	year	and	a	half	earlier	in	September	1946.	 The	 speech	 was	 entitled	 “Restatement	 of	 Policy	 on	 Germany”,	 and	 was	notable	mainly	due	 to	 the	 signal	 being	 sent	 to	Moscow	 regarding	 continued	US	military	presence	in	Europe.	A	second	goal	was	to	prevent	desperate	Germans	from	turning	to	communism,	and	the	speech	also	signalled	the	replacement	of	previous	economic	policies	in	the	US	occupied	areas,	known	as	the	Morgenthau	plan.	The	new	policies	put	 in	 its	place	were	meant	 to	 indicate	a	change	of	policy	 towards	economic	reconstruction,	but	Röpke	claimed	it	had	not	brought	about	the	expected	results,	 and	 that	 this	was	partly	due	 to	 the	merger	of	 the	American	and	British	occupation	zones,	which	had	taken	place	only	three	months	earlier.	Röpke	made	reference	to	the	last	of	four	Moscow	Conferences,	which	was	held	between	Byrnes	and	his	 counterparts	Bevin	 and	Molotov	 in	 the	Christmas	of	 1945,	 and	 claimed	there	was	a	danger	it	was	“just	one	big	red	herring”.	He	did	not	elaborate	on	this,	but	according	to	the	memoirs	of	George	Kennan,	an	American	diplomat	who	was	present	 at	 the	meeting,	Byrne	 cared	only	 about	 the	political	 effect	 of	 the	peace	treaty	“at	home”,	and	he	later	wrote:	“The	Russians	know	this.	They	will	see	that	for	 this	 superficial	 success	 he	 pays	 a	 heavy	 price	 in	 the	 things	 that	 are	 real."90	According	to	Röpke,	the	cost	of	reviving	the	German	economy	was	“increasing	in	geometrical	progression.”	If	Germany	was	allowed	to	produce,	Röpke	thought	the	situation	would	be	much	better,	“but	without	industrial	Germany	being	allowed	to	produce,	the	situation	is	disastrous”.	Röpke	thought	that	Western	Germany	would	have	no	further	problems	if	it	was	allowed	to	produce,	but	that	the	question	was	whether	 to	re-integrate	Western	Germany	with	 the	Eastern	zones	controlled	by	the	Russians:	“Is	it	necessary	or	not.	My	answer	is	that	it	is	not	necessary.”	Röpke	argued	 that	 Germany	would	 still	 need	 help	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 but	 that	 “this	 help	
                                            89	There	is	no	manuscript	for	Röpke’s	introduction,	so	again	I	will	paraphrase	his	remarks	based	on	the	minutes	kept	by	Mrs.	Hahn.	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin	1947”	90	George	Kennan,	Memoirs	1925-1950	(Boston:	Little	Brown,	1967),	267–68.	
  206 
should	now	be	put	 on	 a	 sound	basis”.	 For	Röpke	 this	meant	 “Drastic	monetary	reform,	in	the	form	of	a	drastic	deflation”.			The	 floor	 was	 then	 given	 to	 Walter	 Eucken	 who	 was	 to	 focus	 even	 more	 on	economic	 theory,	 and	 stated	 that	 he	 saw	 his	 introduction	 as	 a	 supplement	 to	Röpke’s	remarks.	“It	was	very	surprising	that	the	occupation	did	not	mean	the	end	of	 the	 Nazi	 system”,	 he	 said,	 referring	 not	 to	 the	 unsuccessful	 denazification	process,	but	instead	to	the	first	part	of	the	dual	argument:	the	notion	that	Nazism	first	 and	 foremost	had	 to	do	with	 economic	planning.	According	 to	Eucken,	 the	Nazi’s	price	and	production	system	“was	preserved	in	all	detail	and	with	only	little	change	 in	personnel.”	The	only	 change	was	 the	division	 into	zones,	 and	Eucken	argued	 that	 the	 present	 development	 showed	 how	 a	 planned	 economy	 of	 the	separate	states	was	so	inefficient	that	it	decayed.	According	to	him	the	rations	were	so	small	that	“nobody,	literally	nobody”	could	live	on	them.	In	consequence,	side	by	side	with	the	planned	economy,	a	separate	unofficial	economic	structure	was	growing	up.	According	to	Eucken	this	separate	economy	had	three	main	features:	the	 general	 growth	 of	 barter;	 the	 use	 of	 products	 like	 brandy	 or	 cigarettes	 as	money;	and	the	home	production	of	potatoes	and	vegetables.	He	argued	that	“the	German	 economy	 is	 undergoing	 a	 progressive	 primitivisation	 [sic]	 and	 now	corresponds	rather	to	the	economic	system	of	the	6th	and	8th	centuries.”	Eucken	claimed	that	there	was	full	employment	and	that	an	enormous	amount	of	work	was	being	done,	but	with	very	little	result.	He	referred	to	a	meeting	he	had	had	with	the	before-mentioned	 Lord	 Beveridge,	 who	 had	 been	 active	 in	 British	 wartime	planning.	Eucken	had	told	him	about	the	low	productivity	of	the	barter	economy,	where	a	“thousand	people	thus	achieve	in	a	day	what	a	single	trader	could	do	in	a	few	hours.”			Eucken	 then	 paraphrased	 Lenin	 by	 asking:	 “What	 is	 to	 be	 done?	 The	 planned	economy	is	evidently	collapsing”,	he	concluded,	and	the	“only	hope	is	to	restore	the	market	economy.”	Like	Röpke	he	advocated	currency	reform,	since	according	to	
  207 
him,	there	could	be	“no	division	of	labour	without	a	functioning	currency	system.”	The	new	money	had	to	be	linked	up	with	foreign	currencies,	so	that	credit	from	abroad	could	be	made	available.	Eucken	did	concede	that	a	new	currency	would	bring	 steep	 rises	 in	 the	prices	of	 agricultural	products,	 something	which	would	lead	to	starvation.	Still	he	stated	unequivocally:	“I	believe	prices	must	be	allowed	to	 rise	 but	 only	 if	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 free	 market	 and	 international	 trade	 are	resumed.	This	is	admittedly	a	risky	policy”.	He	finally	referred	to	a	“small	point	of	difference	 from	 Röpke”,	 relating	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 Eastern	 zone:	 “it	 is	 very	important,	 politically	 and	 economically,	 that	 the	 East	 not	 be	 written	 off	 or	abandoned	 for	good”,	he	said.	Eucken’s	 final	words	are	worth	quoting	at	 length	(Mrs.	Hahn’s	transcription	appears	to	be	accurate),	both	because	of	the	interesting	invocation	of	classical	economic	theory,	but	also	for	the	degree	to	which	Eucken’s	sentiments	were	to	be	repeated	in	George	Marshall’s	ground	breaking	speech	at	Harvard	University	when	launching	the	Marshall	plan	only	two	months	later:		 “The	classical	economists	regarded	it	as	a	weakness	of	the	individual	that	he	does	not	always	regard	his	 true	 interests.	 They	 do	 not	 recognise	 their	 common	 interest	 of	 regaining	 Germany	 to	 the	Western	 system.	 The	 present	 tendency	 to	 keep	 Germany	 going	 for	 charitable	 reasons	 is	 very	unhealthy.	The	Western	powers	ought	to	act	on	their	own	self-interest.	That	presupposes	however	that	German	industry	is	allowed	to	do	something	on	its	own	initiative.	And	that	she	should	not	be	dependent	for	everything	on	permits.	At	the	moment	Germany	is	half	a	corpse.”91	
	It	was	precisely	the	realization	that	an	economically	strong	(albeit	militarily	weak)	Germany	 (and	 Europe)	 was	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 US	 that	 lay	 behind	 the	Marshall	 plan.	 It	 is	 a	widely-held	 view	 that	 this	was	 a	 lesson	 learned	 from	 the	Versailles	 process	 after	 World	 War	 I,	 and	 that	 it	 helped	 the	 international	community	 avoid	 a	 third	 outbreak	 of	war	 in	 Europe.	More	 importantly	 for	 the	development	of	neoliberalism	was	Eucken’s	insistence	that	Germany’s	problems	were	due	to	economic	planning	and	the	lack	of	functioning	market	mechanisms.	Keith	Tribe	has	claimed	that	the	“bleak	picture”	painted	by	ordoliberals	of	the	rise	of	a	barter	economy	in	Germany	was	“at	best	partial,	at	worst	wildly	exaggerated.”	
                                            91	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1:	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”	
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According	 to	 him,	 “There	were	 certainly	 shortages	 of	 food	 and	 energy,	 but	 this	cannot	be	directly	blamed	on	the	absence	of	a	proper	market	mechanism;	it	was	instead	 linked	to	the	general	problems	of	resource	allocation	 in	Europe	and	the	politics	of	occupation	and	reconstruction.”92	Eucken	thus	presented	a	rather	partial	theory	of	what	 the	problems	 in	Germany	 really	were,	 based	on	his	deeply	held	belief	that	market	mechanisms	were	the	only	possible	foundations	for	a	modern	society.	Based	on	this	neoliberal	belief,	the	horrors	of	Nazism	and	the	subsequent	descent	of	Germany	into	poverty	and	disarray	were	blamed	on	economic	policies	that	interfered	with	the	market	mechanism.			
Discussion	The	ensuing	discussion	was	opened	by	Karl	Brandt,	a	German	economist	exiled	to	Stanford	University.	He	began	his	lengthy	intervention	by	stating	that	“If	we	were	to	go	in	to	Germany,	we	would	all	be	shocked	at	what	we	saw.”	Brandt	did	not	refer	to	human	misery,	but	instead	to	the	“Decay	of	the	liberal	economy	in	which	we	are	all	 interested.”	 In	 the	 neoliberal	 view,	 the	most	 shocking	 thing	 about	 post-war	Germany	was	the	lack	of	market	mechanisms.	Brandt	spoke	of	the	influx	of	people	being	repatriated	bringing	“nothing	in	the	way	of	material	goods.	Only	disease.”	He	estimated	it	would	take	eight	to	ten	years	to	replace	lost	capital	equipment	and,	echoing	Keynes’	The	Economic	Consequences	of	 the	Peace,	he	argued	 that	 it	was	now	important	to	prevent	a	recurrence	of	war	due	to	the	public	sentiment	“still	smouldering	 in	 those	parts	of	 the	world.”	The	German	calorie	consumption	had	fallen	 from	 3000	 to	 1000	 calories	 per	 head	 and	 Brandt	 claimed	 that	 “The	catastrophe	which	has	befallen	 the	 industrial	 country	of	Germany	has	no	 equal	whatever	in	history.”	He	then	referred	to	the	denazification	process,	but	claimed	it	was	instead	leading	to	a	renazification.	The	tribunals	were	very	slow,	he	claimed,	saying	that	“Germans	talk	of	“Hitler’s	1000	years’	Reich,	14	years	of	Nazism,	986	years	 of	 denazification.”	At	 that	 rate	 you	would	never	 get	 rid	 of	 the	Nazis,	 said	Barth,	their	children	would	suffer,	and	the	result	would	be	a	hatred	of	the	Allies	
                                            92	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	234.	
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and	their	methods.	Barth	suggested	giving	amnesties,	possibly	levying	an	extra	tax	on	those	who	did	not	have	to	pass	through	the	tribunals.	Speaking	of		the	currency	question,	 Barth	 disagreed	with	 Eucken,	 saying	 that	 Germany	 also	 needed	 food,	textiles	and	raw	materials.	He	finished	by	asking	Eucken	what	he	thought	was	the	right	time	for	the	removal	of	price	controls,	a	move	we	now	know	happened	only	months	later,	on	explicit	advice	from	Röpke	and	Eucken.		Lionel	Robbins,	who	had	been	central	in	the	British	war	effort,	then	took	a	more	moderate	 stand	 than	 his	 German	 colleagues,	 and	 defended	 price	 controls	 and	rationing	in	Britain.	He	said	inflation	had	been	on	the	way	when	they	were	put	into	place,	and	that	they	could	not	be	removed	at	that	time.	Brandt	agreed,	and	said	that	establishing	 a	 “free	price	market	 system”	 in	Germany	would	 lead	 to	 starvation.	Milton	Friedman	and	George	Stigler	made	some	theoretical	comments,	and	after	an	 unclear	 intervention	 by	 Hayek,	 Eucken	 then	 re-entered	 the	 discussion	 and	claimed	 that	 the	 central	 problem	 was	 the	 effect	 of	 production,	 which	 had	 no	direction	and	 therefore	did	not	produce	a	 fix	amount	of	goods	 to	distribute.	He	restated	his	claim	that	the	lack	of	a	free	market	economy	lead	to	a	most	senseless	use	of	resources	and	to	an	intense	misdirection,	a	central	point	from	the	socialist	calculation	debates.	Milton	Friedman	again	made	a	highly	 theoretical	 comment,	reporting	that	he	thought	it	a	fallacy	for	a	free	market	to	be	something	that	rich	nations	could	afford	and	poor	nations	had	to	do	without.	Rappard,	on	the	other	hand,	 argued	 that	 if	 the	 reports	 of	 food	 shortages	 were	 true,	 then	 “liberalism	should	not	be	prejudiced	by	trying	to	establish	a	free	market	economy.”			In	summary	we	may	say	that	the	discussion	offers	a	fascinating	glimpse	into	this	moment	in	time,	when	the	founders	of	the	neoliberal	movement	argued	about	how	to	economically	reconstruct	Germany	along	neoliberal	 lines	and	whether	or	not	starvation	would	be	a	logical	outcome	of	their	faith	in	markets;	and	if	so	whether	that	 was	 to	 be	 deemed	 necessary.	 In	 particular,	 Eucken’s	 introductory	 speech	contained	 many	 of	 the	 ideas	 which	 would	 influence	 reconstruction	 in	 West	
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Germany,	as	the	ordoliberals	went	on	to	play	an	important	role	in	policy-making.	A	 great	 number	 of	 German	 ordoliberals	 would	 become	 members	 of	 the	 Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	the	following	years,	and	the	historian	Kim	Priemel	has	argued	that	the	society	played	an	important	role	in	rehabilitating	German	intellectuals	to	international	 circles	 in	 the	 post-war	 years.93	 The	most	 prominent	 of	 these	was	Ludwig	Erhard,	who	was	not	present	but	nonetheless	listed	as	a	founding	member.	He	would	go	on	to	become	finance	minister	of	West	Germany	and	later	chancellor.	Under	clear	guidance	and	advice	from	the	ordoliberals,	West	Germany	would	begin	abolishing	price	controls	as	early	as	1948,	the	year	after	the	conference.	The	news	of	this	was	delivered	to	the	German	public	by	Erhard	with	this	statement:	“only	a	state	 that	establishes	both	the	 freedom	and	the	responsibility	of	 its	citizens	can	legitimately	speak	in	the	name	of	the	people”.	Michel	Foucault	saw	this	as	a	way	in	which	 neoliberal	 economic	 policy	 also	 played	 a	 part	 in	 absolving	 the	 German	people	for	the	sins	of	the	Nazi	state,	since	the	ordoliberal	redefinition	of	what	gives	a	state	legitimacy	implied	that	the	Nazi-state	could	not	be	considered	a	legitimate	state	acting	on	behalf	of	its	people.94	In	redefining	the	legitimate	role	of	states,	the	ordoliberals	were	thus	engaged	not	only	in	economic	policy	making	per	se,	but	in	the	 complex	 process	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 Nazi	 past.	 Röpke’s	 statement	 that	liberalism	in	Germany	could	be	defined	purely	as	the	state	of	non-totalitarianism	speaks	volumes	about	the	complex	processes	of	reinvention	 involved	 in	making	neoliberalism	 the	opposite	of	 “totalitarianism”.	The	pre-war	 idea	 that	economic	planning	was	the	essence	of	totalitarianism	was	still	touted	by	Röpke,	Eucken	and	his	 colleagues,	 and	 this	was	 certainly	 part	 of	 the	 reason	why	German	post-war	economic	policy	was	decidedly	less	Keynesian	than	that	of	many	other	European	countries.95	 However,	 the	 “social”	 aspect	 of	 West	 Germany’s	 famous	 soziale	
Markwirtschaft	is	hard	to	gauge	from	Eucken’s	intervention,	and	indeed,	as	Tribe	has	 observed,	 from	 ordoliberal	 theorizing	 in	 general.	 Tribe	 claims	 the	 popular	post-war	 idea	 of	 a	 “social	 market	 economy”	 was	 nothing	 less	 than	 a	 “political	
                                            93	Priemel,	The	Betrayal	–	The	Nuremberg	Trials	and	German	Divergence,	387.	94	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	80.	95	Allen,	‘The	Underdevelopment	of	Keynesianism	in	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany’.	
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slogan”,	 which	 had	 very	 little	 to	 do	 with	 the	 actual	 theoretical	 work	 of	 the	ordoliberals,96	who	had	 focused	more	on	 the	price	mechanism	and	often	 rather	aggressively	opposed	welfare	systems	and	popular	democracy.97	When	writing	of	the	 social	 policies	 launched	 by	 the	 ordoliberal	 Alfred	 Müller-Armack	 (1901	 –	1978),	who	had	coined	the	phrase	“social	market	economy”	and	later	joined	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Tribe	writes:		 “The	comprehensiveness	of	this	programme	of	reform	is	no	less	striking	than	the	complete	absence	of	its	discussion	and	elaboration	by	Müller-Armack	himself	or	by	any	of	his	colleagues;	discussion	which	might	be	thought	necessary	given	the	potential	conflict	between	many	of	the	proposals	(for	example	that	concerning	a	‘market-based	equalisation	of	incomes	to	remove	harmful	differences	in	income	and	wealth’)	and	the	usual	strictures	on	the	impairment	of	the	price	mechanism.”98		The	analysis	is	supported	by	several	other	scholars,	who	see	the	idea	of	a	social	market	economy	in	post-war	West	Germany	as	little	more	than	a	PR	campaign.	The	welfare	state	measures	introduced	in	West	Germany	could	thus	be	seen	largely	as	against	the	ideas	of	the	ordoliberal	thinkers	and	a	result	of	compromise	with	other	forces.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 admission,	 because	 it	 counters	 the	 notion	 that	ordoliberalism	and	early	neoliberalism	was	a	form	of	social	liberalism,	when	it	was	actually	framed	as	an	attack	on	the	ideas	of	social	liberalism.	
	
The	problems	and	chances	of	European	federation	Thursday	April	3rd	was	the	third	day	of	 the	conference,	and	unlike	 the	previous	days,	only	one	session	was	scheduled:	a	discussion	on	the	problems	and	chances	of	European	Federation,	following	on	from	Hayek’s	1939	essay	and	the	very	fluid	political	situation	 in	Europe.	The	discussion	took	place	 in	the	morning,	and	was	introduced	by	Bertrand	de	 Jouvenel,	 the	aristocrat	and	 former	 fascist,	who	was	able	 to	 rebrand	 himself	 as	 a	 liberal	 in	 the	 years	 immediately	 after	 the	war.	 As	mentioned,	one	of	the	main	common	points	between	the	liberals	and	an	upper	class	fascist	sympathizer	like	de	Jouvenel	was	distrust	of	democracy.	Another	point	in	
                                            96	Tribe,	Strategies	of	Economic	Order	-	German	Economic	Discourse,	1750	-	1950,	203–5.	97	Ibid.,	240.	98	Ibid.,	236.	
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common	was	Europeanism	and	the	goal	of	European	federation,	and	the	two	are	not	completely	unconnected.	In	A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Daniel	Knegt	discusses	the	Europeanist	character	of	the	fascism	of	the	two	French	intellectuals	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	and	de	Jouvenel.	Fabre-Luce	remained	on	the	extreme	right	after	the	war,	whereas	Jouvenel	found	a	new	home	in	the	organization	meeting	in	his	newfound	Swiss	neighborhood.	Knegt	writes:			 “Thanks	 to	 his	 Swiss	 exile,	 Jouvenel	 was	 quickest	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 new	 circumstances.	 In	 his	influential	 magnum	 opus	 Du	 Pouvoir,	 he	 adopted	 a	 sceptical	 form	 of	 right-wing	 liberalism,	convinced	that	both	state	power	and	the	essentially	irrational	character	of	the	masses	could	easily	lead	to	tyranny.	Outside	France,	this	analysis	caught	the	attention	of	neoliberal	academics	such	as	Friedrich	Hayek	and	Wilhelm	Röpke,	who	were	equally	sceptical	of	democratic	society’s	potential	of	survival.	Jouvenel	was	quickly	integrated	in	these	international	circles	and	became	a	founding	member	of	the	neoliberal	Mont	Pèlerin	Society	in	1947.	At	the	same	time,	he	continued	to	associate	himself	with	extreme-	rightist	and	even	royalist	newspapers	and	reviews.”99				
Du	 Pouvoir	 appeared	 in	 1945,	 and	 in	 it,	 Jouvenel	 wrote	 of	 “totalitarian	democracy”,100	and	claimed	that	liberty	instead	had	“aristocratic	roots”.101	Jouvenel	and	Röpke	apparently	met	for	lunch	at	the	conference	venue,	the	Hotel	du	Parc,	several	 times	 during	 and	 after	 the	war,	 and	 they	 corresponded	 intensely	 from	around	1944.	The	two	found	each	other	in	mutual	despair	over	the	rise	of	mass	democracy,	and	in	a	review	of	Röpkes	Deutsche	Frage,	Jouvenel	wrote:	”(…)	certain	poisons	 are	 capable	 of	 a	 prodigious	 effect	 on	 the	 modern	 masses.	 Vast	 crowd	movements	can	be	caused,	not	by	appealing	to	reason,	but	through	a	stimulation	of	anger	and	hope	that	truly	is	a	demonic	art.”	Jouvenel	argued	that	those	who	were	“motivated	by	generous	intentions”	and	wanted	to	extend	the	state	apparatus	for	social	 means,	 should	 ask	 themselves	 “if	 they	 are	 not	 preparing	 a	 prodigious	dungeon	for	other	madmen.”102	It	was	its	anti-democratic	character	that	attracted	De	Jouvenel	to	the	neoliberal	project,	and	Knegt	writes:			
                                            99	Knegt,	‘A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	and	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	between	Liberalism,	Fascism	and	Europeanism	(1930-1954)’,	42.	100	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel,	On	Power	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1962),	254–81.	101	Ibid.,	317–36.	102	Knegt,	‘A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	and	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	between	Liberalism,	Fascism	and	Europeanism	(1930-1954)’,	219.	
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“Just	 how	 much	 Jouvenel	 and	 Röpke	 agreed	 on	 the	 dangerous	 irrationality	 of	 the	 masses	 is	illustrated	 by	 another	 long	 article	 in	 Curieux	 in	 which	 Jouvenel	 introduced	 Röpke’s	 work	 to	 a	French-speaking	audience.	Citing	Röpke,	Jouvenel	deplored	that	the	introduction	of	democracy	in	the	nineteenth	century	had	coincided	with	the	decline	of	aristocratic	individualism	and	the	rise	of	the	hordes.	From	that	moment,	it	had	become	useless	to	‘reason	with	individual	common	sense’	but	one	had	to	‘excite	collective	fever’	instead.	“Citizens	want	laws	and	magistrates,	the	masses	want	myths	and	heroes:	they	tend	towards	totalitarianism	with	a	movement	required	by	their	nature	as	masses.	Whoever	wants	to	fight	this	has	to	study	the	phenomenon	of	swarming	[grégarisme].”103			This	was	indeed	the	same	argument	that	Hayek	and	Röpke	made,	but	it	was	also	an	echo	of	Benjamin	Constant’s	writings	on	“modern	freedom”;	of	Gustave	Le	Bon’s	(1841	 –	 1931)	 writings	 on	 “mob	 rule”;	 José	 Ortega	 y	 Gasset’s	 (1883	 –	 1955)	writings	on	“the	rebellion	of	the	masses”;	Tocqueville’s	idea	of	the	tyranny	of	the	majority	 and	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 liberal	 critiques	 of	 democracy	 discussed	 in	 the	introduction	 and	 Chapter	 2	 of	 this	 thesis..	 “We	 have	 got	 a	 long	 way	 to	 go	intellectually	before	we	shake	liberalism	free	from	Ricardianism,”	wrote	Jouvenel	to	 Röpke	 on	 November	 28,	 1946.104	 It	 is	 somewhat	 unclear	 what	 he	meant	 by	“Ricardianism”,	but	it	is	clear	that	early	neoliberals	like	De	Jouvenel	were	engaged	in	a	project	to	change	liberalism.		Unfortunately,	de	Jouvenel	did	not	give	a	manuscript	for	his	introduction,	and	we	are	 thus	 left	 with	 the	 very	 short	 opening	 remarks	 by	 Maurice	 Allais	 and	 the	discussion	 following	 Jouvenel’s	 remarks.	 Allais	 opened	 the	 proceedings	 by	claiming	it	was	a	great	error	not	to	realize	that	liberalism	implies	an	international	outlook.	According	to	Allais,	federalism	could	not	be	accomplished	in	a	single	blow,	and	there	would	still	be	separate	states	for	some	time	to	come.	He	claimed	that	the	main	obstacle	to	federalism	was	what	he	referred	to	as	“the	irrational	attitude”	of	people	who	themselves	were	federalists	but	assumed	that	other	people	were	not.	He	thus	seemed	to	think	there	was	actual	support	for	federalism,	but	inferred	that	it	was	 impossible	 to	envisage	a	 federated	system	based	on	the	existing	national	systems.	Unlike	in	the	USA,	this	was	a	question	of	 fundamental	difficulty	for	the	
                                            103	Ibid.,	224.	104	Ibid.,	221.	
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issue	of	a	federation	in	Western	Europe.	He	claimed	that	the	nineteenth	century	had	been	a	century	of	growth	for	monopolies	of	power,	something	he	claimed	could	not	have	happened	if	not	for	the	growth	of	nationalist	feeling.	We	see	that	it	was	also	clear	to	Allais	that	powerful,	(democratic)	nation	states	were	a	problem,	and	he	saw	this	problem	as	connected	to	nationalism.			
Discussion	The	 Belgian	 industrialist	 Henri	 de	 Lovinfosse	 was	 the	 first	 to	 speak	 in	 the	discussion,	and	he	ventured	that	two	types	of	unions	were	possible.	These	were	an	economic	union	and	a	political	union.	According	to	him,	Belgium’s	road	was	the	economic	 one,	 something	 he	 thought	 would	 show	 the	 way	 to	 international	development.	He	envisioned	a	European	union	with	common	laws	in	two	phases:	the	first	was	economic	and	would	make	separate	economies	interdependent,	and	the	 second	 phase	 would	 be	 political.	 Lovinfosse	 considered	 this	 a	 practical	suggestion,	and	in	hindsight	it	was	not	very	far	from	the	actual	attempted	process	of	European	integration	-	from	economic	cooperation	to	a	steadily	closer	legal	and	political	union.	Allais	then	claimed	that	there	were	enormous	difficulties	involved	in	an	economic	union	between	industrial	and	agricultural	states,	but	suggested	a	sort	 of	 quota	 system.	 Lovinfosse	 agreed	 that	 there	 were	 difficulties,	 especially	because	the	monetary	and	capital	situation	of	the	different	countries	had	been	very	badly	affected	by	the	war.	He	suggested	that	a	Belgium-Holland	union	might	be	the	first	step	and	that	France	and	Denmark	might	later	join	in	-	first	economically,	then	politically.	The	Dane,	Carl	 Iversen,	then	noted	that	there	would	be	an	enormous	economic	advantage	in	abolishing	trade	walls	between	the	different	countries,	but	that	 he	 did	 not	 feel	 convinced	 about	 insisting	 on	 a	 complete	 union	 for	 purely	economic	 reasons.	 Felix	Morley	 then	 suggested	 that	 there	was	 a	 parallel	 to	 the	development	 of	 a	 customs	 and	 political	 union	 in	 the	 USA.	While	 the	 American	colonies	may	have	had	a	common	language	and	what	he,	interestingly,	referred	to	as	a	“common	racial	basis”,	Europe	had	an	enormous	advance	in	communications.	According	to	Morley	it	was	all	about	will,	and	he	claimed	that	the	Americans	at	the	
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meeting	had	more	unity	than	the	Europeans	seemed	to	realize.	Morley	believed	it	was	possible	to	achieve	a	union	if	the	will	was	there,	but	asked	“why	start	from	the	economic	union	and	not	grasp	the	whole	nettle	firmly?”	François	 Trevoux	 then	 said	 that	 there	 were	 two	 sorts	 of	 international	 ideas,	communism	 and	 liberalism,	 and	 the	weakness	 of	 liberalism	 lay	 in	 its	 lack	 of	 a	mystique.	Hayek	 then	 entered	 the	debate	making	 the	 key	point	 that	 federalism	required	a	transfer	of	power	to	the	federal	level.	In	that	way,	federalism	implied	a	necessary	 restriction	 on	 the	 powers	 any	 of	 the	 governments	 can	 exercise.	According	to	him,	federation	was	only	practicable	in	a	liberal	society,	and	he	made	it	quite	clear	what	he	meant	by	“liberal”	by	quoting	Lord	Acton:		
“Of	all	checks	on	democracy,	federation	has	been	the	most	efficacious	and	the	most	congenial….	The	federal	 system	 limits	 and	 restrains	 the	 sovereign	 power	 by	 dividing	 it	 and	 by	 assigning	 to	Government	only	certain	defined	rights.	It	is	the	only	method	of	curbing	not	only	the	majority	but	the	power	of	the	whole	people”.			For	 Hayek,	 federalism	was	 the	 perfect	 way	 to	 curb	 democracy	 and	 arrive	 at	 a	liberal,	rule-based	society.	This	was	precisely	the	point	he	had	made	in	his	1939	essay,	where	he	argued	that	the	members	of	a	diverse	federation	would	only	be	able	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 most	 general	 of	 policies.105	 Thus	 the	 very	 structure	 of	 a	federation	 could	 be	 designed	 to	 avoid	 democratic	 interference	 with	 market	mechanisms,	 something	 which	 makes	 quite	 clear	 why	 federation	 and	 close	European	 co-operation	 were	 so	 high	 on	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda.	 The	 distrust	 of	democracy	 also	 explains	 why	 an	 aristocratic	 former	 fascist	 sympathizer	 like	Jouvenel	was	attracted	to	a	neoliberalism,	which	also	chimed	well	with	his	pan-Europeanism.	The	idea	of	a	future	European	federation	to	ensure	a	liberal	society	not	hampered	by	popular	democracy	was	already	present	in	the	writings	of	Lord	Acton,	and	as	we	will	see,	also	in	the	federated	Swiss	republic.		
                                            105	Hayek,	Individualism	and	Economic	Order,	255–72.	
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Exploring	roots	A	new	Europe	was	in	the	making,	and	the	neoliberals	wanted	to	play	a	part	in	how	it	was	going	to	be.	They	were	clear	about	the	need	for	a	new	liberalism,	but	it	is	also	 clear	 that	 they	built	on	previous	 forms	of	elitist	 liberalism	and	critiques	of	democracy.	An	interesting	case	in	point	is	the	choice	of	excursion	for	the	afternoon	of	the	day	of	the	discussion	on	European	federation.	The	neoliberals	travelled	some	75	kilometres	to	the	Castle	of	Coppet,	just	outside	Geneva.106	The	castle	had	once	been	the	home	of	Jacques	Necker,	the	Swiss	born	finance	minister	to	Louis	XVI,	and	the	main	attraction	of	the	castle	is	the	tomb	of	Necker	and	his	wife,	whose	remains	have	 been	 preserved	 in	 alcohol.107	 Another	 resident	 of	 the	 castle	 was	 Necker’s	daughter,	Germaine	de	Staël,	better	known	as	Madame	de	Staël.	She	had	gone	into	exile	at	Coppet	as	early	as	1793,	and	in	1802,	after	the	publication	of	her	critical	novel	Delphine,	she	was	officially	expelled	from	Paris	by	Napoleon.	She	started	the	famous	Coppet	group,	whose	most	famous	members	was	Staël’s	lover,	none	other	than	the	previously	mentioned	liberal	critic	of	democracy	and	universal	suffrage	Benjamin	Constant.108	At	 the	castle	by	the	 lake,	 the	Coppet	group	were	not	only	happy	to	enjoy	the	“modern	 liberty”	as	theorized	by	Constant;	but	also	engaged	themselves	 politically	 through	 discussion,	 writing	 and	 the	 shaping	 of	 political	opinion	 in	 France	 and	 Germany.	 There	 were	 indeed	 lineages	 from	 this	 grand	building	along	 the	Geneva	Lake	 to	 the	 slightly	 less	grand	one	 in	which	 the	 first	members	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	had	gathered.	Their	meeting	in	1947	provides	a	 fascinating	 example	 of	 the	 many-layered,	 intertwined	 processes	 of	 history-making	through	history-writing.	The	members	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	sought	to	 reinvent	 liberalism	 and	 preserve	 western	 civilization	 and	 liberal	 ideals	 in	 a	modern	world.	While	doing	so,	they	paid	homage	to	those	liberal	thinkers	who	had	
                                            106	London	School	of	Economics	Library	and	Archives,	Lionel	Robbins	Collection,	Box	10,	Folder	2,	”Excursions”	107	Sonja	Boon,	The	Life	of	Madame	Necker	(New	York:	Routledge,	2016),	128;	Morroe	(ed.)	Berger,	Germaine	de	Staël	-	Politics,	Literature	and	National	Character	(New	Jersey:	Transaction	Publishers,	2000),	24.	108	See	Renee	Winegarten,	Germaine	de	Staël	&	Benjamin	Constant	-	A	Dual	Biography	(New	Haven	and	London:	Yale	University	Press,	2011).	
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to	escape	the	“tyranny	of	the	majority”	in	order	to	write	their	tracts	on	the	dangers	of	 the	 masses	 from	 secluded	 chateaus	 in	 Switzerland.	 It	 was	 this	 branch	 of	liberalism,	 which	 condemned	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 mass	 democracy	 as	dangerous	perversions	of	the	ideals	of	liberty,	that	the	neoliberal	economists	and	philosophers	of	1947	sought	to	build	on	in	making	markets	the	prime	mediators	of	modern	society.		The	following	day	was	reserved	for	a	discussion	on	“Liberalism	and	Christianity”.	Hayek	had	signalled	early	on	that	much	 like	Röpke,	he	wanted	to	unite	his	new	liberalism	 with	 Christian	 thought,	 and	 he	 was	 followed	 in	 this	 by	 the	 deeply	religious	Walter	Eucken,	who	chaired	the	session.	Despite	wanting	to	create	a	new	liberalism,	these	three	thinkers	shared	a	very	traditional	outlook	and	feared	the	rise	of	what	Röpke	called	“proletarianization”.109	Like	the	Austrians,	the	German	ordoliberals	 felt	 they	 were	 living	 through	 a	 crisis	 of	 civilization,	 and	 were	confronting	“the	problems	of	modernity”.110	Their	conservative	outlook	made	them	look	 to	 Christianity,	 but	 in	 the	 session	 their	 plans	were	 somewhat	 derailed	 by	Frank	Knight,	who	 struck	 a	 provocative,	 anti-religious	 note	 in	 his	 introduction,	claiming	that	liberalism	was	scientific	and	that	religion	had	proved	itself	to	be	anti-liberal.	 This	 lead	 to	 a	 confused	discussion	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 science,	liberalism,	socialism	and	religion,	which	ended	with	Eucken	claiming	that	from	his	Christian	 viewpoint,	 he	 regarded	 the	 competitive	 order	 as	 essential.	 The	theological	 connection	between	Christianity	and	 the	ordoliberal	conception	of	a	competitive	order	remained	rather	blurred,	however.	Eucken	further	claimed	that	the	main	victims	of	the	Nazi	oppression	had	all	been	liberals,	but	at	the	same	time	Christians.	In	the	wake	of	the	mass	extermination	of	Jews	and	also	various	forms	of	 communists	 and	 social	 democrats	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Nazis,	 it	 is	 somewhat	
                                            109	For	a	sympathetic	discussion	of	these	ideas,	see	for	instance	Ralph	Ancil,	‘Roepke	and	the	Restoration	of	Property:	The	Proletarianized	Market’,	The	Imaginative	Conservative,	9	October	2012,	http://www.theimaginativeconservative.org/2012/10/roepke-proletarianized-market.html.	110	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	and	Context	of	Austrian	
Economics	Reconsidered,	89.	
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difficult	to	comprehend	this	rather	stunning	statement,	but,	as	noted	earlier,	it	was	of	 vital	 importance	 for	 the	 German	 ordoliberals	 to	 present	 themselves	 as	 the	victims	of	Nazi	rule.	Eucken’s	comment	suggests	that	he	truly	saw	things	in	this	way,	although	my	analysis	has	sketched	a	different	picture.	The	attendees	used	the	rest	of	 the	Friday	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	 forming	a	permanent	 organization,	 an	 ongoing	 discussion	 of	 the	 meeting	 that	 will	 be	addressed	 in	the	next	chapter.	 	The	week-end	was	spent	on	an	excursion	to	the	canton	 of	 Schwyz,	 some	 250	 kilometres	 away	 from	 Mont	 Pèlerin.111	 This	 visit	serves	 as	 another	 insight	 into	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	neoliberals	wanted	 a	new	Europe	 to	 embody	 some	 of	 the	 things	 they	 cherished	 the	 most	 about	 its	 past,	namely	Christianity	and	Swiss	federalism.	The	canton	is	named	after	the	town	of	Schwyz,	and	together	with	Uri	and	Unterwalden	it	was	one	of	the	founding	cantons	of	Switzerland.	In	fact,	the	federation’s	German	name,	Die	Schweitz	is	derived	from	Schwyz,	and	the	famous	Swiss	flag	is	modelled	after	its	coat	of	arms.	The	canton	held	a	leading	role	in	the	unification,	and	the	Swiss	Federal	Charter	from	1291,	the	
Bundesbrief,	 had	 been	 on	 display	 in	 the	 Bundesbriefmuseum	 since	 1936.112	 Yet	again,	it	was	a	fitting	destination	for	the	neoliberals,	both	in	light	of	the	fetishizing	of	Switzerland	as	a	liberal	Utopia	that	especially	Röpke,	Rappard	and	to	a	certain	extent	 Hayek	 were	 responsible	 for,	 but	 also	 in	 light	 of	 their	 discussions	 on	federation	 as	 a	means	 of	 keeping	 democracy	 in	 check	 and	 stopping	 centralized	economic	planning	and	redistribution.	The	attendees	travelled	by	train	and	stayed	overnight.	They	also	visited	the	famous	abbey	of	Einsiedeln,	north-west	of	the	town	of	Schwyz.	It	was	the	day	before	Easter	Sunday,	and	the	conference	attendees	took	part	in	a	famous	resurrection	ritual	and	listened	to	choral	and	organ	music.113	In	light	of	 the	proclaimed	desire	by	 the	ordoliberals,	Hayek	and	people	 like	Frank	
                                            111	London	School	of	Economics	Library	and	Archives,	Lionel	Robbins	Collection,	Box	10,	Folder	2,	”Excursions”	112	Oliver	Landoldt,	‘Schwyz	(Kanton)’,	Historisches	Lexicon	Der	Schweiz	(Bern:	HLS,	5	2017),	http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D7385.php.	113	London	School	of	Economics	Library	and	Archives,	Lionel	Robbins	Collection,	Box	10,	Folder	2,	”Excursions”	
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Graham,	 that	 liberalism	 needed	 to	 ally	 itself	 with	 Christianity,	 this	 too	 seems	perfectly	apt.	In	Hayek’s	planning	of	the	sessions	and	Hunold’s	planning	of	their	setting,	little	was	left	to	coincidence.			The	question	of	a	new	Europe	was	very	much	the	backdrop	of	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	Part	I	and	the	previous	two	chapters	has	shown	that	their	main	 ideas	were	 embodied	 in	 the	 dual	 argument,	 and	 the	 quest	 to	 find	 a	 new	liberalism	where	state	 intervention	was	used	not	 to	redistribute	wealth	or	cure	capitalism’s	ills,	but	rather	to	make	markets	more	competitive.	In	this	chapter,	we	have	seen	that	neoliberal	ideas	about	the	future	of	Europe	also	included	ideas	of	a	federation	to	curb	the	powers	of	popular	democracy,	and	a	desire	to	unite	their	creed	with	Christianity.	The	degree	to	which	the	early	neoliberals	were	grappling	with	 the	 issues	 posed	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 mass	 democracy	 and	 modernity	 is	 clear.	Scholars	who	 see	 fascism	as	 a	 phenomenon	 related	 to	modernism	 claim	 that	 it	included	 a	 desire	 to	 channel	 the	 energies	 of	 modernity	 into	 paths	 defined	 by	tradition.	Like	socialism	and	communism,	fascism	was	a	modern	creed	for	a	“brave	new	 world”,	 but	 it	 was	 also	 one	 explicitly	 wanting	 to	 maintain	 or	 reinstate	traditional	 forms	 of	 hierarchies.114	 The	 neoliberals’	 appeals	 to	 Christianity	 and	property	shows	that	they	were	engaged	in	a	parallel	project,	fuelled	by	a	similar	animosity	towards	socialism,	and	a	similar	recognition	that	things	would	have	to	change	in	a	modern	world.	Fascism	offered	corporatism	and	submission	to	strong	leaders	 as	 a	 non-socialist	 solution	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 modernity;	 whereas	neoliberalism	favoured	market	mechanisms	and	a	strong	state	charged	with	their	protection	and	maintenance.	These	are	very	different,	non-socialist	solutions,	and	I	am	in	no	way	claiming	that	fascism	and	neoliberalism	are	the	same	thing.	The	two	did	however	arise	from	the	same	context,	and	the	analysis	of	this	chapter,	along	with	that	of	Chapter	2,	has	shown	that	some	of	the	analysis	on	which	they	rested	is	more	similar	than	what	is	suggested	by	the	binary	opposition	between	liberalism	
                                            114	See	for	instance	Griffin,	Modernism	and	Fascism	-	The	Sense	of	a	Beginning	Under	
Mussolini	and	Hitler.	
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and	“totalitarianism”	that	we	are	sometimes	offered.			 	
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Chapter	7	–	The	second	week	
	 						
	
	 	 	 “PROFESSOR	BRANDT:	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society?		 	 	 Dr.	POPPER:	That	is	meaningless.”		 	 	 	Excerpt	 from	 the	 very	 last	 discussion	 of	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 meeting.	Subheading:	“What	should	be	the	TITLE	OF	THE	ORGANISATION?”		(1947)		
	
	
	
	This	 chapter	will	 look	at	 the	second	week	of	 sessions,	which	had	not	been	pre-programmed	by	Hayek	in	advance.	The	analysis	of	the	dual	argument	from	Part	I	is	also	instructive	in	this	chapter,	as	it	will	become	clear	that	a	recurring	topic	in	many	sessions	was	the	problem	of	creating	a	liberal	form	of	interventionism.	Mises	continued	 to	 insist	 that	 all	 interventionism	 was	 negative,	 thus	 frustrating	 the	efforts	of	Hayek	and	the	other	participants,	who	wanted	to	move	beyond	laissez-faire	and	create	a	liberalism	that	used	states	in	the	service	of	market	mechanisms.	Mises	was	given	support	by	some	of	the	American	think	tank	employees,	and	in	a	key	intervention,	Loren	Miller	would	argue	that	the	neoliberals	themselves	were	guilty	of	proposing	a	planned	economy.	The	discussions	on	wages,	 trade	unions	and	poverty	also	revealed	some	of	the	profoundly	right-wing	sensibilities	of	this	group	of	thinkers.	This	shows	the	extent	to	which	neoliberalism	was	not	a	form	of	social	liberalism,	even	if	they	did	discuss	ways	of	using	the	state.		The	program	for	the	second	week	was	as	follows:	
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	Monday	April	7th:	Afternoon:	Contra-Cyclical	Measures,	Full	Employment	&	Monetary	Reform		Tuesday	April	8th:	Morning:	Wage	Policy	&	Trade	Unions	Evening:	Taxation,	Poverty	&	Income	Distribution		Wednesday	April	9th:	Morning:	Agricultural	Policy	Afternoon:	Discussion	of	Organisation	of	permanent	body	Evening:	The	Present	Political	Crisis		Thursday	April	10th:	Discussion	 and	 adoption	 of	 “Memorandum	 of	 Association”	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	Sociey		In	 addition	 to	 analysing	 these	 sessions,	 this	 chapter	 looks	 at	 the	 series	 of	discussions	which	were	held	 throughout	 the	week	regarding	a	public	statement	and	 the	 future	 of	 the	 organization.	 As	 indicated	 in	 the	 epigraph,	 the	 attendees	struggled	to	agree	on	a	name	for	their	organization,	and	as	we	will	see,	the	later	history	of	neoliberalism	abounds	with	confusion	over	which	label	to	attach	to	the	intellectual	creed	and	political	project	emanating	from	Mont	Pèlerin.	This	chapter	will	also	be	used	to	summarize	the	whole	conference	with	some	key	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis	of	the	discussions.		
	
Economic	policy	The	three	first	sessions	of	the	second	week	all	focused	on	issues	directly	concerned	with	economics	and	economic	policy.	The	Monday	afternoon	session	on	Contra-Cyclical	Measures,	Full	Employment	and	Monetary	Reform	 incorporated	no	 less	
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than	 three	 large	 sets	 of	 issues	 within	 economics	 grouped	 together	 into	 one	discussion.	This	format	led	to	a	fragmented	discussion,	in	which	the	attendees	also	disagreed	as	to	whether	or	not	the	issues	were	even	connected	or	needed	to	be	discuss	separately,	and	if	so	in	which	order.	These	issues	were	certainly	amongst	those	which	had	most	occupied	the	economists	among	the	conference	attendees	in	the	1930s,	therefore	many	of	them	had	extensive	experience	and	differing	views	on	many	of	the	subjects.	It	is	often	observed	that	Hayek	turned	away	from	“pure”	economics	 shortly	 after	 his	 Austrian	 Business	 Cycle	 Theory	 had	 been	 heavily	criticized	 by	 Keynes’	 close	 associate	 Piero	 Sraffa	 in	 a	 review	 of	 Prices	 and	
Production	in	1931;	he	subsequently	“failed”	to	respond	to	Keynes’	General	Theory	in	1936.1	Hayek	did	not	speak	in	the	discussion,	and	neither	did	Mises.	Instead	the	discussion	was	dominated	by	American	economists	and	by	Lionel	Robbins,	who	was	 highly	 influenced	 by	 Austrian	 economics	 but	 had	 made	 a	 turn	 towards	Keynesianism	in	recent	years.			George	 Stigler	 introduced	 the	 session	 and	 the	 Austrian-inspired	 Norwegian	economist	Trygve	Hoff	was	in	the	chair.2	Stigler	foresaw	a	large	split	between	the	American	 and	 Continental	 economists,	 as	 the	 USA	 was	 concerned	 with	 full	employment,	 and	 the	 continent	 with	 reconstruction.	 He	 asked	 the	 conference	attendees	if	they	could	all	agree	that	the	first	step	should	be	to	bring	all	money-making	institutions	under	the	control	of	the	state.	In	the	following	discussion	Frank	D.	Graham	wanted	to	discuss	a	proposal	of	a	commodity	reserve	money	system,	which	he	had	put	forward	in	his	1942	book	Social	Goals	and	Economic	Institutions,	another	book	from	this	period	which	put	forward	the	dual	argument.3	After	some	discussion	between	 the	Americans	 and	Lionel	Robbins,	Wilhelm	Röpke	became	impatient,	and	asked	why	the	problem	was	even	being	discussed.	According	to	him	unemployment	was	a	much	more	serious	question,	and	one	on	which	the	group	
                                            1	Caldwell,	Hayek’s	Challenge,	179–81;	Wapshott,	Keynes	Hayek,	110–23.	2	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	“Mont	Pèlerin	1947”	3	Frank	D.	Graham,	Social	Goals	and	Economic	Institutions	(Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1942).	
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was	divided.	Some	saw	full	employment	as	one	of	the	essential	prerequisites	of	the	time;	whereas	others	thought	that	the	influence	of	Keynes	and	his	whole	school	had	been	dangerous.	Röpke	himself	had	called	The	General	Theory	“little	short	of	satanic”	in	a	letter	to	Robbins	in	1936,	so	it	was	not	hard	to	imagine	which	side	of	this	divide	he	came	down	on.4	Röpke	favoured	what	he	called	a	rational	business	cycle	policy	in	order	to	control	the	boom,	and	only	use	Keynesian	measures	if	there	was	a	risk	of	a	secondary	depression	after	the	boom	had	run	its	course.	This	was	Röpke’s	own	version	of	the	Austrian	business	cycle	theory,	in	which	he	suggested	that	Keynesian	measures	might	actually	be	appropriate,	but	only	if	a	recession	was	so	severe	as	to	run	the	risk	of	turning	into	what	he	called	a	secondary	depression.	In	Röpke’s	synthesis	the	effectiveness	of	Keynesian	policy	measures	was	admitted,	but	there	was	also	a	claim	in	there	that	the	main	reason	for	slumps	to	occur	in	the	first	 place	 was	 due	 to	 government	 intervention	 creating	 perverse	 incentives.5	Röpke	 then	 claimed	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 instability	 was	 due	 to	 a	 highly	institutionalised,	“proletarianised”	society.	After	lengthy	interventions	by	the	likes	of	Hazlitt,	Graham	and	Robbins,	Röpke	proclaimed	that	even	if	he	believed	in	most	of	Keynes,	he	would	hesitate	to	say	so	publicly.	Against	Robbins,	Röpke	argued	that	the	great	problem	was	not	deflation,	but	inflation.	Milton	Friedman	was	the	last	to	speak	in	the	discussion,	telling	the	other	attendees	that	by	examining	the	whole	monetary	system,	it	might	be	possible	to	get	the	whole	house	in	order.	Friedman	spoke	 highly	 of	 the	 need	 for	 systems	 that	 are	 automatically	 active	 in	 terms	 of	stimuli,	and	said	everyone	ought	to	consider	getting	the	fundamental	framework	in	order.			Stigler	and	Friedman’s	interventions	pointed	towards	the	monetarism	developed	in	 the	1950s	and	60s	by	 the	Chicago	school,	which	contended	 that	monetary	as	opposed	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 ought	 to	be	 the	preferred	method	 to	 achieve	 economic	policy	goals.	Stigler’s	suggestion	that	money-making	institutions	be	put	under	the	
                                            4	London	School	of	Economics	Library	and	Archives,	Lionel	Robins	Collection,	Box	128		5	Hardhaug	Olsen,	Keynes+Hayek,	146–62.	
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control	 of	 the	 state	was	 in	 no	way	 anti-state.	 As	with	 neoliberalism	 in	 general,	monetarism	as	a	particular	aspect	of	neoliberalism	refers	to	a	different	way	of	using	
the	state,	and	Stigler	insisted	that	government	had	to	work	in	a	framework	of	law,	and	 that	 the	 results	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 through	 contra-cyclical	measures	were	 still	uncertain.	 In	 1969,	 Friedman	would	 publish	 the	 essay	 collection	 The	 Optimum	
Quantity	 of	 Money,	 giving	 rise	 to	 the	 so-called	 “Friedman-rule”	 in	 monetary	economics,	which	consists	of	setting	the	nominal	interest	rate	at	zero.6	Friedman’s	comments	 at	 the	 1947	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 meeting	 may	 be	 one	 of	 the	 first	expositions	of	the	monetarism	which	would	make	Friedman	so	famous	and	bring	neoliberalism	its	breakthrough	some	twenty-five	years	later.7		Frank	D.	Graham	was	in	the	chair	for	the	next	morning’s	session	on	Wage	Policy	&	Trade	Unions.8	The	introduction	was	held	by	Fritz	Machlup,	who	claimed	that	wage	determination,	 trade	unions	and	certain	state	 legislation	regarding	trade	unions	were	 the	 main	 serious	 obstacles	 to	 the	 working	 of	 a	 free	 order	 in	 the	 US.	 He	referred	to	how	John	Stuart	Mill	had	considered	legislation	against	trade	unions	as	government	interference,	due	to	Labour’s	natural	disadvantage	in	bargaining;	thus	the	question	again	centred	on	what	sort	of	state	actions	could	be	considered	as	interference	 in	 the	 market	 order	 and	 which	 state	 actions	 were	 important	 to	maintain	it.	Like	so	many	of	the	early	neoliberals,	Machlup	used	the	language	of	“monopoly	 power”	 when	 referring	 to	 the	 perceived	 problems	 of	 labour	organization.	 His	 view	 was	 that	 the	 size	 of	 unions	 should	 be	 restricted	 either	geographically	or	with	respect	to	one	single	plant,	in	order	to	exclude	combination	between	 the	 different	 unions.	 The	 growth	 of	 working	 class	 organization	 and	cooperation	between	unions	in	different	sectors	throughout	whole	nations	was	an	
                                            6	See	Milton	Friedman,	The	Optimum	Quantity	of	Money	(Piscataway,	New	Jersey:	Transaction	Publishers,	2005).	7	Jones,	Masters	of	the	Universe,	215–73.	8	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	(Mont	Pèlerin	1947)		
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irrational	and	dangerous	development	for	Machlup:	a	rather	clear	example	of	early	neoliberalism	as	a	defence	of	property	and	power	relations.			A	 critical	 note	 against	 Machlup’s	 uncompromising	 attitude	 was	 sounded	 by	William	 Rappard.	 He	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	 educating	 trade	 union	 leaders	 and	members	 into	 a	 conception	 of	 solidarity	 of	 both	 employers’	 and	 employees’	interests,	 in	order	 to	adapt	 them	to	 “the	needs	of	 the	modern	society”.	After	an	intervention	 by	Maurice	 Allais,	 Henri	 de	 Lovinfosse	 said	 that	 there	was	 now	 a	tendency	 to	 discuss	 firms’	 interests	with	 the	workers	 themselves.	 According	 to	him,	the	interests	of	employers	and	employees	often	converged,	and	both	realised	it.	He	went	on	to	state	that	“labourers”	naturally	aspired	to	be	a	privileged	class,	but	since	they	were	in	the	majority	this	would	not	be	possible,	as	privilege	could	only	apply	to	a	minority.	Accoring	to	him,	labourers	realised	this.	Labourers	had	also	 started	becoming	more	aware	of	 the	 relation	between	prices	 and	 costs,	 he	thought,	 adding	 that	workers	 often	 came	 to	 see	 the	 advantages	 of	 cooperation.	Lovinfosse	himself	had	often	found	that	workers	were	far	from	disinclined	to	serve	the	consumers	by	cooperating;	something	which	applied	not	only	in	the	production	of	consumers’	goods,	but	also	in	the	production	of	producers’	goods.			Some	of	the	attendees	agreed	with	this,	but	Frank	Knight	spoke	up	against	what	he	saw	as	an	idyllic	picture	of	solidarity,	which	he	thought	was	inimical	to	the	free	society	 and	 a	 free	 economic	 order.	 He	 said	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 an	 order	would	 imply	 orderliness	 and	 stability,	 something	 he	 claimed	 was	 an	 untrue	portrayal	of	the	very	dynamics	of	modern	society.	A	more	standard	laissez-faire	position	was	 then	 advocated	 by	Orval	Watts	 from	 the	 Foundation	 of	 Economic	Education,	who	 claimed	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 cycles	 had	 largely	 been	 caused	 by	government.	According	to	him,	the	maldistribution	of	labour	in	Great	Britain	was	due	to	wage	controls	and	unemployment	relief.	Had	there	been	a	free	market	for	goods	 and	 services,	 there	 would	 have	 been	 greater	 speed	 in	 removing	maldistribution.	 Stanley	 Dennison	 chimed	 in,	 claiming	 that	 neutralising	 the	
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“violence”	 of	 the	 trade	 unions	 on	 the	 picket	 line	would	 go	 a	 long	way	 towards	solving	 what	 he	 called	 the	 “labour	 problem”	 and	 removing	 the	 obstacles	 of	mobility.	 John	 Davenport	 then	 proclaimed	 that	 in	 the	 US,	 “the	 tower	 of	 labour	power	had	erupted”.	He	joined	those	who	said	that	anti-trust	laws	should	be	used	against	the	unions.	He	also	agreed	with	Machlup	that	one	should	bring	back	the	concept	of	a	company	union	or	a	plant	union.	 John	 Jewkes	then	argued	that	 the	success	 of	 the	 British	 wage	 policy	 during	 the	 war	 was	 largely	 due	 to	 the	understanding	and	restraining	influence	of	union	leaders,	which	he	thought	had	been	 continued	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 war.	 According	 to	 him	 there	 had	 been	 a	revolution	in	England,	and	the	working	classes	had	come	into	power.	In	the	main,	however,	he	thought	that	people	were	taking	the	long	view	about	wage	increases,	largely	due	to	what	he	referred	to	as	excellent	union	leadership.			Machlup	was	then	allowed	to	sum	up	the	discussion	at	the	beginning	of	the	evening	session,	 grouping	 together	 the	 opinions	 of	 professors	 Rappard,	 Polanyi	 and	Jewkes.	They	had	claimed	that	the	unions	were	there	to	stay,	and	that	one	should	hope	they	would	be	restrained	from	making	excessive	demands,	and	also	attempt	to	 educate	 union	 leaders	 and	members.	Machlup	 argued	 that	 this	 position	was	romantic,	and	that	he	could	not	see	how	a	labour	union	with	the	power	to	keep	its	members	from	starvation	would	actually	let	them	starve.	This	had	been	a	session	in	which	the	class-based	politics	of	many	of	the	attendees	were	quite	apparent,	and	Machlup	 seemed	 to	 suggest	 breaking	 up	 unions.	 There	were	 some	 attempts	 at	overcoming	this,	but	the	way	in	which	organized	labour	was	largely	treated	as	a	profound	problem	makes	 it	quite	clear	why	 the	proposed	moniker	of	 “left-wing	liberalism”	was	so	easily	dismissed	at	the	Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	some	nine	years	earlier.	An	 interesting	aspect	of	 their	discussions	 is	how	organized	 labour	was	conceptualized	as	“monopolies”,	 in	the	same	way	as	 large	corporations	had	been	 in	 previous	 sessions.	 I	 noted	 earlier	 how	 the	 neoliberals	 came	 to	 criticize	socialism	 and	 laissez-faire	 in	 a	 similar	 way,	 since	 they	 were	 both	 held	 to	 be	arrangements	that	frustrated	or	supplanted	work	of	markets.	In	a	similar	fashion,	
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the	 early	 neoliberals	 criticized	 both	 labour	 unions	 and	 large	 corporations	 as	institutions	that	corrupted	the	work	of	the	market	mechanism.	This	points	to	how	the	focus	on	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	was	an	innovation	which	lead	to	new	 types	of	 right-wing	 liberalism;	profoundly	different	 from	the	old-fashioned	notion	of	laissez-faire.	
	After	Machlup’s	summary,	the	attendees	moved	on	to	a	closely	related	theme,	that	of	taxation,	poverty	and	income	distribution.	Ludwig	von	Mises	was	in	the	chair,	and	Milton	 Friedman,	 who	 had	 suggested	 the	 topic,	 held	 the	 introduction.9	 He	linked	 the	 session	directly	 to	 the	previous	one	by	 first	 stating	 that	 there	was	 a	desire	 to	 eliminate	 poverty,	 and	 that	 measures	 to	 break	 up	 unions	 could	 only	succeed	 if	 the	 liberals	 could	offer	policies	 to	 combat	 the	 evils	 that	unions	were	designed	to	counteract.	It	was	the	problem	of	poverty	that	lay	beneath	many	of	the	lines	of	intervention	that	had	been	discussed,	he	said,	even	though	he	also	argued	that	poverty	had	 in	many	cases	been	caused	by	policy	 interventions	 in	 the	 first	place.	But	even	with	completely	free	access	to	different	employments	and	capital,	Friedman	ventured,	there	would	still	be	the	problem	of	poverty	for	what	he	called	“sub-marginal	workers”.	He	asserted	that	”Men	are	not	born	equal”,	and	further	claimed	 that	 in	 a	 large	 country,	 the	 sub-marginal	workers	would	not	be	 evenly	distributed	throughout	the	population.	He	claimed	as	a	definite	fact	that	there	were	people	unable	to	earn	even	a	minimum	income	in	the	market	place,	and	that	others	would	 have	 to	 pay	 for	 this	 help.	 No	 democratic	 society	 would	 tolerate	 people	starving	to	death	if	there	was	food	with	which	to	feed	them,	he	said,	and	this	was	the	 reason	 for	 progressive	 taxation.	 Friedman	 differed	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	techniques	for	this:	one	being	a	set	of	general	techniques	of	the	national	minimum	type,	and	the	other	being	poor	law	techniques	where	every	case	was	judged	on	its	merits.	Friedman	claimed	that	if	they	had	been	starting	from	scratch	there	would	be	 a	 case	 for	 the	 second	 type,	 but	 as	 there	was	 too	much	of	 the	 poor	 law	 type	already,	any	additional	measures	should	be	of	the	first	type.	Friedman	proposed	
                                            9	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	“Mont	Pèlerin	1947”	
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maintaining	the	types	of	progressive	 income	tax	currently	 in	 force,	but	with	the	addition	of	progressive,	negative	taxation	below	the	exemption	limit.	This	would	mean	that	if	a	man	earned	nothing,	he	would	be	given	something	by	the	state.	The	advantages	of	this	would	be	that	it	gave	an	incentive	to	get	additional	income,	and	that	 it	would	make	clear	how	much	society	would	have	 to	pay	 for	 the	poor.	He	underlined	that	this	was	meant	as	a	substitute	and	not	as	an	addition	to	present	social	policy	in	the	form	of	unemployment	relief,	old	age	pensions	and	so	on.	He	finished	by	saying	that	progressive	taxation	had	gone	too	far	in	affecting	incentives	in	the	USA,	but	that	it	seemed	“fantastic”	to	try	and	prevent	other	countries	to	use	it	at	all.	He	thought	it	would	be	easier	to	persuade	them	to	use	his	policy	and	to	be	restrained	in	the	use	of	progressive	taxation.		In	the	following	discussion,	Friedrich	Hayek	intervened	by	noting	that	Friedman	had	an	ideal	of	eliminating	poverty,	but	asked	what	he	meant	by	poverty,	and	how	far	he	could	extend	the	idea	from	rich	countries	to	poor	countries.	He	made	it	clear	that	he	doubted	whether	he	would	put	 the	phrase	 “eliminating	poverty”	 on	his	programme	as	a	liberal,	while	still	noting	that	it	was	just	impracticable	not	to	make	
some	provisions	for	the	poor.	He	was,	however,	doubtful	whether	a	certain	money	income	from	the	state	would	be	the	right	means.	Instead	he	suggested	a	voluntary	labour	service,	in	which	anyone	who	could	not	find	employment	could	do	so	at	just	under	market	rates	and	under	“semi-military	conditions”.	He	said	that	the	freedom	not	to	work	was	a	luxury	which	the	poor	country	could	not	afford,	and	suggested	the	slogan	“Duty	to	work	under	direction”.	He	added	that	one	could	refuse	to	enter	this	service	if	preferring	to	exist	“on	a	pittance”.	The	discussion	continued,	during	which	Karl	Popper	took	the	floor	to	point	out	that	Professor	Friedman’s	idea	was	an	 attractive	 alternative	 to	 socialism,	whereas	 Professor	Hayek’s	was	 not.	Why	should	 the	poor	 “get	 it	 in	 the	neck”	both	ways?	he	asked,	at	which	point	Hayek	commented	that	as	long	as	it	was	less	attractive	to	work	for	the	government	than	for	the	market,	 then	the	essential	was	already	there.	From	his	position	as	chair,	Mises	then	intervened	to	say	that	there	were	high	rates	of	allowances	in	the	USA,	
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and	asked	 if	 they	should	not	discuss	 the	problem	of	poverty	all	over	 the	world.	Speaking	rhetorically,	Mises	wondered	why	the	Chinese	and	Japanese	should	not	ask	for	this	alleviation	to	be	international.			Milton	Friedman,	to	his	credit,	actually	did	come	up	with	a	plan	for	poverty	relief.	It	was	based	on	a	rather	elitist	idea	of	there	being	such	a	thing	as	“sub-marginal”	people,	 without	 the	 skills	 needed	 for	 survival	 in	 a	 modern	 world.	 The	 way	 he	presented	 it	 to	 his	 fellow	 neoliberals	 suggested	 also	 that	 the	 most	 important	reason	for	alleviating	poverty	was	to	facilitate	the	break-up	of	unions.	Nonetheless,	it	was	a	proposal	for	how	to	deal	with	social	problems,	and	to	this	day	Friedman	is	cited	as	one	of	several	people	on	the	right	to	support	the	idea	of	a	Universal	Basic	Income	 (UBI).10	Hayek	 and	Mises	were	 less	 than	 impressed,	 however,	 and	both	questioned	whether	 fighting	 poverty	 had	 anything	 to	 do	with	 liberalism	 at	 all.	Hayek	 instead	 suggested	 “semi-military”	 employment	 for	 the	 poor,	 because	 it	would	be	“impractical”	to	simply	do	nothing	in	relation	to	problems	of	poverty.	The	more	 socially	 oriented	 Popper	 defended	 Friedman’s	 scheme	 as	 an	 attractive	alternative	to	socialism;	whereas	both	Hayek	and	Mises	suggested	that	the	fact	that	people	were	even	worse	off	in	poor	countries	should	be	enough	to	give	up	the	idea	of	alleviating	poverty	in	the	West.	These	were	intellectual	arguments,	but	it	is	hard	not	to	conclude	yet	again	that	the	social	composition	of	this	group	contributed	to	the	way	in	which	they	discussed	labour	unions	and	taxation,	 things	they	mainly	saw	 as	 problems.	 The	 notion	 that	 early	 neoliberalism	 was	 a	 form	 of	 social	liberalism11	holds	up	especially	poorly	when	compared	with	the	content	of	these	discussions.	Alleviation	of	poverty	was	not	high	on	the	agenda	in	this	group,	and	when	it	was	discussed	in	a	short	session,	it	was	in	rather	elitist	terms	and	met	with	strong	criticism.	
                                            10	John	Thornhill	and	Ralph	Atkins,	‘Universal	Basic	Income:	Money	for	Nothing’,	
Financial	Times,	26	May	2016,	https://www.ft.com/content/7c7ba87e-229f-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d.	11	Schulz-Forberg,	‘The	Intellectual	and	Institutional	Roots	of	Early	Neoliberalism’;	Nordbakken,	Liberale	Tenkere	for	Vår	Tid.	
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Agricultural	Policy	Wednesday	 April	 9th,	 the	 second	 last	 day	 of	 the	 conference	 and	 the	 last	 with	ordinary	sessions,	included	a	session	suggested	by	Michael	Polanyi	entitled	“The	Present	Political	Crisis”,	and	also	Karl	Brandt’s	suggested	session	on	“Agricultural	Policy”.	 In	 the	 first	 session	 the	 neoliberals	 mainly	 discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	nuclear	war,	a	topic	not	particularly	pertinent	for	this	analysis	of	early	neoliberal	thought.	 Perhaps	 surprisingly	however,	 the	 latter	 session	on	 agricultural	 policy	was	 to	 include	 something	 of	 a	 key	moment	 of	 the	 conference.	 Karl	 Brandt	was	himself	an	expert	on	agriculture,	and	as	we	have	seen,	the	ordoliberals	in	general,	and	Röpke	in	particular,	were	deeply	interested	in	agriculture	and	rural	life,	as	they	sought	 to	 tackle	 the	problems	of	modernity	 in	a	way	that	would	 let	people	 lead	more	 traditional	 ways	 of	 life.12	 Leonard	 Read	 of	 the	 Foundation	 for	 Economic	Education	was	 in	 the	 chair,	 and	Brandt	 opened	 the	 discussion	by	 claiming	 that	agricultural	 policy	 was	 one	 of	 the	 testing	 grounds	 of	 the	 liberal	 philosophy.	According	to	him,	farmers	more	than	any	other	class	held	a	key	position,	and	only	Marxists	thought	the	proletariat	should	hold	such	a	position.	Brandt	informed	the	audience	that	the	price	of	rye	had	begun	to	fall	in	Germany,	a	trend	which	had	lead	the	farmers	to	call	for	state	intervention	to	raise	prices;	in	the	USA,	Hoover	had	had	the	same	policies	as	Roosevelt	with	price	assurance	since	1933,	with	a	limitation	of	agricultural	production	through	quotas	and	then	price-raising.	Brandt	claimed	that	agriculture	made	two	chief	claims,	for	equality	and	security.	He	claimed	that	equality	would	lead	to	nothing	less	than	the	end	of	freedom,	but	he	did	think	that	a	 minimum	 of	 security	 would	 be	 compatible	 with	 a	 liberal	 society.	 It	 might,	however,	distort	the	whole	economic	system	and	was	therefore	very	dangerous.	This	was	the	crux	of	the	matter,	not	only	in	terms	of	agricultural	policy,	but	also	for	the	 neoliberal	 project	 of	 intervening	 in	 markets	 in	 order	 to	 save	 them	 from	intervention.	Brandt	pointed	to	how	the	competitive	economy	had	a	procedure	of	reward	and	penalty,	so	that	by	loss	and	bankruptcy	those	who	fail	were	eliminated.	
                                            12	Zmirak,	Wilhelm	Röpke	-	Swiss	Localist,	Global	Economist,	163–207.	
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By	and	 large	people	accepted	this,	said	Brandt,	but	 this	ethic	was	 thought	 to	be	wrong	when	even	the	best	farmers	failed	to	make	profits.	He	explained	how	the	credit	structure	in	agriculture	was	very	rigid,	making	it	hard	to	make	adjustments	without	 thousands	 of	 families	 losing	 their	 livelihood.	 The	 time	 measure	 for	adjustments	of	scale	in	agriculture	was	years,	so	the	prevention	of	collapse	had	to	begin	at	the	start	of	an	upswing.	Brandt	therefore	thought	that	in	the	special	case	of	 agriculture,	 it	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 ask	 for	 state	 regulatory	 supervision	 of	mortgages,	all	the	while	emphasizing	that	he	was	strictly	against	any	impediments	of	the	rights	of	creditors	in	any	other	way.	In	this	way,	farmers	would	pay	increased	interest	 rates	 in	 the	 boom	 and	 lower	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	 slump,	which	would	diminish	the	bad	effects	of	the	rigidities	of	the	credit	structure.			Once	again	the	question	was	one	of	arguing	against	“interventions”	and	for	“liberal	values”,	while	at	the	same	time	claiming	that	certain	policies	were	necessary	and	somehow	also	defendable	within	their	liberal	framework.	Brandt	underlined	again	that	he	did	not	want	“artificial”	profits	for	agriculture	with	quotas	and	restrictions.	Much	like	Friedman’s	ideas	of	automatic	systems,	Brandt	was	trying	to	make	a	plan	with	 the	 feature	 of	 automatism.	 This	 would	 leave	 the	 market	 entirely	 free,	 he	claimed,	 but	where	 the	 government,	 remote	 from	 the	market,	was	 prepared	 to	underwrite	 a	 minimum	 level	 of	 income	 based	 upon	 commodity	 prices.	 Brandt	finished	the	outline	of	his	proposal	by	stating	that	winning	the	farmers	back	to	the	idea	of	a	free	economy	seemed	very	important	to	him;	apparently	this	had	to	be	done	by	inserting	some	measures	into	this	“free”	economy,	so	that	it	would	not	be	so	utterly	difficult	for	them.		In	 the	 discussion	 that	 followed,	 Aaron	 Director	 was	 quick	 to	 tie	 the	 issue	 of	agricultural	policy	 to	other	discussions	held	 the	 same	week,	by	 referring	 to	 the	hesitation	 expressed	 the	 preceding	 night	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 minimum	 incomes.	Unlike	Brandt,	Director	seemed	to	think	of	farmers	in	the	same	way	he	thought	of	workers,	and	he	claimed	that	the	challenge	to	democracy	in	the	US	came	from	these	
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groups	organised	on	occupational	lines,	and	that	the	pressure	of	these	“minority	groups”	was	only	increasing.	According	to	him,	fluctuations	in	the	economy	as	a	whole	affected	agriculture	and	not	the	other	way	around,	so	that	if	the	problem	of	general	oscillations	could	be	solved,	there	would	be	no	problem	of	agriculture	at	all.	Wilhelm	Röpke,	who	as	we	have	mentioned	was	known	for	his	traditionalism	and	 romanticizing	 of	 agricultural	 life,	 said	 there	 was	 a	 tendency	 to	 look	 at	agriculture	as	any	other	 industry.	He	claimed	that	more	and	more	 liberals	were	coming	to	believe	the	opposite,	that	agriculture	was	“a	way	of	life.”	He	proclaimed	to	no	longer	be	so	interested	in	agriculture	as	such,	but	rather	in	the	social	life	of	the	 family	 farm.	 This	 had	 led	 him	 to	 think	 that	 it	would	 be	wise	 to	 have	 units	smaller	than	would	otherwise	be	rational	for	normal	business	standards.	Through	a	 family	 farm	 system,	 one	 would	 avoid	 the	 “proletarian	 nomads	 of	industrialisation”,	 he	 thought.	 Röpke	 then	 pointed	 to	 a	 general	 tension	 in	 right	wing	thought,	when	he	stated	that	liberals	wanted	to	do	justice	to	the	social	way	of	life	of	 the	 farmer,	while	at	 the	same	 time	not	wanting	 to	associate	himself	with	reactionary	 policies.	 He	 stated	 that	 it	 was	 the	 family	 farm	which	 provided	 the	optimum	form	of	agricultural	production	in	industrial	countries,	and	according	to	Röpke	 this	required	 land	policies,	 credit	policies,	and	policies	of	succession	and	tenure.	He	thus	agreed	fundamentally	with	Brandt.			Loren	 Miller	 then	 returned	 to	 the	 previous	 days’	 discussion	 on	 tolerable	 and	minimum	standards,	asking	Brandt	how	he	would	define	these.	He	asked	why	not	
everyone	should	be	insured	against	the	vicissitudes	of	the	markets	if	farmers	could	be.	 A	 key	 moment	 arrived,	 when	 Miller	 finished	 his	 intervention	 by	 asking	rhetorically	what	the	total	sum	of	all	the	interventions	which	had	been	suggested	during	 the	conference	 really	would	be.	Would	 it	not	be	a	planned	economy?	he	asked.	It	appeared	as	if	the	think	tank	man	from	New	York	had	stumbled	upon	the	basic	contradiction	of	the	dual	argument.		
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Things	were	 heating	 up	 now,	 and	 Karl	 Brandt	 exclaimed	 that	 the	 essence	 of	 a	liberal	economy	was	not	to	construct	a	100%	logical	machine	purely	because	the	Nazis	 had	 done	 so.	With	 this	 he	 seemed	 to	 suggest	 that	 neoliberals	 should	 be	pragmatic,	 and	 accept	 some	 state	 intervention	 when	 it	 could	 be	 considered	expedient.	After	a	lengthy	intervention	by	Robbins,	Hayek	took	the	floor	and	said	that	he,	like	Loren	Miller,	was	alarmed	at	the	aspect	of	considering	problems	one	by	 one,	 which	 indeed	 was	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 second	 week	 of	 non-pre-programmed	sessions	had	been	going.	He	stated	that	the	primary	task	should	be	to	clear	out	their	minds	on	what	principles	they	would	like	to	see	applied	if	they	had	a	free	hand,	and	to	make	it	clear	what	concessions	they	considered	to	be	politically	expedient	at	 the	present	moment.	According	 to	Hayek,	 it	was	already	a	definite	ethical	judgement	to	say	that	everyone	in	a	particular	country	ought	to	be	entitled	to	a	minimum	standard;	and	also	to	say	that	people	getting	into	agriculture,	aware	of	all	the	risks,	ought	to	be	relieved	of	these.			Then	it	was	William	Rappard’s	turn	and	he	said	that	he	couldn’t	help	but	feel	that	it	was	no	accident	that	the	subject	of	agriculture	had	been	kept	towards	the	end.	According	to	Rappard,	agriculture	was	the	great	challenge	to	economic	liberalism,	and	 he	 argued	 that	 they	 could	 not	 apply	 liberalism	 to	 agriculture	 simply	 for	doctrinaire	reasons.	Frank	D.	Graham	said	he	shared	Miller’s	alarm,	but	could	not	follow	his	completely	simplistic	policy.	According	to	Graham	there	was	a	need	for	a	definition	of	 aims,	because	 there	was	a	 conflict	of	 loyalties	at	 the	basis	of	 the	assembly’s	difficulties.	 “Do	we	make	 liberalism	our	 supreme	aim	or	our	unique	aim?”	he	asked,	opting	for	the	first	himself.	He	made	the	example	of	perfectly	free	migration,	saying	that	this	would	be	simplistically	liberal,	because	“transfers”	from	what	he	called	a	 “super-Malthusian	situation”	would	bring	down	the	rest	of	 the	world.	He	asked	rhetorically	if	the	liberals	would	want	freedom	above	everything	if	it	meant	freedom	for	all	to	be	miserable.	He	insisted	that	freedom	was	not	the	only	value	on	which	they	should	lay	importance,	and	that	they	were	not	ready	to	concede	that	all	who	were	“sub-marginal”	on	a	“free	basis”	should	be	allowed	to	
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die.	 According	 to	 him,	 allowing	 freedom	 to	 individuals	would	 not	 lead	 to	 them	providing	themselves	with	insurance,	so	he	was	therefore	in	favour	of	some	forms	of	social	insurance.			Unsurprisingly,	Mises	disagreed,	and	a	rather	confusing	discussion	followed.	Yet	again,	 the	 different	 topics	 of	 discussion	were	 blended	 together,	 as	 the	 issue	 of	whether	 or	 not	 to	 give	 some	 special	 insurances	 to	 farmers	 was	 turned	 into	 a	general	discussion	of	what	sorts	of	interventions	would	be	needed	to	make	a	liberal	society	 work	 and	 whether	 alleviating	 poverty	 was	 a	 goal	 of	 liberalism.	 These	debates	are	highly	interesting,	as	they	show	the	degree	to	which	the	neoliberals	wanted	to	move	beyond	a	laissez-faire	approach	to	liberalism,	but	also	how	they	struggled	somewhat	to	defend	the	interventions	they	thought	were	necessary.	Like	many	others,	Frank	Graham	argued	that	the	notion	of	“freedom”	could	not	be	put	above	everything	else.	The	example	he	chose	was	what	would	happen	 if	people	were	 allowed	 to	 migrate	 freely	 from	 poorer	 countries;	 something	 which	 again	points	to	the	not	so	social	nature	of	early	neoliberalism,	especially	considering	how	so	many	of	the	attendees	had	themselves	become	migrants	in	the	preceding	years.	Yet	Graham	did	favour	some	sort	of	social	insurance,	since	he	was	not	“ready	to	concede”	that	all	who	were	“sub-marignal”	should	be	“allowed	to	die”.	Yet	again	he	was	turned	on	by	Mises,	who	disagreed	with	any	form	of	social	provision.			Loren	Miller’s	 intervention	will	 stand	 as	 a	 summary	of	 not	 only	 the	divergence	between	different	attendees	of	the	conference,	but	also	of	the	clear	tension	within	the	dual	argument,	as	posed	by	Hayek	and	most	of	 the	other	neoliberals.	Miller	asked	 whether	 the	 total	 sum	 of	 all	 the	 interventions	 that	 had	 been	 suggested	during	 the	 conference	would	 not	 be	 “a	 planned	 economy”,	 thus	making	 crystal	clear	 the	 conceptual	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 the	 neoliberal	 project	 of	 saving	 the	market	order	from	state	action	by	state	action.	Hayek’s	response	is	also	telling,	as	he	agreed	 that	 the	approach	of	going	 through	 issues	one	by	one	and	discussing	types	of	intervention	that	would	preserve	liberalism	was	not	proving	fruitful.	As	
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was	clear	 from	the	 first	week	of	sessions,	he	had	wanted	 to	discuss	 the	general	principles	 of	 “planning	 for	 competition”,	 before	 attempting	 to	 apply	 those	 to	special	 cases.	 Since	 that	 discussion	 instead	 derailed	 into	 a	 discussion	 about	whether	or	not	to	use	the	state	at	all,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	discussions	at	the	conference	did	little	to	advance	the	ideas	of	neoliberalism,	as	they	had	been	put	forward	 in	 the	 years	 between	 the	 Lippmann	 Colloqium	 and	 the	 Mont	 Pèlerin	conference.		
Statement	of	Aims	The	Statement	of	Aims	which	was	produced	at	Mont	Pèlerin	is,	to	this	day,	the	only	official	 statement	 ever	 published	 by	 The	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society.	 Discussions	regarding	its	outline	had	already	begun	towards	the	end	of	the	first	week,	when	a	committee	 led	 and	 appointed	 by	Hayek	 presented	 their	 draft	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	conference.	The	committee	members	chosen	by	Hayek	were	John	Jewkes,	Walter	Eucken,	 Henry	 Gideonse,	 Carl	 Iversen	 and	 Henry	 Hazlitt.	 Their	 first	 draft	 is	reproduced	here:		 “A	group	of	students	of	society	met	at	Mont	Pèlerin,	Switzerland	on	April	1	to	10,	1947	to	discuss	the	foundations	for	the	preservation	of	a	free	society.	For	fruitful	collaboration	in	working	out	 these	 principles	 they	 feel	 that	means	 for	maintaining	 closer	 contact	 should	 be	maintained	among	all	those	who	share	in	substance	the	following	convictions:	1.	Individual	freedom	can	be	preserved	only	in	a	society	in	which	an	effective	competitive	market	 is	 the	 main	 agency	 for	 the	 direction	 of	 economic	 activity.	 Only	 the	 decentralization	 of	control	through	private	property	in	the	means	of	production	can	prevent	those	concentrations	of	power	which	threaten	individual	freedom.	2.	The	freedom	of	the	consumer	in	choosing	what	he	shall	buy,	the	freedom	of	the	producer	in	choosing	what	he	shall	make,	and	the	freedom	of	the	worker	in	choosing	his	occupation	and	his	place	of	employment,	are	essential	not	merely	for	the	sake	of	freedom	itself,	but	for	efficiency	in	production.	 Such	 a	 system	 of	 freedom	 is	 essential	 if	 we	 are	 to	 maximize	 output	 in	 terms	 of	individual	satisfactions.	Departure	from	these	individual	liberties	leads	to	the	production	not	only	of	 fewer	 goods	 and	 services	 but	 of	 the	wrong	 goods	 and	 services.	We	 cannot	 enrich	 ourselves	merely	by	consenting	to	be	slaves.	3.	All	rational	men	believe	 in	planning	for	the	 future.	But	this	 involves	the	right	of	each	individual	to	plan	his	own	life.	He	is	deprived	of	this	right	when	he	is	forced	to	surrender	his	own	initiative,	 will	 and	 liberty	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 a	 central	 direction	 of	 the	 use	 of	 economic	resources.	4.	The	decline	of	competitive	markets	and	the	movement	towards	totalitarian	control	of	society	are	not	 inevitable.	They	are	 the	 result	mainly	of	mistaken	beliefs	 about	 the	appropriate	means	for	securing	a	free	and	prosperous	society	and	of	the	policies	based	on	these	beliefs.	5.	 The	preservation	of	 an	 effective	 competitive	 order	depends	upon	 a	proper	 legal	 and	institutional	 framework.	 The	 existing	 frameworks	 must	 be	 considerably	 modified	 to	 make	 the	operation	 of	 competition	 more	 efficient	 and	 beneficial.	 The	 precise	 character	 of	 the	 legal	 and	institutional	 framework	 within	 which	 competition	 will	 work	 most	 effectively	 and	 which	 will	
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supplement	 the	working	 of	 competition	 is	 an	 urgent	 problem	 on	which	 continued	 exchange	 of	views	is	required.	6.		As	far	as	possible	government	activity	should	be	limited	by	the	rule	of	law.	Government	action	 can	 be	made	predictable	 only	when	 it	 is	 bound	by	 fixed	 rules.	 Tasks	which	 require	 that	authorities	 be	 given	 discretionary	 powers	 should	 therefore	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 indispensable	minimum.	But	it	must	be	recognized	that	each	extension	of	the	power	of	the	state	gradually	erodes	the	minimum	basis	for	the	maintenance	of	a	free	society.	 In	general	an	automatic	mechanism	of	adjustment,	even	where	it	functions	imperfectly,	is	preferable	to	any	which	depends	on	“conscious”	direction	by	governmental	agencies.	7.	 The	 changes	 in	 current	 opinion	 which	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 trend	 toward	totalitarianism	are	not	confined	to	economic	doctrines.	They	are	part	of	a	movement	of	ideas	which	finds	expression	also	 in	 the	 field	of	morals	 and	philosophy	and	 in	 the	 interpretation	of	history.	Those	who	wish	to	resist	 the	encroachments	on	 individual	 liberty	must	direct	 their	attention	to	these	wider	ideas	as	well	as	those	in	the	strictly	economic	field.	8.	Any	free	society	presupposes,	in	particular,	a	widely	accepted	moral	code.	The	principles	of	this	moral	code	should	govern	collective	no	less	than	private	action.	9.	Among	the	most	dangerous	of	the	intellectual	errors	which	lead	to	the	destruction	of	a	free	society	are	the	historical	fatalism	which	believes	in	our	power	to	discover	laws	of	historical	development	which	we	must	obey,	and	the	historical	relativism	which	denies	all	absolute	moral	standards	and	tends	to	justify	any	political	means	by	the	purposes	at	which	it	aims.	10.	Political	pressures	have	brought	new	and	serious	threats	to	the	freedom	of	thought	and	science.	 Complete	 intellectual	 freedom	 is	 so	 essential	 to	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 all	 our	 aims	 that	 no	consideration	of	social	expediency	must	ever	be	allowed	to	impair	it.”13		Hayek’s	 influence	 on	 this	 document	 is	 very	 clear.	 The	 first	 six	 out	 of	 ten	 bullet	points,	 by	 far	 the	most	 elaborate	 ones,	 all	 relate	 to	 the	 issues	 he	 raised	 in	 his	opening	 address	 and	 in	 the	 first	 session	 on	 “´Free	 Enterprise’	 or	 Competitive	Order”.	They	all	relate	to	the	dual	argument	in	how	they	combine	ideas	from	the	socialist	 calculation	 debates	 about	markets	 as	mediators	 of	modernity,	with	 an	implicit	 attack	 on	 laissez-faire	 through	 vague	 formulations	 about	 the	 need	 to	modify	existing	frameworks	in	order	to	achieve	a	competitive	society.	The	last	four	points	 relate	 vaguely	 to	 questions	 of	 morals	 and	 historiography	 -	 all	 issues	discussed	in	the	first	week	of	sessions,	as	programmed	by	Hayek.	The	economic	issues	raised	 in	the	three	 first	sessions	of	 the	second	week,	agricultural	policies	and	geopolitical	questions,	are	all	completely	absent.	This	tells	us	something	about	what	mattered	most	for	Hayek,	who	was	the	main	organizer	of	the	event.	He	kept	trying	to	steer	the	meeting	and	the	organization	they	were	founding	onto	the	dual	argument-track.	The	most	important	purpose	in	re-inventing	liberalism,	according	to	him,	was	to	develop	policies	for	the	active	use	of	state	power	in	the	service	of	markets	 and	 liberalism.	Many	 of	 the	 attendees	were	 on	 board	with	 this,	 while	
                                            13	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	(Mont	Pèlerin	1947)	
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others	either	disagreed,	or	were	easily	distracted	by	other	issues	they	found	to	be	even	more	pressing.			If	we	look	closer	at	the	bullet	points,	the	first	four	points	attack	economic	planning.	The	 first	 point	 proclaims	 “competitive	 markets”	 as	 the	 guarantor	 of	 freedom;	hinting	 at	 the	 attack	 on	 laissez-faire	without	 spelling	 it	 out,	 and	 then	 affirming	“private	property	in	the	means	of	production”	as	the	only	way	to	achieve	this.	The	second	 and	 third	 points	 both	 relate	 to	 how	 economic	 planning	 deprives	 both	consumers	and	producers	of	various	freedoms;	and	the	fourth	point	affirms	that	the	movement	towards	planning	is	not	inevitable,	but	based	on	“mistaken	beliefs”.	It	is	only	in	the	fifth	point	that	the	second	part	of	the	dual	argument,	the	attack	on	laissez-faire,	 is	 presented,	 and	 it	 is	 stated	 that	 existing	 frameworks	 must	 be	“considerably	 modified”	 in	 order	 for	 competition	 to	 be	 more	 efficient	 and	beneficial.		The	statement	was	meant	to	be	distributed	externally,	and	as	in	their	various	pre-1947	publications,	the	attack	on	economic	planning	is	given	more	prominence	than	the	attack	on	laissez-faire,	even	though	we	have	seen	that	their	internal	discussions	focused	 more	 on	 the	 other	 plank	 of	 the	 dual	 argument.	 This	 points	 to	 the	importance	 of	 studying	 this	 first	 meeting	 closely	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	importance	 of	 the	 attack	 on	 laissez-faire	 for	 the	 neoliberal	 project.	 In	 the	 sixth	point,	the	idea	of	the	“rule	of	law”	is	brought	in,	in	an	attempt	to	reconcile	the	two	aspects	of	the	dual	argument;	it	is	stated	that	“automatic	adjustments”	would	be	preferable	 to	 conscious	 direction	 of	 the	 economy.	 The	 eighth	 point	mentions	 a	moral	code;	the	ninth	repeats	the	notion	from	point	four	about	historical	fatalism	and	the	movement	towards	planning	as	an	“intellectual	error”;	and	the	last	point	mentions	intellectual	freedom.		In	 the	discussion	 that	 followed	 the	presentation	of	 the	draft,	Frank	Graham	put	further	emphasis	on	 the	 less	understood	part	of	 the	dual	argument	by	saying	 it	
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would	be	good	 to	 further	 recognize	 that	 they	did	not	want	a	 “planless”	 system.	Milton	Friedman	said	it	needed	to	be	added	that	liberalism	had	a	humanitarian	aim	and	was	a	progressive	philosophy;	Lionel	Robbins	said	he	thought	the	draft	would	be	more	effective	 if	 the	 larger	 cultural	 and	moral	 issues	were	put	 first,	 and	 the	economic	 one	 later	 on.	 There	 was	 much	 criticism	 of	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	statement	from	the	likes	of	Maurice	Allais,	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel,	Frank	Knight	and	Erich	Eyck.	Responding	to	this	criticism,	Hayek	referred	back	to	the	discussion	on	“’Free	Enterprise’	or	Competitive	Order”,	stating	that	on	the	issue	of	concentration	of	economic	power	there	could	be	no	chance	of	agreement,	so	they	simply	kept	it	out	of	the	statement.	This	was	not	strictly	true,	as	paragraph	5	made	it	clear	that	a	competitive	order	needed	a	legal	and	institutional	framework	and	that	this	had	to	be	 modified.	 However,	 the	 paragraph	 left	 the	 question	 of	 which	 sorts	 of	modifications	open,	and	the	fact	that	no	agreement	was	reached	on	this	and	that	most	of	 the	discussions	had	been	on	whether	or	not	 it	was	 right	 for	 liberals	 to	modify	state	frameworks	for	markets	at	all,	could	be	seen	as	something	of	a	set-back	for	Hayek.	On	the	other	hand,	the	fact	that	they	even	discussed	it,	and	that	Hayek,	the	ordoliberals,	Lionel	Robbins,	Aaron	Director,	Frank	Graham	and	several	of	 the	other	writers	who	had	peddled	 the	dual	argument	before	 the	conference	were	even	able	to	raise	the	issue,	and	to	frame	the	discussion	in	this	way,	could	also	be	seen	as	a	major	step	on	the	road	to	neoliberal	politics.	They	were	bringing	forth	a	new	form	of	right-wing	liberalism,	which	sought	to	go	beyond	laissez-faire.		Henry	Hazlitt,	who	 had	 also	 been	 on	 the	 committee,	 added	 that	 the	 committee	members	had	had	to	limit	expression	of	their	own	opinions	and	try	to	deal	with	the	presumed	opinion	of	 the	meeting.	This	was	hardly	 true,	as	 the	whole	statement	dealt	only	with	issues	from	the	first	three	sessions	in	a	meeting	which	so	far	had	consisted	of	seven	sessions	and	still	had	four	to	come.	Hayek	was	then	disparaged	by	further	criticism	from	Lionel	Robbins,	and	said	it	was	extremely	difficult	to	put	beliefs	into	a	very	short	statement.	He	asked	if	they	were	wasting	their	time	and	if	the	meeting	perhaps	did	not	want	a	statement	at	all.	Lionel	Robbins	was	asked	to	
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outline	a	new	statement,	 and	agreed	 to	do	 so	after	breakfast	 the	 following	day.	Hayek	insisted	that	some	things	had	to	be	absolutely	essential,	and	that	this	was	
property.	This	was	an	important	admission	from	the	primus	motor	of	the	society.	Robbins	then	asked	how	there	could	be	adequate	liberty	in	a	society	with	only	one	property	 owner	 and	 one	 employer,	 a	 rhetorical	 question	 meant	 to	 outline	 the	problems	of	holding	up	property	as	the	essential	aspect	of	liberty.	Maurice	Allais	then	 stated,	 controversially	within	 this	 context,	 that	 control	 by	 democracy	was	better	than	state	planning,	and	that	 it	had	not	yet	been	proven	that	competitive	controls	 were	 impossible	 under	 collective	 ownership.	 Allais	 obviously	 did	 not	share	 the	 analysis	 of	 Mises	 and	 Hayek,	 who	 had	 made	 it	 clear	 in	 the	 socialist	calculation	 debates	 that	 the	 problem	 with	 state	 planning	 was	 precisely	 its	supposed	 democratic	 nature.	 Röpke	 remarked	 dryly	 that	 he	 thought	 Professor	Allais	had	proved	with	his	comment	that	private	property	had	to	be	retained.	This	pointed	to	another	conflict	within	the	conference:	where	attendees	like	Mises	and	Miller	appeared	to	be	to	the	“right”	of	Hayek	and	the	main	thrust	of	neoliberalism	by	 disagreeing	 with	 any	 form	 of	 state	 intervention	 at	 all,	 attendees	 like	 Allais,	Rappard,	 Tingsten	 and	 Iversen	 seemed	 to	 be	 to	 the	 “left”	 of	 that,	 arguing	 that	Keynesianism	and	democratic	planning	was	perhaps	not	as	bad	as	it	was	made	out	to	 be.	 I	 am	 putting	 “right”	 and	 “left”	 in	 inverted	 commas,	 because	 part	 of	 the	argument	of	this	thesis	lies	in	showing	that	right	and	left	on	the	political	spectrum	are	not	reducible	to	questions	of	whether	or	not,	or	how	much,	to	use	the	state.	This	thesis	shows	that	the	early	neoliberals	were	both	profoundly	“right-wing”	in	their	politics,	but	that	they	also	wanted	to	use	the	state	actively	and	that	these	two	things	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Nonetheless,	it	was	clear	that	the	main	ideas	of	neoliberalism	were	 challenged	 from	 different	 angles	 at	 the	 first	meeting	 of	 the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.		Lionel	Robbins	presented	his	new	draft	for	a	statement	of	aims	on	the	Tuesday	of	the	second	week.	It	is	reproduced	here:		
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“A	group	of	economists,	historians,	philosophers	and	other	students	of	public	affairs	from	Europe	and	the	United	States	met	at	Mont	Pelerin,	Switzerland,	from	April	1st	to	10th	1947	to	discuss	the	 crisis	 of	 our	 times.	 This	 group,	 being	 desirous	 of	 perpetuating	 its	 existence	 for	 promoting	further	intercourse	and	for	inviting	the	collaboration	of	other	like	minded	persons,	has	agreed	upon	the	following	statement	of	aims.	The	 central	 values	 of	 our	 civilization	 are	 in	 danger.	 Over	 large	 stretches	 of	 the	 earth’s	surface	the	essential	conditions	of	human	dignity	and	freedom	have	already	disappeared.	In	others	they	are	under	constant	menace	from	the	development	of	current	tendencies	of	policy.	The	position	of	the	individual	and	the	voluntary	group	are	progressively	undermined	by	extensions	of	arbitrary	power.	Even	that	most	precious	possession	of	Western	Man,	freedom	of	thought	and	expression,	is	threatened	by	the	spread	of	creeds	which	claiming	the	privilege	of	tolerance	when	in	the	position	of	a	minority,	seek	only	to	establish	a	position	of	power	in	which	they	can	suppress	and	obliterate	all	view	but	their	own.	The	group	holds	that	these	developments	have	been	fostered	by	the	growth	of	a	view	of	history	which	denies	all	absolute	moral	standards	and	by	the	growth	of	theories	which	question	the	desirability	of	the	rule	of	law.	It	holds	further	that	they	have	been	fostered	by	a	decline	of	belief	in	 private	 property	 and	 the	 competitive	market;	 for	 without	 the	 diffused	 power	 and	 initiative	associated	 with	 these	 institutions	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 a	 society	 in	 which	 freedom	may	 be	effectively	preserved.	Believing	that	what	is	essentially	an	ideological	movement	must	be	met	by		intellectual	 argument	 and	 the	 reassertion	of	 valid	 ideals,	 the	 group,	having	made	a	preliminary	exploration	of	the	ground,	is	of	the	opinion	that	further	study	is	desirable	inter	alias	in	regard	to	the	following	matters:	1)	The	analysis	and	explanation	of	the	nature	of	the	present	crisis	so	as	to	bring	home	to	others	its	essential	moral	and	economic	origins.	2)	The	redefinition	of	the	functions	of	the	state	so	as	to	distinguish	more	clearly	between	the	totalitarian	and	the	liberal	order.	3)	 Methods	 of	 reestablishing	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 of	 assuring	 its	 development	 in	 such	manner	that	individuals	and	groups	are	not	in	a	position	to	encroach	upon	the	freedom	of	others	and	private	rights	are	not	allowed	to	become	a	basis	of	predatory	power.	4)	The	possibility	of	establishing	minimum	standards	by	means	not	 inimical	 to	 initative	and	the	functioning	of	the	market.	5)	Methods	of	 combatting	 the	misuse	of	history	 for	 the	 furtherance	of	 creeds	hostile	 to	liberty.	 6)	The	problem	of	the	creation	of	an	international	order	conducive	to	the	safeguarding	of	peace	 and	 liberty	 and	 permitting	 the	 establishment	 of	 harmonious	 international	 economic	relations.	The	group	does	not	aspire	to	conduct	propaganda.	It	seeks	to	establish	no	meticulous	and	hampering	orthodoxy.	It	aligns	itself	with	no	particular	party.	Its	object	is	solely,	by	facilitating	the	exchange	of	views	among	minds	inspired	by	certain	ideals	and	broad	conceptions	held	in	common,	to	contribute	to	the	preservation	and	improvement	of	the	free	society.”14		In	many	ways,	Lionel	Robbins	was	the	perfect	man	to	write	the	statement	of	aims.	He	was	deeply	inspired	by	Mises	and	Austrian	economics;	on	the	other	hand,	his	views	had	softened	during	the	war	years,	and	he	was	able	to	see	things	also	from	the	 perspectives	 of	 more	 moderate	 conference	 attendees,	 like	 Rappard,	 Allais,	Tingsten	 and	 Iversen.	 Hayek	 wanted	 to	 unite	 a	 very	 conservative	 approach	 to	property	and	redistribution	with	a	new	approach	to	using	the	state	 for	what	he	defined	as	liberal	ends.	The	ordoliberals,	the	Chicago-economists	and	someone	like	
                                            14	Liberaal	Archief,	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	(Mont	Pèlerin,	1947)	
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Frank	 Graham	 followed	 him	 in	 this	more	 or	 less	 to	 the	 letter;	whereas	 his	 old	mentor	Mises	 remained	highly	 sceptical	of	 the	others’	 enthusiasm	 for	using	 the	state	as	a	tool	to	create	a	functioning	market	society.	Others	agreed	with	Hayek	on	the	 importance	 of	 the	 state,	 but	 went	 much	 further	 in	 a	 “Keynesian”	 or	 “new	liberal”	direction	in	wanting	to	use	the	state	to	“fix	capitalism”.		Robbins	was	able	to	unite	all	these	strands	in	a	statement	of	aims	with	many	words,	but	not	an	awful	lot	of	substance.	He	did	go	into	redefining	the	functions	of	the	state	in	bullet	point	 two	(in	many	ways	 the	 first	point	since	bullet	point	number	one	simply	stated	that	they	wanted	to	study	contemporary	problems).	This	point	was	softened,	 however,	 in	 the	 following	 sentence	 where	 it	 was	 stated	 that	 the	redefinition	 of	 the	 state	 had	 to	 be	 done	 in	 order	 to	 distinguish	 more	 clearly	between	a	totalitarian	and	a	liberal	order,	something	to	which	it	would	be	difficult	for	 anyone	 to	 object.	 Even	 so,	 it	 was	 established	 in	 this	 statement	 that	 the	redefining	 of	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 state	was	 the	 prime	 goal	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	Society.	 Another	 mention	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 a	 guiding	 principle	 for	 liberal	economic	planning	was	then	noted,	before	the	fourth	bullet	point	alluded	to	social	questions,	but	made	clear	that	the	establishment	of	minimum	means	could	not	be	“inimical	to	initiative	and	the	functioning	of	the	market”.	The	last	two	bullet	points	mentioned	 the	 misuse	 of	 history	 and	 the	 need	 for	 an	 international	 order.	 The	discussion	of	the	statement	of	aims	that	followed	was	not	recorded,	but	after	some	amendments	(the	quoted	statement	is	the	finished	product),	it	was	approved	by	everyone	except	Maurice	Allais.	Further	discussion	was	devoted	to	the	question	of	the	form	of	the	organisation	of	the	permanent	body,	and	a	sub-committee	was	set	up	to	prepare	a	draft	memorandum	of	association	for	submission	to	the	meeting	on	Wednesday	afternoon.		Thursday	the	10th	of	April	was	the	last	day	of	the	conference,	and	it	had	only	one	short	session	to	discuss	both	the	memorandum,	based	on	the	above	statement	of	aims	that	had	been	agreed	upon	the	previous	day,	and	the	name	of	the	organisation	
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being	founded.	Wilhelm	Röpke	opened	the	proceedings	by	stating	that	the	word	“liberal”	was	associated	with	different	things	in	different	countries,	asking	whether	it	 would	 not	 be	 better	 to	 replace	 it	 with	 the	 phrase	 “philosophy	 of	 freedom”.	Bertrand	 de	 Jouvenel	 asked	why	 the	 committee	 had	 refrained	 from	 calling	 the	society	 the	Acton-Tocqueville	Society,	as	Hayek	had	originally	suggested.	Hayek	answered	briefly	it	was	because	“some”	had	objected.	After	some	discussion,	Hayek	decided	to	reiterate	that	his	suggestion	remained	to	call	it	the	Acton-Tocqueville	Society,	with	 the	 subtitle	 of	 “an	 international	 academy	 of	 political	 philosophy”;	however	 Frank	 Knight	 argued	 that	 neither	 Acton	 nor	 Tocqueville	 stood	 for	anything	economic.	Ludwig	von	Mises	claimed	that	using	 that	name	would	be	a	political	 mistake	 with	 regards	 to	 Tocqueville,	 as	 he	 had	 held	 a	 position	 under	Napoleon.	 Aaron	 Director	 suggested	 the	 “Adam	 Smith-Tocqueville	 Society,	 but	William	 Rappard	 noted	 that	 both	 Acton	 and	 Tocqueville	 were	 Catholics	 and	noblemen.	Milton	Friedman	said	it	would	be	incongruous	to	name	the	society	after	people	when	it	should	be	named	after	principles.	Lionel	Robbins	suggested	“The	Protagonist	Society”;	Karl	Popper	suggested	“The	Periclean	Society”.	“International	Society	for	the	Study	of	Freedom	in	Society”	and	“International	Academy	for	the	study	of	the	requisites	of	a	free	society”	were	also	put	on	the	table.	Finally,	Karl	Brandt	 suggested	 “The	Mont	Pelerin	 Society”,	 to	which	Karl	Popper	 responded:	“That	is	meaningless.”			
Summary	That	is	the	very	last	entry	in	the	minutes	of	the	first	meeting	of	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society.		The	 attendees	 had	 covered	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 topics	 in	 their	 discussions,	 from	religion	and	unions	 to	agriculture	and	nuclear	war,	but	as	should	be	clear,	 they	returned	time	and	again	to	the	issue	of	how	to	use	the	state	for	liberal	ends.	Thirty-seven	intellectuals	meeting	for	ten	days	were	bound	to	discuss	a	 lot	of	different	issues,	but	it	was	obvious	that	this	diversity	of	issues,	especially	prevalent	in	the	second	 week	 of	 the	 conference,	 annoyed	 Hayek,	 the	 main	 convenor	 of	 the	
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conference.	He	had	programmed	the	first	week	in	order	to	steer	the	participants	towards	serious	discussions	on	the	future	of	liberalism,	and	a	collective	effort	at	working	out	of	the	contradictions	involved	in	the	dual	argument.	The	conference	was	 opened	 by	 his	 own	 introduction	 and	 the	 session	 on	 ‘Free	 Enterprise’	 or	Competitive	Order,	which	he	made	absolutely	clear	was	the	most	important	one.	Hayek	also	took	a	great	interest	in	the	politics	of	history,	and	Dieter	Plehwe	has	noted	 that	 the	 neoliberals	 “recognized	 the	 paramount	 importance	 in	 political	action	of	rewriting	history…”.15	Wanting	to	steer	liberalism	in	a	more	conservative	direction,	he	was	also	deeply	interested	in	the	question	of	uniting	liberalism	and	Christianity,	something	which	was	also	reflected	in	their	excursion	to	the	cathedral	of	 Einsiedeln	 for	 Easter.	 These	 issues	 were	 not	 Hayek’s	 speciality,	 but	 we	 can	assume	 that	 he	 recognized	 their	 importance	 and	 wanted	 input	 from	 others,	especially	 from	 non-economists.	 With	 the	 dual	 argument	 it	 was	 different,	 and	Hayek’s	lengthy	introductions	and	interventions	on	these	issues	show	us	that	he	very	 much	 wanted	 to	 make	 others	 understand	 the	 importance	 of	 developing	principles	for	liberal	state	intervention,	and	to	actually	discuss	the	development	of	these.	 To	 a	 certain	 extent	 he	 was	 successful,	 but	 the	 conference	 also	 drifted	somehow	 off	 track,	 and	 we	 can	 see	 from	 the	 proceedings	 that	 Hayek	 got	progressively	less	involved	as	the	discussions	panned	out	onto	a	variety	of	specific	topics,	instead	of	discussing	the	general	question	of	liberal	state	intervention.			A	key	moment	of	the	conference	was	thus	on	Wednesday	8th	of	April	when	Loren	Miller	stumbled	upon	what	he	saw	as	a	basic	contradiction	in	the	dual	argument,	and	asked	if	the	interventions	suggested	at	the	conference	did	not	amount	to	a	form	of	 planned	 economy.	 Despite	 their	 attacks	 on	 social	 liberalism	 and	 economic	planning,	the	vast	majority	of	neoliberals	also	understood	that	laissez-faire	would	not	save	the	day	either.	The	bigger	question	looming	was	then	how	to	define	which	state	 actions	 were	 to	 be	 considered	 “interventions”	 that	 distorted	 the	“spontaneous”	work	of	the	market	mechanism;	and	which	state	actions	could	be	
                                            15	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin,	26.	
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considered	 to	 be	 supportive	 of,	 and	 even	 foundational	 for	 the	 	working	 of	 said	mechanism.	 Hayek	 intended	 to	 steer	 the	 meeting	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 these	questions,	 and	as	we	saw,	he	 responded	 to	Miller	 in	 the	agricultural	 session	by	saying	he	too	was	alarmed	at	the	aspect	of	considering	problems	one	by	one.	The	primary	task	of	the	conference	as	he	saw	it	was	to	clear	out	the	neoliberals’	minds	on	what	principles	they	would	like	to	see	applied	if	they	had	a	free	hand,	and	also	to	make	it	clear	which	concessions	they	considered	to	be	politically	expedient	at	that	present	moment.		The	divergence	of	views	between	some	of	the	conference	attendees	meant	that	the	discussion	on	exactly	how	neoliberals	could	claim	the	market	order	as	largely	self-regulating,	but	still	endorse	a	strong	state	with	active	economic	policies,	did	not	always	proceed	 in	 the	way	Hayek	had	hoped.	Towards	 the	end	of	 the	very	 first	session,	 Aaron	 Director,	 along	 with	 key	 figures	 like	 Lionel	 Robbin	 and	 Walter	Eucken,	agreed	completely	with	Hayek’s	exposé	on	the	problems	of	laissez-faire.	He	commented	that	they	would	never	come	anywhere	in	defining	what	the	rules	of	the	game	should	be	if	they	did	not	even	know	whether	there	should	be	any	rules	at	all.	On	one	side	was	Mises,	who	in	several	discussions	refused	to	budge	from	a	laissez-faire	position.	He	saw	the	dual	argument	as	a	contradiction	in	terms,	and	he	 criticized	 the	 other	 neoliberals’	 proposals	 for	 liberal	 state	 actions	 a	 great	number	of	times.	Some	of	the	American	think	tankers,	like	Loren	Miller	and	Felix	Morley,	 would	 support	 Mises;	 whereas	 other	 attendees,	 like	 Frank	 D.	 Graham,	would	attack	Mises	outright	and	criticize	him	with	very	harsh	words.	As	 I	have	noted	earlier,	Mises	views	set	him	apart	from	the	other	neoliberals,	but	due	to	his	status	as	mentor	to	Hayek	and	a	great	inspiration	to	people	like	Lionel	Robbins	and	the	 ordoliberals,	 he	 held	 a	 privileged	 position	 in	 the	 group	 and	 was	 named	 a	member	of	the	executive	committee.			Interestingly,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case	 with	 those	 who	 diverged	 from	 the	 dual	argument	 in	 the	 other	 direction.	 Herbert	 Tingsten	 spoke	 of	 the	 need	 for	 a	“reasonable	 liberalism”	which	was	not	 averse	 to	 state	monopolies;	Carl	 Iversen	
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suggested	 that	 state	 monopolies	 could	 in	 fact	 be	 liberal;	 and	 Maurice	 Allais	speculated	 that	 a	 planned	 economy	 could	 still	 be	 competitive.	 In	 spite	 of	 their	allegiance	to	liberalism,	these	attendees	found	that	their	views	on	state	planning	were	out	of	tune	with	the	rest	of	the	neoliberals.	Allais	claimed	that	state	planning	lead	to	totalitarianism,	but	still	wanted	to	find	ways	of	using	the	state	to	support	the	market	order,	not	to	replace	it.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	Morley	was	not	the	only	one	among	the	American	think	tank	attendees	who	supported	Mises’	non-compromising	stance,	and	in	a	letter	to	Morley	on	January	26th	1948,	Leonard	Read	wrote	that	he	had	few	hopes	for	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	and	made	retrospective	references	to	the	discussion	on	the	statement:		 “Ideologically,	even	with	the	initial	group	hand-picked	by	Hayek,	with	the	exception	of	a	dozen,	it	ranged	all	the	way	from	state-interventionists	to	one	who	was	an	all-and-out-socialist.	It	doesn’t	appear	to	me	to	have	quite	the	element	of	liberalism	in	it	that	would	make	its	expansion	something	to	be	ardently	desired.	The	attempt	to	write	a	statement	was	actually	funny.	It	was	as	though	it	was	being	done	by	socialists	who	like	to	label	themselves	liberal.”16		It	is	not	clear	who	Read	was	referring	to	as	the	all-and-out-socialist,	but	it	is	quite	possible	he	meant	Allais,	who	had	been	the	only	one	who	did	not	vote	to	support	the	statement	of	aims.	 Indeed,	not	 long	after	the	meeting	at	Mont	Pèlerin,	Allais	wrote	an	article	in	the	journal	Féderation,	 in	which	he	argued	for	a	“competitive	socialism”.	He	wrote:	“le	planisme	central	n’est	pas	un	doctrine	de	gauche	pas	plus	que	la	concurrence	n´est	spécifiquement	une	doctrine	de	droite”	(central	planning	is	no	more	a	doctrine	of	the	left	than	competition	is	specifically	a	doctrine	of	the	right).17	This	was	very	much	a	minority	view,	however,	and	both	in	his	introduction	and	 in	 a	 later	 discussion,	 Hayek	 iterated	 that	 the	 most	 central	 point	 in	 their	endeavours	was	the	belief	in	private	property.	Thus	unlike	what	Tingsten,	Iversen	and	Allais	might	have	thought,	the	reinvention	of	 liberalism	would	not	be	about	acknowledging	 the	 need	 for	 redistribution	 or	 democratisation	 of	 the	 economic	
                                            16	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	29,	Folder	4,	”Hunold	–	Morley”	17	Rubenstein	Library	and	Archives,	Maurice	Allais	Collection,	Folder	39	(P)	“Fédération,	août	-	septembre	1947	–	31-32”		
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sphere,	but	about	finding	new	ways	to	fight	this	growing	threat.	In	the	discussion	on	unions,	these	divisions	arose	again	when	Iversen,	Allais	and	others	who	did	not	share	in	the	outright	contempt	towards	labour	organization	exhibited	by	members	like	Machlup,	Knight	and	Graham	were	derided	as	romantic	and	naïve.			The	 fragmentary	 nature	 of	 both	 the	 conference	 as	 a	whole	 and	 indeed	 even	 of	single	discussions	could	lead	us	to	think	that	Hayek	failed	somewhat.	Then	again,	anyone	who	has	been	to	a	meeting	or	conference	with	more	than	a	couple	of	people	who	are	perfectly	 in	 tune	with	 each	other	knows	 that	 these	 sorts	of	 events	 are	almost	 always	 somewhat	 dissapointing.	 Participants	 in	 discussions	 can	 have	widely	different	perspectives	and	often	talk	past	one	another.	The	mere	fact	that	the	 meeting	 took	 place,	 that	 an	 organization	 was	 formed	 and	 that	 the	 dual	argument	was	the	attempted	frame	for	the	Hayek’s	reinvention	of	liberalism	is	an	extremely	relevant	point	if	we	want	to	understand	early	neoliberalism.		
Speaking	time	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	was	Hayek’s	brainchild.	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	2	through	the	correspondence	between	Hayek	and	Lippman	in	1937,	Hayek	had	already	been	one	of	 the	key	players	 in	the	organization	of	 the	Walter	Lippman	Colloquium	in	1938,	nine	years	earlier.	During	his	extensive	travels	in	the	US	after	the	publication	of	 The	 Road	 to	 Serfdom	 in	 1944,	 he	 was	 actively	 promoting	 the	 idea	 of	 an	organization	of	right-wing	intellectuals	to	develop	and	spread	a	neoliberal	creed.	In	the	meeting	itself,	it	could	be	argued	that	Hayek	kept	a	somewhat	low	profile,	always	insisting	that	the	society	was	what	the	members	would	make	it	out	to	be	and	that	he	did	not	have	time	to	take	on	more	responsibilities	himself.	Still,	he	was	by	far	the	most	active	participant	at	the	meeting,	making	a	total	of	24	interventions	(including	 his	 opening	 address	 and	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	 session	 on	 “‘Free	Enterprise’	or	Competitive	Order?”).	Just	behind	him	were	Lionel	Robbins	with	21	interventions	and	Milton	Friedman	with	18	(see	figure	#7).			
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		The	reader	will	remember	that	Hayek	only	programmed	the	first	week	of	sessions,	and	that	the	second	week’s	agenda	was	decided	upon	by	the	conference	attendees.	It	is	obvious	that	Hayek	was	less	interested	in	this	part	of	the	conference,	and	he	also	spoke	comparatively	less,	making	only	8	interventions,	which	still	put	him	in	“fourth	place”	in	the	second	week	of	proceedings,	behind	Milton	Friedman	with	14	interventions;	Lionel	Robbins	with	12;	and	Karl	Brandt	with	10	(see	figure	#9).	It	was	 in	 the	 first	 week,	 then,	 that	 Hayek	 dominated	 the	 meeting,	 making	 16	interventions,	with	the	second	highest	number	being	reached	by	Lionel	Robbins	with	9	(see	figure	#8).			
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Figure	#7	- Number	of	interventions	 in	total
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#Figure	#8	– Number	of	interventions	 in	the	first	week
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Figure	#9	– Number	of	interventions	 in	the	second	week
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Of	course,	not	all	interventions	were	the	same	length,	Friedman’s	for	instance	were	often	very	short.	Hayek	on	the	other	hand,	spoke	at	length	in	a	great	number	of	his	many	interventions.	If	we	break	down	total	speaking	time	of	the	conference	as	lines	covered	in	the	minutes,18	Hayek	spoke	for	a	staggering	41,4%	of	the	time	during	the	first	week	of	the	meeting.	William	Rappard	came	closest	with	6,9%.	This	way	of	 measuring	 gives	 special	 credence	 to	 those	 who	 gave	 introductions,	 and	 as	mentioned	 in	 the	 footnote	 it	 is	 a	 far	 from	perfect	method.	 It	 does	 however	 say	something	about	the	dominance	of	Hayek	at	the	first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	meeting,	especially	during	the	first	week	that	he	himself	had	programmed.		
		
	
                                            18	A	method	which	is	far	from	perfect	for	several	reasons,	but	still	tells	us	something.	Some	of	the	pages	of	the	minutes	are	in	smaller	print	than	others,	and	some	parts	of	the	discussions	were	only	transcribed	by	Dorothy	Hahn	in	keywords.	Other	pages	of	the	minutes	of	the	discussion	are	lost,	and	this	is	also	the	case	with	a	couple	of	the	introductions,	in	which	case	I	have	counted	an	average	number	of	lines	per	introduction	into	the	speaking	time	of	those	holding	introductions	that	did	not	hand	in	manuscripts	(Carlo	Antoni,	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel,	Walter	Eucken).	
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A	neoliberal	cadre	It	did	not	take	long	for	the	conference	attendees	to	start	writing	to	each	other	after	returning	from	Mont	Pèlerin	to	their	respective	home	bases.	Leonard	Read	and	the	other	members	of	the	Foundation	for	Economic	Education	must	have	taken	a	costly	international	flight	to	make	it	back	to	the	US,	because	by	April	14	Read	had	already	written	to	Hunold:		 	“It	seems	rather	remarkable	that	all	of	us	from	the	Foundation	staff,	who	attended	the	conference	at	Mont	Pelerin,	were	at	our	desks	this	Monday	morning	–	particularly	when	leaving	you	Thursday	and	spending	a	day	in	Geneva	and	another	 in	Paris.	This	accomplishment	 in	travel,	a	carry-over	from	 the	 liberal	 economy	of	 the	past,	 is	 everywhere	 threatened	with	extinction.	 It	 could	not	be	brought	into	being	with	today’s	socialistic	practices.	All	of	this	gave	a	meaning	to	the	Mont	Pelerin	meeting.	Added	to	this	was	your	gracious	hospitality	and	the	inspiration	that	comes	from	knowing	you	personally.	I	am	certain	we	can	be	mutually	helpful	in	our	common	purposes.”19		Neither	Read	nor	Hunold20	spoke	during	the	plenary	sessions	of	the	conference,	but	 they	 were	 both	 very	 important	 behind	 the	 scenes.	 Read	 attached	 a	memorandum	 from	 The	 Foundation	 for	 Economic	 Education,	 addressed	 to	“Liberals	of	the	British	Isles	and	the	Continent	of	Europe”,	in	order	for	Hunold	to	distribute	it	to	all	those	who	had	attended	the	conference.	Read	put	his	staff	and	their	 resources	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 members	 in	 order	 to	purchase	and	send	books	that	were	difficult	to	obtain	in	Europe	due	to	post-war	exchange	controls.	The	Foundation	for	Economic	Education	exists	to	this	day,	and	amongst	 many	 other	 activities	 they	 finance	 the	 work	 of	 several	 Austrian	 and	libertarian	scholars	on	the	history	of	economic	thought	that	this	thesis	quotes.21		Michael	Polanyi	wrote	to	Hunold	from	his	office	at	the	University	of	Manchester	on	the	19th	of	April,	in	order	to	thank	him	for	his	kindness:	“Quite	apart	from	several	additions	 to	my	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 of	 contemporary	 affairs,	 I	 have	received	a	new	background	for	my	thoughts	which	will	be	 lasting	 in	 its	effects”,	
                                            19	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	29,	Folder	5,	”Hunold-Read”	20	Hunold	made	one	remark	in	the	first	session	regarding	the	use	of	English	as	the	conference	language.	21	http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Foundation_for_Economic_Education	
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wrote	 Polanyi,	 adding	 that	 both	 Hunold	 and	 Hayek	 ought	 to	 be	 thanked	 for	founding	 the	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society,	 “which	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 guidance	 to	 liberal	thought”.22	 It	 was	 obvious	 to	 the	 conference	 attendees	 that	 Hunold	 was	organizationally	 as	 important	 as	 Hayek,	 but	 since	 Hunold	 was	 not	 involved	 in	discussions,	this	is	not	clear	from	our	treatment	of	the	minutes	in	the	preceding	chapters.	 Polanyi	 also	 emphasized	 the	 friendships	 he	 had	 made,	 and	 several	conference	attendees	would	go	on	to	do	the	same.	Hunold	had	a	photo	album	made	with	financial	contributions	from	Henry	Hazlitt,	Felix	Morley	and	possibly	some	of	the	 other	American	 attendees,	 and	he	 circulated	 it	 to	 all	who	had	 attended	 the	event.	 It	 was	 enthusiastically	 received	 by	 the	 European	 delegates	 around	Christmas	1948,23	(see	pictures	#1	–	#5).						
                                            22	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	29,	Folder	4,	”Hunold	–	Polanyi”	23	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	29,	Folder	3,	”Hunold	–	Hazlitt”	
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Picture	#1:	Hayek	in	the	chair,	Dorothy	Hahn	keeping	the	minutes.		
	
Picture	#2:	The	meeting	room	at	Hotel	du	Parc.		
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Picture	#3:	Mises	to	the	right.	
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Picture	#4:	Lively	discussions.		
	
Picture	#5:	Excursion,	to	Chateau	Coppet	or	Schwyz.24			
                                            24	All	pictures	from	the	album	found	in	London	School	of	Economics	Library	and	Archives,	Lionel	Robbins	Collection,	Box	10,	Folder	2.	
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The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	was	registered	in	the	state	of	Illinois	in	November	1947	by	Aaron	Director.	In	October	1948,	the	first	“members	circular	and	booklet	of	the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society”	 was	 printed	 and	mailed	 to	 all	 the	 society’s	 members	 by	Hayek.	The	first	page	listed	the	officers	of	the	society,	with	Hayek	as	president	and	Eucken,	Jewkes,	Knight,	Rappard	and	Jaques	Rueff	as	vice	presidents.	Rueff	had	not	been	 present	 at	 the	 first	 meeting,	 but	 had	 taken	 an	 active	 part	 in	 the	 Walter	Lippmann	Colloquium	in	1938.	Secretaries	were	listed	as	Albert	Hunold	and	Aaron	Director.	A	C.O.	Hardy,	who	held	a	senior	position	at	the	Brookings	Institution	in	Washington	D.C.,	was	 listed	as	 treasurer.	Under	 “other	members	of	 the	council”	were	listed	Carlo	Antoni,	Henry	Gidenose,	Carl	Iversen,	Ludwig	von	Mises,	Lionel	Robbins	 and	Wilhelm	 Röpke.	 The	 only	 other	 entry	 in	 the	 booklet	was	 a	 list	 of	members,	which	now	ran	to	a	full	121	people.	It	seems	that	recruitment	had	been	the	thing	occupying	Hayek	and	the	rest	of	the	council,	and	in	this	very	first	circular,	the	exclusive	group	of	37	people	who	had	gathered	for	the	original	meeting	were	only	 marked	 by	 an	 asterisk	 next	 to	 their	 name	 in	 the	 members	 list.	 The	 new	additions	 are	 too	many	 to	mention,	 and	go	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis,	 but	notable	 inclusions	 were	 the	 economists	 Ronald	 Coase,	 Constantino	 Bresciano-Turroni,	Gottfred	Haberler	and	Eli	Drekschler;	Anthony	Fischer	who	would	start	the	 Institute	 of	 Economic	 Affairs;	 Max	 Eastman	 of	 the	 Readers’	 Digest;	 Harold	Luhnow	of	the	Willam	Volker	fund;	Ludwig	Erhard,	the	Spanish	politician	Salvador	de	Madriaga;	and	“His	Excellency	Luigi	Einaudi”,	president	of	the	Italian	Republic.25			Some	of	the	members	who	had	not	yet	written	books	or	articles	expounding	the	dual	argument	went	on	to	do	so.	Henry	Hazlitt’s	book	Will	Dollars	Save	the	World?,	published	 later	 in	 1947,	 would	 be	 described	 by	 the	 Mises	 Institute	 as	 “a	blockbuster	 argument	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 putting	 post-war	 Europe	 on	 the	 US	dole”26.	In	a	letter	to	Hazlitt	on	the	occasion	of	receiving	his	book,	Hunold	wrote:		
                                            25	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1,	”Booklets”	26	https://mises.org/library/will-dollars-save-world	
  257 
“It	 is	a	great	pleasure	to	me	to	see	how	the	broad	views	of	the	personalities	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	conference	are	getting	more	and	more	influence	in	the	USA	and	also	here	on	the	continent	(…).“27		Another	example	is	John	Jewkes,	who	opened	is	1948	book	Ordeal	by	Planning	with	the	following	statement:		 “Everything	I	have	to	say	here,	and	indeed	much	more,	is	to	be	found	in	Professor	Hayek’s	masterly	
Road	to	Serfdom.	Every	planner	who	believes	in	reason	as	the	guide	in	social	organisation	should	read	or	re-read	that	book	now	and	honestly	ask	himself	whether	events	are	or	are	not	following	the	course	against	which	Professor	Hayek	warned	us	four	years	ago.”28			Jewkes	paraphrased	many	of	the	insights	developed	during	the	socialist	calculation	debates	to	make	a	strong	critique	of	“economic	planning”:			 “For	central	planning	ultimately	turns	every	individual	into	a	cipher	and	every	economic	decision	into	blind	fumbling,	destroys	the	incentives	though	which	economic	progress	arises,	renders	the	economic	system	as	unstable	as	the	whims	of	the	few	who	ultimately	control	it	and	creates	a	system	of	wirepulling	and	privileges	in	which	economic	justice	ceases	to	have	any	meaning.”29		Yet,	when	one	knows	what	to	look	for,	it	is	clear	that	Ordeal	by	Planning,	in	spite	of	its	central	message	as	an	attack	on	the	Labour	government’s	economic	policies,	did	not	 advocate	 laissez-faire.	 Instead,	 Jewkes	 made	 implicit	 reference	 to	 the	discussions	 on	monopoly	 held	 at	 the	 1947	meeting,	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 state’s	“legitimate	function	of	controlling	monopoly….”30	Jewkes	wrote:			 “It	is	just	as	much	a	normal	part	of	the	function	of	the	State	to	curb	monopoly	as	to	formulate	and	enforce	 traffic	 rules	 (…)	 some	 practices	 should	 be	 definitely	 proscribed,	 others	 should	 be	 kept	under	constant	surveillance.	A	Government	research	body	should	be	engaged	continuously	in	the	study	 of	 changes	 in	 industrial	 organisation	 so	 that	 the	 public	 may	 be	 kept	 informed	 of	 those	changes,	 and	 industries	 given	 proper	 and	 timely	 warning	 of	 practices	 which	 threaten	 the	 free	economy.”31		
                                            27	Hoover	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society”,	Box	29,	Folder	3,	”Hunold	–	Hazlitt”	28	John	Jewkes,	Ordeal	by	Planning	(London:	Macmillian	and	Co.,	Limited,	1948),	ix.	29	Ibid.,	8.	30	Ibid.,	24.	31	Ibid.,	55.	
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It	is	well-known	that	Winston	Churchill	invoked	ideas	from	The	Road	to	Serfdom	in	his	unsuccessful	bid	for	re-election	in	1945,	by	claiming	that	Labour	would	have	to	fall	back	on	some	form	of	Gestapo	in	order	to	carry	out	their	economic	program.32	Jewkes,	 however,	 had	 read	 Hayek	 carefully	 enough	 to	 understand	 the	 dual	argument,	 and	 in	his	 critique	of	Clement	Atlee’s	nationalisation	policies	he	was	careful	to	add	that	“in	Great	Britain	certainly	there	is	much	that	the	State	could	do	to	revivify	the	competitive	process”.33			The	neoliberal	movement	was	now	well	under	way.	 In	articles	written	 for	Felix	Morley’s	US	based	conservative	weekly	Human	Events,	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel,	who	in	Du	Pouvoir	had	only	attacked	economic	planning	and	democracy	as	leading	to	totalitarianism,	went	on	to	criticize	both	state	intervention	and	laissez-faire,	thus	completing	 the	 dual	 argument.”34	 Included	 as	 a	 new	 member	 was	 another	Frenchman,	 René	 Courtin,	 editor	 of	Le	Monde,	 who	 in	 a	 letter	 to	Hunold	 dated	December	2nd,	1948	wrote	“je	suis	persuadé	que	nous	avons	là	la	seule	possibilité	de	créer	une	cadre	pour	le	néolibéralisme.”	(I	am	concinced	that	we	have	a	unique	possibility	to	create	a	cadre	for	neoliberalism).35			The	neoliberal	cadre	Courtin	was	referring	to	was	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,	whose	membership	had	 tripled	 in	 one	 year.	The	next	 available	membership	 list	 in	 the	archives	is	from	1956,	and	shows	that	the	membership	had	doubled	since	its	initial	tripling,	 and	 now	 stood	 at	 some	 195	members.36	 This	 section	 of	 the	 thesis	 has	analysed	the	very	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	1947,	aided	by	the	analysis	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 the	 dual	 argument	 as	 foundational	 for	 their	intellectual	and	political	project.	The	conclusion	will	consider	how	this	analysis	can	
                                            32	Ebenstein,	Friedrich	Hayek,	131.	33	Jewkes,	Ordeal	by	Planning,	56.	34	Knegt,	‘A	New	Order	for	France	and	Europe?	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	and	Alfred	Fabre-Luce	between	Liberalism,	Fascism	and	Europeanism	(1930-1954)’,	226.	35	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	29,	Folder	1,	”Hunold	–	Courtin”	36	Hoover	Institution	Library	and	Archives,	”Mont	Pelerin	Society,	Box	1,	Folder	1,	”Booklets”	
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be	helpful	in	judging	the	influence	of	these	thinkers	in	the	years	after	1947	and	up	until	the	present	moment.					
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Conclusion	–	What	is	neoliberalism?								 “Not	 without	 admiration,	 we	 have	 to	 concede	 that	 neoliberal	 intellectuals	 struggled	through	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	political	and	organizational	character	of	modern	knowledge	and	science	than	did	their	counterparts	on	the	 left,	and	therefore	presents	a	worthy	challenge	to	everyone	interested	in	the	archaeology	of	knowledge.”1		 Philip	Mirowski,	Never	Let	A	Serious	Crisis	Go	To	Waste	(2013)									When	the	attendees	of	the	Mont	Pèlerin	conference	left	Hotel	du	Parc	on	the	10th	of	April	1947,	neoliberalism	as	we	know	it	was	only	just	beginning.	Many	would	even	argue	that	it	wouldn’t	fully	begin	until	at	least	25	years	later,	when	various	developments	 in	 the	 economic	 history	 of	 the	world	 coincided	with	 the	 gradual	acceptance	of	ideas	emanating	from	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.	In	this	conclusion	I	will	attempt	to	show	how	my	study	of	early	neoliberal	thought	can	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	neoliberalism	today.	Rather	than	see	neoliberalism	as	a	set	of	now	outdated	economic	policies	regarding	deregulation	and	“free	markets”,	I	argue	that	it	should	be	seen	as	something	closer	to	what	Michel	Foucault	called	a	
                                            1	Mirowski,	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste,	49.	
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“political	 rationality”:	 a	 way	 of	 understanding	 society,	 politics	 and	 subjectivity,	which	 is	based	on	the	original	neoliberal	conception	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity.	The	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	gave	rise	to	the	dual	argument:	a	unifying	 and	 foundational	 claim	 put	 forward	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 early	 neoliberal	intellectuals	in	the	years	leading	up	to	1947.	On	the	one	hand,	they	claimed	that	economic	 planning	 lead	 to	 totalitarianism;	 on	 the	 other	 they	 argued	 against	laissez-faire	and	 for	a	strong	state.2	At	 the	 first	Mont	Pelerin	Society	meeting	 in	1947,	 Ludwig	 von	Mises	 and	 Loren	Miller	 claimed	 that	 this	was	 contradictory.	Mises	 and	 Miller	 thus	 failed	 to	 grasp	 and	 get	 on	 board	 with	 the	 novelty	 of	neoliberalism.	Stuck	in	their	laissez-faire	views,	they	thought	government	activity	and	a	 strong	 state	would	 always	mean	 social	 liberal	 interference	with	markets.	Hayek,	 the	 ordoliberals	 and	 economists	 like	 Robbins,	 Director	 and	 Graham,	arguably	 took	 the	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	more	seriously.	They	concluded	that	in	a	modern	world,	modern	states	would	have	to	be	put	to	use	to	protect	and	spread	these	mechanisms.	This	was	their	main	innovation,	and	the	resistance	of	someone	like	Mises	shows	what	a	leap	it	was	for	right-wing	liberalism	to	 consider	 active	 government	 policies	 and	 a	 strong	 state.	 The	 reasons	 of	 the	neoliberals	for	opening	this	conceptual	space	was	not	that	they	were	social	liberals	who	wanted	to	use	the	state	for	redistributive	purposes	and	tasks	they	believed	should	lie	outside	of	the	domain	of	markets.	Their	cautious	embrace	of	states	was	not	due	to	a	mistrust	in	markets,	but	rather	the	opposite.	I	believe	that	this	is	a	key	insight	offered	by	the	analysis	of	this	thesis:	neoliberalism	was	neither	laissez-faire	nor	social	liberalism.	Neoliberals	wanted	to	use	the	state,	not	because	they	didn’t	believe	in	markets,	but	precisely	the	opposite:	since	they	believed	so	deeply	that	markets	 were	 the	 bedrock	 of	 civilization	 and	 had	 to	 be	 the	 basis	 of	 a	modern	
                                            2	The	concept	of	totalitarianism	was	largely	abandoned	by	neoliberals	after	1947,	as	totalitarianism	theory	became	a	more	unified	school	of	thought,	more	related	to	so-called	“Cold	War	liberalism”.	See	for	instance	Jan-Werner	Müller,	‘Fear	and	Freedom:	On	“Cold	War	Liberalism”’,	European	Journal	of	Political	Theory,	no.	7	(2008):	45–64.	
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society,	it	made	perfect	sense	for	them	to	start	considering	how	to	best	use	modern	states	in	their	service.		Even	so,	neoliberalism	has	been	understood	both	as	laissez-faire	liberalism,	and	more	recently	as	a	form	of	social	liberalism.	The	latter	interpretation	has	begun	to	arise	in	publications	by	scholars	connected	to	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society,3	but	is	also	present	in	the	work	of	Hagen	Schulz-Forberg	and	Serge	Audier,4	who	see	some	of	the	social	topics	of	the	Lippmann	Colloquium	as	 indicative	of	neoliberalism	as	a	third	way	between	socialism	and	laissez-faire.5	In	certain	ways,	the	case	of	France	is	the	most	confusing	one,	not	only	due	to	the	slightly	more	social	liberal	bent	of	the	 Lippmann	 Colloquium,	 which	 was	 held	 in	 France.	 The	 French	 tradition	 of	planning	would	make	French	neoliberalism	somewhat	more	Keynesian	and	social	than	was	the	case	 in	other	countries.6	Nonetheless,	my	study	of	early	neoliberal	thought	has	shown	very	clearly	that	neoliberalism	was	an	attack	on	the	ideas	of	social	liberalism.	In	the	case	of	Hayek	and	other	conference	attendees	like	Director	and	Eucken,	there	was	a	strongly	held	conviction	that	liberalism	had	lost	its	way	by	becoming	more	socially	oriented.		What	 is	 more	 common	 than	 the	 idea	 that	 neoliberalism	 was	 a	 form	 of	 social	liberalism	is	the	opposite	mistake:	the	notion	that	it	was	a	revival	of	laissez-faire	liberalism.	We	have	noted	 that	David	Harvey’s	 standard	work	A	Brief	History	of	
Neoliberalism	makes	this	assumption,7	and	in	journalism,	public	debate	and	even	academia	 it	 is	 very	 widespread.	 Scholars	 specializing	 on	 neoliberalism	 have	arguably	moved	passed	this	notion	by	now,	but	a	historian	like	Angus	Burgin,	who	is	 certainly	 aware	 of	 the	 nuances	 of	 early	 neoliberal	 thought,	 nonetheless	 calls	neoliberalism	a	reinvention	of	 “free	markets”.	Bernhard	Harcourt,	author	of	 the	
                                            3	Nordbakken,	Liberale	Tenkere	for	Vår	Tid.	4	Serge	Audier,	Néo-Libéralisme(s)	(Paris:	Grasset,	2012).	5	See	also	Emile	Chabal,	‘The	Mid-Life	Crisis	of	Neo-Liberalism’,	Books	&	Ideas,	4	July	2012,	http://www.booksandideas.net/The-Mid-Life-Crisis-of-Neo.html.	6	Franois	Denord,	Néo-Libéralisme	-	Version	Française	(Paris:	Demopolis,	2007).	7	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism.	
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influential	book	The	Illusion	of	Free	Markets,	refers	to	what	he	calls	“the	American	paradox	 of	 laissez-faire	 and	 mass	 punishment”	 as	 an	 apt	 description	 of	neoliberalism.8	How	neoliberalism	came	to	be	perceived	as	closely	connected	to,	or	even	a	revival	of	 laissez-faire	when	it	was	an	explicit	attack	on	it,	 is	really	no	great	mystery.	Those	at	the	1947	meeting	who	criticized	Hayek	and	the	core	group	of	neoliberals	from	a	social	liberal	position,	would	more	or	less	disappear	from	the	group	after	1947,	and	were	certainly	not	influential	in	any	way.	This	includes,	for	instance,	Maurices	Allais,	Herbert	Tingsten	and	Carl	Iversen.	Conversely,	Ludwig	Mises,	who	arguably	 criticized	 the	neoliberals	much	more	and	 in	much	harsher	language	at	the	Mont	Pèlerin	meeting,	but	from	a	laissez-faire	position,	was	made	a	director	of	the	society.	Neoliberalism	built	on	the	elitist,	anti-democratic	strand	of	liberalism	that	James	L.	Richardson	argues	mutated	into	laissez-faire	liberalism	in	the	1800s,	and	it	was	therefore	in	many	ways	its	heir.		Morever,	the	neoliberal	argument	for	a	strong	state	to	spread	and	support	markets	was	also	built	on	an	invisible-hand	 rhetoric	 of	 organic	 growth,	 which	 Hayek	 called	 “spontaneous	order”.	The	idea	of	a	market	order	automatically	regulated	by	an	“invisible	hand”	is	a	powerful	secular	reworking	of	the	concept	of	providence,	and	it	has	held	great	appeal	 among	 various	 conservative	 thinkers	 for	 centuries.9	 The	 metaphor	indicates	 that	 the	 status	quo	 is	 the	 result	of	 a	 logic	beyond	 the	 control	of	mere	humans;	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	it	has	often	been	popular	amongst	those	who	find	themselves	comparatively	well	off	under	current	social	arrangements.	As	Chapter	 4	 showed	 very	 clearly,	 the	members	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	were	certainly	members	of	a	privileged	elite,	and	as	such	would	be	prone	to	defend	the	general	outline	of	 the	capitalist	society	 in	which	 they	 found	themselves.	Razeen	Sally,	scholar	of	economics	and	international	relations	and	current	member	of	the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society,	 has	 claimed	 that	 this	 notion	 of	 order	 is	 in	 fact	 what	
                                            8	Bernard	E.	Harcourt,	The	Illusion	of	Free	Markets:	Punishment	and	the	Myth	of	Natural	
Order	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011).	9	Hirschman,	The	Rhetoric	of	Reaction.	
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characterizes	what	he	calls	“classical	liberalism”.10	The	latter	was	a	term	used	by	Hayek,	and	it	seems	to	be	an	amalgam	connecting	earlier	ideas	from	the	cannon	of	what	 Richardson	 calls	 “elitist	 liberalism”	 with	 more	 recent	 neoliberalism.	Liberalism	was	long	seen	to	be	a	product	of	the	nineteenth	century,	and	perceived	to	be	more	socially	and	democratically	oriented	than	what	is	now	the	case.11	This	is	what	the	early	neoliberals	sought	to	change,	and	understood	relationally	to	other	political	projects	existing	at	 the	 time,	 early	neoliberalism	was	profoundly	 right-wing.	 So	 much	 so	 that	 a	 key	 question	 becomes	 what	 really	 separates	 it	 from	conservatism.		Hayek	himself	attempted	to	answer	that	question	in	a	presidential	address	to	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	1957,	later	reprinted	as	a	post-script	to	The	Constitution	of	
Liberty	(1960)	under	the	title	“Why	I	Am	Not	A	Conservative”.	There	he	stated	that	“though	there	is	a	need	for	a	‘brake	on	the	vehicle	of	progress’,	I	personally	cannot	be	content	with	simply	helping	to	apply	the	brake.	What	the	liberal	must	ask,	first	of	all,	is	not	how	fast	or	how	far	we	should	move,	but	where	we	should	move.”12	Corey	Robin	argues	that	this	general	understanding	of	conservatism	as	merely	a	moderating	force	is	misleading.	According	to	Robin,	conservatism	has	always	been	an	activist,	counterrevolutionary	creed,	born	out	of	the	experience	of	having	power	and	privilege,	and	seeing	 it	 threatened.13	Robin	considers	Hayek	a	conservative,	and	implies	that	conservatism	is	always	a	form	of	reaction.14	Regardless	of	whether	we	want	to	use	that	term	to	label	Hayek’s	thinking,	Robin’s	analysis	can	be	useful	for	understanding	neoliberalism	as	a	movement	placed	squarely	on	the	political	right.	 The	 foundational	 attack	 on	 laissez-faire,	 exhibited	 in	 the	 writings	 of,	 for	
                                            10	Razeen	Sally,	Classical	Liberalism	and	International	Economic	Order	(London:	Routledge,	1998),	5.	11	Bell,	‘What	Is	Liberalism?’,	700.	12	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty,	398.	13	Robin,	The	Reactionary	Mind,	28–35.	14	Dekker	concedes	that	many	Viennese	thinkers	would	not	have	been	very	offended	by	the	term	“reactionary”,	but	argues	that	“edification	and	therapeutic	knowledge	captures	better	what	we	are	after.”	Dekker,	The	Viennese	Students	of	Civilization	–	The	Meaning	
and	Context	of	Austrian	Economics	Reconsidered,	158.	
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instance,	Lippmann,	Hayek,	Röpke	and	Robbins,	and	backed	up	in	discussion	by,	for	instance,	Eucken,	Director	and	Graham,	signalled	that	neoliberalism	was	to	be	something	 different	 from	 the	 perceived	 passivity	 of	 nineteenth	 century	 laissez-faire	liberalism,	but	it	did	not	signal	a	turn	towards	social	liberalism.	According	to	Hayek,	 the	 main	 point	 of	 the	 conference	 at	 Mont	 Pèlerin	 was	 precisely	 to	 rid	liberalism	of	the	dogma	of	laissez-faire	and	find	ways	of	using	states	to	create	the	conditions	for	a	market	society,	without	falling	into	the	constructivist	trap	of	social	liberalism.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 part	 of	 the	 challenge	 then	 lay	 in	 defining	 the	boundaries	 of	 the	 mechanism	 and	 consequently	 to	 find	 which	 interventions	created	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 market	 mechanisms,	 and	 avoid	 those	 which	amounted	 to	 an	 interference	 with	 it.	 These	 subtle,	 yet	 highly	 important	considerations	were	mainly	reserved	for	internal	meetings,	and	the	paragraphs	in	published	writing	which	alludes	to	them	remain	obscure.	This	is	why	it	has	been	so	important	to	study	the	minutes	of	the	first	meeting	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	order	to	better	understand	what	sort	of	project	they	were	engaged	in.	Externally	however,	the	simple	rhetoric	of	denouncing	economic	planning	and	praising	the	workings	of	 the	 “free”	market	prevailed,	and	 this	was	perceived	by	most	as	 the	main	content	of	the	ideology	promoted	by	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society.15		
The	importance	of	context	Another	reason	why	neoliberalism	has	been	understood	as	a	return	to	laissez-faire	liberalism,	when	it	was	in	fact	an	attempt	to	steer	right	wing	liberalism	away	from	the	dogmas	of	laissez-faire,	is	that	the	content	of	neoliberal	doctrine	changed	over	time.	Historians	 like	Angus	Burgin	and	Daniel	Stedman	Jones,	who	have	studied	early	neoliberalism	extensively,	and	thus	found	its	anti-laissez-faire	content,	have	been	making	this	point	for	some	time.	There	is	certainly	a	case	to	be	made	for	the	idea	that	neoliberalism	was	radicalized	in	the	1970s,	coinciding	with	what	Angus	Burgin	dubs	“the	invention	of	Milton	Friedman”:	his	appointment	as	president	of	
                                            15	Raymon	Aron,	for	instance,	saw	Hayek	in	this	way,	even	though	he	joined	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	for	a	few	years	in	the	1950s.	Raymon	Aron,	‘Remarques	Sur	L’Objectivité	Des	Sciences	Sociales’,	Theoria	5,	no.	2	(January	1939):	161–94.	
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the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	in	1970	and	his	rise	to	fame	as	a	major	public	intellectual	in	the	USA.16	In	a	letter	to	Friedman	as	early	as	1960,	Bertrand	de	Jouvenel	claimed	that	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	had	“turned	increasingly	to	a	Manicheism	according	to	which	the	State	can	do	no	good	and	private	enterprise	can	do	no	wrong”,17	so	a	change	 in	 orientation	 was	 perceived	 also	 by	 the	 society’s	 members.	 In	 public	especially,	 Friedman’s	message	was	 a	 rather	 simple	 one	 of	 governments	 being	good	 and	markets	 being	 bad,	 and	 according	 to	 Burgin,	 Friedman	 developed	 “a	rhetorical	mode	and	popular	profile	that	supplanted,	and	exceeded	the	Hayekian	precedent.18	 Friedman’s	 simplifications,	 broadcast	 amongst	 other	 places	 in	 the	television	show	Free	to	Choose	which	he	made	with	his	wife	Rose	Friedman	(1910	–	 2009)	 (née	 Director,	 sister	 of	 Aaron),	 was	 symptomatic	 of	 a	 broader	 shift	between	what	has	been	known	as	the	first	and	second	generation	of	Chicago	School	economists.	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	4,	the	discussion	on	how	to	use	states	for	liberal	ends	centred	mainly	around	the	problem	of	monopolies.	Apart	from	Mises,	there	was	strong	agreement	that	the	rise	of	large	corporations	was	a	major	problem	with	modern	 capitalism,	 which	 distorted	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	 price	mechanism,	 and	 thus	 needed	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 state	 action	 in	 the	 name	 of	liberalism	 and	 competitive	 markets.	 The	 degree	 to	 which	 this	 critique	 of	corporations	disappeared	from	the	neoliberal	agenda	in	later	years	is	striking,	and	indeed	worthy	of	a	thesis	of	its	own.19	Led	by	founding	MPS	members	like	Milton	Friedman	and	George	Stigler,	the	second	generation	of	Chicago	economists	turned	the	 argument	 for	 strict	 competition	 laws	on	 its	head.	They	 largely	 claimed	 that	
                                            16	Burgin,	The	Great	Persuasion,	152–86.	17	Ibid.,	150–51.	18	Ibid.,	151.	19	The	ground	work	of	which	having	been	done	by	Robert	Van	Horn	in	his	article	on	the	topic	Van	Horn,	‘Reinventing	Monopoly	and	the	Role	of	Corporations:	The	Roots	of	Chicago	Law	and	Economics’.	See	also	his	edited	volume	Van	Horn,	Building	Chicago	
Economics.	
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corporations	could	do	no	wrong,	as	any	power	 they	had	was	a	result	of	market	outcomes	that	ought	not	to	be	second-guessed	by	states	and	politicians.20		Gilles	Cristoph	has	conceptualized	the	historical	trajectory	of	neoliberal	thought	as	a	 change	 in	 the	 object	 of	 regulation.	 In	 the	 beginning,	 early	 neoliberal	 thinkers	wanted	 to	 regulate	 markets,	 and	 our	 analysis	 has	 shown	 that	 they	 wanted	 to	regulate	 them	 to	 secure	 better	 competition.	 In	 a	 way,	 they	wanted	 to	 regulate	markets	 to	 make	 sure	 they	 were	 more	 like	 market-like,	 because	 the	 logic	 of	competition	was	believed	 to	be	 the	essence	of	market	mechanisms.	As	we	have	seen,	however,	it	was	realized	that	the	active	use	of	state	power	was	necessary	to	achieve	a	competitive	society	based	on	markets.	Cristoph	argues	that	a	change	then	took	 place	with	 the	 rise	 of	 so-called	 Public	 Choice	 theory,	 in	which	 neoliberals	largely	gave	up	on	regulating	markets,	and	instead	shifted	their	attention	towards	regulating	states	and	the	public	sector,	based	on	the	same	logic	of	competition.21	Dardot	and	Laval	suggest	that	a	similar	change	has	happened	when	they	write	of	“the	 mutation	 of	 ordoliberalism”	 in	 Europe.	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 original	ordoliberal	view	of	states	as	guarantors	of	markets,	so	important	in	the	history	of	the	 European	 integration	 project,	 has	 now	 morphed	 into	 a	 full-blown	marketization	of	states.	Principles	of	market	competition	have	been	imposed	both	on	 the	 internal	 organization	 of	 states	 and	 the	 public	 sector,	 and	 in	 how	nation	states	compete	with	other	states	on	a	global	market.22		Compared	to	these	ideas,	the	early	neoliberals	gathered	at	Mont	Pèlerin	do	seem	moderate,	 pragmatic	 and	 nuanced.	 They	 certainly	 wanted	 to	 regulate	markets,	while	 remaining	 liberal	 and	 true	 to	 the	 what	 they	 believed	 were	 the	 market	
                                            20	Mont	Pelerin	Society	member	Ronald	Coase	later	applied	this	principle	also	to	the	concept	of	externalities.	Ronald	Coase,	‘The	Federal	Communications	Commission’,	
Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	2	(October	1959):	1–40.	21	Gilles	Cristoph,	‘More	Neoliberalism	to	End	Neoliberalism?	The	Historical	Trajectory	of	Neoliberal	Thought	and	Post-2008	Political	Economy’	(Kingston	University,	London,	2013).	22	Dardot	and	Laval,	The	New	Way	of	the	World,	193–215.	
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mechanism’s	own	 logic	of	competition.	 	The	gist	of	 their	discussions	 focused	on	how	 to	 use	 the	 state	 to	 avoid	 monopolies	 and	 power	 concentrations.	 This	 did	change	 somewhat,	 but	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 radicalization	 is	 a	 more	 suitable	metaphor	 than	 mutation.	 	 The	 latter	 means	 to	 change	 into	 something	 quite	different,	whereas	the	former	means	going	to	the	root	or	origin	of	something	which	is	arguably	what	happened	to	neoliberalism.	The	work	of	historians	 like	Burgin	and	Stedman	Jones	who	argue	the	thesis	that	the	ascent	of	Milton	Friedman	led	to	a	radical,	“Americanized”	neoliberalism,	suggests	that	we	should	see	Hayek	and	the	early	neoliberals	as	“ambivalent”	and	with	“notes	of	restraint”.23	I	would	argue	that	this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 most	 fruitful	 way	 to	 understand	 the	 history	 of	neoliberalism.	 This	 narrative	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 attempting	 to	 understand	 the	political	thought	of	the	past	with	the	norms	and	vocabulary	of	the	present.	If	early	neoliberalism	seems	moderate	to	us	today,	it	was	no	such	thing	in	its	own	time:	the	ideas	 of	 the	Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	members	 were	 considered	 rather	 fringe	 and	about	as	right	wing	as	possible	in	the	context	of	the	immediate	post-war	years.	It	is	indeed	possible	that	the	fact	that	they	appear	moderate	from	today’s	perspective	says	more	about	our	own	time	than	it	does	about	the	ideas	in	question.			My	point	is	that	later,	more	“extreme”	versions	of	neoliberalism	than	the	ones	on	display	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	 40s	 are	 not	 deviations	 from,	 but	 rather	 logical	continuations	of	 the	pioneering	efforts	of	early	neoliberal	 intellectuals.	 I	am	not	denying	that	the	content	of	neoliberal	doctrine	changed	somewhat,	nor	that	Milton	Friedman	actually	started	using	the	term	“laissez-faire”	to	describe	his	own	views,	merely	that	this	should	be	seen	not	as	a	break	with	a	more	pragmatic	past,	but	as	continuity	and	adherence	to	a	set	of	principles	laid	down	by	early	neoliberals.		The	 key	 to	 this	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 context	 of	 the	 early	 neoliberals’	 supposed	pragmatism.	Their	economic	liberalism	was	on	the	defensive	in	1947:	they	simply	
                                            23	See	for	instance	Sloan	Wilson,	‘The	Road	to	Ideology.	How	Friedrich	Hayek	Became	a	Monster’.	
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had	to	concede	that	the	rise	of	corporations	had	led	to	major	problems,	and	that	capitalism	was	 not	 at	 all	 working	 the	way	 idealized	 liberal	 theories	 seemed	 to	suggest.	 Indeed,	 some	 of	 the	 positions	 held	 by	 latter	 day	 neoliberals	would	 be	almost	 unimaginable	 to	 the	 intellectuals	 gathered	 at	 Mont	 Pèlerin	 in	 1947.	Consider	 Hayek’s	 statement	 in	 the	 session	 on	 “Free	 Enterprise	 or	 Competitive	Order”	regarding	public	services,	where	he	said	that	some	“services	of	this	kind	we	must	 always	 expect	 the	 governments	 to	 provide	 outside	 the	 market”	 [Hayek’s	emphasis].24	 Contrast	 this	with	 the	widespread	marketization	of	public	 services	that	has	taken	place	all	over	the	Western	world	in	the	past	20	years.	In	1947,	Public	Choice-theory	 and	 New	 Public	Management	 had	 yet	 to	 be	 invented	 (mainly	 by	James	Buchanan,	president	of	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	from	1984	–	1986);	but	the	important	thing	to	realize	is	that	these	later	developments	could	not	have	taken	place	 without	 the	 pioneering	 efforts	 of	 the	 early	 neoliberals	 to	 start	conceptualizing	markets	 as	mediators	 of	modernity.	 The	 notion	 that	 a	modern	society	can	only	function	through	market	mechanisms	is	the	core	idea	that	allowed	someone	like	Buchanan,	in	a		very	different	context,	to	argue	that	public	employees	and	 even	 politicians	 had	 to	 be	 held	 in	 check	 by	 incentives	 and	 market-like	structres.25	I	argue	that	this	is	the	same	core	idea	which	allowed	Friedman,	Stigler	and	other	Chicago	economists	to	backtrack	on	the	1947	meeting’s	ideas	on	anti-trust	law,	and	claim	that	large	corporations	and	market	failures	were	arguably	less	dangerous	than	perceived	failures	by	government26.		
Think	tanks	The	Mont	Pelerin	Society	exists	to	this	day,	and	several	of	the	scholars	quoted	as	secondary	sources	in	this	thesis	are	or	were	members.27	The	influence	of	this	small,	
                                            24	Liberaal	Archief,	”Mont	Pèlerin	Society”,	Box	1,	Folder	1	“Mont	Pèlerin,	1947”	25	Marius	Doksheim	and	Kristian	Kjøllesdal,	Svikt!	-	En	Introduksjon	Til	Public	Choice	(Oslo:	Civita,	2009).	26	Van	Horn,	Building	Chicago	Economics.	27	This	includes	the	economist	and	historian	of	economic	thought	Peter	Boettke,	who	has	worked	extensively	on	the	socialist	calculation	debates	and	has	held	the	presidency	of	the	organization	since	2016.	
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closed	 organization	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 some	 scrutiny,	 especially	 by	 the	numerous	 scholars	 loosely	 connected	 to	 the	 research	 network	 around	 Philip	Mirowski	and	Dieter	Plehwe.28	One	of	the	findings	to	emerge	from	this	research	are	the	close	ties	between	the	society,	whose	activities	have	usually	been	limited	to	 annual	 conferences,	 and	 a	much	more	 active	 organization	 called	 the	 ATLAS	Network.29	 As	mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction,	 this	 was	 founded	 in	 1981	 by	 Sir	Antony	Fisher,	who	was	invited	to	Mont	Pèlerin	in	1947.	The	ATLAS	network	is	today	an	umbrella	organization	for	no	less	than	467	think	tanks	and	organizations	in	96	countries	all	over	the	world.30	Fisher	began	his	foray	into	the	ever-expanding	world	of	think	tanks	by	founding	the	Institute	for	Economic	Affairs	(IEA)	in	London	in	1955.	He	had	made	a	fortune	in	farming	caged	chickens,	and	after	reading	The	
Road	to	Serfdom	(the	condensed	version),		decided	he	wanted	to	use	his	money	and	energy	to	spread	the	ideas	of	neoliberalism.31	Fisher	approached	Hayek	in	1945,	and	was	told	that	going	into	politics,	as	he	had	originally	intended	to,	might	not	be	the	most	efficient	way	to	 influence	society.	Fisher	wrote:	“He	[Hayek]	explained	that	the	decisive	influence	in	the	great	battle	of	ideas	and	policy	was	wielded	by	the	intellectuals	whom	he	characterised	as	‘second-hand	dealers	in	ideas’.”32	Hayek	would	use	this	latter	phrase	and	elaborate	upon	this	strategy	for	achieving	social	change	in	his	1949	essay	“The	Intellectuals	and	Socialism”.	More	important	than	running	 for	 office,	 according	 to	 him,	 was	 to	 slowly	 influence	 intellectuals	 and	opinion	makers	 so	 that	 politicians	wielding	 power	would	 eventually	 do	 so	 in	 a	society	where	neoliberal	 ideas	were	available	as	alternatives,	or	even	dominant	and	seen	as	common	sense.33	Hayek	claimed	to	be	inspired	by	the	social	democrats	
                                            28	Mirowski	and	Plehwe,	The	Road	from	Mont	Pèlerin.	29	Djelic,	‘Spreading	Ideas	to	Change	the	World	–	Inventing	and	Institutionalizing	the	Neoliberal	Think	Tank’.	30	https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners/global-directory	31	See	for	instance	Richard	Cockett,	Thinking	the	Unthinkable:	Think-Tanks	and	the	
Economic	Counter-Revolution	(Waukegan,	Illinois:	Fontana	Press,	1995).	32	Gerald	Frost,	Antony	Fisher	-	Champion	of	Liberty	(London:	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs,	2008),	10.	33	Friedrich	Hayek,	‘Intellectuals	and	Socialism’,	The	University	of	Chicago	Law	Review,	Spring	1949.	
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in	the	Fabian	Society,	which	for	some	time	before	the	Second	World	War	exerted	great	influence	over	British	politics,	and	he	advised	Fisher	to	visit	Leonard	Read	and	 the	 other	 Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 members	 at	 the	 Foundation	 for	 Economic	Education	in	1952.		The	 IEA	 has	 been	widely	 credited	with	 laying	 the	 foundations	 for	 and	 actively	promoting	 the	rise	of	Margaret	Thatcher	 to	 the	UK	prime	ministership	 in	1979.	Two	years	after	 that,	Fisher	set	up	ATLAS	to	be	a	“think	tank	that	creates	think	tanks”.34	 He	 contributed	 to	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Fraser	 Institute	 in	 Canada;	 the	Manhattan	 Institute	 and	 the	Pacific	Research	 Institute	 in	 the	US;	 the	Centre	 for	Independent	 Studies	 in	 Australia	 and	 some	 150	 other	 think	 tanks	 all	 over	 the	world.	 The	 most	 famous	 think	 tanks	 in	 the	 ATLAS	 Network	 are	 powerful	organizations	like	the	Heritage	Foundation,	Cato	Institute	and	others	among	the	156	registered	outlets	in	the	USA;	as	well	as	UK	based	think	tanks	like	the	IEA	and	the	 Adam	 Smith	 Institute.	 ATLAS	 also	 has	 an	 overwhelming	 presence	 in	 Latin	America	 and	 somewhat	 smaller	 contingents	 in	 Asia,	 Africa	 and	 Oceania.	 In	Scandinavian	countries,	think	tanks	like	Timbro	(Sweden),	CEPOS	(Denmark)	and	Civita	(Norway)	have	exercised	tremendous	influence	over	contemporary	politics	in	the	preceding	decade,	giving	rise	to	right-wing	governments	with	market-based	reform	programs	and	setting	the	terms	for	public	debate.	The	network	also	has	a	strong	 presence	 in	 post-Soviet	 states	 in	 Eastern	 Europe,	 and	 a	 more	 modest	position	 in	 continental	 Western	 Europe.	 This	 network	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	important	way	in	which	the	neoliberal	ideas	studied	in	this	thesis	have	influenced	the	world,	and	it	amounts	to	a	new	form	of	political	organization.		The	 many	 changes	 that	 societies	 both	 in	 the	Western	 world	 and	 the	 so-called	developing	world	have	gone	through	 in	 the	past	 four	decades	can	surely	not	be	attributed	exclusively	to	the	ideas	and	political	practices	of	Friedrich	Hayek,	the	
                                            34	Richard	Meagher,	Right	Ideas:	Discourse,	Framing	and	the	Conservative	Coalition	(New	York:	University	of	New	York,	2009),	94.	
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Mont	 Pelerin	 Society	 and	 the	 ATLAS	 Foundation.	 Privatisations;	 trade	liberalisation;	 the	 abandonment	 of	 Keynesian	 fiscal	 policies;	 austerity	 policies;	structural	 adjustment	 programmes;	 financialisation	 of	 the	 world	 economy	 and	other	 developments	 often	 labelled	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 process	 of	neoliberalisation35	 can	 also	 be	 explained	 through	 analyses	 of	 political	 economy	that	pay	 little	attention	to	 ideas.	These	narratives	 focus	on	various	crises	of	 the	“embedded	 liberalism”36	 and	democratic	capitalism	of	 the	post-war	order,	often	falling	back	on	a	Marxian	analysis	of	dwindling	rates	of	profit,37	and,	ultimately,	class	struggle.38	This	can	then	be	joined	to	an	analysis	and	critique	of	neoliberal	thought,	 through	 a	 Gramscian	 hegemony-theoretical	 approach39,	 or	 by	 simply	pointing	to	the	fact	that	the	Mont	Pelerin	Society	and	the	vast	network	described	above	 is	 lavishly	 financed	 by	 capital	 interests.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 analyses	 of	 the	political	economy	of	capitalism	are	necessary,	and	that	they	may	very	well	tell	us	more	about	our	current	impasse	than	works	of	intellectual	history.			However,	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	and	imagine	the	economy	are	also	of	great	importance	to	how	we	allow	it	to	operate.	Samuel	Moyn	has	recently	argued	that	“Intellectual	history	has	never	really	reckoned	with	the	implications	of	social	theory.”	 According	 to	 him,	 developments	 in	 post-Marxist	 social	 theory	 offer	insights	into	the	relationship	between	the	social	order	and	representations	of	it.40	Moyn	 makes	 special	 reference	 to	 Cornelius	 Castoriadis’	 concept	 of	 a	 “social	imaginary”,	and	argues	 that	 “the	most	 interesting	work	 in	 the	 field	of	European	
                                            35	See	Alfredo	Saad-Filho	and	Ben	Fine,	‘Thirteen	Things	You	Need	to	Know	About	Neolibrealism’,	Critical	Sociology	1,	no.	22	(2016):	1–22.	36	Ruggie,	‘International	Regimes,	Transactions,	and	Change:	Embedded	Liberalism	in	the	Postwar	Economic	Order’.	37	See	Wolfgang	Streeck,	Buying	Time	(London	-	New	York:	Verso,	2014);	Streeck,	‘The	Crises	of	Democratic	Capitalism’.	38	See	Dominique	Lévy	and	Gérard	Duménil,	The	Crisis	of	Neoliberalism	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011).	39	Springer,	‘Neoliberalism	as	Discourse:	Between	Foucauldian	Political	Economy	and	Marxian	Poststructuralism’.	40	Samuel	Moyn,	‘Imaginary	Intellectual	History’,	in	Rethinking	Modern	European	
Intellectual	History	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	112.	
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intellectual	 history	 today	 is	 attempting	 a	 history	 of	 ideas	 as	 (constitutive)	ideology.”41	 In	 so	 far	 as	 my	 analysis	 in	 this	 thesis	 can	 contribute	 to	 our	understanding	of	 the	present,	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	uncovering	 the	 roots	 of	why	we	think	the	way	we	do	about	economics,	politics,	and	the	social	order	as	such.	In	the	introduction	I	asked	what	the	relationship	is	between	politics	and	the	economy,	and	this	thesis	has	shown	that	early	neoliberalism	very	much	amounted	to	a	desire	to	keep	democratic	politics	away	from	the	economy.	This	was	achieved	with	new	ideas	about	how	to	use	modern	states	to	construct	and	support	markets,	but	to	also	protect	 them	 from	 “interference”.	 Their	 foundational	 idea	 of	 markets	 as	 the	mediators	of	modernity	may,	especially	through	the	impressive	work	of	neoliberal	think	tanks,	have	influenced	common	sense	and	political	rationalities	concerning	the	 way	 we	 view	 the	 relationship	 between	 politics	 and	 the	 economy	 today.	 In	conceptualizing	neoliberalism	purely	as	a	set	of	policy	proposals	or	a	“philosophy”,	we	risk	missing	 the	deeper	content	of	neoliberalism	as	a	 theory	of	modernity.	 I	argue	 this	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 when	 we	 carefully	 analyse	 the	 historical	context	out	of	which	it	grew.			
Conclusion	Economists42	 and	 political	 scientists43	 have	 in	 past	 decades	 tended	 to	 define	neoliberalism	 as	 an	 economic	 policy	 program	 inspired	 by	 a	 neoliberal	”philosophy”,	the	early	development	of	which	has	been	the	topic	of	this	thesis.	The	research	department	of	the	IMF	issued	a	report	in	2016	entitled	“Neoliberalism:	Oversold?”,	 in	 which	 the	 authors	 suggest	 that	 what	 they	 perceive	 to	 be	“neoliberalism”,	 namely	 policies	 of	 increased	 competition	 and	 privatisation	 in	
                                            41	Ibid.,	123.	42	See	for	instance	John	Quiggin,	Zombie	Economics	-	How	Dead	Ideas	Still	Walk	Among	Us	(New	Jersey,	United	States:	Princeton	University	Press,	2010);	Anwar	Shaikh,	Capitalism	
–	Competition,	Conflict,	Crises	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016);	Erik	Reinert,	How	
Rich	Countries	Got	Rich	and	Why	Poor	Countries	Stay	Poor	(London:	Constable	&	Robinson,	2007).	43	See	for	instance	Mark	Blyth,	Austerity	–	The	History	of	a	Dangerous	Idea	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013);	Cornel	Ban,	Ruling	Ideas	-	How	Global	Neoliberalism	Goes	
Local	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2016).	
  274 
developing	countries,	had	not	had	the	beneficial	effects	they	were	once	thought	to	have.44	Similarly,	Donald	 J.	Trump’s	presidential	bid	 is	widely	perceived	to	have	been	successful	because	of	his	campaign’s	appeal	 to	people	 in	areas	affected	by	industrial	closures,	with	a	promise	to	withdraw	from	trade	deals	in	order	to	raise	employment	 figures.45	 Policies	 of	 industrial	 protectionism	 would	 surely	 run	counter	to	what	in	policy	circles	is	considered	“neoliberalism”,	and	it	brings	back	the	 questions	 asked	 by	 many	 after	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 of	 whether	neoliberalism	 is	 entering	 its	 final	 phase.46	 This	 thesis’	 historicizing	 of	 early	neoliberal	 thought	as	 resting	on	a	conceptualization	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	makes	it	clear	that	we	should	be	under	no	such	illusions.			The	sociologist	Will	Davies	has	written	that	even	if	the	economics	of	neoliberalism	might	be	experiencing	some	setbacks,	the	real	challenge	is	to	come	to	terms	with	the	 sociology	 of	 neoliberalism.	 “At	 the	 root	 of	 the	 difficulty	 and	 meaning	 of	neoliberalism	is	the	way	it	straddles	the	terrain	of	sociology	and	economics”,	he	writes,	 suggesting	 that:	 “One	way	 of	 understanding	 it	 is	 as	 an	 effort	 to	 anchor	
modernity	 in	 the	market”.47	 This	 is	 precisely	what	my	 study	 of	 early	 neoliberal	thought	has	shown:	neoliberalism	is	about	much	more	than	economic	policies,	it	amounts	 to	 a	 theory	 of	modernity.	Wendy	 Brown	 has	 decried	 the	 reduction	 of	“neoliberalism	 to	 a	 bundle	 of	 economic	 policies	 with	 inadvertent	 political	 and	social	 consequences:	 they	 fail	 to	 address	 the	 political	 rationality	 that	 both	organizes	these	policies	and	reaches	beyond	the	market”.48	Foucault	once	defined	a	political	rationality	as	«le	conduire	des	conduites»,	which	translates	roughly	as	
                                            44	Jonathan	Ostry,	Prakash	Loungani,	and	Davide	Furceri,	‘Neoliberalism:	Oversold?’,	
Finance	&	Development	53,	no.	2	(June	2016).	45	Richard	A.	Epstein,	‘Trump	vs.	Free	Trade’,	Defining	Ideas	-	A	Hoover	Institution	
Journal,	6	March	2017,	http://www.hoover.org/research/trump-vs-free-trade.	46	Colin	Crouch,	The	Strange	Non-Death	of	Neo-Liberalism	(New	Jersey:	Wiley,	2011).	47	William	Davies,	‘The	Difficulty	of	“Neoliberalism”’,	Open	Democracy,	1	June	2016,	https://www.opendemocracy.net/will-davies/difficulty-of-neoliberalism.	48	Wendy	Brown,	Edgework	(Princeton	and	Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005),	38.	
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“the	conduct	of	conducts.49	It	is	not	defined	by	specific	policies,	but	rather	by	how	we	think	about	politics	even	before	policies	are	designed.	In	a	sense,	it	concerns	what	we	see	as	being	political	in	the	first	place	and	what	we	mean	by	that	adjective.	I	argue	that	the	neoliberal	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	could	be	seen	as	the	basis	of	neoliberalism	as	a	political	rationality.		We	are	used	 to	 thinking	 that	 the	political	 turmoil	 and	economic	 collapse	of	 the	interwar	 years	 gave	 birth	 to	 two,	 now	 largely	 defunct,	 political	 movements:	communism	and	fascism.	In	this	thesis	we	have	concerned	ourselves	with	a	third	political	movement	that	 I	argue	should	be	understood	as	arising	out	of	 the	very	same	context:	neoliberalism.	In	some	ways,	neoliberalism	is	more	comparable	to	fascism	than	communism	is.	I	am	not	referring	to	the	content	of	doctrines,50	but	merely	 to	 the	 indisputable	 fact	 that	 both	 neoliberalism	 and	 fascism	 can	 be	understood	 contextually	 as	 generating	 much	 of	 their	 energy	 from	 reacting	 to	socialism.	 Followers	 of	Karl	 Polanyi	 have	 argued	 that	 fascism,	 communism	 and	social	liberalism/social	democracy	were	different	types	of	protective	responses	to	the	excesses	of	Utopian	laissez-faire	liberalism,	and	that	neoliberalism	should	be	understood	as	an	updated	response	to	the	consequent	success	of	the	“embedded	liberalism”	 of	 the	 post-war	 years.51	 This	 brings	 to	mind	 the	 intellectual	 history	methodology	of	the	logic	of	questions	and	answers,	introduced	by	R.G.	Collingwood	and	 redeveloped	 by	 Quentin	 Skinner.52	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 full	 meaning	 of	neoliberal	ideas	is	only	brought	home	once	we	see	it	fundamentally	as	a	theory	of	modernity:	developed	as	a	response	to	the	interwar	years’	collapse	of	the	liberal	world	order	and	the	rise	of	socialism	and	social	liberalism.		
                                            49	Michel	Foucault,	Power.	New	York:	The	New	Press	2000,	336.	50	A	growing	body	of	work	does	compare	neoliberalism	to	fascism	and	other	forms	of	authoritarianism.	See	for	instance:	Riad	Azar,	‘Neoliberalism,	Austerity,	and	Authoritarianism’,	New	Politics	15,	no.	3	(2015).	51	Kari	Polanyi-Levitt	and	Mario	Seccareccia,	‘Thoughts	on	Mirowski	and	Neoliberalism	from	a	Polanyian	Perspective’,	Institute	for	New	Economic	Thinking,	May	2016,	https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/thoughts-on-mirowski-and-neoliberalism-from-a-polanyian-perspective.	52	See	especially	Skinner,	Visions	of	Politics,	Volume	1,	Regarding	Method.	
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	The	 neoliberals	 always	 considered	 socialism	 and	 indeed	 the	 whole	 workers’	movement	an	intellectual	error.	In	later	writing,	Hayek	would	claim	that	the	main	problem	with	 socialism	was	 that	 it	was	 based	on	 an	 ethical	 principle,	 altruism,	which	 according	 to	 him	 could	 only	 work	 in	 a	 tribal	 society	 in	 which	 everyone	knows	everyone	else	personally.	According	to	him,	modern,	intertwined	societies,	could	only	work	if	organized	as	markets	 in	which	people	act	self-interestedly	 in	competition	 with	 others.	 Unlike	 the	 caricature	 of	 neoliberalism	 we	 are	 often	presented	with,	Hayek	was	well	aware	 that	people	 tend	to	act	altruistically,	but	according	 to	him,	 this	was	a	problem	 in	a	modern,	market-based	society.53	This	sheds	new	light	on	Margaret	Thatcher’s	famous	quote	“Economics	is	the	method;	the	objective	is	to	change	the	soul.”54			The	neoliberal	notion	of	markets	as	mediators	of	modernity	is	a	powerful	idea.	It	could	be	argued	that	it	exercises	a	tremendous	influence	on	contemporary	political	imaginaries,	and	that	it	makes	neoliberalism	a	constitutive	ideology	of	our	time.55	This	thesis	has	shown	where	these	ideas	came	from,	and	hopefully	contributed	to	a	better	understanding	of	them.					
                                            53	Gamble,	Hayek,	26–49.	54	Sunday	Times,	3.	mai,	1981	http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475	55	This	is	not	to	say	that	in	our	current	social	imaginary,	everyone	subscribes	to	some	sort	of	Hayekian	worldview.	On	the	contrary,	it	seems	clear	that	several	political	rationalities	can	exist	side	by	side	and	to	different	degrees	in	different	milieus	and	individuals.	It	may	for	 instance	 be	 possible	 for	 a	 neoliberal	 rationality,	 that	 imagines	 human	 beings	 as	fundamentally	 engaged	 in	 perpetual	 competition	with	 each	 other,	 to	 co-exist	 to	 some	extent	with	a	more	social(ist)	rationality	imagining	human	beings	as	fundamentally	“in	the	same	boat”	and	capable	of	collective	political	action.	
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